What this covers
Steve Davies and Tyler Cowen explore the anatomy of European and American populism, arguing that cultural anxiety and identity threat, rather than economic hardship alone, explain the populist wave across both continents. Davies contends that Identity Politics as Driver of Populism combines left-wing economics with cultural traditionalism and anti-immigration sentiment, creating a coalition that appeals to those who feel their way of life is under siege. This fractures the old social-democratic settlement: center-left parties now find themselves pulled in incompatible directions, forced to serve both older, economically left but culturally conservative workers and younger, metropolitan progressives—an Incompatible Coalition that explains the dramatic collapse of parties like Dutch Labour. The conversation turns repeatedly to Brexit as a case study, with Davies arguing that the decision to control EU immigration rules out EEA membership and that trade negotiations with all 27 remaining members will be protracted and difficult.
Beyond the immediate politics, the discussion ranges across Britain's long-term territorial integrity. Davies suggests that Scotland and Northern Ireland may face existential questions: Scotland will likely vote to stay in the Union only because leaving it outside the EU appears riskier, while Northern Ireland could drift toward joining the Republic as demographics shift Catholic and Brexit acts as a catalyst. He also sketches the implications for financial services, forecasting gradual rather than sudden shifts in London's passporting privileges, and proposes unconventional solutions like port-based border checks instead of a hard Irish land border. Throughout, both speakers weigh Public Choice Theory and the United States' fiscal constraints against the cultural grievances that appear to be the motor of contemporary political realignment.
Davies argues that the populist wave across Europe and the US is driven primarily by threatened cultural identity rather than economic loss, and that this fractures the old social-democratic coalition, while Brexit will be hard, slow, and reconfigure the UK's internal unions.
- Populism combines left economics with cultural traditionalism and anti-immigration, appealing to losers of cultural change, not just globalization
- Social democratic parties collapse because they must serve two incompatible blocs: older traditionalist workers and younger metropolitan progressives
- Brexit will be hard because immigration control rules out EEA membership, and no trade deal can pass all 27 members in time
Brexit and Theresa May's snap election reflect strategic pursuit of immigration controls, EU enlargement blowback, and Conservative Party consolidation.
- The government is choosing a hard Brexit primarily because it wants to impose controls on EU immigration, which is incompatible with European Economic Area membership since free movement of labor is a non-negotiable part of the EEA package deal; Davies considers this politically motivated and incorrect.
“They can't do that if they're part of the European Economic Area because the European countries, quite reasonably, I think, say, "Look. There's a whole package deal here. Free movement of labor is part of the package deal."”
- By calling the election now under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act, May postpones the next election well beyond March 2019, avoiding a vote held immediately after concluding Brexit negotiations and giving her time to resolve problems arising from the actual exit, which is a smart strategic move.
“She will have time to sort out any problems that arise from the actual way in which we leave the EU.”
- Britain deliberately pushed to enlarge the EU enormously after the Soviet collapse so that the larger membership would make consensus difficult and 'nothing could get done,' consistent with a thousand-year British foreign policy goal of bringing about a disunited Europe; this strategy now backfires because getting all 27 remaining members to agree to a trade deal is very difficult.
“it was British strategy to expand the EU so enormously in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union”
- Theresa May called the snap election to win a larger parliamentary majority, secure a mandate for an independent (non-EEA) Brexit strategy, and stamp her own authority on the Conservative Party, completing its transformation into a more traditional Conservative Party with significant generational change.
“she wants a mandate for the kind of Brexit she wants to pursue”
- Although the European Central Bank would like to revoke London's passporting rights, the EU cannot build a rival financial center like London in Frankfurt or Paris overnight; therefore London will likely retain passporting in the medium term, with business shifting to the continent gradually over roughly a 15-year horizon rather than via an abrupt cliff-edge transition.
“you can't build a major financial center like the city of London in somewhere like Frankfurt or Paris overnight. It's a much more drawn out process.”
- A majority of English would vote in favor of getting rid of Scotland if a referendum on Scottish independence were held purely in England.
“If there was a referendum on Scottish independence purely in England there would be a clear majority in favor.”
Identity politics and cultural anxiety, not economic grievance, drive populist movements across Europe and Britain.
- The populist wave across Europe is driven primarily by the politics of identity rather than economic disaffection by the losers of globalization; many people feel their identity is threatened by social, cultural, technological change and mass migration, and respond by supporting a politics that combines very left-of-center economics with anti-globalism, cultural traditionalism, authoritarianism, and anti-immigration.
“I think this is about the politics of identity. I think what is happening in many countries is that a lot of people feel that their identity is threatened by globalization”
- Social democratic parties are collapsing because they try to appeal to two increasingly hostile blocs that share left-of-center economics but differ on everything else: older white working-class voters who are economically left but culturally traditionalist, and younger metropolitan, green, progressive voters; it is nearly impossible to appeal to both, and the traditional working-class base is defecting to populism, as shown by the Dutch Labour Party collapsing from 24 percent to under six percent.
“they are trying to appeal to two radically different and increasingly hostile blocks of voters”
- The main British argument is no longer whether to leave the EU but what kind of Brexit to pursue, since the public—including most who voted remain—broadly accepts the decision and wants to get on with it.
“The big argument now, I think, in Britain is not should we leave the EU or not.”
Smaller countries up to seven million people achieve better governance and economic policy due to reduced public choice problems.
- Small to medium sized countries up to about seven million people empirically have better governance and better economic policy than large countries because public choice problems are less severe at smaller scale.
“small to medium sized countries, countries up to about seven million people, empirically do better, have better governance, better economic policy than large countries because public choice problems are less severe in small countries”
- Scotland will not address its severe social problems, concentrated in greater Glasgow, in a mature way as long as it can blame them on the English and push the costs onto English taxpayers; independence would force Edinburgh taxpayers to pick up the tab, concentrating minds and forcing real solutions.
“They're not going to address those problems in a mature way as long as they can blame them all on the English.”
- The Shetland Islands, historically part of Norway and only recently Scottish and home to the major oil fields, would have a prosperous future as an independent Nordic-style island.
“The Shetlands would have a wonderful future as a Nordic little island. That's where the oil is, actually.”
Scotland and Northern Ireland will narrowly remain in the UK despite demographic and political pressures because of border and EU membership fears.
- Despite changed circumstances justifying a second referendum, Scotland will likely narrowly vote to remain in the UK because leaving while the UK is outside the EU is more frightening—Spain would likely veto Scottish EU membership to discourage separatism, and independence would create a hard England-Scotland border—and the 'small c' conservative Scottish electorate will not embrace that risk.
“Spain, in particular, is probably going to veto Scotland becoming a member of the EU because they do not want to give encouragement to separatist movements”
- There is a realistic chance Northern Ireland will move toward joining the Republic—possibly under a condominium scheme—because demographics are shifting toward a Catholic majority and younger Protestants are less attached to the historic Ulster identity than older generations, making Brexit a catalyst for a united Ireland.
“the demographics are changing. The next census is probably going to show a Catholic majority in Northern Ireland”
- Rather than reinstituting a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, the Irish and British governments will agree that border controls and checks happen at Irish ports like Waterford, Cork, and Dublin, reverting to the pre-1971 arrangement, because no one in their right mind wants a hard land border in Ireland.
“the Irish government will do the British government's dirty work and have all the border controls and checks in places like Waterford, Cork, and Dublin”