What this covers

Blake Scholl makes the case that aviation, airports, and infrastructure dysfunction stem not from engineering limits but from institutional misalignment—specifically from government-led innovation, absent price systems, and regulation that punishes risk. He argues that the path forward is commercially-led innovation powered by reducing the cost of iteration. The conversation ranges across his company Boom's pursuit of supersonic flight, the economics of the Concorde and Apollo programs as prestige-driven rather than viable products, and why commercial aviation innovation flatlined after the 707. Scholl also ventures into airports, traffic, and airline service models, each treated as a puzzle of incentives rather than engineering.

The argument turns on specific mechanisms. Vertical integration cuts the time to manufacture a turbine blade from six months to 24 hours, which he claims unlocks design freedom and kills analysis paralysis. LLMs and RAG compress regulatory paperwork from months to minutes, shifting organizations from armies of crank-turning labor to small creative teams. The over-land supersonic ban, he contends, was never necessary but became politically impossible to reverse—until it was. Traffic persists because roads are priced at zero, airports trap travelers in shopping malls because regulation caps revenue, and airline service innovations die in union contracts. Throughout, he invokes first principles thinking as antidote to status-quo steeping, and returns often to how incentive structures—not engineering—determine what gets built and how fast.

Sharpest takeaway

Scholl argues that the major failures in aviation, airports, and infrastructure are not technical but institutional—caused by government-led innovation, mispricing, and risk-averse regulation—and that commercially-led iteration is the path to renewed progress, exemplified by supersonic flight.

  • Concorde and Apollo were impressive tech demos rather than economically viable products because they were government-speced and prestige-driven
  • Most accepted problems (traffic, airport security, slow manufacturing) persist due to missing price systems and misaligned incentives, not engineering limits
  • Reducing the cost of iteration—via vertical integration, LLMs, and iterative certification—is the key lever for restarting aerospace progress

The argument · threads9 threads · 34 claims
0.79

Aerospace innovation requires treating certification as iterative rather than a one-time freeze event that prevents change and improvement.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The key to restarting aerospace innovation is to make the iteration loop easy by planning to certify repeatedly and iteratively—working with regulators to prove out airplanes more efficiently—rather than treating certification as a one-time event that freezes the design.

    “Don’t plan to certify once, plan to certify repeatedly. Plan to do it iteratively.”

  • Aerospace has gotten dramatically slower: Boeing and Airbus last launched an all-new airplane program in 2004—21 years ago—and even modified ones fail, partly because certifying an all-new airplane is regulatorily difficult, leading Boeing's mid-2000s CEO Jim McNerney to declare no more moonshots, meaning no new products.

    “does anybody know the year in which Boeing and Airbus last launched an all-new airplane program? 2004, 21 years ago. No new airplanes.”

  • Supersonic flight should have begun as a small-range supersonic private jet carrying a handful of well-heeled people coast to coast, which would have kicked off an S-curve of innovation leading to Mach 5 travel today—but instead the prestige-driven national competition convinced the world supersonic was impractical and led to the US over-land ban from 1973 until July 6, 2025.

    “Supersonic should have started with a supersonic private jet that could take a handful of well-heeled people coast to coast, with a small airplane, limited range. That would have kicked off a whole S-curve of innovation that would have us all going Mach 5 by now”

  • Many airlines are state enterprises called flag carriers, and because they operate for national prestige and show, decisions get made for show—a bad motivation that can yield a tech demo but does not lead to good outcomes.

    “a lot of the airlines are state enterprises. They’re literally called flag carriers, and so things get done for show. For show is a really, really bad motivation.”

0.73

Regulatory systems reward risk-aversion and make it politically impossible to undo safety measures even when they provide little real protection.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Current airport security is largely theater that does not actually stop terrorists—evidenced by a box cutter passing undetected through SFO, Seattle, and Heathrow—and the real problem is a regulatory incentive structure where bureaucrats are rewarded for adding security but career-ended for taking any risk, making safety regulation a one-way door that is politically near-impossible to reverse.

    “The literal weapon used on 9/11 has been brought through SFO, Seattle, and London Heathrow with nobody catching it. We are not actually stopping terrorists.”

  • We are meaningfully safer than on 9/11 in two specific respects—reinforced cockpit doors and passengers now knowing to fight back (which is why the fourth plane never reached its target)—while measures like confiscating box cutters and water bottles add no real safety.

    “One is reinforced cockpit doors... Another is that the passengers know to fight back. This effect happened so quickly. It is why the fourth airplane didn’t make it into the White House on September 11.”

  • Security regulation is explicitly harmonized internationally to support transferring and connecting passengers without re-clearing security, which causes the country with the most obtuse security rules to have those rules metastasize globally.

    “There is international harmonization of security that basically results in the worst rules in any country metastasizing.”

0.65

Government-led tech projects become cost-insensitive bureaucracies that survive prestige rather than economics; commercial competition drives actual enduring innovation.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Apollo created a cost-insensitive supply chain and self-perpetuating bureaucracy, after which 50 years passed before Elon Musk recognized that the economics of space must be tackled for there to be an enduring human presence in space.

    “we created a supply chain behind it that was cost-insensitive and a bureaucracy that wanted to perpetuate its own existence. Then 50 years goes by before — thank Elon for realizing that we need to go tackle economics of space”

  • Concorde and Apollo were impressive government-speced tech demos rather than commercially viable products, which is why neither endured—Concorde because it ignored economics (100 uncomfortable seats, $20,000 inflation-adjusted fares, flying 52% full, only 14 planes in service), and government-led innovation generally produces cost-insensitive supply chains and self-perpetuating bureaucracies.

    “What we did is we built really impressive tech demos, not products. That’s what happens when you have government-speced innovation.”

  • From the Wright Brothers' 1903 flight through the introduction of the 707, aviation innovation was entrepreneurially and commercially driven, with each generation of commercial airplane faster and safer than the last—until speed itself was banned as a vector of innovation; had the 707 been a state-led DARPA project instead, jets would be as stagnant as supersonic and few of us would fly.

    “From 1903, with the Wright Brothers’ first flight, all the way through the introduction of the 707, we had entrepreneurially driven, commercially driven innovation in aviation. Every generation of new commercial airplane was faster than the one that came before it until we literally banned speed as a vector of innovation.”

  • Ayn Rand's 1957 Atlas Shrugged (in Galt's speech) effectively argues that a socialist cannot create a supersonic airplane—you need a capitalist with real motivation—reflecting the view that moral conditions and motivation determine whether such innovations succeed.

    “It basically says you can’t have a socialist create a supersonic airplane. You need to have a capitalist with real motivation.”

0.65

Institutional constraints embedded in contracts and regulations prevent obvious operational improvements from being adopted even when technically simple.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Airline in-flight service models are hard to change because the service delivery methods are written into union contracts—illustrated by Virgin America's ordering of snacks via the entertainment screen being undone when Alaska acquired it because it required a different union contract.

    “the service delivery models are actually written into union contracts. If you remember Virgin America, you could order snacks through the in-flight entertainment screens, and then when Alaska took them, that got undone”

  • The main obstacle to better airports is not design but lack of a business model and alignment: airports have been socialized and limited by regulation to roughly $5.60 per enplaned passenger, which forces them to trap travelers in shopping malls as their only way to make money, so the infrastructure must be privatized and a new revenue model invented.

    “We’ve socialized airports, and we’ve limited their revenue to $5.60 per in-plane passenger. This is why airports trap people in shopping malls, because it’s the only way for them to make any money.”

  • Faster boarding requires more doors in better places on airplanes plus fixing checked baggage: because baggage check is slow and unreliable, people carry on items they don't want to carry, so a fast, reliable system (where a robot moves your bag from your Uber trunk at origin to your Uber trunk at destination) would eliminate carry-ons and dramatically speed boarding and deplaning.

    “Because baggage check is unreliable and slow, we have people carrying onto airplanes things they absolutely do not want to carry.”

  • Airports could be radically more efficient by putting terminals underground while keeping airside above ground, using a two-runway arrival-to-departure flow that eliminates tugs and much infrastructure, with jetways as escalators rising from below, modeled fundamentally on a crossbar switch.

    “You should put the terminals underground. Airside is above ground. Terminals are below ground.”

0.65

Supersonic flight's ban over land prevented the natural s-curve from small private jets to faster commercial aircraft and global innovation.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Boom is building an airliner rather than a private jet first because the 1973 over-land supersonic ban effectively banned the supersonic private jet—since even on a high-end Gulfstream 85% of business-jet miles are over land, an aircraft that can't fly faster over that 85% has no market—so Boom planned to skip the normal 1.0 and start with international 2.0 flights where the over-land rule doesn't bind.

    “we banned effectively a supersonic private jet because even on a high-end international range Gulfstream, 85% of business jet miles are over land. If you can’t fly faster than the 85% use case, there’s no market. Effectively, we banned minimum viable product.”

  • As of October 2025, the prospects for supersonic commercial flight have blown wide open: Boom broke the sound barrier in January and again in February, announced Boomless Cruise on February 10, got an Oval Office model and West Wing invitation, and saw the over-land supersonic ban repealed by executive order on June 6—115 days after the announcement—leaving the technology and regulatory barriers removed.

    “In January, we broke the sound barrier. February, we did it again. That’s when we announced the Boomless Cruise.”

  • Supersonic flight transforms travel by converting North Atlantic red-eyes into daytime flights that save a full day, and on the Pacific saving two days round-trip and eliminating jet lag—an 8:00 a.m. SFO departure arriving Tokyo 8:00 a.m. Monday lets you do a full day of meetings and return within 24 hours without changing time zones.

    “If you look across the Pacific, you actually save two days on a round trip.”

  • The only good thing about being in a tube at 60,000 feet is being able to look out, and at that altitude you can actually tell whether the earth is curved.

    “at 60,000 feet, you can tell whether the earth is curved. We’re going to do a flight of flat-earthers, and we’ll be able to settle this.”

0.59

Congressional optimization of supply chains for votes rather than efficiency makes manufacturing absurdly slow and expensive despite simple technical fixes.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The US aerospace and defense supply chain is congressionally optimized rather than efficiency-optimized: a 3D-printed turbine blade costing a million dollars takes six months because process steps are spread across factories in different states (spending more time on trucks than machines), even though doing all steps under one roof takes 24 hours—because spreading process steps across congressional districts maximizes votes needed to make a program a program of record, which would be catastrophic in an actual war.

    “It takes six months, and the part spends more time on a truck than on a machine.”

  • Fixing the congressionally-optimized defense supply chain requires a team approach: nobody wants to be the only one cutting things in their home district, so a bipartisan campaign where the next Congress runs together on a shared platform (e.g., balancing the budget, changing defense procurement) could overcome the district-by-district pork dynamic—an underrated Newt Gingrich-style playbook.

    “Nobody wants to be the only one who cuts things in their home district... I think the Newt Gingrich playbook is underrated. Congress runs together on one platform”

  • Doing all manufacturing process steps under one roof has a powerful second-order effect: when a wrong turbine blade takes six months to re-make, engineers wring their hands and take no risk, but when a new part arrives in 24 hours, there is design freedom to test more ideas, move faster, and avoid analysis paralysis.

    “If you say, “By the way, if you screw it up, you can get a new part in 24 hours,” now there’s a lot of design freedom. You can test more ideas, you can move much faster.”

0.52

Rapid iteration and reduced change costs enable engineers to test more ideas and avoid analysis paralysis, accelerating design progress.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • LLMs are powerful for filling out regulatory paperwork with important second-order effects: a certification document like a 100-page lightning-strike test plan that historically took an engineer two months can be produced in minutes via a prompt and a RAG of federal guidance, then edited by a creative engineer—shifting organizations from large armies of crank-turning talent to small teams of creative, change-tolerant talent by reducing the cost of change.

    “a small prompt and a RAG with all the federal regulatory guidance in it can produce this thing in a few minutes. Then, a pretty creative engineer can edit it and fix the hallucinations quickly.”

  • There is a massive advantage in switching domains quickly because becoming an expert almost certainly makes you useless by steeping you in the status quo, whereas a domain switch forces a focus on first principles—and with passion plus a good internal sense of when you are clear versus confused, one can learn a great deal quickly.

    “by the time you become an expert, you’re almost certainly useless because now you’re steeped in the status quo. I think there is a massive advantage in switching domains and doing so quickly because it forces a focus on first principles.”

  • Amazon's distinctive strength, learned in contrast to Groupon, was making all major decisions with a long-term view (via discounted cash flow analysis, e.g. buying discounted CD inventory that hurt Q4 but helped Q1) while maintaining moment-to-moment operational excellence—whereas Groupon repeatedly made short-term decisions like blasting more email that worsened the next quarter.

    “The thing Amazon did very, very well is make long-term decisions while being incredibly short-term vigilant.”

  • Amazon sustained its culture as it scaled because customer-centricity was so deeply baked in that any internal debate was resolved by asking what's best for customers—a cultural trump card handed to every employee to win any argument.

    “It was the cultural trump card that was handed to every employee for how to win any debate in the company.”

0.44

Market design failures like free road access and low airport revenue caps perpetuate avoidable problems that pricing mechanisms could solve.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Traffic is a tractable problem made permanent by the absence of a price system: because road access is given away at zero variable cost, roads are always flooded, and the engineering concept of induced demand wrongly concludes we shouldn't build roads—whereas tolling every road would actually solve traffic, just as grocery stores work because of cash registers rather than free access.

    “We don’t really build more roads because we give away road access for no variable cost. They’re always flooded.”

  • At a cultural or spiritual level, we live in a world full of radically improvable things—like the average American sitting in traffic more than a working month per year—yet we have learned to accept these problems instead of challenging them.

    “We live in a world full of things that are radically improvable, and yet we’ve learned to live with most of the problems.”

  • Online reviews need reinvention because everything converges to four and a half stars; using percentile ranks (top 5%, bottom 5%) would be more useful, though the harder unsolved problem is getting good-quality inputs given strong financial incentives to stuff the review ballot box.

    “everything is four and a half stars, right? I think percentile ranks would be a really useful thing to do.”

  • A central open question worth solving is why problems that seem obvious, with seemingly obvious solutions, don't get solved—figuring that out could unlock a lot of innovation.

    “I think a lot about why problems that seem really obvious, that have in some ways solutions that seem really obvious, don’t get solved.”

  • A reusable meta-principle: when something seems stupid, ask what would have to be the case for this action to be smart; occasionally things really are dumb, but usually you can reverse-engineer how the world works from that question.

    “when something seems stupid, ask yourself, “What would have to be the case for this action to be smart?””

0.32

Great aircraft design requires integrated thinking across interior, engineering, and human factors using both creative and engineering mindsets.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Overture is designed so pilots don't need extraordinary skill, deleting unnecessary knobs and switches, and the real safety breakthrough is the pilot-airplane interface—using forced-feedback side sticks to give pilots an extra sense of what the airplane is doing in a crisis, countering the tunnel vision that occurs when alarms are going off.

    “the key thing is how the airplane and the pilot talk to each other in a crisis. It’s very normal to get tunnel vision when alarms are going off”

  • The best aircraft interiors result from designing the interior and the airplane together, with designers who think like engineers and engineers who think like designers holding a very high bar—analogous to asking what a plane would be like if Steve Jobs or Jony Ive had designed it.

    “the meta insight is designing the interior and the airplane together. I think you get the best results when you’ve got designers that think like engineers and engineers that think like designers”

  • Single-pilot operation is not a good idea for airliners and won't be a viable transition path to autonomy, because if the one pilot is incapacitated or away (e.g., using the restroom) at the moment something goes wrong, there is no backup.

    “I don’t think single pilot’s actually a good idea, and I don’t think it’ll be a viable transition path to autonomy.”