What this covers
Mark Carney discusses central banking, economic policy, and financial stability across a wide range of practical and conceptual terrain. The conversation ranges from the mechanics of inflation measurement and monetary policy transmission to the governance challenges of large central banks, the design of digital currencies, and the reframing of climate risk as an economic opportunity. Carney's core argument ties these threads together: that effective policymaking rests on planning for failure in advance and on converting shared objectives into market-driven value creation rather than treating risks as problems to be merely contained or avoided.
The substance spans several distinct areas. On financial regulation and resilience, Carney examines how different jurisdictions manage systemic risk—from Switzerland's approach to oversized banks through capital requirements and "living wills," to the mechanics of central bank digital currency design and the run risks that retail CBDC can create. On monetary policy, he discusses the labor market's role in judging transitory inflation, the persistence of monetary traction even in a liquidity trap, and the structural differences between consensus-based and individual-accountability decision-making on rate-setting committees. On climate, he reframes the transition from fossil fuels not as constraint but as value creation, arguing that over the next decade to fifteen years, transition risk from policy and innovation will dominate physical risk, and that banks' exposure to stranded assets requires precise assessment. He also addresses cryptocurrency regulation, the fiscal vulnerabilities of smaller economies, and the lessons of state capacity failures exposed during the pandemic—all grounded in the principle that clear responsibility and shared objectives unlock institutional effectiveness.
Carney argues that central banking and economic policy are fundamentally exercises in planning for failure and acting on values, and that converting risks (like climate change) into shared objectives can unleash market-driven value creation rather than mere risk avoidance.
- Good policymaking requires anticipating failure in advance and building resilient systems
- Moving from a tradeoff approach to a clear hierarchy of values (e.g. net zero) unleashes powerful market dynamics
- Climate and financial stability risks can be reframed as value-creation opportunities when there is a shared objective
Central banks should assume off-balance-sheet risks will collapse onto their balance sheets and plan proactively for failure.
- Central banks should always assume off-balance-sheet risks of private institutions will collapse back onto the central balance sheet due to moral or quasi-legal responsibility, as happened when SIVs in 2008 collapsed back onto Citibank and Merrill Lynch, revealing higher-risk assets that were off balance sheet precisely because they were low quality.
“You should always assume that those risks collapse back on the central balance sheet. Just as, if you recall, the SIVs in 2008 collapsed back on the balance sheets of major institutions like Citibank... the assets that were off balance sheet were off balance sheet because they weren’t that high quality.”
- A key lesson of being a policymaker and central banker is to plan for failure rather than assume you have things sorted, asking 'What would I wish I had done once that failure happens?' and doing it in advance.
“you have to plan for failure. Don’t always tell yourself you’ve got things sorted and that you can withstand the failure. Plan for the failure and think of “What would I wish I had done once that failure happens?””
- Monetary policy gains traction even when reserves pay near the T-bill rate because bank reserves exist only for inter-bank settlement and cannot be lent out, and under QE banks are effectively forced to carry extra reserves so the central bank can buy bonds, easing financial conditions beyond what they otherwise would be.
“bank reserves exist for settlement between banks. Bank reserves are not liabilities that the commercial bank can actually act on and lend out. Furthermore, of course, with quantitative easing, banks were in effect forced to carry these reserves... The reason the liquidity trap has not existed particularly in the United States, and UK as well, has been because financial conditions have been easier than they otherwise would be because of asset purchases and other measures”
- Being a central banker differs temperamentally from being a goalie: a goalie builds muscle memory and reacts after the fact, moving before consciously deciding, whereas a central banker must anticipate where the economy is going and react in advance.
“You cannot be as anticipatory as a central banker. You’re building up muscle memory... you realize what you’ve done after the fact you’ve done it... As a central banker, obviously, what you need to do is anticipate where the economy is going and react in advance.”
Trust in central banking rests on admitting mistakes, demonstrating competence, and showing alignment with the people served.
- Trust is built through admitting when things go wrong or when you've changed your view (humility), through competence (making more right decisions than wrong), and through the people you serve feeling you are on their side and aligned with them.
“I think part of it is admitting when things go wrong or when you’ve learned new information and you’ve changed your view, which is difficult to do. Maybe that’s another aspect of humility. Part of it is competence... to be trusted, you need to feel someone’s on your side, that you’re aligned with the people you’re serving.”
- The greatest challenge in running highly hierarchical central banks—which become more hierarchical the older they are—is empowering people below to say what they think clearly and act as if they are making the decision, giving clear advice rather than 'on the one hand, on the other hand' equivocation.
“The greatest challenge is to empower people below to say what they think and to be clear and to act as if they are making the decision. They give clear advice as opposed to classic “on the one hand, on the other hand” type advice.”
- Recognizing how much one does not know reinforces the value of humility, but humility is only valuable when combined with ambition to move things forward—it is not just about knowing things can fail.
“this point on humility and where that is valuable. It’s not just about knowing that things can fail, but also recognizing that you need to combine that with ambition in order to move things forward.”
Climate risk is primarily transition risk from policy and innovation, requiring banks to assess their exposure rigorously.
- Over the next decade to fifteen years, most climate-related financial risk is transition risk from policy and innovation (e.g. the EU ban on internal combustion engine sales after 2030) rather than physical risk from extreme weather, and central banks' role is to work through with financial institutions how well they have assessed such risks.
“Most of the risk in the course of, let’s say, the next decade, 15 years, relates to what’s called transition risk... If you’re lending or investing in the European auto industry now, you probably want to take into account that you can’t sell an internal combustion engine vehicle in Europe after 2030. That is a regulation. That is transition risk.”
- Under scenarios necessary to achieve one and a half degrees, three-quarters of proven coal reserves, half of gas, and more than a third of oil would become stranded assets, forcing banks and investors to judge whether they are exposed to reserves that will or will not be produced.
“The orders of magnitude of stranded assets of known reserves in energy are three-quarters of coal, proven reserves; half of gas; and more than a third of oil.”
- Moving from a tradeoff approach to a clear hierarchy of values—anchoring on a shared social objective like net zero—is far more powerful for market dynamics and investment than treating risk as something merely to avoid, because a shared objective flips climate risk into value creation, as is now being seen in financial markets and the real economy.
“moving from a tradeoff approach on a big issue — the flattening of values... to a hierarchy — just how powerful that can be in terms of market dynamics and investment... you can flip that risk into value creation if there’s a shared objective, the shared objective around net zero. That’s what we’re seeing today in financial markets and in the real economy.”
- Property and casualty insurers and reinsurers like Lloyd's of London can manage climate physical risk because they write relatively short-term contracts and reprice coverage and risk frequently, rather than holding large amounts of 30-year catastrophe risk on their books.
“The reason why Lloyd’s does well... is because they write relatively short-term contracts, and they reprice. They reprice coverage and they reprice risk... they’re not writing a whole ton of 30-year catastrophe risk in their books.”
- Giving central banks a climate mandate need not endanger their independence if the government democratically directs the relevant committees to take climate risk into account consistent with existing law, as in the UK—which is fundamentally different from the central bank itself appropriating a new responsibility by reading it into its mandate.
“There’s a difference between given something or directed to do something, again, consistent with the legal framework, and having the central bank appropriate that responsibility, which is not the case in the UK.”
Monetary policy has limits: structural factors like rising natural unemployment constrain its effectiveness independent of innovation.
- Despite liquidity trap theory, the US revealed there was no liquidity trap because monetary policy innovation kept the Fed close to its dual mandate without fiscal policy substituting for monetary policy, achieving its dual mandate by 2019 at the cost of other accumulated risks.
“It is revealed that there wasn’t a liquidity trap. Further, for a large portion of that period, it was not that fiscal policy was providing the support... I think the innovation that was done on the monetary policy side helped ensure that the Fed... by 2019 it certainly was there, in my judgment, at its dual mandate.”
- As the economy recovers to pre-pandemic levels, supply capacity is unlikely to return as quickly because the natural rate of unemployment has risen with a large portion of the population effectively out of work, so price pressures will come through more quickly—a risk for which early indicators are already appearing.
“as the economy gets back to the level it was before, the supply in the economy is not going to get back to the level it was before, or at least not quickly. And so those price pressures will come through more quickly. And we’re seeing some early indicators.”
- The UK productivity slowdown has multiple causes: a deeper financial crisis aftermath starving investment; the statistical fact that up to a third of pre-crisis productivity came from financial services lending spreads inflated by the credit boom; a lengthened and fattened tail of low-productivity firms with less productivity diffusion; and the flatlining of investment from 2016-2020 due to Brexit uncertainty.
“quite a lot of the productivity — as much as a third of the productivity in the run-up to the crisis — came from financial services, at least as productivity was measured. Basically, lending, the lending spread... counted as productivity. If you were in a credit boom, you were getting productivity.”
- Italy's economic problem is fundamentally one of supply capacity and productivity rather than demand—its GDP level is the same as in 1999 while Germany's is 25-27% higher—rooted partly in regulatory failures like slow bankruptcy laws that deter lending and business formation, requiring supply-side reforms alongside infrastructure spending.
“Italy, the level of GDP is the same as it was in 1999... whereas Germany is 25, 27 percent above today... It’s a question of supply capacity, ultimately, productivity given weak population growth... a very important example is around bankruptcy laws in Italy. It just takes a very long time to unwind a business”
Central bank governance should consolidate financial stability responsibility and eliminate rotating regional leadership.
- If reforming Fed governance, the rotating regional Fed chair system should be eliminated, and the Fed should have a clearer obligation to identify and use its tools to address financial stability risks rather than housing that primarily in the Treasury-chaired FSOC.
“The rotating regional Fed chair — I understand why the regional Feds exist, but the rotating chair system, I probably would not have that. I would have a clearer obligation on the Federal Reserve to identify and use its tools to address financial stability risks.”
- Boards of governors of central banks should have chief operating officers so they do not have to actually run the central bank, as the Bank of England did.
“Absolutely. We did have that at the Bank of England.”
- Switzerland manages its oversized banks by making them less likely to fail through higher capital and liquidity requirements than even new standards, and by putting in place living wills that separate domestic retail banking assets so retail banking continues while losses fall on the wholesale side.
“it’s made those banks less likely to fail by running higher capital requirements and higher liquidity than even the new standards. Secondly... putting in place what are called living wills, so an ability to unwind aspects of those banks if they hit the rocks, separate out the domestic banking assets”
Inflation assessment requires looking past headline measures to labor market composition, participation, and wage pressure patterns.
- To judge whether inflation is transitory, the most important underrated indicator is the labor market adjusted for compositional effects—determining whether wage inflation reflects more high-wage jobs being created rather than true wage pressure—alongside participation rates and hourly earnings across segments.
“I would look to the labor market, adjust for compositional effects. In other words, to what extent is wage inflation being driven by more high-wage jobs being created than lower-wage jobs? Look for a broad suite of labor market indicators, including participation rates, hourly earnings, cut across various different segments.”
- Canada's rigorously equal age-cohort vaccination approach, while reinforcing solidarity, is less effective on a risk-management basis than targeting high-exposure groups such as teachers, meatpacking plant workers, and Amazon warehouse workers in disease hot spots.
“it would make more sense to go and vaccinate the teachers and vaccinate those who are working in meatpacking plants and Amazon warehouse and other hot spots for the disease, but that’s not the approach. The approach has been very rigorously equal working down through age cohorts.”
Policy effectiveness depends on institutional culture, effective communication, and believing in markets' capacity to innovate.
- Recruiting central bankers from abroad works only as a rare exception under specific circumstances (such as a post-crisis UK with expanded central bank powers), and relies heavily on the technocratic nature of the role, unlike positions such as Defense Minister which could not be filled from another country.
“it’s very much the exception as opposed to the rule. It relies heavily on the technocratic nature of the role.”
- When giving central bank speeches, you should put the substance into footnotes so you are well grounded in your argument without cluttering it and losing the audience, because once you lose an audience during a speech you cannot get them back.
“as a central banker, put the substance as much as possible into footnotes, so you’re well grounded in terms of your argument but it’s not cluttering the argument and losing your audience.”
- The UK Monetary Policy Committee model—where members felt individual responsibility for their votes, voted differently from the governor, and did not seek consensus—led to more robust and healthier discussions about the economy than the more consensus-based Fed tradition.
“there was quite a rigorous independence of the committee members on what’s called the Monetary Policy Committee... they felt individual responsibility, they definitely would vote in different ways than the governor. They didn’t feel the need to have a consensus... And that led to quite robust discussions, in a healthy way”
- A defining lesson from 13 years at Goldman Sachs was a teamwork culture in which anyone in the organization, including the CEO, would return a call within 24 hours regardless of seniority or location.
“one of the biggest lessons I took from that place was teamwork... if you needed to get ahold of somebody in the organization, they would be back to you, certainly within 24 hours... I needed to speak to the CEO, Bob Rubin, and he didn’t know me, but he got back to me”
- Growing up near the Alberta tar/oil sands—a vast deposit economically impossible to extract that was 'cracked' within his lifetime through innovation—made Carney a believer in markets' ability to innovate and profit from opportunity.
“it made me a market believer because... this huge deposit of oil which was virtually impossible to get out of the ground, economically... Very quickly over the course of as I was growing up... the issue had been cracked. The ability to innovate and make a profit out of an opportunity.”
- Populism, an 'us versus them, the people versus the elite' approach, is restrained when people believe there is equality of opportunity and equal access, which in Canada is reinforced by universal healthcare and near-universal state education creating an 'all in this together' sentiment.
“populism, the way I think of it is, it moves into an “us versus them, the people versus the elite” type approach. Part of what determines populism... is how much do people believe that there is equality of opportunity or an ability to move through the system?”
- An independent Scotland—more of an optimal currency area with the rest of the UK than Northern Ireland—would face underestimated challenges from losing the fiscal stabilizer it naturally enjoys as part of the United Kingdom.
“the challenges, which were a little underestimated by some, of Scotland leaving the UK and losing the fiscal stabilizer that came naturally as being part of the United Kingdom, that was underestimated.”
- The recovery of the British pound to pre-referendum levels does not mean there were no macro costs to Brexit, because UK equities and other assets, while recovering somewhat, would be hard pressed to be said to have followed the trajectory they would have had Brexit not happened.
“If you look at broader asset prices, there has been some recovery in UK equities and other assets, but I would be hard pressed to say that they followed the trajectory that they would have if this hadn’t happened.”
- The O. Henry story 'The Gift of the Magi'—where each spouse sacrifices their most prized possession to buy the other a gift—serves as a counterexample to Joel Waldfogel's argument about the deadweight loss of Christmas gift-giving, demonstrating that the act of sacrifice expresses love beyond efficient anticipation of preferences.
“there’s a paper in the AER which is about the deadweight loss of gift-giving at Christmas because I can’t perfectly... anticipate what I want next year for Christmas... The fact that they were willing to sacrifice that which was most dear in order for their beloved to get a present at Christmas demonstrated their love”
- While both the UK and EU had pandemic issues, the UK handled it better than the EU, whose vaccine procurement approach had elements that were actively counterproductive.
“it has handled it better than the EU, and that elements of the EU’s approach have been actively counterproductive. In that respect, yes, it has been better.”
- The damage from harmful treatment of native populations has a very long tail, passing through generations rather than affecting only the initially impacted generation, making the cycle hard to break.
“I learned just how long the tail of damage, how that passes through generations. It’s not just the generation that is affected initially, but it can have a life, and how hard it is to break that cycle.”
- Ireland handled its terrible 2008 situation well, and structuring the support for its financial institutions as junior debt rather than pari passu with the country's overall debts contributed to its recovery.
“how that support ranked in terms of the overall... that support was junior as opposed to pari passu and, I think that contributed to their recovery.”
- Historical shifts in reserve assets begin with the means of payment—as dollars took over from sterling—so deliberately organizing the move to digital currencies, rather than letting it happen organically, has the potential to accelerate a rebalancing of the international monetary system.
“in past times, when there had been a shift in reserve assets... it starts first with means of payment. Dollars started to take over from sterling as means of payment, that helped accelerate a shift... If we organize it as opposed to we just let it happen organically, there’s a potential for some rebalancing.”
Central bank digital currency must limit retail holdings and avoid paying returns to prevent deposit flight during stress.
- Disintermediation from a central bank digital currency can be limited by a two-tier model where the CBDC is principally wholesale (between institutions) while citizens access currency through wallets held with commercial banks or fintechs, since most money is created by the private financial system anyway.
“there are two tiers to the central bank digital currency. The digital currency is as much a wholesaler — it’s principally a wholesale digital currency. What faces you and I... is some form of wallet we have a relationship with, whether it’s a commercial bank or an emerging tech company... most of that money will have been created by the private financial system itself.”
- A central bank digital currency should not pay a return; it should not be introduced as a tool to enable wildly negative interest rates, with the exchange ratio between public and private money instead showing up in deposit rates at financial institutions as it does today.
“I don’t envision the central bank digital currency paying a return. I’m not one who says, “Let’s have a central bank digital currency so we can have wildly negative interest rates, so we can add another tool to the toolbox.””
- Allowing citizens unlimited holdings of a retail central bank digital currency creates instantaneous run risk because private money would collapse into public money in times of stress, so the only workable safeguard is to limit the portion of assets that can be held in CBDC.
“the only way I can see directly around your issue is to limit the portion of my assets that I can hold in... central bank digital currency... because otherwise, that instantaneous run risk very much does exist. You collapse the private money into public money in times of stress”
- Private stablecoins backed by CBDC or Treasury bills are possible but not inherently fully resilient, illustrated by the Bank of Amsterdam which functioned as a stablecoin fully backed by deposited gold for over a century but gradually ran a mismatch—the danger if such a structure becomes the core of the system.
“the Bank of Amsterdam, which lasted almost a century... was a form of stablecoin. They were offering the bank bills supposedly fully backed by the gold that people had deposited. Now, over time, they gradually ran a mismatch. That’s the danger with that structure if that becomes the core structure.”
Divergent vaccine rollout and monetary recovery across economies will widen global inequality and stress the international monetary system.
- Canada's slow vaccine rollout reflects a prior failure of state capacity—no domestic vaccine production, inadequate PPE supplies, and arguably insufficient healthcare capacity—compounded by a non-operable track-and-trace system, demonstrating that lower healthcare capacity raises risk even from small infection increases.
“there’s a problem with state capacity in advance. We had inadequate vaccine production capacity. We didn’t have any... We had inadequate supplies of PPE and arguably inadequate capacity in our healthcare system... the less the capacity in your healthcare system, the riskier it gets, even small increases in infections.”
- A divergent global recovery—where unvaccinated emerging and developing economies with limited policy space lag while advanced economies move forward—will cause rates to rise and the US dollar to strengthen, creating an asymmetry through which the structure of the international monetary system bears down on weaker economies.
“we’re going to have a fairly divergent recovery with a number of emerging, developing economies really lagging because of COVID... while major advanced economies move forward. That’s a world where rates rise and the US dollar strengthens and you get this asymmetry, and the challenge of the way our system works bears down on these economies.”
Crypto and stablecoins require regulation at the point they enter the formal financial system where they ultimately must function.
- Crypto can only be regulated as it enters the formal financial system, so crypto exchanges should be regulated like other exchanges with the same quality and Know Your Customer standards, since even decentralized crypto and ransomware proceeds ultimately need to return to the centralized system to function as a medium of exchange.
“crypto exchanges should be regulated as other exchanges are and should be subject to the same quality standards and Know Your Customer standards... it is interesting how essential much of crypto — that crypto for a decentralized system ultimately needs to come back into the centralized system in order to be a true medium of exchange.”
Systemic failures like pandemics require clear joint responsibility and empowerment across jurisdictions rather than divided accountability.
- Systemic risks like pandemics fail when there is an absence of clear responsibility and empowerment, as Canada's federal-provincial finger-pointing showed; effective response requires governments to take joint ownership and share the positive and negative outcomes rather than dividing responsibility across jurisdictions.
“There was an absence of clear responsibility, who’s responsible for it, and empowering those who’s responsible still. There’s a lot of finger-pointing between the federal government and the provincial governments.”