Doug Irwin
What this covers
Doug Irwin draws on economic history and trade theory to challenge both reflexive protectionism and the claim that free trade requires pure laissez-faire governance. The conversation ranges across two centuries of US trade policy, the architecture of modern trade institutions, and the structural changes reshaping global commerce. Irwin contends that legitimate policy goals—national security, cultural preservation, labor adjustment—do not require tariffs or quotas when more direct domestic measures can address them. He also revisits widely accepted historical narratives, arguing that 19th-century American growth came from agricultural and service-sector productivity rather than tariff protection, and that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, while economically damaging, did not cause the Great Depression as commonly claimed.
The discussion extends into the American founding itself, where Irwin frames the Revolution as an early trade dispute: colonists enjoyed cheap British defense while paying low taxes, and the Constitution emerged partly from the need for unified trade negotiating authority. He reexamines figures like Alexander Hamilton, whose reputation as a protectionist obscures his reliance on import revenue for federal finances, and Adam Smith's exception for defense, which Irwin subjects to practical scrutiny. Later sections address contemporary dynamics: the China shock as a one-time labor-supply event with modest aggregate impact, NAFTA as relationship-building rather than tariff-reduction, and the WTO's dysfunction under consensus rules. Throughout, Irwin distinguishes between tariffs and targeted regulation, explores how Investor-state dispute settlement functions as a credibility mechanism, and assesses whether Dani Rodrik's pessimism about premature deindustrialization in developing countries accounts for production fragmentation.
Irwin argues that the case for free trade has never been a case for laissez-faire: most apparent exceptions (national security, culture, jobs, tourism) are better addressed by targeted domestic policies than by trade barriers, and historical claims that tariffs drove growth are largely unsupported.
- 19th century US growth came from services and agriculture productivity, not tariff-protected manufacturing
- Legitimate goals like defense or limiting externalities can be met with domestic policy or taxation rather than tariffs or quotas
- Trade agreements like NAFTA delivered gains through relationship-building and openness more than through tariff cuts
Tariffs were not the driver of American or other nations' historical economic growth.
- 19th century American economic growth was not driven by high tariffs; the overtaking of Britain in per capita income came largely from rapid productivity growth in the service sector and agriculture, and counterfactual simulations show removing tariffs would have shifted only a small amount of resources out of manufacturing.
“Steve Broadberry's shown that a lot of the overtaking of Britain in terms of per capita income was in terms of the service sector.”
- No late-19th-century country had growth driven by tariffs; countries like Argentina, Canada, and Germany did very well as commodity exporters, and Argentina, one of the richest countries in the world then, only began falling behind after adopting import substitution policies post-WWI.
“Argentina was one of the richest countries in the world in the late 19th century. It really wasn't until they adopted more import substitution policies after World War I that they began to fall behind.”
- You do not need protectionist tariffs to fund the federal government; in the 1870s-1880s the US ran huge fiscal surpluses, and a few select commodity duties (the sugar tariff alone provided around 25% of tariff revenue) could raise all needed revenue, whereas heavy duties on steel rails and cotton textiles raised little revenue and merely blocked imports to help domestic interests.
“The sugar tariff alone accounted for 25 percent of all revenue coming from the tariffs, maybe even more. You could tax a few select commodities, have them as excise taxes.”
- Alexander Hamilton was not the founding American protectionist; though his Report on Manufactures argued against Adam Smith and the physiocrats that manufacturing is valuable, as Treasury Secretary he wanted a large continuous flow of imports as his tax base and rejected Jefferson-Madison embargo proposals because trade disruption would upset his fiscal plans.
“when you look at his activities when he was Secretary of the Treasury, he did not want to keep out imports. He wanted a constant flow, a large flow of imports coming in because that was his tax base.”
China's integration into global trade has not proceeded as hoped, with mercantilist intervention undermining WTO commitments and escalating conflict.
- When letting China into the WTO, US negotiators were defensive—seeking exceptions allowing the US to impose barriers against Chinese textiles and special safeguards—rather than insisting on strict rules preventing China from intervening in sectors or providing free credit to domestic firms, so the West did give up too much leverage.
“US negotiators were very defensive in terms of what they were asking China. They wanted, really, exceptions that the US could impose trade barriers against China”
- China has become more mercantilist, interventionist, and protectionist in non-tariff ways than hoped when it joined the WTO, echoing Jacob Viner's post-WWII question of whether communist and non-communist worlds could be integrated in a trading system — to which the answer turned out to be no — and continued Chinese rule-pushing points toward more trade conflict regardless of Trump.
“It's become much more mercantilist, much more interventionist, much more protectionist in nontariff ways than a lot of people thought and hoped that China would evolve.”
- China's blocking of Uber, Google, and Facebook is done for political and national security reasons, not economic ones, and on the economic margin it does not boost Chinese welfare because it limits citizens', scientists', and others' access to the best ideas and most efficient services, even though domestic equivalents like Baidu, WeChat, and Didi arise.
“By limiting access to information by your domestic citizens, your scientists, and others — unless they can breach that wall — they're not going to have access to the best ideas out there.”
- Chinese capital inflows financed US government securities and transfer payments, making fiscal deficits easier to accommodate, but there will be a reckoning because cheap credit for a 5-to-10-year period must eventually be paid for and access to cheap credit may not last forever.
“A lot of government spending is just transfer payments. So it made those transfer payments and the US fiscal deficits easier to accommodate.”
The WTO's consensus-based structure paralyzes negotiations, driving countries to bilateral and regional deals while its authority erodes.
- The WTO's future is in doubt because shifting from the smaller like-minded GATT club to a 160-member consensus-based WTO created a lowest-common-denominator forum—'a car with one accelerator and 150 hand brakes'—where almost any country can block progress, driving countries to bypass it via regional, bilateral, and sectoral agreements, while US hostility to its dispute settlement system threatens its remaining value.
“The former director general of the WTO once said it's like a car with one accelerator and 150 hand brakes.”
- Because tariffs have already been beaten down, big future trade agreements (like TPP or a hypothetical US-EU deal) will increasingly be about regulatory provisions, and this will on net bring more regulation, though it could cut either way by also preventing regulatory protectionism where governments tweak standards to favor domestic firms.
“Unfortunately, yes. Tariff levels have been beaten down.”
- A containerization-like breakthrough that makes services easily tradable is unlikely because, unlike merchandise with a single transport cost or border tax, each service sector (banking, insurance, airlines) has its own locally-determined regulatory regime that is very hard to harmonize, which is why the WTO's GATS is an essentially empty agreement.
“each service sector has its own specific trade costs, if you will. Financial services — every country has its own regime, its own regulatory regime.”
Developing countries face fundamentally different industrialization paths as manufacturing employment stagnates early in their growth.
- Countries whose manufacturing employment share has stagnated below 15% (Brazil, India, South Africa) cannot follow the old industrialization recipe of building a manufacturing-based middle class; they will have to take a different, services-oriented path in which the schooling system and human capital become much more important.
“If these people are going to be going into services rather than manufacturing, it could be the schooling system is much more important to the extent that human capital is more important for services.”
- Africa is the big region where future trade-driven growth could occur given many people and high trade costs from both bad policy and bad infrastructure, but unlike the 1990s—which were special because of communism's collapse and regime change—there is unlikely to be a simultaneous big-bang reform moment in Africa; growth will be more piecemeal and drawn out.
“the 1990s was special because we had the collapse of communism, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and so a lot of regime change that led to some of these things.”
- Premature deindustrialization (Dani Rodrik's claim that some countries will never industrialize like South Korea because manufacturing is automated and services are hard to trade) is not inevitable, because production can fragment locally—just as US steel shifted from big integrated mills to dispersed mini-mills, developing countries can host efficient small-scale local industry rather than centralizing in one or two countries.
“When you look at the steel industry in the United States, it's really become fragmented. You don't have the big, integrated mills anymore.”
Trade's macroeconomic context and aggregate labor-market conditions matter more than trade exposure itself for worker welfare.
- The Autor et al. China shock was a one-off, unique episode of economic history—a huge increase in Chinese market-sector labor supply in the 1990s-2000s—that hit specific one-factory towns hard but had a small aggregate impact (roughly one million US jobs over a decade), and a future negative China shock may occur as the Chinese labor force shrinks.
“the China shock was a one-off shock. It's not going to happen again.”
- The 1990s China import competition was less harmful because the US economy was growing robustly and displaced textile workers often got higher wages elsewhere, whereas the 2000s damage stemmed from a non-robust economy and large macroeconomic imbalances (a 10% Chinese current account surplus and a big US deficit); had US export growth to China matched import growth, the China shock would not be a debate.
“The China shock was not a macroeconomic shock, not an aggregate demand shock in a sort of Scott Sumner point of view.”
Trump's trade damage stems from alienating rhetoric and destabilization rather than major policy shifts, eroding gains with little offset.
- NAFTA was an excellent trade agreement that, despite small measurable consumer-surplus gains (since US barriers to Mexico were already low), solidified the US-Mexico relationship, was on net very good for Mexico, and produced nebulous John Stuart Mill-type benefits—an attitudinal shift toward openness and the dissolution of the one-party state into a competitive democracy.
“They said NAFTA is not a good trade agreement. NAFTA is an effing great trade agreement. And I agree.”
- The sprawling, decentralized US trade bureaucracy (USTR, State, Commerce, OPIC) is preferable to a consolidated Department of Trade because the interagency process provides internal checks and balances and coherence, whereas centralizing power risks an authority doing things we don't want; this same decentralization has acted as a check on Trump acting too quickly.
“What it does is it provides checks and balances on USTR or any lead agency ... Whenever you centralize power, it will do things that we don't necessarily want it to do.”
- On balance, the evidence suggests Brexit (Britain's NAFTA-like debate) will cost Britain some market access to Western Europe and part of its financial sector, and it is unclear that gains in sovereignty or regulatory freedom will compensate for that loss of trade and investment.
“Britain would lose some of its market access to Western Europe. They're going to lose some of their financial sector. And it's not clear what they gain in terms of sovereignty, or regulatory freedom, is going to compensate for that loss”
- Despite having the highest per capita income in the US and no income or sales tax, New Hampshire is not attracting young people and professionals because its business taxes are more of a hurdle than commonly thought, and economists in the state worry about its demographics and business climate.
“We say, "We have no income tax. We have no sales tax. We want businesses to come here." But the business taxes are more of a hurdle than one would think.”
- The American Revolution can be understood as an early Brexit: the Founding Fathers wanted political independence but expected to retain market access to the British Empire; Britain instead stripped all economic privileges, the 1780s saw severe trade disruption (arguably worse than the Great Depression for economic activity), and the Constitution itself was largely an outgrowth of the need for unified trade negotiating authority and revenue.
“The Founding Fathers really didn't want to lose market access to the British Empire.”
- American colonists were 'whiners' on trade and taxes: they received an enormous implicit subsidy from British national defense while bearing very low tax burdens compared to the average British citizen, the Navigation Acts have been exaggerated in popular history, and post-independence the US did not shift its trade much away from Britain.
“we were getting an enormous implicit subsidy in terms of British national defense. And our tax burdens, compared to the average British citizen, were very, very low.”
- The Smoot-Hawley Tariff is in one sense overrated because, contrary to the reflexive warnings of trade economists, it did not cause the Great Depression and a lot of the weight put on it is unsupported, though it was still a very bad thing.
“the dirty little secret might be that it's overrated because it didn't cause the Great Depression. A lot of the weight that was put on it doesn't support that.”
- Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is often demanded by developing countries, not foisted on them by the US, because it serves as a commitment device to credibly promise fair treatment of foreign investors and thereby attract foreign investment, as shown by Mexico and even the EU-Canada CETA agreement.
“The reason why developing countries want it is because it's a way of ensuring that they can commit themselves to treating foreign investors fairly.”
- Trump's trade damage so far is less about specific actions (the main one, leaving TPP, Clinton or Sanders would arguably have done too) and more about rhetoric that alienates allies like South Korea during tense times and pushes Mexico to consider living without NAFTA, producing a deterioration and 'rot' that costs the US market access with no gain.
“The damage is more the rhetoric in some sense. You're alienating South Korea, an ally, during a very tense time.”
- Comparative advantage and specialization are hard to separate because they reinforce each other: comparative advantage is a narrow concept with broad applicability (taught as a technology factor), and specialization reinforces technological advantages, so much of trade reflects both rather than one cleanly attributable share.
“Comparative advantage is a narrow concept, but it has a broad applicability. ... Specialization reinforces technological advantages in many senses.”
- Jagdish Bhagwati taught Irwin two lasting things: that economics should be fun and joyful rather than sterile theory, and that scholars must market their work to journalists and policy professionals (e.g., turning a paper into a New York Times column and Economist coverage) rather than merely submitting it to journals.
“He was a master at disseminating his work, not just to other academics, but to journalists, to public policy professionals”
Legitimate exceptions to free trade exist for national defense and externalities but require domestic solutions, not protectionist tariffs.
- The case for free trade has never been a case for laissez-faire; there may be legitimate cases for intervention (overuse of tourist sites, industries needed for national security), but these do not require trade interventions like tariffs, quotas, or export subsidies, because other domestic policies can address the underlying problem more efficiently and directly.
“the case for free trade has never been the case for laissez-faire. There may be cases for intervention, either overuse of certain tourist sites or you need a certain industry or sector for national security.”
- Following Adam Smith, defense can be more important than opulence, so there can be a legitimate exception to free trade for industries essential to national defense, but the relevant question is whether a given protection (e.g. rice tariffs) would actually help in a conflict, which is doubtful.
“I go back to Adam Smith, the master, who said that defense is more important than opulence.”
- Excessive tourism is best addressed by an appropriate tax applied equally to domestic and foreign visitors to account for the externality of degradation or overuse, rather than by quotas or exclusion of foreigners, which would be protectionist.
“The appropriate policy response would be taxation. You want to tax the foreign visitors. You wouldn't want to exclude them. You wouldn't want to set quotas.”
Trade and peace appear related through cost-benefit logic, though empirical political evidence remains weaker than economic theory suggests.
- Free trade and world peace appear related — statesmen like Cordell Hull and economists like Jacob Viner saw that trade protectionism and imperialism led to territorial scrambles — but the empirical political-science evidence is weaker than economic evidence because peace and trade agreements are hard to operationalize and trade is endogenous.
“when you had either trade protectionism or imperialism closing off markets, it led to the scramble for Africa or something like that. Instead of trading these resources freely, you had territorial acquisition”
- Following Norman Angell (who is widely misinterpreted), increased trade does not eliminate war but changes the cost-benefit calculation of conflict, which may apply to China given the volume of commerce and governments' need to justify themselves by providing rising living standards.
“This goes back to Norman Angell's point. Of course he's widely misinterpreted from saying, "We won't see wars in the future because of increased trade." He didn't say that. He said it changed the cost-benefit calculation.”
- Something distinctive happened in 1930s University of Chicago economics classrooms, where students arriving with leftist or New Deal views (James Buchanan, Milton Friedman) were converted to market-oriented thinking—Buchanan within six weeks of Frank Knight's course—suggesting Knight, Simons, and Viner were teaching something that convinced people that socialism or communism was not the correct alternative even during the Great Depression.
“they had these people — James Buchanan ... who would go there as a socialist and come out as a free-market advocate. In fact, he said that, within the first six weeks of Frank Knight's course, he was converted.”
Distance retains economic force in merchandise trade but services increasingly transcend it through digital transmission and investment.
- The global trade slowdown after 2007 reflects the exhaustion of a one-off effect: the 1990s great opening of the developing world (China, India, parts of Africa and Southeast Asia) cut tariffs dramatically once, and further cuts cannot reproduce that boost, so we should not expect trade to keep growing two to three times faster than GDP in perpetuity.
“You got this one-off, big effect of countries that had been relatively closed to world trade really reducing trade barriers significantly, and big boost to world trade growth as a result of that.”
- The 'death of distance' is largely false for merchandise—the gravity equation showing trade depends on distance has not changed much because shipping costs persist—but it has more force in services, which can be transmitted over the internet or require direct investment, so distance matters less there.
“The death of distance may have more of an impact in terms of trade in services. For merchandise, there are shipping costs and things like that”