Roy Foster
What this covers
Roy Foster, the Oxford historian, speaks with Tyler Cowen about Irish history as a succession of contingent choices and missed chances rather than an inevitable unfolding. Foster argues that the Act of Union of 1800 and the failed Home Rule bill of 1886 were moments when Anglo-Irish reconciliation could have taken root on the Canadian model, but instead set the conditions for later partition and violence. He contends that Ireland's land reform created a conservative smallholding class that made the Irish revolution politically radical but socially cautious—explaining decades of agricultural stagnation that persisted until de Valera's protectionism gave way to liberalization in the 1950s and later integration into the Common Market.
The conversation ranges across how the priest-mother bargain that sustained Irish Catholic society fractured in the 1970s with women's defiance on reproductive and sexual autonomy; how Irish modernist painters and sculptors belong in a European expressionist lineage rather than as footnotes to British art; and how teaching Irish history demands different approaches for Irish, English, and Irish-American audiences. Foster examines Ireland's "pro-Allied" neutrality during World War II, the structures that made Northern Ireland a "political slum," and why Historical parallels as blunt instrument fails when comparing Irish to colonial oppression elsewhere. Throughout, he emphasizes history as imagined futures—how actors on all sides behaved toward futures that never arrived, and how understanding those imagined worlds explains the choices that produced modern Ireland.
Foster argues Irish history is best understood as a sequence of contingent moments and missed chances, where actors behaved according to imagined futures that never arrived, producing an Ireland that is more European, modern, and culturally distinctive than conventional nationalist or English narratives allow.
- Key turning points (1800 Act of Union, 1886 Home Rule defeat) were missed chances for reconciliation that made later partition and violence more likely
- Ireland's land reform created a conservative small-property class that shaped a politically radical but socially conservative revolution
- Irish culture (literature, visual art) belongs in a European/international modernist mainstream rather than as a variant of British experience
Ireland experienced systematic dispossession and religious persecution that differed fundamentally from Scottish experience.
- The English were more brutal to the Irish than to the Scots primarily because the Irish were overwhelmingly Catholic, which in the 17th-century geopolitical context made them seen as an entry point for hostile continental Catholic powers (Spain, France) and therefore ipso facto disloyal, whereas lowland Scotland adapted to Protestant union and profited from the empire.
“The Irish were overwhelmingly Catholic. In the global political world of the 17th century, that meant being against protestantized England. They were seen as an entry point for continental political influence from Spain and from France”
- While England was radicalized through the Cromwellian revolution, Ireland underwent a different radicalization rooted in colonization and dispossession: native Catholic landowners were expropriated in favor of English incomers and Scots/North-of-England planters in the northeast, reducing the old Catholic aristocracy to a tiny minority west of the Shannon.
“it's a radicalization that essentially expropriates the old Catholic aristocracy, the landowning aristocracy, in Ireland; it reduces them to a tiny minority west of the Shannon in the badlands of Connemara.”
- There were two great missed chances for permanent, liberal Anglo-Irish union: the failure to grant Catholic emancipation alongside the 1800 Act of Union (blocked by George III, leaving 29 years of bitterness until 1829), and Gladstone's 1886 Home Rule bill, which—had it passed—could have preserved a united autonomous Ireland on the Canadian model that would likely have disengaged peacefully over 50 years.
“There are two great missed chances. One is when the Act of Union happened in 1800–1801... The other great missed chance is in 1886, when Gladstone converted himself and a large part of his ruling Liberal Party in Britain to the cause of Irish home rule.”
- The Act of Union's theory was that Ireland would be treated as any other part of the United Kingdom, but during the Great Famine of the 1840s, when Irish people died in hundreds of thousands and millions, they were treated as a special case rather than as full UK citizens, and Irish landowners were left to bear the brunt—a betrayal that radicalized Isaac Butt into Home Rule.
“when Irish people starved and died in their hundreds of thousands, and indeed millions, during the Great Potato Famine of the 1840s — the fact of it was that they were not treated as if they were "any" part of the United Kingdom. They were treated as a special case”
Irish unification depends less on Catholic demographics than on complex shifts in identity, economic subsidy, and European orientation.
- The assumption that a more-Catholic Northern Ireland increases the chance of a united Ireland assumes too much that political voting follows ethnoreligious identity, which is decreasingly true: more middle-class Catholics now admit support for the union, while younger Protestants increasingly envisage a united Ireland precisely because the Republic is now younger, more outward-looking, and less priest-ridden.
“To say that it would increase them is to perhaps assume too much that people's political vote follows their ethnoreligious identity. It used to be so; it's less so now.”
- Within about 30 years, governing opinion in Northern Ireland might well shift toward uniting with a European Republic of Ireland rather than staying with what will by then be a sadly diminished England—though Foster offers this as a personal opinion and notes the enormous obstacle that Northern Ireland's economy subsists on subsidies from the larger island.
“in about 30 years' time the governing opinion in the six counties of Northern Ireland might well have shifted much more towards uniting with a European Republic of Ireland to the south than staying with what will by then be a sadly diminished England.”
- In a united Ireland, Belfast and the Protestant culture it represents would supply a quality sometimes called 'Northern Iron'—creativity, energy, and history (evidenced by the Belfast poets since the 1960s)—that was lacking in newly independent Ireland, though the dependence of the Northern economy on British subsidies poses a great obstacle to simplistic reunification.
“in a united Ireland, Belfast and what it stands for would supply something that was lacking, certainly, in newly independent Ireland: that quality that's sometimes called Northern Iron.”
Irish intellectual and economic life emerged from confronting poverty and producing remarkable 19th-century thinkers.
- The flowering of first-rate 19th-century Irish economics (Longfield, Cairnes, Whately, Butt, Lecky) arose because intellectuals confronted the pressing question Isaac Butt posed—'Why are the many poor?'—forcing them to grapple with why Ireland was so poor despite natural advantages, with answers ranging from English domination to infrastructural problems of land use and population.
“The reason why economics was something that intellectuals turned to in 19th-century Ireland... was simply that there was that question that Butt kept asking: "Why are the many poor?" Why was Ireland so poor when it had so many natural advantages?”
- Ireland's economic stagnation under de Valera's protectionism and inward-looking, anti-materialist nationalism ended in the 1950s when civil servant T. K. Whitaker introduced economically liberalizing measures, invited external investment, and created an industrial development authority that leveraged Ireland's highly educated workforce, beginning the expansion that later produced the Celtic Tiger.
“until the 1950s, when a very brilliant civil servant called T. K. Whitaker brought in a whole new schedule of economically liberalizing measures and began to invite external investment into Ireland and set up an industrial development authority”
- Following John Stuart Mill, Ireland is in the mainstream of European history whereas England is in an eccentric tributary—a framing borne out across the centuries discussed, reframing Ireland not as a peripheral British appendage but as centrally European.
“Ireland is in the mainstream of European history, whereas England is in an eccentric tributary. I think that's very true”
Ireland's distinctive English-language literature arose from Gaelic substrate, oral tradition, and language as evasion.
- Irish writing in English is distinctively original and destabilizing because the language sits 'at the corners of change'—shaped by the declining Gaelic substrate, by the oral storytelling tradition of vivid idiosyncratic phrasing, and by English serving as a medium Irish people used to conceal truth or evade uncomfortable conclusions when dealing with land agents, police, and bailiffs.
“There is an original twist to the English language in Ireland which is unique.”
- Irish modernist visual art (Orpen, Lavery, stained-glass artists like Harry Clarke, Mainie Jellett, Evie Hone, and especially Jack Yeats) should be understood as part of the European modernist mainstream—closer to French and German expressionist painters—rather than as a variant of the British experience, with Irish artists and collectors like Hugh Lane embracing French Impressionism long before the English art establishment.
“great painters like [William] Orpen and [John] Lavery, who are much more like French painters... rather than being variants of the British norm.”
- Ireland is not a country of utopian theorists; modern Irish fiction shifted from the somewhat idealized celebrations of Irish identity in the 1920s-30s short stories to a dystopian register from the 1970s novel onward, where the family novel explores imprisonment rather than refuge and the rural novel depicts cruelty and exploitation rather than pastoral beauty, reflecting the surfacing of previously unspeakable subjects like the mother and baby homes.
“The novel of family life has become, in many cases... a novel that explores imprisonment, rather than safety and refuge. The novel of rural life, and think of the great John McGahern here, is often a novel of cruelty, hardness, exploitation, rather than a novel of pastoral beauty.”
The 1968-69 violence in Northern Ireland was not inevitable but resulted from unionist establishment failure to respond intelligently to emerging reconciliation.
- The outbreak of violence in 1968-69 in Northern Ireland was not an inevitable 'bursting of a boil' but a lurch into violence that could have been avoided had the unionist establishment behaved with more intelligence and foresight, since reconciliation and liberalization movements were genuinely emerging in the early-to-mid 1960s before civil rights demonstrations were violently suppressed.
“all that followed as a lurch into violence that could have been avoided, had the unionist establishment behaved with more intelligence and foresight.”
- Northern Ireland was a 'political slum' built on a culture of discrimination (e.g. the early abolition of proportional representation) that Britain enabled by throwing money at unionist demands while averting its eyes; the British intervention was reluctant, and the nationalist claim that Britain poured in the army to retain the North for military reasons is unproven and likely false.
“the British threw money at it when demanded by the unionists but kept their faces firmly averted from the kind of culture of discrimination... When they did intervene, it was, I believe, reluctantly.”
Ireland's integration into the European Common Market transformed it from economic stagnation into prosperity, building durable European commitment.
- Ireland became rich earlier than people think, beginning with its 1972-73 entry into the Common Market, which brought grants and integration into European governance where it punched above its weight, so that even the draconian post-2008 austerity imposed by the troika was accepted far more readily than in Greece or Spain because two decades of benefit had built deep, committed European loyalty.
“It became much richer from 1972–3 when it entered the Common Market, as it was then called, and became the recipient of very many grants and handouts and also, more creatively, was integrated into the European government”
- Despite immigration that would generate populist backlash elsewhere, Ireland has absorbed incomers comparatively easily with little nativist movement, partly because the Irish emigrant experience created a global sense that opens the mind to incomers, and because returning emigrants ('reverse emigration') brought back outward-looking, tolerant views—so newcomers quickly become 'the New Irish.'
“emigration has created among the Irish a kind of global sense which opens the mind to such things.”
Historical understanding requires recognizing how people acted toward imagined futures that never arrived, shaped by their own era's expectations.
- Britain's early-1830s attempt to introduce nondenominational primary education in Ireland was a genuine, not entirely malign, experiment intended to overcome religious differences, but 'Ireland being Ireland' it was rapidly denominationalized as Catholics and Protestants each used it for their own purposes.
“Ireland being Ireland, it was rapidly denominationalized: the Catholics used it for their purposes and the Protestants used it for their purposes.”
- Contrary to Adam Smith's claim that union was good for Scotland as a country but bad for its elites (because positions went to the English), the Scottish elites actually did much better out of the union than Smith, for his own rhetorical purposes, was admitting.
“I think the elites did a lot better than Adam Smith, for his own purposes, was admitting.”
- The theory that Ireland served as a laboratory for British colonial governance later applied in India and the Caribbean is problematic because Ireland was a special 'metropolitan colony' where the original inhabitants remained in a far stronger position than colonized peoples elsewhere who were enslaved or wiped out.
“Ireland is a very special kind of colony, if it's a colony: it's a metropolitan colony. The original inhabitants remain, one could say, in a far stronger position than in many of the areas of the British Empire”
- Spoken Irish faded more rapidly than Welsh because Welsh persisted in the industrialized, prosperous regions (slate quarries, coal mines), whereas Ireland's prosperous regions were in the English-speaking East and Northeast, leaving Irish confined to poor western fastnesses and thereby identified with a pre-modern, anti-materialist past rather than modern commercial life.
“The areas of Ireland that were comparatively prosperous... were in the East of the island and in the Northeast, where Irish was not spoken and had not been for many, many years.”
- Jack Yeats commands lower prices than Picasso or Matisse partly for the practical reason that he didn't prepare his canvases so his paintings are fragile, but mainly because buying a major Picasso or Matisse means buying a statement of a change in the history of world art, whereas a Jack Yeats is something special and idiosyncratic that did not change the practice of world art.
“If you're buying a Jack Yeats, you're not buying into a work that has changed the practice and effect and achievement of world art. You're buying something very special and, if you like, idiosyncratic”
- Ireland began being liberal earlier than commonly thought—not with the 1990s church scandals but with the early-1970s Irish women's movement, when the implicit 'bargain between the priest and the mother' (per sociologist Tom Inglis) that kept Ireland going was broken radically from the mother's side as women refused church instruction on their reproductive, social, work, and sexual lives.
“it began with the Irish women's movement in the very early 1970s, when what the sociologist Tom Inglis has called the bargain, the implicit bargain between the priest and the mother that kept Ireland going, was broken radically from the mother's side.”
- England is strikingly less commemorative of its own pivotal history than Ireland or France—nobody marked the 1991 tercentenary of the 1691 Glorious Revolution that created the modern British political system, in contrast to Ireland's passionate Decade of Commemorations and France's intense bicentenary observance in 1989—perhaps because England is more secure and blinkered about its own past.
“Living in England, I've been amazed at how little commemoration there was, let's say, for instance in 1991 of 1691, of the Glorious Revolution... Nobody gave a damn about it or remembered it.”
- Historical parallels and precedents (such as those drawn between native Irish, Native Americans, and Black Americans) can be used as rather a blunt instrument, and should be handled cautiously even where radical and nationalist politicians felt a common cause.
“I think myself that historical parallels and historical precedents can be used as rather a blunt instrument.”
- Frederick Douglass, as a subtle and analytical politician, likely learned during his Irish visit that the parallels between the oppression of the native Irish and the oppression of Black slaves in America were not truly commensurate—what the Irish suffered in mid-19th-century Ireland was nothing like what Black slaves suffered in America.
“anyone as analytical as he would have seen that what Irish natives suffered under in mid-19-century Ireland, it was nothing like what Black slaves suffered under in mid-19th-century America.”
- Teaching Irish history differs by audience: Irish people bring a passionate, sophisticated but parti pris attitude requiring challenge; English people (especially Oxford future-establishment figures) bring astonishing ignorance that must be overcome; and Irish Americans bring an emigrant memory 'kept in aspic' from the grandparent generation that must be stirred to accentuate the nuances, ironies, and unexpected futures of a history more complicated than a linear march to liberation.
“the memory of Ireland is the memory of the grandmother or the grandfather or the generation who emigrated. They've kept it in aspic, and it's necessary to stir that around a bit, to change it, to accentuate the complications, the nuances, the ironies of Irish history”
- Foster's Waterford Quaker-school upbringing (though his family was nominally Church of Ireland) shaped a more sympathetic, middle-ground view of the varieties of religious experience in Ireland than a hard-line Anglican or devoutly Catholic background would produce, because Quakers, as discriminated-against dissenting Protestants, felt at one with the Catholic majority and held values of equality.
“if you take a Quaker view of Irish history, you will have a more intrinsically sympathetic view to the varieties of religious experience that exist in Ireland than you would if you were either coming from a hard-line Church of Ireland background or a devoutly Catholic background.”
- The best history is written when we realize that people acted in belief of and expectation of a future that was never going to happen—revolutionaries of 1919-21, unionists and imperialists of the late 19th century all acted toward imagined futures that never arrived, and that imagined future is what dictated their behavior.
“the best history is written when we realize that people acted in terms, in belief of, in expectation of a future that was never going to happen.”
- Ireland's adoption of single transferable vote PR encouraged coalition governments between unlikely allies and produced a remarkably stable democracy in a post-revolutionary country—superior to Britain's archaic first-past-the-post system that grants sweeping power to parties lacking national majorities—though at the cost of clientelist, pork-barrel politics especially in rural constituencies.
“it's produced a remarkably stable political system in a postrevolutionary country... Ireland, though it had a miniature parafascist party in the 1930s, kept a stable democratic system going.”
Land reform created a conservative rural property-owning class that made Irish revolution politically radical but socially conservative.
- The under-appreciated Irish land reform of the Land Acts (1881-1909), which used substantial government money to let occupying tenants buy out their holdings from compensated landlords, created a solid conservative small-property-owning rural petite bourgeoisie—explaining why the Irish revolution was politically radical but socially very conservative, and why Irish farming remained backward and stagnant for decades.
“It created a very solid, conservative, small-property-owning rural petite bourgeoisie. In that one fact... you have a large explanation for why the Irish revolution, when it did come, was politically radical in some ways but socially very conservative.”
- By the early 1920s an attempt at a single independent Ireland could only have produced a bloody civil war, because the First World War split a deeper rift between the Protestant Northeast and the rest of Ireland—the Somme's decimation of Ulster's youth cemented unionist identity just as the 1916 Rising executions cemented nationalist resentment.
“The Battle of the Somme, which decimated the flower of Ulster's youth on the western front, put this into stone, just as the 1916 nationalist rising a few weeks before... built into stone the resentment of the nationalist Irish against British rule”
Irish neutrality in World War II was effectively pro-Allied despite official policy, revealing profound contradictions in Irish state behavior.
- The periodic World War II talk of Ireland giving up neutrality in return for unification was never a serious proposal—it was just Churchill 'with one too many drinks in him.'
“No, I think it was Churchill with one too many drinks in him, frankly.”
- Ireland's WWII neutrality was effectively a 'pro-Allied neutrality'—many Irish volunteered for the Allies and shot-down Allied airmen were quietly repatriated while Germans were interned—yet returning Irish veterans were unwelcome and forbidden to discuss their experiences, and Irish-Army deserters who fought for Britain were actually disciplined, a doublethink only recently coming under historical examination.
“the vast majority of Irish people were engaged in what might be called a pro-Allied neutrality. Certainly Allied airmen who were shot down over Ireland... were quietly repatriated to Britain. If they were Germans, they were interned.”