What this covers
Carl Zimmer and Tyler Cowen explore how the scientific community systematically overlooked airborne transmission and disease for centuries, and what this blindness reveals about the limits of evidence and prediction. Zimmer traces the historical path from ancient belief in miasma—corrupted air as a disease vector—through the triumph of germ theory of disease, yet shows that even after germs were understood, airborne mechanisms remained actively resisted well into the modern era. Measles, one of the most contagious diseases known, was not accepted by the scientific community as airborne until the 1970s. This long delay happened not from lack of evidence but from what Zimmer calls cognitive inertia: by the early 1900s, leading experts had declared concern about airborne disease obsolete thinking, creating a consensus so strong it filtered out contrary experimental findings for decades.
The conversation then widens into the mechanisms of scientific resistance and the dangers of overconfidence in prediction. Zimmer explains how aerobiology itself was arrested by militarization: after the field was formally named in 1937, World War II classification locked away research and reframed public health as fighting an enemy rather than reforming living conditions. On the question of heritability, Zimmer distinguishes it sharply from predictability—a genetic link to variation in a trait tells you almost nothing about whether that trait can be predicted in an individual, an error historically weaponized when DNA-based claims were used to institutionalize people. Cowen presses on contemporary questions: whether randomized controlled trial standards have been applied fairly to masking, whether human challenge trials should have been run for COVID, and what indoor air safety actually requires. Throughout, the thread is skepticism about what we think we know—about inheritance, about what the data shows, and about the psychological reasons smart people look away from uncomfortable truths.
Zimmer argues that the science of airborne life and disease was systematically overlooked and resisted for centuries due to cognitive blind spots, scientific consensus inertia, and the militarization of aerobiology, and that recognizing what we breathe and inherit requires humility about what evidence can and cannot tell us.
- Airborne disease transmission was dismissed as obsolete miasma thinking, delaying acceptance into the late 20th century
- The classification of aerobiology for biological warfare drained the field and reframed public health as fighting an enemy
- Genetic and DNA-based prediction is far more uncertain than people assume, inviting dangerous overreach
Early-twentieth-century public health consensus explicitly rejected airborne disease as obsolete miasma thinking, creating institutional blindness to contrary evidence.
- The WHO and CDC's delay in acknowledging COVID-19 airborne transmission stemmed from a deep historical inertia: the early-1900s consensus that airborne transmission was insignificant had become embedded in public health policy, so experts dismissed even strong evidence — compounded by the fact that admitting airborne spread demands far costlier interventions than handwashing and surface disinfection.
“it goes back to these battles I was talking about over the germ theory of disease and the way that airborne transmission, by the early 1900s, was really being seen as something that was just not significant”
- By the early 1900s leading public health experts explicitly declared in print that concern about airborne disease was just obsolete miasma thinking that could be set aside, creating a strong consensus that primed the field to ignore even strong contrary experimental evidence from the 1930s onward.
“it goes back to these battles I was talking about over the germ theory of disease and the way that airborne transmission, by the early 1900s, was really being seen as something that was just not significant”
- For thousands of years the dominant view held that corrupted or 'bad' air (miasmas) directly caused diseases like yellow fever and cholera, and this entrenched framework actively competed with and delayed acceptance of the germ theory, with debates eventually resolving toward specific microorganisms and vectors (cholera via Vibrio cholerae in water, yellow fever via mosquito-borne virus).
“the standard view was that, if somehow the air became corrupted, it could cause diseases, yellow fever, all sorts of other diseases, and sometimes that would be called miasmas.”
Scientific communities resist accepting uncomfortable ideas even when evidence accumulates, as measles and hay fever illustrate across decades.
- Despite measles being the most contagious disease known and extremely airborne, it was not until the 1970s that the scientific community agreed it was airborne, illustrating how long it takes to amass enough evidence to persuade a primed-to-resist community.
“It wasn’t until the 1970s that people really agreed that measles are airborne, even though it’s incredibly airborne. It’s the most contagious disease that we know of.”
- Hay fever is not an infection but the body's own immune system mounting an incorrect defensive attack on inhaled substances like pollen, producing the runny nose, coughing, and misery of an allergy — a mechanism not understood until the early 1900s.
“it’s your own immune system that is mounting an attack on them and making you feel miserable. It makes your nose run, and makes you cough, and gives you all the symptoms of an allergy.”
- The idea that something alive could travel through the air and sicken or kill you was psychologically resisted because it makes humans feel helpless — you can wash your hands but you cannot stop breathing — which gave the scientific community emotional reasons to look away.
“it’s a frightening idea because it makes us feel particularly helpless. We can wash our hands all day long and keep ourselves safe that way, but you have to breathe.”
Multiple complementary approaches including ventilation, filtration, UV light, and real-time pathogen sensors can establish safe indoor air standards.
- Building engineers argue we could set standards for how clean indoor air should be and meet them through multiple complementary approaches — ventilation with fresh air (outdoor life is far more dilute than poorly ventilated indoor air), air purification systems, filters, and emerging real-time pathogen sensors funded by a $150 million US government project.
“you could put out standards for how clean your indoor air should be, how free of disease, and then you could meet those standards in a number of different ways.”
- Ultraviolet light can disinfect indoor air, an idea demonstrated by William and Mildred Wells in the 1930s when they installed UV lamps in Philadelphia-area schools and protected children from measles outbreaks; with further research to ensure UV doesn't create harmful airborne compounds, it could be part of a serious strategy for safe indoor air.
“They actually put ultraviolet lamps up in a couple schools in the Philadelphia area and protected the children there from measles outbreaks.”
- During flight, planes have very good ventilation and filtration systems that lower airborne disease risk by pulling pathogens from the air, but during boarding and after landing those systems are off — so people exhaling in a small space can spread droplets through the whole cabin and CO2 levels rise sharply, meaning risk is reduced but not zero in flight.
“when you’re flying, and that system is actually running, your risk is going to be lower because they’re going to pull pathogens out of the air.”
- The simplest way to gauge indoor air health is to measure carbon dioxide, because exhaled CO2 accumulates in unventilated rooms; this method was figured out in the mid-1800s by German hygiene scientist Max von Pettenkofer, and the safe threshold (around 1,000 ppm) is still called the Pettenkofer number.
“The simplest way to do that, actually, is just to measure the level of carbon dioxide in the air.”
Historical narratives oversimplify science, erasing the actual debates, reversals, and circling-back that reveal why obvious ideas took so long to win acceptance.
- Max von Pettenkofer made the great CO2 discovery yet was incredibly wrong about airborne infection — a committed miasma champion who swallowed a tube of cholera to 'prove' it wasn't waterborne and survived — demonstrating that science does not follow a neat path and that a person can be brilliant on one fact and badly mistaken on another.
“He even swallowed a whole tube of cholera once to prove that cholera was not caused by waterborne bacteria... he survived, and he decided that proved his case.”
- We tend to rewrite the history of science to pretend things were simpler than they were, ignoring the debates and the way ideas appear, flourish, disappear, and return, which obscures why obvious-seeming ideas took so long to be accepted.
“We tend to pretend that things were simpler than they really were. We ignore all the debates and the way that ideas pop up and flourish for a while and then disappear and then come back again.”
Air pollution from ordinary sources kills millions yearly; icy moons and Venus's atmosphere are the most promising places to search for extraterrestrial life; and assembly theory offers a substrate-independent framework for recognizing alien life.
- The icy moons of the outer solar system, with subsurface oceans beneath their ice, are the most interesting place to look for extraterrestrial life — potentially harboring life, or at least interesting chemistry or pre-life conditions that could yield clues about how life began on Earth.
“I certainly think that the icy moons of the outer solar system are the most interesting place to look for life.”
- Ordinary particulate matter from cars and power plants kills several million people around the world every year, making it a major attack on human health, and microplastics are a newer addition to air pollution that warrant more research in air, water, and everywhere.
“even just good old particulate matter from cars and power plants and so on kills several million people around the world every year. It’s a major attack on human health.”
- Although Venus's surface is hot enough to melt lead, high in its atmosphere there are clouds where conditions aren't that bad, and since Earth's clouds host many microbes that ride up, hang out, and fall back, life could potentially exist as aerial life in Venusian clouds — perhaps having originated on the surface and risen up.
“when you get pretty high up in the atmosphere there, there are clouds up there where things aren’t that bad. We have clouds here on Earth that have lots of microbes in them.”
- On a planet-by-planet, moon-by-moon basis it is very unlikely that any given body harbors life, but because there are so many planets and moons even in our own galaxy, Zimmer is sure life of some form exists elsewhere — while putting the odds of life within our own solar system as low (he'd take 1,000:1 odds against).
“on a planet-by-planet, moon-by-moon basis, it’s very unlikely that there’s life out there, but there’re so many planets and moons in even our galaxy that I’m sure that there is life of some form elsewhere.”
- Lee Cronin's assembly theory proposes that life is matter able to assemble molecules beyond a certain complexity threshold (measured by how many steps it takes to produce something), offering a substrate-independent way to recognize life on other planets without assuming it is made of DNA — and possibly even a recipe for creating life in the lab.
“life is what is able to assemble things beyond a certain threshold. This might be a way to actually identify life on a planet, even if you don’t know what life is made of.”
Establishing disease causation is intrinsically difficult because science requires large-scale longitudinal studies against changing environments.
- Establishing causes like environmental triggers of disease is hard because science works by studying large numbers of people tracked over months and years against a constantly changing environment, so a single sufferer's observations (like Blackley's) cannot reliably tie symptoms to causes.
“Science really works by numbers. You actually have to study lots and lots and lots of people, and then... you’re actually going to have to track them over months, years, and so on, because the environment is changing all the time.”
- British doctor Blackley in the 1860s-70s self-experimented by rubbing pollen in his nose to trigger sneezing, then used kites flown over 1,000 feet and over the ocean to capture airborne pollen grains, demonstrating that winds carry living particles for hundreds of miles — a visionary finding largely dismissed at the time because people believed hay fever was an infectious disease or a neurosis.
“he built himself a kite, and he put a little probe on the kite where pollen grains could stick to. He flew this kite over 1,000 feet in the air.”
Mask effectiveness depends critically on mask type and proper use, and early CDC cloth recommendations were pragmatic stopgaps during shortages.
- Whether masking 'works' is ill-defined without specifying the mask type (cloth, surgical, N95, duckbill) and how it is used — wearing one with the nose hanging out, like an unstrapped motorcycle helmet, won't help — and the CDC's early cloth-mask recommendation was a stopgap during N95/surgical shortages based on small prior studies.
“there are cloth masks, there are surgical masks, there are N95 masks, there are these masks that are called duckbill masks. When you’re asking, 'Does masking work?' one of the questions is, what kind of masks are we talking about?”
- Some experts argue masks can only be judged by randomized controlled trials, but others counter that demanding an RCT for masks is like demanding one for hard hats — the physics of how masks trap particles already shows they reduce inhaled virus-laden air, and RCTs themselves can fail through poor design or analysis.
“that’s a bit like saying we need a randomized controlled trial to show that hard hats work. The physics shows you how it works.”
Military classification of aerobiology during WWII arrested a promising science and reframed public health as defense rather than living-condition reform.
- The turning of aerobiology into biological warfare was a tragedy that arrested a promising new science: after the field was named in 1937 by Fred Meier (who died in a plane crash), WWII US military classification locked away research that could have advanced understanding of airborne disease, causing a brain drain, with parallel programs in the Soviet Union — and even reframed American public health as a fight against an enemy attack rather than reform of living conditions.
“the way that aerobiology got turned into biological warfare was quite a tragedy because this was a science that, at the time, was just getting off the ground.”
- The 2001 anthrax mailings, initially feared to be an Al-Qaeda or foreign-state attack, were determined by FBI and scientists to involve anthrax that looked domestically produced, specifically traceable to Fort Detrick's aerobiological warfare research, and the FBI's identified suspect committed suicide before arrest; absent compelling alternate evidence Zimmer finds it plausible he was responsible.
“This looks like it was just here in the good old USA,’ specifically at Fort Detrick, which was the headquarters of this aerobiological germ warfare research since World War II.”
Genetic heritability statistics measure variation within a population but cannot predict individual outcomes, and overconfidence in genetic determinism risks historical abuses.
- The rising IQ scores across many countries (the Flynn effect) cannot result from a genetic or evolutionary process, since people aren't being born with different DNA over such timescales; likely explanations are environmental — daily life increasingly resembling IQ-test thinking, digital device use, or health changes — though these hypotheses remain hard to rigorously test.
“it’s certainly not a result of some sort of genetic process. You cannot explain a rise in IQ scores in so many different countries because somehow people are being born with different kinds of DNA”
- IVF embryo selection already screens out clear abnormalities and dominant disorders like Huntington's disease (even pre-fertilization, by selecting sperm or eggs without the marker), but a key danger of extending genetic selection is that parents convince themselves DNA guarantees traits it cannot, setting up a lifetime of watching a child fail to meet genetically encoded expectations.
“one of the dangers is that people will convince themselves that the information we have about DNA is going to ensure things about their kids that they can’t be sure about.”
- History shows people are eager to leap from basic DNA findings to self-serving conclusions — in the early 1900s claims about inherited intelligence were used to decide who should be institutionalized or admitted to the US, with Eastern European Jews labeled developmentally disabled — so we should be on guard not to repeat such abuses.
“Jews were considered largely to be developmentally disabled at one point, especially the Jews from Eastern Europe. We have seen that people are certainly more than eager to jump from the basic findings of DNA to all sorts of conclusions which often serve their own interests.”
- Heritability merely measures, in a given situation, how much variation among individuals can be statistically connected to variation in their genome; this is a totally different question from whether that variability can be used to predict an individual's future outcomes, because the genome is complex and exists within environments.
“Heritability really is just saying... how much of their variation can I connect with variation in their genome? That’s it. Can you then use that variability to make predictions about what’s going to happen in the future? That is a totally different question”
Zimmer's views align with accepted science rather than heterodoxy, because mainstream discoveries about whales, microbes, and life's origins already seem extraordinary.
- Zimmer's claimed lack of heterodox views stems from the fact that the scientific mainstream itself is mind-blowing to lay audiences — discoveries like whales hearing each other across oceans and changing their songs, or billions of microbes in a single cloud, sound crazy to most people even though they are accepted science.
“to most people, that’s crazy that whales can hear each other across oceans and can change their songs.”
- Life, like superconductivity, is a property of matter that scientists are trying to explain with a theory; just as multiple wrong theories of superconductivity (including one by Einstein) preceded the correct one with powerful explanatory power, we are not there yet with life, and a new theory like assembly theory may turn out right or wrong.
“life is a property of matter. Scientists are trying to explain it... Superconductivity is a property of matter, and there were a bunch of theories that were put forward about it, including by Einstein, and they were wrong.”
New Jersey politics allowed nonpartisan public service despite the state's history of corruption and rough dealings.
- New Jersey politics has a rich, long history of corruption and rough-and-tumble activity, against which Zimmer's father (a New Jersey congressman) stayed above the fray, showing a non-corrupt New Jersey politics was possible.
“New Jersey politics has got a rich, long history of corruption and just rough-and-tumble kind of activity. I was very proud to see my dad stay above that fray.”