What this covers

Edward Glaeser and David Cutler debate the costs of urban density and which institutions determine whether cities lift people up or lock them down. The conversation moves across disease epidemiology, housing policy, education, healthcare pricing, and labor markets—all anchored by a core claim: that over four decades, America has systematized the protection of insiders (tenured teachers, existing homeowners, established professionals) while making entry harder for outsiders. Rather than flee cities for the suburbs, they argue, the right response is to fight the Externalities of density—crime, contagion, congestion, failing schools—through better institutions and pragmatic design, not retreat.

The two trace how education has become the dominant sorting mechanism for health, opportunity, and geography, replacing race as the primary divide. Cities fail at this sorting because entrenched interests prevent both school improvement and housing supply expansion; NIMBY zoning and teachers' unions protect insiders while pricing out strivers. They examine how congestion pricing would outperform free roads, why remote work widens skill gaps by preserving static productivity while undermining the dynamic learning that comes from agglomeration, and why pay for performance in healthcare struggles against fragmented incentives and gaming through coding. Healthcare pricing remains opaque because patients avoid discussing costs with doctors—a form of discomfort that lets hospitals shirk transparency. They consider why suburbs don't deliver the happiness people expect, how beautiful neighborhoods require freedom from regulation, and why improved urban fertility depends on good schools. On cities and poverty, they push back against romanticized rejection of density: Brazil's favelas deliver upward mobility despite police failure; the problem is not density itself but whether institutions function.

Sharpest takeaway

Glaeser and Cutler argue that cities and societal institutions increasingly protect entrenched insiders (via schools, NIMBYism, and administrative health costs) at the expense of outsiders, and that the right response to the 'demons of density'—disease, crime, poor schools—is to fight them through better institutions and pragmatic policy rather than to retreat from urban life.

  • Education increasingly determines health, opportunity, and where one can afford to live, making education 'the new race'
  • Cities fail at schools and housing supply because of entrenched interests (teachers' unions, NIMBYs) protecting insiders
  • Remote work preserves static productivity but undermines the dynamic learning and onboarding benefits of agglomeration

The argument · threads13 threads · 52 claims
0.76

Housing abundance and low development barriers are essential for affordability and broad economic opportunity.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • While we should fight against distributing rents to particular localities (it was good that Rio stopped being Brazil's capital), there is nothing normative about Zipf's law: social scientists have no way to know whether New York is 'too big' or Chicago should be '30 percent larger,' so we should resist any urge to micromanage the locations of firms and individuals through national spatial policy.

    “I don’t think there’s anything normative about Zipf’s law.”

  • In a world where city space is scarce, you should charge as much or more for on-street parking as a structured parking lot charges; once parking is priced, there's no reason to impose parking minimums or free-parking regulations, and there's no reason any block in Manhattan should offer free parking.

    “you want to charge as much, if not more, for parking in a slot on the city streets as the person who has a structured parking lot charges for their space.”

  • The Southeast's value has been as the land of free development where ordinary Americans can buy a home at a reasonable price because developers aren't fettered, but NIMBY walls are going up in place after place (Austin, central Atlanta) with more barriers to tearing down and rebuilding—which would be very bad for America if it eliminated the parts that make building easy enough for ordinary people to afford housing.

    “in place after place, in Austin, Texas, in central Atlanta, we’re seeing the NIMBY walls go up.”

  • Complaints about absentee owners (e.g., Vancouver towers owned by oligarchs who are never there) are misguided as an argument against new construction: if you sell a $50 million apartment to someone who is never present and demands no city services, you've made a huge gain and should simply charge more in property taxes—though such units do nothing for affordability, so they should be taxed to fund services rather than relied upon to lower prices.

    “If you tell me you’re selling a $50 million apartment to someone and they’re never there, and you’re unhappy about that, I’d tell you you’re not charging enough in property taxes.”

  • Glaeser's two-factor model of economic growth is that it comes down to education and to institutions that are relatively pro-free-market and pro-business; highly educated pro-business Southern cities (Austin, Atlanta) are well-positioned because embracing economic freedom makes housing easier to buy.

    “I basically have a two-factor model of economic growth, Tyler. My model is always, it’s about education, and it’s about institutions that are relatively pro-free market, relatively pro-business.”

0.71

Behavioral and structural factors beyond information access drive major health and social outcomes, not market transparency.

7 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Consumers will shop on price and quality in healthcare when the choice is clear, they have time, the doctor has no stake, and no person they might offend is involved—exemplified by people choosing among COVID vaccines on their own and selecting IVF centers by their success records—but they refuse to do so when it means questioning a surgeon or having an uncomfortable conversation with their own doctor.

    “It helps if it’s a pill and not a person who you’re deciding between yes or no, and where you don’t feel like your doctor has a stake in it”

  • Hospital price transparency fails because patients are deeply uncomfortable discussing money or quality with doctors—they will research a TV or refrigerator but not a surgeon's record—so when patients won't complain, hospitals have no burning need to disclose prices and do the minimum or fail to comply.

    “People really don’t like the money being involved in the medical care part.”

  • The vast bulk of prolific members of the anti-vax community know exactly what the CDC says—they simply don't believe it—so more access to information ('Dr. Google') will not solve vaccine refusal, even if it helps other people navigate the medical system.

    “The vast bulk of people who are prolific in the anti-vax community know exactly what the CDC says. They just don’t believe it.”

  • Suicide results from a confluence of demand-side pain (physical pain, mental health impairment, despair) and demand for rapid pain relief meeting supply-side access to lethal means (especially guns for men, or opioids), with many acts being intense non-rational responses to pain rather than rational decisions; the supply side matters more for opioid deaths while the demand side matters more for youth.

    “On the demand side, there is pain of various forms, and there’s demand for pain relief... Then there’s, on the supply side, the ability to carry it out. In the case of suicides, it’s access to guns.”

  • Latino immigrants tend to outlive native-born Americans partly due to selection and the favorable health behaviors they bring from their home countries, but their descendants converge toward American (and 'native American') health outcomes as they adopt American behaviors like smoking and obesity.

    “second generation will be more like Americans and so on, in terms of smoking and obesity and a variety of adverse behaviors like that.”

  • Americans cut smoking in half within 40 years of the surgeon general's report while Western Europeans did not, because smoking is a social activity subject to peer effects and external consequences: US taxes, indoor/public smoking restrictions, and information shocks (like the Master Settlement Agreement revealing tobacco-company lies) hit much sooner in the US, triggering a two-to-three-decade decline in youth smoking.

    “Smoking is also a social activity, so if your friends are smoking, and you don’t have restrictions on where you can smoke, then people are more likely to start smoking and continue smoking.”

  • Residual/environmental theories of obesity—that some unidentified chemical or substance exposure contributes to rising obesity—should be taken seriously as theories, analogous to how it took a long time to identify what in tobacco caused cancer; environmental factors may turn out bigger than thought (with hints linking pollution to dementia and Alzheimer's), though there is not yet definitive evidence.

    “I wouldn’t be surprised if some of these environmental factors turn out to be bigger than we had thought, but I don’t have anything yet that I look at and say, “Okay, this is obviously definitive on this point.””

0.68

Education now drives inequality more than race, with cascading effects on health, housing, and geographic sorting.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Better-educated people are systematically in better health, and the health gap between college and non-college groups is growing over time even as other gaps (e.g., between whites and Blacks) are shrinking.

    “the gap between people with a college degree and people without a college degree is growing over time, even as other gaps, for example, between whites and Blacks, are shrinking over time.”

  • American society is increasingly bifurcating along socioeconomic/educational lines rather than race ('education is the new race'); because high-wage areas now have such high house prices that only the very wealthy can afford them, lower-income people get compressed into areas with other lower-income people, turning society into an insider's game where outsiders can't participate.

    “education is the new race, that we’re learning how to dismantle some of the barriers that have existed by race... What’s coming up is that education is increasingly associated with where you live”

  • Cities have below-replacement fertility largely because residents don't believe they have access to great public schools (unlike suburbanites), and since each new human is a source of creativity worth having, the most important way to address urban fertility decline—as with so many urban problems—is to improve the quality of urban schooling.

    “the part of the cities that are really detrimental to fertility — I think it’s got to be the schooling.”

0.67

Urban schools remain trapped by entrenched interests blocking reform and competitive alternatives despite density's theoretical advantages.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Cities are surprisingly bad at providing upward mobility for poor children: per the Opportunity Atlas (Chetty, Hendren, Friedman), at the metro level density and size are negatively associated with performance, and within metros density and proximity to the city center negatively correlate with upward mobility, with a sharp cliff at the central-city school-district edge where children do much better economically and are less likely to be incarcerated.

    “Within metropolitan areas, density and proximity to a city center are both negatively correlated with upward mobility.”

  • Segregation is generally more harmful the less educated the group is, so we should particularly worry about and take policies against the segregation of lower-skilled groups; however, beyond banning outright housing discrimination (illegal for 50 years), it is unclear what strong policies exist to reduce within-city segregation, and the right lever is less regulation rather than dictating density.

    “in general, segregation is more harmful the less educated the group is. We should particularly worry about the segregation of those groups that have less skills”

  • Brazil's favelas are not a YIMBY failure but provide upward mobility for millions, since cities have a phenomenal track record of turning poor farmers into middle-class urbanites; the one real failure is that Brazil's police have failed, and the right response to the 'demons of density' (crime, contagious disease, traffic) is to do battle against them rather than tell people to stay in rural poverty.

    “The overall track record of cities as a tool for turning poor farmers into middle-class urbanites is phenomenal.”

  • Over the last 40 years America has done an amazing job protecting its insiders at the expense of its outsiders, with schooling and NIMBYism as prime examples of how cities and suburbs have become machines for protecting the entrenched interests of middle-aged, middle-class people while making it hard for those who start with less to find a brighter future.

    “America has done an amazing job over the last 40 years of protecting its insiders at the expense of its outsiders.”

  • Urban schools persist in dysfunction because change is uniquely hard: unlike police chiefs who can change officer behavior 'on a dime,' principals cannot quickly change teacher behavior, and powerful entrenched interests—especially teachers' unions whose members vote and are anxious against change—block reforms like vouchers; a workaround is competitively sourced, pay-for-performance wraparound/vocational training that bypasses unions.

    “Unlike policing, principals cannot immediately tell teachers how to change their behavior, whereas police chiefs can actually change what their officers do on a dime.”

  • Because it has never been easier for people and businesses to leave cities, treating the rich and businesses like a piggy bank is a terrible mistake; city governments must be pragmatic—providing decent schools and safe streets cost-effectively—or people will run away, and movement driven by political dysfunction rather than economic reality is bad.

    “It’s never been easier for people to leave the city. Treating your rich, treating your businesses like they’re a piggy bank is a terrible mistake.”

0.63

Social insurance and universal program reach reduce health inequality through stress reduction and access across life stages.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Society has made it easier for high-income, high-SES people to engage in and buy things associated with improved health—through lower environmental exposure, lower chronic stress, and better access to medical care—and the way cities and environments are shaped by upper-middle-class residents benefits everyone living nearby (e.g., less smoking, more parks).

    “people who live in cities — where there are more better-educated people — smoke less, even conditional on your own education.”

  • Social insurance programs—not just Medicare and Medicaid but also WIC, food stamps, TANF benefits, and housing policies—have a bigger and more sustained effect on health over the life cycle than previously thought, partly through lowering stress, so ensuring these programs reach everyone is a key lever for improving health.

    “many programs really seem like they have a big impact over the course of the life cycle on people’s health.”

  • It is a bad idea for all of a country's public health to hang on one agency, because if that agency suffers bad luck or bad leadership, nothing can happen—analogous to having only one hospital able to do cardiac surgery; and the Trump administration's beating-down of public health agencies caused good people to leave, creating lasting harm that takes a long time to recover from.

    “it’s a bad idea where all of the public health of the country hangs on one agency so that if that agency has bad luck or bad leadership... then nothing can happen.”

  • Over the 19th century, governments transitioned from being essentially agents of death to actually doing good, largely through urban upper-middle-class civic leaders fighting for sewers and aqueducts to combat contagious disease—and the institutions developed alongside that infrastructure were a major advance.

    “this is the moment in which governments stop, cease from being just an agent of death.”

  • The pandemic showed that even a purely selfish wealthy person must now care about the health of poorer residents because contagious disease, obesity-linked COVID spread, smoking, and IV drug use create externalities that affect everyone—implying public policy must reinvigorate the neglected public health infrastructure rather than focus only on doctors and hospitals.

    “poor health anywhere is poor health everywhere.”

0.63

Healthcare cost control requires fixing drug prices and administrative waste before moving to outcome-based payment bundling.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Pay-for-performance in healthcare (via accountable care organizations and bundled-care arrangements with quality indicators) is effective—when introduced, quality improves while costs stay the same or decline—but it has not been a total game-changer, and no intervention has yet been found that saves 15 percent while dramatically raising quality.

    “when you put them in, quality improves, costs stay the same or decline. As best we can tell, they’re very effective. They’ve not turned out to be absolute, total game-changers.”

  • The single highest-priority, nonobvious healthcare reform is reducing spending in two areas: certain pharmaceuticals that are vastly overpriced relative to what they deliver due to gaming, and the absurd administrative costs that drive up prices, frustrate patients and doctors, and deliver nothing valuable—saving here would make the medical system both better and cheaper and enable everything else.

    “the administrative costs of healthcare that are absolutely absurd, that drive up prices so people can’t afford it, that frustrate people and doctors... and don’t do anything valuable.”

  • Based on the literature, the best healthcare contract pays a fixed per-member per-month fee for caring for the person plus a fixed payment for each episode of care (to encourage coordination across the episode), combined with substantial outcome measurement so providers earn extra for genuinely good results.

    “you get paid a fixed amount for caring for the person. A per-member per-month fee for caring for the person. If you have an episode of care, there’s a fixed payment for the episode. That encourages coordination across the episode.”

  • Very important people risk worse care because of overtreatment: excessive testing (like PSA tests, which are no longer recommended, or extra biopsies) triggers a 'cascade' where an incidental finding leads to specialist visits, removals, and further interventions unrelated to the original problem, costing a lot while bringing anguish and sometimes worse health outcomes.

    “It’s the cascade. People talk it about in terms of a cascade. The first thing is never that bad, but then it leads to the next thing and the next thing and so on.”

  • The Minnesota-Wisconsin area has extremely good healthcare across the board with smaller treatment-intensity gradients, providers who don't 'go wild' on procedures, and a stronger social ethic of caring about people as a whole—making it where Cutler would choose to get sick if forced to leave Boston.

    “The upper Midwest has very good healthcare if you think about the Minnesota-Wisconsin area... They don’t go wild on doing stuff.”

0.59

Institutional capacity and leadership matter more than policy design; sound policy fails without adequate resources and implementation.

1 pointcentrality 5/5
  • City government capacity is more important than policy: academics focus on the right policy, but if a mayor has at most two people who will do anything they say, it doesn't matter what policy you recommend because it can't get done—so understanding the institutional constraints on particular leaders is crucial.

    “city government capacity is more important than policy.”

0.57

Remote work sorting and unequal home environments amplify inequality despite enabling location flexibility for some workers.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Remote work will persist most among older workers and established firms (e.g., two accounting partners who know each other well), while younger workers and just-getting-started firms in their creative/learning phase will continue to need to be co-located, and home environment matters greatly—working at home is far more pleasant for a middle-aged professor than a 23-year-old in a studio apartment.

    “for younger workers, for firms that are just getting started, I think being live is likely to continue being a major part of the work environment.”

  • Remote work will drive a reallocation of small teams and educated workers toward high-quality-of-life areas and countries (skiing in Vail, beaches in Hawaii or Bali; English-speaking, tech-savvy Ireland), rather than Silicon Valley startups simply 'phoning it in,' thereby cementing English as a global language.

    “I would expect a really allocation towards high-quality-of-life areas and high-quality-of-life countries.”

  • If businesses leave cities because workers moved to suburbs, the harm to cities is far less than intuition suggests: losing 10 percent of businesses equals only two or three years of normal business growth, and vacated commercial real estate can be converted to residential use, making cities cheaper and more attractive for younger people who want urban density.

    “if you move 10 percent of businesses out of cities... that’s roughly two or three years of growth, typical growth by business. So within two or three years, you’re back to where you were.”

  • Remote work can preserve or even raise static productivity but undermines the dynamic benefits of being around others—learning, onboarding, and promotion—evidenced by call center studies (Bloom's China RCT and Emanuel/Harrington's US study) showing remote workers are equally or more productive but far less likely to be promoted, and by new programmer hires falling 42 percent from November 2019 to November 2020.

    “while the static productivity remains, you lose the dynamic benefits of being around other people.”

  • Telecommuting exhibits an enormous skill divide—in May 2020, 68.9 percent of Americans with advanced degrees telecommuted versus 15 percent with only high school degrees and 5 percent of high school dropouts—so a world of remote work benefits educated areas and educated people (e.g., Bangalore's rise) and will do nothing for the bottom third of the American skill distribution.

    “In May 2020, 68.9 percent of Americans with advanced degrees were telecommuting; 5 percent of high school dropouts were telecommuting; 15 percent of people who just had high school degrees were telecommuting.”

  • Pay-for-performance is limited because insurer incentives are fragmented (each insurer has its own system) and because reimbursement systems reward making patients appear sick through coding—an easy, high-return activity—so far more effort goes into coding for reimbursement than into actually improving patient health.

    “there’s much more effort put into the coding part, which has got a real easy return to it, than there is put into the health improvement part.”

  • One genuinely good outcome of the COVID pandemic is that telemedicine now seems firmly implanted as a result of improvements in IT, giving many people valuable ability to see their doctor online.

    “now telemedicine seems firmly implanted, and that’s really a result of improvements in IT and stuff.”

0.36

Global diet Westernization and short time horizons in health behavior drive obesity and chronic disease independent of food costs.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Diets don't work well despite cheaper food preparation lowering the price of eating, because people have a very short-term time horizon and chronically defer dieting and exercise to 'next week,' failing to recognize that they will make the same deferral again, so the time saved on food preparation is never reallocated to exercise.

    “People have a very short-term horizon where they have difficulty understanding that if I don’t do it this week, I’m not going to do it next week, and then I’m not going to do it the following week.”

  • As countries and regions get richer, they adopt a Western (particularly US) diet high in corn syrup, fast food, and salty foods, which brings US-type health problems—seen in parts of rural Mexico and in Pacific islands with sudden mineral wealth that reach obesity rates as high as 80 percent with associated diabetes.

    “You have in some of these islands 80 percent obesity rates and all the diabetes that comes along with that.”

0.32

Police funding and respectful policing require investment because reduced presence increases crime despite concerns about style.

1 pointcentrality 3/5
  • Crime fluctuations are largely unexplainable due to peer effects in crime creating hard-to-explain variation, but the elasticity of crime with respect to the quantity of police is strong (more cops in a neighborhood reduces crime), while the effect of policing style is much harder to detect; pattern-of-practice investigations after viral police shootings caused crime to spike because police stopped going to high-crime areas, which is why defunding police is dangerous and improving respectful policing actually requires more funding, not less.

    “there’s an elasticity of crime with respect to the quantity of cops that seems pretty strong... but the styles making a difference is much harder to tell.”

0.31

Urban renewal requires regulatory reform, better schools, congestion pricing, and embracing autonomous technology over legacy transit.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The reason we don't see beautiful new urban neighborhoods is that older cities have regulated themselves into stasis—historic preservation is a binding rule in London, Paris, and New York—and because for the past 80 years cities have been built around the dominant car technology, producing places to drive but few new pedestrian neighborhoods to walk around.

    “We don’t get beautiful new neighborhoods because historic preservation is a completely binding rule in London, in Paris, and in New York.”

  • It is odd to keep relying on the 19th-century technology of trains to connect cities; instead we should envision single dedicated lanes for autonomous buses going 150 miles an hour, which would be more flexible, cheaper, and a 21st-century technology.

    “Envision single, dedicated lanes for autonomous buses that go 150 miles an hour. This is going to be more flexible. It’s going to be cheaper.”

  • Congestion pricing is the best way to deal with urban traffic jams because there's no reason not to charge people for the social cost of their actions and giving away street space for free is crazy; moreover, introducing autonomous vehicles without congestion pricing would lower the cost of sitting in traffic, so the first-order behavioral response would be more people sitting in traffic and worse congestion.

    “if we introduce autonomous vehicles without congestion pricing, you have just lowered the cost of sitting in traffic, which means the first-order behavioral response is that more people will sit in traffic”

  • For many public policy problems (per Marty Feldstein), you don't need to know the optimal end state because you'll never reach it; you only need to know the right direction—so given how much demand and productivity Los Angeles has, we can be confident it should have more homes even without knowing whether that means skyscrapers or duplexes.

    “for many public policy problems, you don’t need to know where you want things to end up because it’ll never end up close to where you want it to end up. All you need to know is the right direction.”

0.21

Glaeser and Cutler disagree on paternalistic obesity policy and single-payer healthcare despite shared COVID severity concerns.

5 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Glaeser remains less comfortable than Cutler with paternalistic obesity and opioid policies that push people to be thinner, even while agreeing strongly that American obesity made COVID more severe—and separately, Cutler has never persuaded Glaeser on single-payer healthcare over 30 years of friendship.

    “I am still less comfortable with the view that you’re going to have paternalistic policies that really push people to be thinner than they currently are.”

  • Glaeser's 'Strategic Extremism' model (QJE 2005) explains partisan divides by communication channels: the right clustered around religion because there were religiously oriented microphones speaking to Republican voters, while the left was dominated by economic issues because unions were its primary communication device.

    “you had people clustering all along religion... on the right because there were people who were speaking to Republican voters who had religiously oriented microphones. By contrast, the left tended to be more dominated by economic issues because the left had the unions”

  • The resource curse tends to operate at intermediate levels of resource wealth; once a country has an unbelievable amount of it (as with UAE's oil), it tends to be much less of an actual curse, so generalizing from UAE's success to charter cities is not easy.

    “the resource curse tends to be in the intermediate levels, that once you have just an unbelievable amount of it, it tends to be much less of an actual resource curse.”

  • Charter cities like Próspera in Honduras are very hard to sustain because it is hard for governments to keep their hands off the golden egg; populist political dynamics tend to unravel a separate, more-successful jurisdiction, whereas Hong Kong worked because the British Navy protected it so neither China nor anyone else could grab it.

    “it’s very hard for a country to say, “Oh, we’re going to have this different jurisdiction run the city, and it’s going to be much more successful than the rest of the country, and we’re going to think that that’s okay.””

  • Moving from a city to a suburb produces little net health or happiness gain because, although people anticipate enjoying more space and a backyard, before-and-after surveys show they are not much happier—largely because they badly underestimate how stressed out they will be by spending substantial time commuting in a car five days a week.

    “people say they’ll be happier when they move to more space, but when you actually ask them before and after, they’re not much happier... people get very stressed out by commutes.”

0.18

Well-functioning emergency systems with practiced mass-casualty response deliver high health returns for cities managing acute crises.

1 pointcentrality 2/5
  • A well-functioning emergency system delivers high returns: in the Boston marathon bombing, deaths were very few and no one who reached a hospital alive died, because the emergency system had intensely practiced mass-casualty response—demonstrating that getting emergencies to the right places quickly and treated correctly matters a lot for any city.

    “No one who made it to a hospital alive died. That was because the emergency system had practiced intensely, how do you handle a mass casualty situation?”