What this covers
Jacob Mikanowski surveys the fractured, fluid history of Eastern Europe through the lens of identity—not as something fixed in blood or soil, but as perpetually remade by war, migration, and the choices people make under extremity. The conversation ranges from the deep structures that divide the region (the medieval boundary between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, the competing visions of Piast Poland and Jagiellonian Poland) to contemporary politics and the literary archive. Mikanowski argues that much of what looks like nationalist obsession—Trianon in Hungary, Kosovo in Serbia, border disputes across the Balkans—operates as symbolic dreaming rather than actual foreign policy, a manifestation of the Small Nations Dreaming of Being Big dynamic that animates the region.
The conversation turns repeatedly to the Holocaust as a crucible revealing human nature's radical Plasticity of Human Nature. Mikanowski argues that survival of hidden Jews in occupied Poland depended less on moral character than on material conditions—the length of the war, the marginal status of rescuers, the economics of secrecy—and that no framework can predict in advance who will act well and who will betray. He contrasts this with contemporary patterns: how Legal Authoritarianism under Viktor Orbán proceeds through constitutional patience rather than force, how Ukraine and Poland flipped from historical enmity to alliance, how EU integration and economic convergence may dissolve ethnic antagonisms. The discussion also touches Stanislaw Lem's prescience on artificial intelligence, and the translatable spare clarity of postwar Polish poets like Wislawa Szymborska and Zbigniew Herbert.
Mikanowski argues that Eastern Europe's identity is fundamentally mutable and polycultural rather than fixed and monoethnic, and that its recurring 'small nations dreaming of being big' dynamic, combined with the Holocaust's lesson about the plasticity of human nature, reveals deeper truths than nationalist mythologies admit.
- Poland and other states have a Jagiellonian polycultural tradition that war and migration are now partially reviving
- Most Balkan and Central European nationalist obsessions are symbolic dreams of past greatness, not literal foreign policy
- The Holocaust in occupied Poland shows human nature has no fixed floor or ceiling under extreme duress
Poland embodies competing identity models: exclusive Piast nationalism versus inclusive Jagiellonian multiethnicity, with recent Ukrainian migration and Western economic integration shifting the balance.
- Polish identity is divided between two models inherited from its first dynasties: Piast Poland, a narrow one-culture, one-religion conception that is now dominant, and Jagiellonian Poland, a big-tent confederation of peoples reflecting Poland's historically multireligious and multiethnic reality.
“there's Piast Poland and Jagiellonian Poland. Piast is that more narrow, one-culture, one-religion — that's what's been assigned to it. That's the dominant view. The Jagiellonians are this bigger, "We're a confederation of peoples."”
- The war in Ukraine and the resulting influx of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Chechens has shifted Poland from a very closed, monoethnic society back toward a meaningful recovery of the polyethnicity it had historically lost, changing Polish perceptions of difference.
“It's amazing how much I think the war in Ukraine has changed things... Because of that war, the perceptions of difference have really shifted in Poland. From a very closed society, I think it's opened up a little bit in a very meaningful way.”
- Ukraine is not a natural fixed fact but an entity that has continually shifted, created in relation to and against both Poland and Russia; the Polish-Ukrainian relationship was historically very tense (with Poland commemorating WWII Polish-Ukrainian violence) but flipped 'in a flash' to 'Poles and Ukrainians: brothers' because of the common Russian enemy.
“what Ukraine is has shifted over time and is continuing to shift... Ukraine between Poland and especially Russia of being entangled with both of those and creating itself in relation and against both of those.”
- The shift in Poland toward more smiling, direct eye contact, and Western-style customer service is driven by economic growth plus the expansion of Western cultural norms, which has eroded the old confrontational, dour mode of interaction especially in cities like Warsaw.
“I think it's growth plus the hegemonic West expanding, which is not necessarily a bad thing. But a certain set of cultural mores has crumbled, especially in the big — like in Warsaw.”
- Eastern Europeans in the 1970s-80s had children young because the communist political economy provided housing through state allocation lists and assigned jobs, leaving nothing to save toward, whereas the shift to a Western career- and savings-oriented economy with expensive apartments has pushed childbearing into the late 20s and early 30s.
“It was a really different political economy in the '70s and '80s. You were not waiting to save up for an apartment; you were usually on a list that your parents put you on, and you were waiting to be granted the right to an apartment.”
Eastern European culture expresses itself through distinctive forms—humor blending tragedy and absurdity, poetry of ideas rather than untranslatable form, literary pessimism about progress and human nature.
- Eastern European humor is characterized by finding laughter in the worst situations and uniting a sense of the tragic with a sense of the absurd, a feature shared across the region including Ashkenazi Jewish humor.
“But a sense of the tragic, a sense of the absurd, a sense of how those two go together. That's a great question. Finding laughter in the worst situations; finding a way to laugh at really dark things.”
- Stanisław Lem is less popular in the West than Asimov or Dune because his work lacks their world-building and optimistic forecasting of the human future; instead he is 'Kafka in space' with absurd situations and a pessimistic view of progress, plus an odd childlike humor that makes him hard to digest.
“They don't have that thing that Asimov does, or even Dune, of world-building and forecasting the human future far in advance. They are like Kafka in space... I think a pretty pessimistic view of progress. Maybe that makes them hard to digest.”
- Unlike older Polish poetry and Russian poetry, which depend on untranslatable rhythm, meter, and wordplay, the great postwar Polish poets (Szymborska, Miłosz, Herbert) work well in translation because theirs is a spare poetry of ideas, especially Herbert.
“I think they work really well in translation. They don't rely on the things that make Russian poetry so hard and older Polish poetry so hard, which is rhythm and meter and extremely untranslatable wordplay.”
- Lem's cybernetics tales and Solaris anticipated the current state of large language models and AI by decades, depicting machines you talk to that are weird, mystical, and serve as therapists or oracles, and the seductive yet monstrous prospect of mimicking consciousness without any consciousness behind it.
“the idea that you use them to talk to, that they're weird, they might be somewhat mystical, they serve as therapists or oracles — that's very much in Lem, quite early.”
- The Holocaust in occupied Poland—especially the 1941-45 phase where surviving Jews lived as hunted nonpersons dependent on bargains for shelter—shows that human nature is completely plastic with no bottom: most people in the worst situation will behave in any way and denounce for trivial rewards, while a few will act remarkably well, and crucially no one, including themselves, can predict in advance which way they will go.
“To me, that means human nature is in some ways completely plastic, has no bottom, has no backside. Most people in the right situation — in the wrong situation, the worst situation — will act in any way, behave in any way. I think there's almost no bottom to human behavior.”
- Ketman, a concept Miłosz drew from Shiite Islamic practice (where Shiites under Sunni rule were religiously obligated to feign being Sunni) and applied in The Captive Mind, describes how intellectuals under Stalinism split into an inner self holding older prewar ideals and an outward doctrinaire Marxist face—a form of ideological masquerade or disguise.
“this idea from The Captive Mind, by Czesław Miłosz, of ideological masquerade or disguise... it's a concept in Shiite Islamic practice that he read about, where Shiites, under duress, under Sunni rule, would pretend to be Sunni.”
Regional ethnic conflicts persist as symbolic grievance rather than literal territorial ambition, but will cool as EU integration and economic convergence reduce the stakes of difference.
- The Serbian obsession with the 1389 Battle of the Field of Blackbirds and Kosovo is less about literal territory than a symbol of the dream of Serbia as a great country; once Serbia loses Kosovo and Montenegro it becomes merely a small country with no more dream of the oversize regional role it held in Yugoslavia.
“in terms of a larger value, it's the dream of Serbia as a great country... Kosovo is the last piece of that. Once they lose that, and Montenegro, they're really a small country. There really is no more dream.”
- An actual Serbian takeover of Kosovo would produce a horrible insurgency nightmare because Kosovo is so dominantly ethnically Albanian and monumentalizes the heroes of the 1999 war and the KLA; it would not be worth it except to satisfy a psychological craving, with partial partitioning of the Serb-majority strip near Serbia the more plausible future.
“if Serbia were to take over Kosovo, it would be a nightmare insurgency. Maybe Serbia doesn't — I definitely don't think it's worth it except on a — just satisfying psychological craving.”
- Hungarian concern with Trianon and the loss of territory is largely symbolic ('like Remember the Alamo'), expressed through belt buckles and national symbology rather than literal demands for territory; it reflects the small-nation-dreaming-of-being-big sense of having been robbed of historical destiny, which Orbán plays with rhetorically but which is not actual foreign policy.
“I don't think they care, literally. I think it's a little bit "Remember the Alamo." It by this point has moved into the realm of national symbols and symbology.”
- Increasing European integration lifts regional and enclave conflicts by letting countries devolve contentious issues to the EU, and as poor countries like Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo catch up economically toward Western standards, the temperature of ethnic conflict will go down because the antagonism is not bred in the bone.
“the more European integration happens, the more that does lift some of those regional and enclave problems, as you can devolve some things to the EU.”
- Albania has almost no Christian-Muslim conflict because a shared Albanian national identity ('the religion of Albanians is Albanianism') dilutes religious differences, the Islam is a very mild Sufi strain, there is much intermarriage, decades of official communist atheism cooled all three faiths, and historical conflicts ran along clan lines rather than religious ones.
“one of their main poets said that the religion of Albanians is Albanianism — is that they're all Albanian. They're all Albanian-speaking. It kind of dilutes those differences.”
Eastern European borders are historically unstable except where anchored by natural geography or deep linguistic-religious divides rooted in Byzantine and Roman imperial legacies.
- Very few Eastern European borders have remained stable over 50-60 years; the main durable frontiers are natural ones like the Danube and the Carpathians (the Slovak-Polish border), and the Bulgarian-Romanian border which doubles as a real linguistic frontier and was once the edge of the Roman Empire.
“as a whole, the river — it used to be the frontier of the Roman Empire for a long time. It's still a solid Bulgarian-Romanian border, a real linguistic frontier. That's a solid, longtime frontier.”
- The direct legacy of the Roman Empire's frontier (the Limes) does not matter much for present-day Eastern Europe because it was obliterated between the 5th and 10th centuries; what really matters is the imprint of Byzantium and its church—the dividing line between the worlds of Orthodoxy and Catholicism—established in the 900s and 1000s.
“I don't think it matters in a major way. I think the traces come later. It's where the imprint of Byzantium is still around... The world of Orthodoxy versus the world of Catholicism. Those lines.”
- The best Polish folk art comes from southern Poland because, after the 1795 partition, the Hapsburg-ruled Galician south was left extremely underdeveloped and poor while being neither industrialized like the Russian part nor Westernized like the prosperous Prussian part, which incubated and kept traditional folklife intact.
“It was neither industrializing nor Westernizing the way the Prussian area was. I think that maybe incubated and kept some of that folklife intact.”
Balkan geopolitics increasingly orient toward Russia and China rather than pursuing transit-hub integration, while economic migrants and skilled workers return home or pass through toward Western Europe.
- Rather than resolving regional conflicts to become a transit hub, Serbia's actual strategy is to maintain increasingly close links with Russia and especially China, positioning itself as an island of Chinese influence in the Balkans.
“the Serbian solution is to be close to Russia and China. They have increasingly close links to especially China. Maybe they're an island of Chinese influence in the Balkans. It's their future.”
- Albania has become Eastern Europe's second-fastest-growing economy due to Gulf and Saudi investment, extensive road and cultural-infrastructure building, return migration of skilled workers from Italy, Switzerland, and the UK, and enormous untapped tourism potential as the last undeveloped prime Mediterranean coastline, with small-country effects amplifying these gains.
“you do feel that boom. You can feel there's a lot of Gulf investment, Saudi investment. There's a ton of road building... There's enormous untapped tourism potential, because it's the last piece of European — really prime Mediterranean coastline that hasn't been developed deeply.”
- Many Romanians who migrated for work to Spain, Italy, and Portugal will return home, while Romania simultaneously receives an influx of Ukrainians and Moldovans; migrants traveling overland from Asia rarely stop in the Balkans because the living-standard gap is not large enough, treating the region as a thruway to Germany, France, and Britain.
“Some of those people are going to come back. A lot of them are coming back. You're going to get an influx from over the border.”
- The traditional Balkan male ethic of physical masculinity will persist for a long time and will not be eroded by rising per capita income or Western-style postmodern gender fluidity, with Greece as a possible bellwether and Greek men showing no sign of following a Houellebecqian decline.
“I think we're a long way off from losing the Balkan male, as is a natural species. I think we can improve the economy a lot, and that male culture, that ethos, is going to be around for a while.”
Hidden Jews in occupied Poland survived based on protectors' marginal social status and moral conviction rather than commercial bargains, with survival odds declining as war duration stretched.
- Survival of Jews hidden in occupied Poland was strongly a function of how long the war lasted: in the short run many protectors would take money and hide people, but as the war dragged on through successive harsh winters the risk, scarcity, and fear mounted, so the longer it ran the more hidden Jews were denounced—meaning a shorter war would have saved many more.
“If the war had been shorter, a lot more people would have been saved. The longer the war runs, the more people are either denounced by their neighbors or their own protectors denounce them.”
- Among Holocaust rescuers in rural Poland, the ones who protected hidden Jews longest were people living on the absolute margins—widows and outcasts—who never made a bargain and never asked for money, because village surveillance ('100 eyes') meant any purchase from received money would reveal them, and because a life that is bought can be sold, whereas those acting from moral instinct held fast.
“The people who were the best at saving the people they saved tended to be people who never made a bargain, who never asked for money, who just did it out of moral instinct. Because if you buy a life, you can sell it.”
- Germanic influence in modern Poland flows not from Germans returning to live there but from labor migration and cross-border travel, especially Silesians with mixed-German roots working in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.
“Germans aren't going that much back to Poland... I think it's from — what contexts are, what influences are — are from labor migration.”
Authoritarian leaders like Orbán employ legal constitutional capture and media control while maintaining soft power and EU funding flows, exploiting Western investment to entrench dominance.
- Viktor Orbán practices a soft, legal authoritarianism: an extremely smart, professional politician with no genuine ideological allegiance (his Christian nationalism is a strategic invention) who always colors within the lines while changing what those lines are, parlaying many small electoral victories into transformational constitutional changes and capture of media and economy, yet without being a hard dictator who would fire on crowds.
“This idea of him as a Christian nationalist is something he came up with strategically. Everything, with him, is a strategic calculation on how to build and maintain power.”
- The EU effectively abets Orbán because the hugely transformational EU funds flowing into Hungary—visible in constant pointless roundabout construction—are controlled by construction firms that act as extensions of Fidesz and Orbán's power, so the EU is funding the dominance of the very political movement eroding its norms.
“that's all EU money, and it's all under the control of companies that — construction firms essentially act as extensions of Fidesz and Orbán's power. They control, as a party, this tap of money, and that helps solidify their power.”
Moldova's political future hinges on EU merger with Romania, blocked by Transnistria's Russian separatism, and Kaliningrad persists as stable Russian territory because nuclear deterrence overwhelms traditional exclave precarity.
- Moldova has a strong pro-EU political movement to merge with Romania, evidenced by its parliament officially renaming the 'Moldavian' language as 'Romanian,' but the merger is blocked by the problem of incorporating Transnistria, an ethnically Russian separatist enclave; Moldovan politics splits not Left-Right but pro-EU versus pro-Russia.
“They just renamed their language "Romanian." The complicated history of Moldavian as a separate language has maybe come to an end.”
- Despite the historical tendency for separated exclaves to be precarious and end badly in Eastern Europe, Kaliningrad is stable because Russia's status as a nuclear power is an overwhelming deterrent, making it more like a long-lasting curio (Malta or Luxembourg) than a Crimea of the Baltic.
“as much as those exclaves used to be — and still are (in Nagorno-Karabakh) — very precarious, being a nuclear power is an awfully big trump card. I can't see any of the countries surrounding that oblast making a big move.”
Orthodox Christianity as cultural curse is overstated; economic outcomes depend on EU proximity and integration rather than deep religious determinism.
- The supposed 'Orthodox disease' or curse holding back economic growth in Orthodox countries is more a figment of geography than a deep cultural matrix; one can be optimistic about Catholic Croatia and Orthodox Romania and Bulgaria simultaneously, with outcomes driven by EU integration and proximity to the industrial core of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland rather than by religion.
“I think that idea of an Orthodox disease is maybe a figment of geography more than a deeply cultural matrix that we think... I'm not sure that I believe in a kind of Orthodox curse.”
Polish culinary tradition thrives in unpretentious home cooking and communist-era milk bars rather than in new artisanal gastronomy.
- Polish food is at its best as simple, well-made home-style cooking by grandmothers and in communist-relic milk bars (daytime cafeterias serving cheap alcohol-free standards), even as a higher tier of fancy artisanal Polish gastronomy has emerged.
“Polish food is best when it's made by babcias, by Polish grandmas. I go to milk bars, and it's always the best meal.”