What this covers

Jonny Steinberg examines the roots and current state of South African institutions—police, courts, prisons, local government—through the lens of consent and trust. He traces how Nongoloza, a real bandit from the early industrial era, became the mythological foundation of prison gang law that still governs incarcerated populations today, passed down unchanged for over a century. He shows how apartheid's racial classification depended not on ancestry but on the subjective judgment of working-class White administrators observing how people carried themselves and where they lived. He then pivots to post-apartheid decay, arguing that a 2007-08 revolution within the ANC brought a provincial middle class to power that systematized corruption and hollowed out state capacity across policing, local government, and the judiciary—though he notes South Africa managed genuine success distributing antiretroviral treatment to millions despite an AIDS-denialist president.

The conversation moves through crime patterns that complicate middle-class perception: violent crime concentrates among young men who know each other, leaving the wealthy victimized mainly by property crime rather than murder, while policing by consent means officers avoid the neighborhoods they most fear and serve only those who summon them. Steinberg argues Nelson Mandela succeeded through strategic self-presentation, becoming the elder statesman the moment required while privately harboring rage, and that younger Black South Africans now question whether his early-1990s political settlement was sound. He identifies education and human capital as the central blockage to equality, and points to local governance failures—illustrated by Durban's collapsing land values—as symptoms of ruling-party corruption at the granular level where infrastructure actually deteriorates. Throughout, he holds that a durable liberal political center of 25-30 percent of voters offers a rational basis for modest institutional renewal, distinguishing South Africa from Zimbabwe-style state collapse.

Sharpest takeaway

Steinberg argues that South Africa's institutions—policing, governance, the Mandela legacy—are shaped by whether the public consents to and trusts state authority, and that despite catastrophic institutional decay since 2007-08, the country has a durable liberal political center that makes modest renewal plausible without genuine flourishing.

  • Policing in South Africa works only by consent; police avoid crowds they cannot control
  • A 2007-08 internal ANC revolution brought a nihilistic provincial middle class to power that hollowed out state institutions
  • A guaranteed 25-30% liberal-minded electoral center is South Africa's saving grace against a Zimbabwe-style collapse

The argument · threads21 threads · 44 claims
0.71

South African policing fails catastrophically because officers avoid hot spots, lack public consent, and condition responses on payment.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Policing can be fixed by choosing which crimes to target, beginning with good detection performed by small, carefully hand-picked, well-resourced, and well-motivated groups built around clear priorities, rather than trying to reform the entire enormous system at once.

    “You start by choosing which crimes are the ones that you want to go after, and you target them, usually beginning with good detection. And to do good detection, you assemble a carefully hand-picked group of people into small, well-resourced, well-motivated groups. You don’t try and fix the whole thing at once.”

  • Whatever shreds of legitimacy the South African police had in 2007—when democracy's novelty meant Black people could call the police at all, which was impossible under apartheid—are much weaker now, with the willingness to be policed having gotten worse.

    “Whatever shreds of legitimacy the police had in 2007 are much, much weaker now.”

  • South African policing has been failing catastrophically, with a leading commander accusing the cabinet minister in charge of being in hock with organized crime, triggering a commission of inquiry and a new minister—possibly an inflection point where change becomes possible after 15 years with little good in policing.

    “One of the leading commanders in the police accused the cabinet minister in charge of policing of being in hock with organized crime. There’s a big commission of inquiry; there’s a new minister.”

  • It has become fairly endemic and common practice in the South African police that responding to a crime scene depends on being paid by the people who want the crime investigated, with officers conditioning their staying at a scene—even domestic violence—on whether it is made lucrative for them.

    “It’s become fairly common practice in South African police that if you’re going to see to a crime scene, see to a crime, you get paid. It’s become fairly endemic in the South African police.”

  • Policing happens by consent or it doesn't happen; police don't enter crowds because those crowds don't want them and don't consent to their presence, so the relationship between police and public is fundamentally driven by whether the public wants them there.

    “policing happens by consent or it doesn’t happen. They don’t enter crowds because those crowds don’t want them and don’t consent for them to be there, and so they’re not. And so, a relationship between police and a public is driven by whether a public wants them there.”

  • South African police try not to police because they are afraid of people; with only two officers they cannot control a crowd, so they deliberately avoid the hot spots their crime-mapping system identifies and gravitate only to situations where they have been called, such as domestic violence, because being summoned grants them authority.

    “the police try not to police because they are afraid of people, and they essentially gravitate to situations in which they’re comfortable. The only situation in which they’re comfortable is a situation in which they’ve been called”

0.70

Rebuilding collapsed infrastructure is feasible, but restoring a civil service corrupted by destructive ideology faces political barriers.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The basic infrastructure that fell apart between 2010 and 2020—logistics, electricity, the country's plumbing—can be rebuilt, but whether South Africa can move beyond that to actually flourish depends on the far more ambitious task of rebuilding a civil service that is on its knees and animated by a destructive ideology, and the politics for that renewal is not yet in place, so only modest improvement is probable until something more fundamental changes.

    “I think that some modest improvement is possible and probable, but it is modest until something more fundamental changes.”

  • The South African judiciary's independence has held up—it has not caved to the executive—because of a deep, old legal tradition of independence dating to and before the apartheid years, but its quality has declined like every other public institution as a result of the 2007-08 ruling-party revolution that brought a different group of people to power.

    “The judiciary’s independence has held up, but its quality has not held up... the quality of judiciary, as with every other public institution in South Africa, is much weaker than it was 10 years ago.”

  • Durban's roughly 20-25 percent fall in land prices over decades stems from shocking local-government management, a symptom of the ruling party's corruption; ruined local governments in Johannesburg, Durban and other major cities cause deteriorating infrastructure, fleeing commerce, and escalating cost of doing business, so much of South Africa's problems are about the nitty-gritty of governance at local and regional levels.

    “the main issue is absolutely shocking local-government management, and that is a symptom of the corruption of the ruling party... commerce flees that. The cost of doing business escalates.”

0.65

A 2007-08 ANC revolution brought racially brittle provincial elites who pursued nihilistic politics and systematic state capture.

2 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Around 2007-08 a revolution inside the ANC saw the thwarted, frustrated provincial middle class take over the organization and the state; these racially brittle people, who did not believe anyone else could build a future in such a difficult country, pursued nihilistic politics and began fleecing the state through their positions in power and the bureaucracy, causing the institutional decay of the following decade.

    “The thwarted, frustrated provincial middle-class essentially took over the organization and the state, and their politics was pretty nihilistic. They were very, very racially brittle people... And they began fleecing the states through their position in power and in the bureaucracy.”

  • When Thabo Mbeki became South Africa's second democratically elected president, he immediately began using the police to police his own party and opponents, installing his own commissioner; once police are seen as a politician's vehicle rather than a state function, their bureaucratic integrity becomes very difficult to maintain, causing a rapid decline.

    “he immediately began using the police to police his own party... once police are seen as a politician’s vehicle, it becomes very difficult to make its bureaucratic integrity.”

0.65

The ANC's first 15 years succeeded by managing commodity boom prosperity and building reasonably functional institutions.

2 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The ANC governed reasonably well for its first 15 years, greatly benefiting from China's rise and a commodity supercycle, during which literally everybody did better and the bottom two deciles of South African society earned about twice as much as at the end of apartheid, with the ANC managing the wave and building a reasonably functional state.

    “They were very lucky that they caught a commodity supercycle. They benefited greatly from China’s rise... The bottom two deciles of South African society were earning about twice as much as they did at the end of apartheid.”

  • Despite a president who was an AIDS denialist and roughly 25 percent of the population being HIV positive, South Africa successfully administered antiretroviral treatment to several million people—something nobody was sure the health service could do—demonstrating genuine, surprising state capacity.

    “Anti-retroviral treatment, which at the time nobody was sure whether South African health service could administer, they did administer. Several million people went onto treatment. That was a sign of state capacity that really could work despite the fact that we had a president who is an AIDS denialist.”

0.53

Winnie Mandela embodied contradictions: brilliant political operator with entitlement, capable of deep love and commitment yet chilling cruelty.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Although Nelson Mandela was deeply besotted with Winnie, having only lived under the same roof with her for about two years before prison, he never truly came to know her; in prison she became the center of meaning and foundation of his self as everything else fell away, and he loved and 'coronated' an increasingly romantic, intense image of her that was really a fiction, since she was living a separate life outside—revealing a troubling line between fantasy and reality.

    “the person he’s so deeply in love with is really a fiction. She’s living a life on the outside. And you see this very troubling line between fantasy and reality.”

  • Winnie arrived in 1950s Johannesburg convinced there was no position she should not occupy despite being a woman, and understanding that the way to exercise power in that time and place was through a man, she pursued the most powerful rising political activist available; once she became Mrs. Mandela she held an aristocratic sense of entitlement and legitimacy, understanding herself as South Africa's leader by virtue of the marriage and treating both reputations as her project, which she managed with brilliant savvy and command of image.

    “she understood intuitively that in that time and place, the way to do that was through a man. And she went after the most powerful rising political activists available.”

  • Winnie did chilling and scary things—the irony being that as the supposed representative of the oppressed, the people she hurt were poor, young, Black, and defenseless—yet she was also capable of deep sympathy, love, and commitment; the biographer's task is to integrate these antinomies not as contradictions but as parts of one psychic architecture.

    “I saw these amazing antinomies in her, not as contradictions, but as part of one psychic architecture.”

  • Raised among 11 children by intensely ambitious parents who openly said they would pick winners and abandon losers, Winnie learned the stakes were high and secured a prime place in her father's head; she carried weak boundaries through life—needing to colonize others' heads—which made her a weak prisoner under torture because she let her torturer deep into her psyche, and she later presented her resulting hatred of him as the fuel of her political activism.

    “She had very, very weak boundaries. She would need to be very intensely involved with somebody, to colonize their heads, to be inside them all the time.”

  • South Africa never really healed from the civil war it fought in the 1980s; the extreme violence surrounding Winnie's late-1980s life was a sadly formative moment whose wounds never closed, partly because of what didn't happen next, illustrating that some societies recover quickly from extreme moments while others, like South Africa, never quite do.

    “South Africa didn’t really heal from the civil war that it fought in the 1980s... those wounds had never really quite healed, partly because of what didn’t happen next.”

0.51

A sane liberal-minded political center commanding 25-30 percent of votes offers the country's primary protection against state collapse.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • South Africa's remarkable asset, given its troubles, is a very solid and hard-to-dislodge sane, liberal-minded political center guaranteed 25-30 percent of the vote each election and expanding, which gives a rational basis to govern the country into the future and is its saving grace against a Zimbabwe-like collapse.

    “it has a very solid political center which is very hard to dislodge, and a pretty sane liberal-minded political center. It’s guaranteed 25 percent, 30 percent of the vote every election and is expanding.”

  • A Zimbabwe-like scenario for South Africa is not unimaginable but much more unlikely, because what Zimbabwe lacked was 30 percent of the electorate always voting for the center; replicating Zimbabwe's path in South Africa would meet concerted resistance from across society and be very, very hard.

    “it has a very solid political center which is very hard to dislodge, and a pretty sane liberal-minded political center. It’s guaranteed 25 percent, 30 percent of the vote every election and is expanding.”

0.51

Education deficits leaving most citizens unemployable in skilled work block equality and perpetuate inequality across economic futures.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • South Africa's great problem is human capital and its incapacity to build an education system that would make the majority of the population employable in more than unskilled labor, which is probably the central blockage to a more equal country, especially if the economic future lies in agricultural and mining exports that may worsen inequality.

    “South Africa’s great, great problem is human capital and its incapacity to build an education system which is going to make the majority of the population employable in more than unskilled labor. That is probably the blockage to a more equal country.”

  • In a country with a 40 percent expanded unemployment rate where tens of thousands apply for police jobs requiring only a driver's license and secondary education, the tiny minority who get the stable, salaried, pensioned positions are seen as having been unfairly catapulted into the middle class by chance, generating a distinct class resentment toward Black police as people who 'got out of the ghetto' and shouldn't have.

    “there’s an anger around Black police, that in the country of mass unemployment, they’ve gotten ahead just by chance, just by throwing the dice... So that creates this class resentment towards Black police.”

0.43

Prison gangs rooted in century-old Nongoloza narratives regulate members through ritual violence and represent South Africa's oldest institutions.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The prison gang culture originates from the mass incarceration of Johannesburg's early Black working class, where in the early 20th century 70-80 percent of working-class Black people entering the city would be jailed at some point; the historical Nongoloza's gang and an entire class of people moved into jail in parallel, making incarceration a defining everyday experience of early modern South Africa unlike the rest of Africa.

    “There was a point in the early 20th century where 70 percent, 80 percent of working-class Black people who entered the city would go into the jails at some point.”

  • South Africa's prison gangs (26s, 27s, 28s) regulate members through scary violence combined with an elaborate ritual system rooted in the oral history of Nongoloza, a real and mythologized bandit from the dawn of industrialization; their law and ritual are embedded in narrative, so to enforce law is to tell a story, with judges retelling Nongoloza's tale to try the accused.

    “you have law and ritual embedded in narrative. And so, to enforce law is to tell a story.”

  • The same Nongoloza-derived story, virtually unchanged for a century, controls prisons throughout South Africa, passed across generations without losing its texture or basic narrative line, making the prison gangs probably the oldest institutions in South Africa.

    “That story hasn’t changed all that much in a century... Those prison gangs are probably the oldest institutions in South Africa.”

0.34

Racial categorization under apartheid relied on subjective 'common sense' of working-class whites; police make law capriciously because ordinary people don't know it.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • When the 1950 government decided to racially categorize every person, it rejected ancestry (too much mixing) and instead relied on the 'common sense' intuition of recently-uplifted White working-class people who judged race by how a person carried themselves, where they lived, who their friends were, and what they wore—a non-scientific process visible today through transcribed appeals.

    “Finally, what was used was the common sense of White working-class people... It was relying on intuition. “We know that you are not White by the way you carry yourself, by where you live, by who your friends are, by what you wear.””

  • Because very few ordinary South Africans know what the law is, police effectively make it up in the moment with great leeway, and at domestic violence scenes female and male officers police very differently—holding different imaginations of what a family should be and different types of empathy—which can make a world of difference to the outcome.

    “very few ordinary people know what the law is, and it’s made up by police in the moment, and they have a lot of leeway because they’ve been called onto the scene. And what a woman does and a man does is, in my experience, usually very, very different.”

  • By the 1970s-80s there were not enough White people to staff the apartheid state, so the majority of civil servants—from police to prison warders to nurses—were Black, but a color bar limited how far their careers could advance, producing a White-governed state whose basic functionaries were Black.

    “the majority of civil servants are Black, but there’s a color bar. There’s a limit to how far their careers can advance.”

  • People were imprisoned for having the wrong stamp in their book or being in the wrong place, a practice that intensified during high apartheid so that by the late 1960s something like three-quarters of a million people were taken off the streets every year for pass-book violations, constituting racial-minority regime policing of Black movement.

    “By the late 1960s, something like three-quarters of a million people were being taken off the streets every year for having the wrong stamp in their book or not having their book at all.”

0.33

Nelson Mandela's political genius lay in strategically performing whatever character each era demanded while masking his true feelings.

1 pointcentrality 3/5
  • Nelson Mandela's genius was reading the times and presenting himself as the character he felt the era needed—a tailored-suited Black lawyer in the 1950s, a Castro-styled military man when the ANC was banned, a martyr at the 1964 trial—and his greatest mask in the 1990s was an avuncular, joyful old man, the opposite of the deep raging anger and sadness he actually felt, because he believed bringing his real feelings into politics would lead his people to civil war.

    “Nelson’s genius was to read the times and to present himself as a character he felt the times needed.”

0.29

Middle-class South Africans face property crime disproportionately but not murder rates comparable to developed countries, with violence zoned in ghettos.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The relative safety of middle-class bourgeois spaces in Cape Town comes from private policing rather than effective public policing, and those areas are still not nearly as safe as New York, London, or Paris; meanwhile Khayelitsha, a township of over a million people on the other side of the mountain, has a murder rate exponentially higher.

    “probably in Cape Town, you were in middle-class bourgeois spaces, which are privately policed.”

  • The vast majority of violent crimes in South Africa are between young men who know one another, while predatory crimes only sometimes result in murder; consequently middle-class people are much more victimized by property crime than their developed-world counterparts but are not subject to comparably high murder rates.

    “the vast majority of violent crimes are between young men who know one another. Predatory crimes sometimes result in murder, but it’s a small minority of them.”

  • Crime in South Africa is zoned and ghettoed, so a visitor can move around quite safely—including to Soweto's jazz scene or Braamfontein's music venues via organized tours or Ubers—without too much fear, provided one does not do anything stupid; it is not like the parts of Brazil where one risks being mugged in the 30-second walk from car to club door.

    “Crime is zoned. It is ghettoed. There are ways to move around quite safely if one doesn’t do anything stupid.”

0.24

White farmer murders represent real violence but genocide claims are insane; young unemployed Black men are statistically the primary victims.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • White Afrikaner farmers are not being murdered in huge numbers; the vast, statistically incontestable majority of murder victims in South Africa are young, Black, and unemployed, with violence concentrated in the ghettos but spilling meaningfully into the suburbs—so while white farmers face a scary degree of violence atypical of the developed world, the idea that they are victims of a genocide is absolutely insane.

    “white Afrikaner farmers are not being murdered in huge numbers... The vast majority of people who are murdered in South Africa are young, black and unemployed, and it’s incontestable.”

  • Fifteen years ago, the per capita murder rate for police was considerably lower than for a 25-year-old Black man in a ghetto who was not a police officer, meaning the police were actually safer than the people they were policing.

    “the per capita rate of murder of police when I was working on this stuff 15 years ago was considerably lower than a 25-year-old Black man in a ghetto who was not a police officer. So, they were safer than the people they were policing.”

0.05

South Africa's literary and political cultures inherited nationalism's habit of treating writers seriously, producing enduring cultural vitality.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • South Africa's literary vitality stems partly from high stakes but largely from a long tradition: as a country of nationalisms—both the Afrikaner Nationalist Project and the Black Nationalist Project—it inherited the classic old-nationalism trait of treating writers and literature with great seriousness, so the impulse to write seriously is in the country's DNA.

    “This was a country of nationalisms, and nationalisms get very, very serious about their literary figures and about their literature... It was part of the Afrikaner Nationalist Project. It was part of the Black Nationalist Project.”

0.05

Young educated Black South Africans reject Mandela's ANC deal, while populists lionize Winnie's unarmed revolution that never happened.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Many educated middle-class young Black South Africans have decisively turned their backs on Nelson Mandela, associating him with 30 years of disappointing ANC rule and legitimately questioning whether the deal he made in the early 1990s was the right one; meanwhile a vocal middle-class populist constituency takes Winnie as a lodestar and proponent of a violent revolution that ought to have happened but never did.

    “Many educated middle-class young Black people have really quite decisively turned their back on Nelson Mandela. He’s associated with 30 years of ANC rule, which have not gone especially well.”

0.05

Apartheid government knew its system was finite by late 1960s but lacked courage to conceive alternatives and allowed it to persist.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • By the late 1960s and early 1970s the apartheid government was terrified by the amount of coercion it had to use and knew the system had a finite shelf life and could not last forever, but lacked the courage or imagination to conceive an alternative, so the system kept spinning with everyone aware it had to end, and it went on far too long.

    “It knew that the system had a shelf life. It could not last forever. There wasn’t really the courage or the imagination to think of something else.”

0.05

South Africa faces Namibia's trajectory: neither rapid collapse nor flourishing but stagnant stability amid unemployment and crime.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Namibia—a hard place with a lot of crime and unemployment that neither grows quickly nor falls apart—is probably South Africa's future: not coming apart at the seams, but not flourishing either.

    “That’s probably South Africa’s future too. Not coming apart at the seams, but not flourishing.”

0.05

COVID lockdowns enforced paternalistically by a liberation movement hurt poor people severely in ways middle-class citizens never experienced.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • South Africa's hard COVID lockdown, enforced by the military before there was even a single case, worked fine for middle-class people but made poor people suffer enormously in both the short and long term; it was driven initially by fear and then by a cabinet group itching for serious state intervention, producing the irony of a former liberation movement turning paternalistic and statist and gratuitously hurting its own people.

    “It was a hard, hard lockdown. It lasted much, much, much longer than it ought have to. It worked fine for middle-class people. Poor people suffered enormously”

0.05

Agriculture succeeded over 30 years while mining failed due to policy mismanagement, suggesting potential futures depend on political choices.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Agriculture has been a great success over the last 30 years and could be far more successful, while mining has been a disaster due to bad public policy management despite having a great potential future under different politics.

    “agriculture has been a great success over the last 30 years and can be much, much more successful. Mining has been a bit of a disaster because it’s been very badly managed by public policy”

0.05

White southern African settlement patterns followed disease ecology and resembled American westward expansion across two centuries.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Whites settled the southern Cape in the mid-17th century largely because its Mediterranean climate and rainfall lacked malaria and diseases that would kill them, then marched north over two centuries—reaching present-day Zimbabwe only at the end of the 19th century—in a pattern not dissimilar to the westward movement of Whites in America.

    “largely because its rainfall patterns and climate were Mediterranean, and it didn’t have malaria. It didn’t have diseases that were going to kill White people.”

0.05

Cecil Rhodes likely did not understand himself as gay but was formatively in love with men, connecting intimate and public life.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Steinberg's intimate biography of Cecil Rhodes concludes that Rhodes likely did not understand himself as gay and probably never had sex with anyone, man or woman, yet as an outsider's reading he was in love with some of the young men around him, and that formative, shaping love connected his intimate and public lives in ways central to understanding him.

    “I don’t think that he understood himself as gay. And I suspect that he never had sex with anybody, man or woman... he was in love with some of the young men around him, and that love was very important. It was formative, it was shaping.”

0.05

Early-1980s South Africa's certainty the old order would not last created intellectual excitement about first-principles thinking.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Growing up in early-1980s South Africa, where everyone knew the old order would not last and a new order was coming, produced in certain circles an excitement about first-principles thinking, having no shibboleths, and imagining the unimaginable—a formative outlook that figures like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel may have carried with them.

    “that produced a kind of an excitement about first principle thinking, about having no shibboleths, about imagining the unimaginable. It’s quite possible that he took that with him.”