What this covers
Ed Luce, a Financial Times journalist, discusses Western liberalism's condition with Tyler Cowen in this 2018 conversation. Luce's argument centers on retreat rather than collapse: the liberal order, particularly in the Anglo-American world, faces serious pressures but retains institutional capacity to regroup. He traces the decline to three interconnected sources—the commodification of public life into market logic, the economic failures of the elite-led model that has left middle classes worse off than their continental peers, and the withdrawal of American hegemonic leadership—that allowed illiberal movements in Eastern Europe to gain ground. Yet he argues the underlying architecture, from the Madisonian checks and balances to representative institutions themselves, proves resilient when tested.
The conversation ranges widely across the mechanisms of decline and recovery. Luce examines how Britain and the United States confuse credentials with actual skill in ways continental Europe avoids, how the post-1945 liberal international order was historically "unnatural" and required the Cold War's existential discipline to sustain, and how economic determinism—whether the system delivers material gains—ultimately governs liberalism's legitimacy. He discusses Brexit and Trump as illiberal reactions that could be reversed, points to Modi as a paradoxical figure mixing development with authoritarian impulses, and argues that cities vote internationalist even in illiberal regimes, offering grounds for hope in Russia. Throughout, he defends liberalism's precedence over democracy and argues that both the left and right now pose populist challenges to the postwar consensus.
Luce argues Western liberalism is in retreat—not collapse—primarily in the Anglo-American world, driven by commodified public life, economic failures of the elite-led order, and the absence of American hegemonic leadership, though the underlying institutions retain capacity to regroup.
- Britain and the US under-support their middle classes and conflate credentials with skill, generating more frustration than continental Europe
- The 70-year Pax Americana was an unnatural, deliberately sustained liberal order whose withdrawal lets illiberalism (Poland, Hungary, Putinism) advance
- Brexit and Trump are illiberal counterreactions, but the Madisonian system and a possible second referendum show retreat can be reversed
Liberalism's retreat stems from economic underperformance delivering worse outcomes to middle classes in the Anglo-American world.
- The retreat of Western liberalism is ultimately an economic-determinist phenomenon measured by whether the model delivers the goods to broad electorates: 2008 was described as a global recession but was actually an Atlantic recession—China and India kept growing—which raised the relative attractiveness of the Chinese model and undermined Western liberalism's claim to deliver.
“2008 was described as a global recession. It wasn’t. It was an Atlantic recession. China kept growing. India kept growing. The relative attractiveness of the Chinese model therefore grew.”
- The Anglo-American skew of illiberalism stems from the middle classes faring worse with fewer supports than elsewhere, a male employment problem (more prime-aged males work in France than the US), the poisoning effect of the Iraq War which France and Germany avoided, and the commodification of public life into a market society rather than merely a market economy.
“There are fewer supports for the middle classes in Britain and the United States than there are elsewhere, so the level of frustration, I think, is higher.”
- Globally this is an immensely positive moment with more people lifted from poverty than ever—enabled by the Pax Americana that let China and India grow—but in the West there is far more wasted, idle talent than before, which the unemployment rate hides; the true indicator is the falling labor force participation rate.
“In the West we have more talent but we have way more wasted talent than we used to have. There’s a lot more idle humans than there used to be”
- Contra Niall Ferguson's thesis about over-consumption and deficit spending, US publicly-held debt at around 75 percent of GDP is not remotely alarming by historic standards; the US should have had more counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus over the last decade, and Germany's 'sado-managerist' austerity approach has been very damaging to Europe's Club Med countries.
“when we look at, what, 75 percent of GDP, look at the publicly‑held debt, I don’t think by historic standards that’s remotely alarming.”
The Cold War's end removed the existential threat that kept Western liberal institutions honest and bipartisan.
- Today's absence of American leadership of the liberal international order allows countries like Hungary and Poland—which once craved EU membership—to move extraordinarily toward Putinism; America has been an exceptional hegemon whose 70-year post-1945 role was, per Bob Kagan, an unnatural period in human history, and its withdrawal means further illiberal drift.
“Today we are suffering, I think, from an absence of leadership of the liberal international order, and countries like Hungary and Poland are able to move extraordinarily ... towards Putinism”
- Much of liberalism's decline is attributable to the disappearance of an existential threat: the Cold War kept America honest and enabled bipartisan support for its unnatural global role as the Hercules sustaining the liberal international order, exemplified by Bush Sr.'s deft, breast-not-beating management of the Cold War's end; it will be very hard to reinvent that threat, nor should we wish to.
“the Cold War kept America honest, as it were, and enabled this bipartisan support for America’s, as I say, unnatural global role of being the Hercules that sustains the liberal international order.”
- Western liberalism is undergoing a retreat rather than a collapse—retreat implies the possibility of regrouping—but there is a severe structural challenge to how liberal democracy is conducted in the West, particularly in the English-speaking West.
“I do think there is a severe structural challenge to the way we conduct liberal democracy in the West, particularly in the English‑speaking West.”
Illiberalism is rising across the political spectrum from populist right and left movements, not exclusively from one direction.
- The 2017 British election producing a near-hung parliament was a far better outcome than a thumping Conservative majority would have been, because a strong majority would have enabled hard Brexit; many voters who would never want Corbyn as PM voted Labour precisely to maximize the chance of a hung parliament and constrain May's negotiating hand.
“I think this election was a way better outcome than a thumping majority for Theresa May to negotiate hard Brexit. I always felt that the best possible result was a hung parliament.”
- Low electoral turnout reflects a deep, understandable cynicism about politics, experts, and the establishment—who 'sold' the Iraq War and failed to see 2008 coming—and millennials have grown up treating this cynicism as normal; while apathy may seem preferable to anger, it is highly corrosive of liberal democracy.
“I think there is a deep cynicism about it, which is really quite understandable, if you look at what the experts have bought us. They bought us the Iraq War ... They bought us 2008.”
- UKIP vanished in the election not as a positive development but because the Conservative Party essentially became UKIP, taking up base anti-migrant politics; this illustrates Hofstadter's point that third parties are like bees—they sting and then they die—as UKIP stung (Brexit happened) and the Conservatives occupied its ground.
“the Conservative Party has essentially become UKIP. It has taken up some really base, low, anti‑migrant politics”
- Illiberalism is not exclusively a right-wing phenomenon: the far left is on a roll—Corbyn (an unrepentant Marxist) gaining 30 seats, Mélenchon winning nearly a fifth of the French vote, and Bernie Sanders in the US—and as we move further from the 2008 Third Way era, populist left movements will marshal everywhere, posing a debate within the Democrats between a Macron wing and a Corbynista wing.
“The far left is really on a roll, something of a roll, in the Western world.”
- Theresa May is politically finished—a 'dead woman walking'—and British politics is Italianizing, with another general election likely within a year.
“the dead woman walking will actually be dead.”
Representative democracy requires delegating authority to elected representatives and must resist both plebiscitary shortcuts and technocratic rule.
- The best Brexit outcome would mirror Ireland's twice repeating European referendums (Maastricht and Lisbon) after a cooling-off period that raised turnout; a country's future should not be determined by 52 percent of the vote, and a second referendum giving people a chance to think is warranted given the poor pre-vote debate (Britons famously googled 'What is the EU?' the day after voting).
“You can not determine a country’s future like this with 52 percent of the vote.”
- Liberalism historically comes before democracy and the two go together rather than one trumping the other; the demonization of judges as 'Enemies of the People' for suggesting Parliament should have a say in Brexit is itself an example of illiberalism that chilled rational debate about the trade-offs.
“I think it historically comes before democracy. I don’t necessarily think it trumps. I think the two actually go together.”
- Following Edmund Burke's defense of representative over plebiscitary democracy during the French Revolution, complex ethical, legal, societal, and international decisions cannot be decided by plebiscite—even online—and require delegating authority to full-time representatives who can be fired at the next election; the only alternatives are Robespierre-style instant democracy or a Singapore-style rule of experts, and nothing beats representative democracy.
“These are questions where you need to be able to delegate authority to your representatives who you can fire at the next opportunity to develop the skills as full‑time political representatives to make these judgments.”
- So-called soft Brexit is an oxymoron: remaining in the single European market while leaving the EU means paying a hundred-billion-Euro divorce cost while having no say over EU trade deals, regulation, movement of people, or any EU policy—it is a clear loss of sovereignty and economic clout, not a gain.
“It’s a loss of sovereignty, not a gain of sovereignty. For certain it’s a serious loss of economic clout.”
Continental European social models better accommodate diverse skills and transitions than Anglo-American degree-based approaches.
- Britain and the US confuse what 'skilled' means by equating it with holding a college degree, when many skilled people lack degrees and many degree-holders are unskilled; continental Europe, particularly the Nordics and Germany, better accommodates a diversity of aspirations and aptitudes and invests in stepping-stone roles the Anglo world dismisses as low-skilled.
“We think if you’ve got a college degree, you’re skilled. I know lots of skilled people who don’t have college degrees, and I know lots of people with college degrees ... who are unskilled.”
- Denmark has an employer-government program letting everyone train at anything for two weeks a year, which most Danish employees use; this produces higher labor-market turnover than the rest of Europe because workers don't feel wedded to one skill and feel more confident moving around in a gig economy.
“Denmark, for example, has an employer government program where everybody can train at anything they like for two weeks a year, and most Danish employees avail of that.”
- There is no such thing as a generic speechwriter—you are a speechwriter to a specific person and must know that individual very well; writing for Larry Summers, for example, transferred no skill applicable to writing for Steve Mnuchin, and the intensive process taught Luce more in three months than a year as a student.
“there’s no such thing as a generic speech writer. There’s, “You are speech writer to A or B.””
- Anyone wanting to be the next Ed Luce should not start out as a journalist (or in politics) but should acquire real skills and experience in completely unrelated fields first.
“I would say do other things than journalism. Don’t start out being a journalist.”
The US system fails when parties become monochromatic and parliamentary rather than coalitional, undermining constitutional checks.
- The US system is not designed to be parliamentary—it works better when each party is itself a coalition of different interests—so the fact that each party is becoming more monochromatic, disciplined, and parliamentary is disastrous for a system that doesn't work that way.
“Your system works better when each party is a coalition between different interests, and the fact that each is becoming more and more monochromatic, more and more disciplined and parliamentary, is disastrous for this system.”
- The most plausible scenario in which Trump works out for the better is the Madisonian system demonstrating that it works—holding Trump to account via the Mueller appointment, courts repeatedly blocking the Muslim ban, the media ferreting out wrongdoing, and Congress—making it a net plus over time.
“Trump working out for the better, I would say, is the system showing the it works, the Madisonian system showing that it works.”
- Lennon is rated highly partly because he died youngest, and while a great lyricist he was a bit of a jerk—a deflation of the worship that surrounds him.
“He’s the best Beatle because he died youngest.”
Democratic renewal remains possible in illiberal regions like Russia and India despite current authoritarian drift or Hindu nationalism.
- What still most surprises Luce about the United States is its ability to reinvent itself—a protean quality that, even alongside a complacent class and possible slowing, remains far more in evidence in America than in places that never had it, illustrated by how quickly gay marriage, marijuana legalization, and a black president became reality from a 2002 vantage point.
“The ability to reinvent itself, even though there is a complacent class ... there is that protean quality to America which might have slowed, but it’s still way more in evidence here”
- African Americans (and Hispanics) poll as optimistic about the country's future because they are getting better off from a much lower base, are younger on average, and rationally see their children as being better off than they are.
“Because they are getting better off from a much lower base, and Hispanics do, too. They, I think, quite rationally, see their children as being better off than they are.”
- Liberalism could take hold in Russia within 20 years because cities everywhere tend to vote for the internationalist option—Putin allowed over half of Moscow to vote against him in 2012, Istanbul rejected Erdogan's referendum, and Navalny is getting young Russians out protesting on scale—offering grounds for hope rather than treating Russia as permanently the antagonist of liberalism.
“If you look anywhere around the world, cities tend to vote for the internationalist option, and Putin was so complacent ... He allowed more than half of Moscow to vote against him”
- India's sheer diversity—18 official languages and every religion—is a great stabilizing strength that gives it an advantage over China; viewed from 30,000 feet it looks stabilizing even though from within it appears anarchic, because India is a country that lets off steam regularly, which is why Modi's failure to celebrate that side of India is concerning.
“India’s sheer pluralism is very stabilizing if you take a sort of 30,000‑foot view. If you’re in the midst of it, you think it’s anarchy”
- Modi is a Jekyll-and-Hyde figure: the Jekyll is a non-corrupt fanatical project-executor pursuing a China-style infrastructure development model that, if successful, would be a positive liberal event lifting people from poverty; but the Hyde is a fascist who, if development fails before reelection, is unmatched at whipping up Hindu sentiment to override caste divisions, since in India you don't cast your vote, you vote your caste.
“Modi, I think of him as a Jekyll and Hyde figure. The Jekyll figure, the good part, is that he’s a fanatic. He believes what he believes, and he’s therefore not in politics for business.”
Some historical developments can be judged illiberal in real time despite complexity, and some remain ambiguous depending on vantage point.
- The 1688 deposition of James II by William of Orange was a liberal development at the time—producing the bill of rights and restricting monarchical power—but in retrospect, given the Protestant fundamentalist Battle of the Boyne, it is now celebrated in a pretty illiberal manner, and judgment depends on which historical vantage point you adopt.
“At the time, it was very much a liberal development. Of course, we then get the bill of rights. We then get a further restriction of the power of the monarchy”
- While judging whether a development is liberal sometimes requires the passage of time (per the misquoted Chou En-Lai anecdote, which actually referred to 1968 not 1789), some judgments can be made confidently in real time—Luce predicts Brexit will not stand the test of time and Trump will not retrospectively be seen as a liberal moment, just as the real-time comparison of George W. Bush to Truman was easily dispensed with.
“I don’t think that Brexit is going to stand the test of time. I can argue that, if you wish me to, that judgment pretty confidently, I don’t think the election of Trump is going to retrospectively be seen as a liberal moment”