Kwame Anthony Appiah
What this covers
Kwame Anthony Appiah, a philosopher, speaks with Tyler Cowen about how cosmopolitanism, patriotism, and epistemology interconnect. The conversation moves across philosophy, African politics, cultural ownership, gender in academia, and the future of moral life. Appiah argues that the most defensible form of cosmopolitanism is not rootless but rooted—a person can be both a patriot and a citizen of the world, deeply attached to a particular place while recognizing that humanity's cultural inheritance belongs to everyone. He illustrates this through African history (Ghana's actual cohesion predates colonialism by centuries), through philosophy (Shakespeare wrote about Danes; cultures that isolated themselves slowed their own development), and through practical questions about where great artworks should live and who gets to see them.
Running through the discussion is Appiah's conviction that [fallibilism](concept:Fallibilism)—holding many imperfect pictures of the world simultaneously—is wiser than seeking certainty. Because every picture we have is slightly wrong somewhere, we should work with as many as our minds can hold rather than dismiss one picture because it contradicts another. This epistemological stance shapes his thinking on religion in West Africa (rapid growth, not secularization), on the real sources of economic discontent (perception of unfairness rather than stagnation itself), and on how women leave philosophy faster than men—not from lesser interest but from absorbing false signals about innate brilliance. He reflects on his own career's emergence through discovery rather than planning, and on how individual intellectual work depends invisibly on vast communities of scholars doing technical work that never reaches the public.
Appiah argues that the right kind of cosmopolitanism is rooted rather than rootless — it presupposes local attachments and patriotism while insisting that the world's cultures, treasures, and obligations belong to all of humanity, and that fallibilism (holding many imperfect pictures of the world) is the wisest epistemic stance.
- A cosmopolitan can and should be a patriot rooted in a particular place.
- Cultural treasures should be collectively curated for global access rather than owned by territorial states.
- Because all our pictures of the world are slightly wrong, we should work with many pictures rather than ruling any out.
Cultural exchange and dialogue with other places drives the development of what we value most in our own national cultures.
- Much of what we value most about our own national culture is itself the product of dialogue with other places — Shakespeare's most famous play is about a Dane, Japan's most famous poet Basho was a Buddhist connected to India writing in a Chinese-derived script — and societies that cut themselves off, like Tokugawa Japan or late-Ming China, harmed their own internal development.
“a lot of what we value about our own stuff, our own national stuff, is actually the result of dialogue with other places.”
- The right kind of cosmopolitanism does not oppose national identity but presupposes it: you can be a cosmopolitan patriot, rooted in a place and caring about it specially while also being a citizen of the world; cosmopolitanism that demands rejecting the local cannot persuade most people and the idea that cosmopolitans must be rootless is a mistake.
“You can be rooted in a place, care about it in a special way, and still be a citizen of the world, and think that you have obligations and concerns and interests that transcend your national identity.”
Museums should prioritize shared global access to cultural objects over repatriation, treating collections as humanity's common heritage.
- The key questions about great cultural objects are access questions, not ownership questions; rather than repatriating objects (which would leave Mali with only Malian art and no Renaissance, Chinese, or Aztec works), museums should collectively curate the world's collection and share it so everyone in the world can be near a significant body of interesting objects.
“The key questions about the great objects are access questions, not ownership questions. If we fuss about ownership, we’ll never make any progress.”
- Cultural objects belong, in a sense, to all of humanity; a state has responsibility for the objects in its territory as a trustee but no special right to determine their fate simply because they are located there — just as the Taliban's possession of Afghanistan did not entitle them to destroy Buddhist artifacts as idols.
“each state has responsibility for the stuff in its territory, but it doesn’t have special rights to determine what happens to things just because they happen to be in its territory”
People should increasingly intervene in the moral lives of strangers, representing a major shift in how societies approach ethics and moral expression.
- The next major moral revolution may be a shift from the idea that you leave others to do their own moral thing toward people feeling inclined to intervene in the moral lives of strangers and express views — rooted in a tradition like the Muslim duty of commanding right and forbidding wrong — which if it takes hold would be a huge change.
“Now there’s an interesting change going on, that people feel inclined to intervene in the moral lives even of strangers and to say what they think about it.”
- Within 10-15 years there will be many more bystander interventions in social life, reducing sexual, racial, and homophobic harassment because bystanders are useful in dealing with it; but the change has downsides, since (as the Muslim tradition warns against being too nosy) some people will respond by nosily poking into others' lives, eroding moral privacy.
“there’ll be a lot less sexual and racial and homophobic harassment because bystanders are very useful in dealing with that kind of thing.”
Multiple imperfect pictures of reality should be held together rather than rejected for inconsistency, within limits of cognitive capacity.
- Because all our best pictures of the world are slightly wrong, we cannot rule out a picture merely because it is inconsistent with another picture — the inconsistent part may be the wrong bit of the other picture — so we should work with as many pictures as we can manage, limited only by our cognitive capacity.
“because all of our best pictures of the world are slightly wrong, we can’t rule out a picture on the grounds that it’s wrong, inconsistent with some other picture that we have, because it may be that the part of the other picture that it’s inconsistent with is one of the wrong bits.”
- Of all his pictures of the world, the everyday commonsense view of middle-sized objects (tables and chairs) is the one least likely to be wrong, even though modern philosophy since Descartes begins by making us doubt it.
“I think my everyday, commonsense, middle-sized-object view of the world is the one that’s least likely to be wrong.”
- Pop music generally does not age well because it is meant to be for the moment and is not constructed with the care and detail that goes into making works that endure, which is why Paul Simon's Graceland is fine but less important than it seemed at the time.
“It’s not meant to be constructed with the kind of care and detail that goes into making the kinds of works that endure.”
- Appiah's best guess for the basic physical structure of the world is that some mixture of quantum theory and relativity can be made to work, currently via string theory, but he holds string theory with a confidence below half because it is incredibly difficult to understand and a reasonable person might doubt it.
“if you ask me what I think the best current physical theory is, I’m going to say string theory, but with a sort of confidence that’s probably below half.”
- The turn against globalization stems partly from people being encouraged to blame it falsely, and partly because the elites who led globalization and European integration paid almost no attention to the tensions and difficulties produced — they assumed what they were doing was obviously good and didn't listen.
“the elites that led globalization, or that led integration in Europe, paid almost no attention to the views . . . They weren’t listening.”
- Ghana's political stability is largely the achievement of President Jerry Rawlings, who, with Kofi Annan's help, re-professionalized the military to see itself as serving civilian power rather than correcting political mistakes — so that when Rawlings himself lost and appealed to the army, they refused, citing his own teaching.
“he re-professionalized the Ghanaian military to think of itself as a military in service of a civilian power, not as people who might come in from time to time to correct political mistakes.”
- Afrofuturism and films like Black Panther are sentimental and unhelpful in the way the pyramids figure in Afrocentrism: since Africa did not in reality develop and build on advanced technologies in the remote past, a fantasy in which it did does not help us think about Africa's actual future.
“the reality is Africa did not develop advanced technologies in the remote past and build on them, and I think a fantasy in which they did doesn’t really help us to think about Africa’s future.”
- Appiah positions his main contribution as drawing philosophical work to a wider public, and credits himself with more or less starting the philosophical subfield of African-American studies in the early 1980s at Yale — holding what he believes was the first appointment in philosophy in African-American studies in the world — by bringing analytic training to bear on questions of race that it had nothing originally to do with.
“To the extent that there is a subfield of African-American studies that’s philosophical, I think I can claim to have more or less started it.”
- British-background colonies outperformed French ones partly because the British created a middle class not wholly dependent on the state (people made money in farming, forestry, and trade), whereas in francophone West Africa middle-class status came through being a civil servant or lawyer; British indirect rule also preserved continuous traditional institutions like chieftaincy, giving legitimacy independent of the formal state.
“one thing that happened in the British colonies was that a middle class was created that was not wholly dependent upon the state”
- A wealthy society can manage stagnant middle- and working-class incomes without resentment if the burdens feel fairly shared and people feel engaged in a common enterprise — as in wartime Britain — so the real driver of discontent is the perception that gains are not being fairly distributed, not stagnation per se.
“I think it’s possible to manage that in a way that feels fair, that makes the burdens feel fairly shared.”
- Where one works matters idiosyncratically to productivity: Appiah reliably writes his column for six or seven hours in his New Jersey living room and writes lectures and articles in certain New York spaces, yet has never managed to write a single word in his beautiful, well-appointed New Jersey study — productivity attaches to the living-room-with-laptop setting, not the formal desk.
“I have a beautiful study in New Jersey, and I’ve never managed to write a single word in it. It somehow doesn’t work for me.”
- Singapore's success is best explained by Lee Kuan Yew's leadership combined with a fortunate economic location as a major port in a fast-growing region with a population speaking the two great trading languages, Chinese and English — rather than by the indirect-rule institutional continuity that explains parts of British Africa.
“I suspect the story in Singapore is three words: Lee Kuan Yew.”
- Keeping a sheep farm in New Jersey reminds Appiah of the possibility of a kind of untroubled existence: his well-fed, predator-free sheep live apparently happy lives without knowing about Donald Trump or worrying about the fate of the world.
“I learned that it is possible to be a happy creature that doesn’t know about Donald Trump and doesn’t worry about the fate of the world.”
Good intellectual and creative work emerges from intrinsic motivation and community effort, not from chasing recognition or planning predetermined impact.
- The main function of an ethics advice column is not to help the letter writer (whose situation he can't probe and whose action he can't much change) but to help the million other readers think through ethical questions like confidentiality, loyalty, and what relationships oblige; for the writer, advice mostly functions as a sounding board, and the advisor's actual answer may not be hugely important.
“the main thing I think I’m doing in the column is helping everybody except the person that wrote the letter to think about some ethical question”
- Serious literary fiction is not written by people seeking fame, fortune, or prizes — the author of Milkman lived in a small apartment and would use the prize money to pay off debts, and writers like Anna Burns have a vocation, waiting for the novels to come to them; recognition and prizes matter as part of the literary world's structure but do not motivate the writing itself.
“I think literary fiction is not written by people who are looking for fame and fortune.”
- Intellectual work is the product of a community of scholars: an individual is just 'one tiny proboscis on the vast amoeba of philosophy,' standing on the shoulders of people whose technically inaccessible work (modal logic, philosophy of physics) is invisible outside the subject but underpins the work that does get explained widely — so one should not chase a particular kind of impact but do good work and let it have whatever uptake it will.
“the work is the product of the community of scholars, and you’re just one tiny proboscis on that vast amoeba of philosophy.”
- The value of a literary prize like the Booker lies primarily in its function for readers: it creates a months-long public conversation in England about the longlist, the shortlist, the judges' supposed errors, and finally the winner, leading people who otherwise wouldn't to read good books — which is the reason Appiah agreed to the stressful judging commitment.
“What the Booker does is it creates a conversation in England over the summer about 13 books”
- Appiah's central advice is that life is not the kind of thing you can plan with a life-plan in your back pocket; his own path from medical student to philosopher to teacher emerged by attending to what he discovered in himself and in the world, so one should match what is in oneself to what is out there, avoid excessive reflection on the effects of one's work, and hold onto the intrinsic desire to understand.
“life is not the kind of thing you can plan. You can’t have a sort of life plan — which is a term some ethicists use — in your back pocket.”
African integration and development are hindered by nationalism within states and poor regional infrastructure despite broader shared identity.
- Pan-Africanism has two strands: the diasporic strand (invented in the diaspora by figures like Sylvester Williams and Du Bois) remains lively as a sense of solidarity though it produces little politics, while the continental strand fails to advance practical integration because Africans, despite a broad sense of shared identity, can be made strongly nationalistic within their own states.
“That idea of a diasporic African identity seems pretty lively in the world today, though it doesn’t produce much actual politics or policy”
- The failure of African political integration is illustrated by the fact that traveling by road from Lagos to Accra requires crossing the Nigeria-Benin, Benin-Togo, and Togo-Ghana borders, where officials try to extract illegal taxes, making it easier to fly to London and back than to travel within the region.
“Much easier to fly to London and back to Accra. That’s crazy.”
- Ghana's surprising national cohesion cannot be credited to its roughly 90 years of British colonial rule because that period was shorter than a single lifetime; rather, the region was economically integrated for centuries under the Ashanti Empire radiating trade from Kumasi, and Twi served as a widely-spoken second language long before the British arrived.
“It’s been integrated economically for quite a long time, and people know each other.”
Religious and philosophical diversity persists because belief systems are locally rooted in relationship and practice rather than universal doctrine.
- Cross-religious and cross-denominational marriage is relatively common in West Africa because the character of belief centers on relationship with the spiritual world rather than insisting on long lists of doctrinal beliefs, so once people agree on the spiritual world, the rest is treated as details.
“the key thing is belief in, and kind of relationship with, the spiritual world. As long as you agree about that, the rest is details.”
- West Africa is an exception to the secularization thesis: rather than moving away from belief and church/mosque life, it shows huge growth in religious denominations, especially the Wahhabi version of Islam and Pentecostal/charismatic Christianity.
“It’s certainly not going in the direction of secularization as far as I can see, in the sense of moving away from church life or mosque life and moving away from belief.”
- Atheism in its modern argumentative form is a recent phenomenon; since the rise of the Abrahamic religions there were few atheists anywhere, and one reason people in Ghana have not given up theism is that nobody publicly argues against it.
“Atheism is a relatively modern phenomenon, at least the form of atheism that we see around us.”
Working hard with widely distributed traits matters more than innate ability; signaling deficiency discourages capable people from persisting.
- Women leave philosophy faster than men not because they are less interested but because analytic philosophy wrongly treats early performance as evidence of an innate 'it' that makes a good philosopher; since good philosophers are actually those who work hard with widely-distributed traits, teachers should stop signaling that poor early performance means a student lacks this nonexistent gift, and should instead tell students to push on and seek help.
“there’s been a tendency in analytic philosophy to treat the question of how people perform early in the subject as an indication of whether they have this thing, this it that can make for good philosophy.”
- When people get indications that they are in an activity where they won't do well, women are more likely than men to wisely move to something where they will succeed, whereas boys and young men are more likely to resist and try again — which contributes to attrition in philosophy.
“if they get indications that they’re in an activity where they’re not going to do well, they wisely move to something where they think they will.”