Raghuram Rajan
What this covers
Raghuram Rajan discusses how markets, the state, and local community together form the foundation for stable capitalism and democracy—and how technology has destabilized this balance without societies yet adapting. Speaking with Tyler Cowen in this conversation, Rajan moves between questions of economic policy, financial regulation, and political structure, tracing a through-line from the 2008 crisis and its aftermath through contemporary disruptions in labor, technology, and trust in institutions. The argument is that policymakers have repeatedly chosen to mask structural problems—especially job displacement—with easy credit rather than undertake genuine reform, and that this pattern leaves societies vulnerable to both economic fragility and political backlash.
The scope ranges across finance, governance, and social cohesion. Rajan examines how crony capitalism destroys both competition and political freedom, contrasts shareholder value maximization with emerging stakeholder models of the corporation, and traces how post-2008 regulation pushed risk into the shadow financial system rather than eliminating it—a version of Risk Migration / Whac-A-Mole Regulation. He offers a sharp critique of inflation targeting frameworks as overly esoteric given how poorly ordinary people understand inflation itself. On India specifically, he argues that Distribution of Power vs Institutions matters more than formal rules, that India's democratic structure functions as a pressure-release valve, and that infrastructure investment—not manufacturing exports—is the practical path to growth. The conversation also touches on why face-to-face education outperforms online formats through the mechanism of social pressure, and why the European Union's centralization generates backlash against the abstraction of power upward.
Rajan argues that durable capitalism and democracy depend on a strong, empowered-but-porous local community as a third pillar balancing markets and the state, and that technological disruption has unbalanced this triad without yet producing the needed societal adaptation.
- Community must be empowered in decision-making while keeping borders low and porous to global flows
- Crony capitalism — when the private sector is co-opted by the state — destroys both competition and political freedom
- Easy credit was used to paper over technological displacement of middle-income jobs rather than enabling real structural change
Democratic openness and community empowerment are prerequisites for sustained economic development and political freedom.
- India is well positioned to grow from middle to high income but to reach the frontier it needs intellectual openness generated by its open, respectful democratic dialogue, which produces the innovative forces required—so an open, liberal, tolerant country is a prerequisite for the next stage of growth, after first reaching middle income.
“to grow further, I think we need an intellectual openness, which only the kind of democracy we have — the open dialogue, a respectful dialogue — will generate the kinds of innovative forces that will take us more to the frontier”
- Local communities should be given greater decision-making power attuned to their economic needs and capabilities, but their borders must be kept low and porous so they can take advantage of the global economy and the larger country, rather than using empowerment to build protective walls.
“you have to make sure that that empowerment is not total, that it’s not about building walls around the community but making the community able to take advantage of a global economy”
- Capitalism worked over the past 70 years in the West because democracy operating through empowered communities pushed ideas upward and spread capitalism's benefits, and it stops working—producing socialist, fascist, or capitalist crony states—when everything is determined at the top; the community is therefore the basic building block of democracy and the key to making capitalism work for all, especially the powerless person at the bottom.
“It’s the guy at the bottom, who has no influence, who is essentially saying, “I want capitalism to work for me” — that’s when capitalism actually works. It’s when everything is determined at the top that it stops working”
- India's surprising stability—no serious signs of breaking up despite vast internal diversity, unlike Spain or Belgium—comes from its democratic structure functioning as a pressure-release valve that lets pressures building in each community get expressed and diffused, and from finding a workable balance between regional and central power, whereas repression tends to produce pushback.
“democracy plays an important role here because it allows some of the pressures which build up in each community to essentially get expressed and therefore diffuses some of the pressure”
Centralized top-down policymaking, whether monetary or organizational, fails without understanding how ordinary people actually form expectations and make decisions.
- The most difficult concept in monetary theory is how people's inflation expectations actually form, because surveys show ordinary people have wildly inaccurate inflation perceptions—Indian respondents' median estimate was about 10 points higher than the highest actual rate in a decade—yet monetary theory depends critically on shaping these expectations whose formation mechanism remains poorly understood.
“In India, we found that in our surveys, the median inflation rate that people said was going on was about 10 percentage points higher than the highest rate had been for the last 10 years.”
- Once a central bank commits publicly to a 2 percent target, it becomes a prisoner of that target: tolerating 4.5 percent triggers fears it will tolerate 6.5 percent, which makes both moving above target and changing the target itself (as Blanchard suggested) much more difficult.
“if you hit 4 and a half percent, people start worrying that if you’re tolerating 4 and a half, well, why not 6 and a half? You become a prisoner of the target that you’ve set.”
- Central banks are getting increasingly esoteric—moving from inflation targeting to price-level targeting to nominal GDP targeting—even though the ordinary person doesn't even understand what inflation is, so the priority should be figuring out how to communicate what inflation is before adopting more sophisticated frameworks.
“We’re getting more and more esoteric in how we implement inflation targeting, now price-level targeting, nominal GDP targeting. The poor guy on the street doesn’t even understand what inflation is.”
- Following Marx's sensitivity to the importance of technology, technological revolutions create the impetus for society to change; the current technological revolution has produced disruption but the corresponding societal change has not yet occurred and is needed for society to adapt.
“I am more and more convinced that it’s these technological revolutions which create the impetus for society to change”
Easy credit cannot substitute for structural economic change; sustainable growth requires investment in infrastructure and skills.
- Over a 30-year process of automation that destroyed middle-income jobs, policymakers tried to remedy the resulting stagnation through easy credit, which failed—leaving people with underwater houses and even angrier—and the same trap is recurring, when what is actually needed is structural change and skills, illustrated by construction jobs before 2008 and Uber driving today as unsustainable pseudo-solutions.
“that stagnation, for at least certain groups inside these certain communities, we tried to remedy through making credit easy. Didn’t work.”
- Financial development is associated with economic growth as a lubricant that helps when things are going well, but it is not the underpinning of growth; beyond a certain income level the priority shifts from access to finance toward managing the adverse side—preventing the financial sector from going haywire and taking GDP down 10-20 percent, which sets a country back a decade or two.
“It’s a lubricant to growth. Is it the underpinning of growth? I don’t think so.”
- India does not need to follow the Chinese manufacturing-led export model—which may already be closed off—but can generate 9-10 percent growth for 10-15 years by building out infrastructure and housing, where construction creates jobs both directly and in the surrounding service sector (restaurants, motels), followed by some manufacturing and a large rise in services.
“just simply building out the infrastructure in India, connecting people, getting internal trade up — you don’t need to go the external manufacturing route to get strong growth for some time”
- India has both the freshest vegetables (less fertilizer use) and high rates of food rotting in transit because it lacks the infrastructure to move produce to cities quickly; building that infrastructure would let produce reach urban markets where it fetches higher prices, reducing rot and improving food quality, though with more reliance on refrigeration.
“the highest rate of rotting is because we don’t have that infrastructure we talked about earlier. We need to build that infrastructure to take those vegetables to market”
- India's demonetization, which removed 87.5 percent of currency overnight, proved money matters because people rely on cash for transactions without credit cards or checks, causing measurable drops in informal economic activity—detectable via proxies like nighttime light intensity—and the harsh approach killed people in lines and shuttered firms when smoother transitions to new payment systems were available.
“we just had a massive experiment where 87 and a half percent of the currency was taken out. And it turns out that actually, people use the money for transactions”
Financial sector risk migrates when constrained in one place, so regulation must monitor where risk moves rather than simply forbid it.
- The enduring informational advantage of banks lies on the deposit side rather than the lending side: the demandability of deposits is a disciplinary mechanism, and even today it is the large sophisticated depositors—hedge funds, mutual funds, commercial paper players monitoring daily—who run at the first whiff of trouble, forcing banks to stay on the straight and narrow far better than clueless equity holders, even though this creates financial-sector fragility.
“it doesn’t require a genius to keep testing the bank. If you want your money, you go in and say, “I want it back today.” That is a disciplinary mechanism on the bank which has stood the test of time.”
- Narrow banking is not a clean solution because requiring all deposits to be invested in safe treasuries with no lending merely shifts the problem to how the government recycles excess funding back to the private sector—raising cronyism concerns about which corporate bonds it would buy—issues that narrow-banking advocates fail to discuss.
“All the deposits first go to the government, and if the government has an excess of funding, it has to find a way of recycling it back to the private sector. It’s that part that people don’t talk about.”
- Forcing all bank risk onto the balance sheet is misguided because whenever you stop something, it shows up elsewhere if there is a need for it; risk in an entity you regulate and monitor that can absorb losses is preferable to risk migrating to unregulated places, where you become worse off by being blindsided when interconnected markets bring those losses back into the system.
“Every time you stop something, it’ll show up somewhere else if there’s a need for it. And is it better that it be in an entity that you regulate and you monitor reasonably closely? Or in an entity that you don’t regulate?”
- Post-2008 recapitalization and higher capital requirements were good, but banks reduced risk-taking and a lot of risk migrated into the poorly understood shadow financial system, where—as before the crisis—there is excessive trust that these players manage their own risks; the big explosion in leveraged loans raises the question of whether borrowers will have enough liquidity when it dries up, since liquidity is increasingly a source of both leverage and credit risk.
“A lot of the risks have migrated into what we call the shadow financial system. And the worry is, we don’t fully understand that.”
Market concentration and network effects in tech and finance reduce competition and innovation despite appearing well-managed.
- The biggest American corporate governance crises are the domination of industries by a few well-managed firms—especially big tech like Facebook and Google whose possession of networks may keep out competition—because we don't understand how long network effects can chill innovation, illustrated by venture capitalists' notion of a 'kill zone' where startups will be bought out or forced out before maturing.
“we don’t fully understand the extent to which the possession of a network can keep out the competition and how long it can do that”
- Crony capitalism is a genuine danger because it not only constrains economic growth but limits political freedom: an independent private sector keeps government in check, but when the private sector depends on tariffs and government-sanctioned cartels it loses independence and becomes a pawn of government, which is the path to authoritarianism—a contemporary reading of Hayek's Road to Serfdom.
“a comparative independent private sector is extremely important to keep government in check. That when the private sector gets compromised and depends on tariffs to protect itself or depends on cartels... that’s when we get authoritarianism.”
Technology and infrastructure improve wellbeing when institutions allow their benefits to reach people; banks persist despite disruption.
- China's One Belt, One Road is a real initiative but generates substantial resentment and unintended debt traps—not necessarily intentional—because financed infrastructure that goes unused leaves recipient countries feeling they built white elephants, even though longer term it represents an important step in China taking on international responsibility.
“Some of the debt traps that countries have gotten into as they’ve built out some of the infrastructures associated with the One Belt, One Road — I don’t think that was necessarily intentional on the part of the Chinese.”
- Institutions matter less than the political environment and distribution of power in which they are created; the same institution (e.g. the US Constitution adopted by Liberia) can function entirely differently when the underlying distribution of power differs, which is why institutions are poor predictors of which countries become high-growth winners.
“more than institutions is the political environment in which these institutions are created that matters. The political dispensation.”
- The Netville natural experiment—where internet was overlaid on half a community in a randomized fashion—showed that the connected segment did better at maintaining social ties because they could communicate, traverse barriers, and organize social events, demonstrating the internet can strengthen rather than erode community.
“they actually overlay internet on half a community. This is exactly what an economist wants: a randomized experiment, half the community linked, the other half not. Which segment does better in maintaining social ties? It’s the one that’s linked.”
- China cultivates few allies relative to its GDP partly because its one-party system lacks internal dialogue and debate, whereas postwar US hegemony was more trusted not because foreign governments trusted Washington but because they recognized internal checks and balances—public introspection like Carter's—that periodically restrained the worst US actions.
“one of the reasons people felt more comfortable with the United States’ postwar hegemony was the internal debate in the United States. Not so much that everybody trusted the US government, but they realized that there were checks and balances internally”
- Online education works less well than face-to-face because the depth of engagement is much lower; in-person teaching delivers social pressure like the embarrassment of being unprepared, which cannot be conveyed in full measure over the net, and online's opt-in/opt-out flexibility comes at the cost of engagement depth.
“when I look at a student and they’re not prepared, they feel a sense of embarrassment. It’s hard to get that sense of embarrassment across the net, at least in full measure.”
- Chinese growth came not from having the best business regulation but from empowering local Communist Party officials with strong rewards for growth (faster promotion), incentivizing them to selectively break otherwise impenetrable business regulations to open opportunities for local businesses.
“they’ve incentivized the local officials by giving them strong rewards for growth — they get promoted faster up the Communist Party — and allowed them, in a sense, to build the local community around their abilities”
- Banks have been resilient for the last three thousand years, suggesting their basic structure persists despite information technology.
“banks have been resilient for the last, what, 3,000 years?”
- A lesson from the East Asian crisis only partly learned is how to deal with abundant capital flows: they are hard to refuse when they come in but don't stay long and can leave on a whim, so countries like Argentina and Turkey repeatedly get into trouble by borrowing in good times without knowing how to handle the bad times.
“how to deal with capital flows — abundant capital flows — because when they come in, it’s hard to say no to them, but they don’t stay that long, and they can leave on a whim”
Corporations and international institutions must evolve beyond shareholder primacy and unipolar dominance to share power with stakeholders.
- The nature of the corporation is moving away from the manager-worker model toward partnerships in which a variety of stakeholders—especially long-term workers—share in the corporation's rents, which challenges Friedman's shareholder-value-maximization principle (premised on shareholders as residual claimants) and is both politically reasonable and economically correct.
“the nature of the corporation is moving more towards partnerships rather than manager-worker... increasingly, long-term workers are part of the stakeholders of the corporation”
- Integrating China into the IMF and World Bank requires restructuring those organizations for a multi-polar world, because the old model assumed one dominant equity holder (the US) with pull position, whereas a world with multiple equity holders—some with very different incentives and lacking the US's liberal-market-democracy structure—needs a structure that accommodates these competing interests, which will be painful but necessary.
“what kind of structure do we have in which there’s not one single sort of equity holder, but there are multiple equity holders, some of whom have very different incentives?”
Social dysfunction and community collapse drive people toward nationalism and alternative identities rather than the reverse.
- When local community declines and social dysfunction sets in (family breakdown, teenage pregnancies), people grasp at alternative sources of identity such as nationalism and religion, so rising religiosity can be a reaction to community collapse rather than its cause.
“when community declines, people reach out to measures of identity that they can lock onto. And sometimes, religion is something that they grasp at”
- The European Union, by drawing powers traditionally held at country and regional levels up to Brussels, makes people feel disempowered, which generates a backlash against the Union—amplified by local politicians who claim credit for the good and blame Brussels for the bad—even though the abstract concept of Europe still enjoys strong consensus.
“as those paths migrate up, people in the country feel disempowered. “We can’t determine everything. Everything is determined by those bureaucrats in Brussels.””