Adam Tooze
What this covers
This conversation between Tyler Cowen and Adam Tooze ranges across a century of economic crises—from the 1920s gold standard through Nazi rearmament to the COVID-19 pandemic—arguing that purely technocratic analysis misses what actually drove these events. Tooze contends that political struggle, class conflict, and ideology shaped the economic choices that appear, in retrospect, to have been inevitable. The discussion moves between historical interpretation and real-time assessment of emerging instabilities in 2020, treating economic outcomes as products of power and choice rather than mechanical necessity.
The historical terrain includes Britain's 1925 return to gold as an anti-labor move, the role of US financial backing in stabilizing Weimar democracy through Hegemonic Stability / Holding the Ring, and the puzzle of Nazi Germany's decision to wage war despite material disadvantage—where Tooze argues ideology became "irreducible" once economic explanation fails. He challenges conventional readings: Nazis were not Keynesian Multiplier practitioners but practitioners of Financial Repression, channeling resources directly into rearmament rather than allowing consumer spending. He contests the coherence of Bretton Woods itself, treating it instead as History as Re-improvised Makeshift. On present crises, Tooze examines the diffuse nature of 2020's financial stress across multiple credit markets, the vulnerability of emerging markets to distinct pressures (oil prices, foreign debt exposure, quasi-state balance sheets), and political constraints—such as German monetary populism against ECB activism—that make technocratic solutions politically unsustainable. The conversation also addresses how historians should work, emphasizing Interpretive Triangulation and the practice of writing as daily habit rather than heroic effort.
Tooze argues that economic outcomes—from the 1920s gold standard to Nazi rearmament to today's COVID crisis—cannot be understood through abstract technocratic logic alone, but only by situating economic choices within their political, ideological, and class-conflict contexts.
- The gold standard restoration and Versailles reparations were driven by political priorities (class struggle, sovereign debt credibility), not welfare optimization
- Nazi Germany's war was driven by ideology rather than material superiority, which it lacked
- The Weimar Republic's survival depended on US willingness to anchor a liberal global order, not just domestic factors
International economic systems are continuous improvisations constrained by material dependencies, not coherent regimes with internal logic.
- Lebensraum was a significant motive not because Germany lacked land but because it could not feed itself at the accustomed standard of living—roughly a quarter of food (including critical animal feed for dairy herds) was imported, and the bitter WWI lesson was that dependence on imported food is a fatal vulnerability when facing an enemy like Britain wielding naval blockade; the fantasy was to bolt a self-sufficient agricultural hinterland onto Germany like the US Midwest or the British Empire.
“the bitter lesson the Germans learned in World War I is that that kind of a highly efficient international division of labor... is its dependence on imported food.”
- It is a clichéd error to treat 'Bretton Woods' as a coherent system existing between 1944 and 1971; no such system ever existed—it was agreed, broken by the British panic of 1947, not reinstituted until convertibility in 1958, nearly dead by 1967, and tossed overboard in 1971—suggesting international economic history should be understood not as big lumpy regimes with internal logic but as continuous re-improvised makeshift.
“that’s one of the most common, clichéd errors that you could make in international political economy. No such system ever existed.”
- There is not one emerging market crisis but several, because a range of different pressures act on countries: exposure to the medical crisis, oil prices, degree of foreign ownership of sovereign debt, dependence on foreign dollar borrowing, and macroprudential hazards from quasi-state-owned companies like Pemex, Petrobras, and Eskom which can create a doom-loop between sovereign debt credibility and private balance sheets.
“there’s notoneemerging market crisis; there are several because there’s a range of different pressures which are acting on them”
- The Weimar Republic's survival depended critically on the United States's ability to 'hold the ring' in European politics—moderating French aggression and providing a steady rain of dollars—which made cooperative subordination the optimal local strategy for moderate politics across Germany, Japan's Taishō democracy, and even early Mussolini; when this US-anchored liberal order broke in the early 1930s, it changed the parameters of decision-making and doomed centrist politics across multiple challenger nations.
“it does depend critically on the ability of the United States to hold the ring in European politics.”
Ideology and political choice, not economics or material capacity, explain major historical decisions and state behavior.
- Despite admiring Keynes's political writings, The Economic Consequences of the Peace was disastrous because it enhanced and gave arguments to German nationalists, even though the Weimar Republic was in fact perfectly capable of bearing a reasonable burden of reparations of 2-3 percent; the real problem was the German political class's unwillingness to accept responsibility and the front-loading of demands.
“I regardThe Economic Consequences of the Peaceas disastrous because, essentially, it enhanced and gave arguments to the German nationalists”
- Britain's 1925 return to gold at prewar parity cannot be evaluated as abstract welfare optimization; it was driven by political priorities—securing the high standing of British sovereign debt and deflation as a strategy to undercut the bargaining power of the trade union movement (the Triple Alliance of railway workers, miners, and dockers)—restoring class balance after the most dramatic period of class struggle in West European history.
“the restoration of the gold standard is part of a strategy ofdeflation, which is about undercutting the bargaining power of the British trade union movement”
- The Nazis were adventurous macroeconomists doing massive intervention but were not Keynesians, because Keynesianism is fundamentally a liberal economics built on the multiplier (small discretionary state interventions generating outsized private reactions, allowing sporadic 'emergency medicine'); the Nazis instead systematically repressed the multiplier through financial repression, channeling money straight back into rearmament rather than letting workers spend on consumer goods requiring imports.
“What they’re actually trying to do is systematically repress the multiplier because they do not want people employed in armaments factories to go out and buy clothing and fancy food, which requires imports.”
- Germany's decision to go to war and its 1940 victory cannot be explained by economic or material superiority—France was more motorized than Germany by a large degree (Renault dwarfed German carmakers; the only substantial German manufacturer was GM-owned Opel)—so where the economics fails to explain why Germany went to war against unfavorable odds, the power of ideology becomes an essential and irreducible element of any meaningful history of the Third Reich.
“the decision by Hitler to go to war against the kind of backdrop thatI’moffering doesn’t make sense from the point of view, if you like, of a correlation of forces, a material balance–type argument.”
Financial stability depends on smooth credit markets and central bank capacity to restore normal asset relationships during crises.
- The smoothness of the government debt yield curve serves as a foundational indicator of financial stability; in the dangerous weeks of March 2020, central banks (including the Bank of England with UK gilts around March 18th) saw irregularity and gaps where a smooth curve should exist, and the restoration of normal relationships between equity and bond markets after massive asset purchases is reassuring.
“The government debt market is clearly one of the foundations of financial stability.”
- The balance sheets of the core systemically important US banks are not vulnerable to anywhere near the same extent as in 2008, but if the real economic recession becomes protracted, the shock could develop from the bottom up through households and companies unable to service debt—which is why Neel Kashkari called for a big bank capital raise to provide shock-absorbing capacity.
“It’s not obvious to me right now that the balance sheets of the core group of systemically important largest US banks are vulnerable to anywhere near the same extent as they were in ’08”
- A likely outcome of the current crisis is the warehousing of huge quantities of government debt on central bank balance sheets in the hope it gets forgotten about, and while not ideal, this is far from the worst possible outcome—it is the solution the eurozone is drifting towards and one of the more tolerable ones if Northern European states accept it.
“one of the outcomes of this is likely to be the warehousing of huge quantities of government debt on central bank balance sheets, where we just hope it gets forgotten about.”
- Unlike 2008, the current crisis is a financial market crisis affecting many different credit markets rather than a bank-centered crisis concentrated in the balance sheets of individual systemically important banks, making the risk more diffuse and harder to pinpoint to a single statistic.
“this was a financialmarketcrisis, so it’s affecting lots of different markets for credit rather than the balance sheets of individual banks.”
Democratic institutions and centrist politics become untenable when external economic order breaks down or monetary grievances delegitimize technocratic solutions.
- Orbán has been incredibly fortunate in the macroeconomic conditions enabling his economic nationalism experiment, as financial markets never punished him; a less friendly environment for emerging market borrowers plus a downturn in the auto industry (Hungary being an extension of the German car plant system) may make his formula unworkable.
“Orbán has been incredibly fortunate in the macroeconomic conditions which he’s enjoyed for his experiment. Financial markets have not punished him for his economic nationalism.”
- The Dublin agreement—under which refugees stay in the country they first reach with no formula for EU redistribution—provided a fig leaf for nationalist selfishness by Northern European states better positioned to absorb migrants than frontline states Italy and Greece, and a collapse of the Turkey deal could recreate the explosive 2015 poly-crisis combining Chinese pressure, Greek crisis, Ukraine, and refugees.
“The Dublin rules are, basically, if they come to your country, they stay there. There’s no formula for redistribution within the EU.”
- The Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) is not primarily an anti-immigrant party but in the first instance an anti-Draghi party directed against ECB monetary activism; this German monetary populism—blaming the ECB for low rates and problematizing risk-sharing via its balance sheet, exemplified by Hans-Werner Sinn's polemics against TARGET2 balances—creates a spiral of de-legitimization that makes the convenient technocratic fix unsustainable, unlike France where it is not even a subject of serious conversation.
“It’s not an anti-immigrant party in the first instance. It’s an anti-Draghi party in the first instance, a party directed against Mario Draghi.”
Historical interpretation requires self-conscious triangulation between subject matter, observer perspective, and connecting arguments rather than subjective narration.
- Germany doggedly refuses to be the uniform country that German nationalism tried to weld it into—it is simultaneously Catholic and Protestant, rural and intensely urban, an incredibly heterogeneous place that ranks among the great underrated tourist destinations of Europe.
“One of the bizarre projects of German nationalism was to weld it into a uniform country, which it just doggedly refuses to be.”
- The productive approach to writing is to treat it not as something terrifying requiring steeling oneself but as a daily activity like exercise—doing even 10 minutes every single day regardless of life circumstances keeps a project 'top of stack,' so that when a larger block of time arrives you know exactly where to go because you've been chewing on it continuously.
“the best way to think about it was as something I do every day, so it’s like exercise.”
- Within five years the EU will restore free-flowing internal mobility on a level similar to the United States because it is one of the core values and what the EU is for; pandemic management structures like electronic passports and temperature monitoring may exist but will not be significant, much as airport security differences between countries are not interesting and don't matter much.
“I would be very surprised if there wasn’t a relatively free-flowing mobility regime within the EU. It’s one of the core values. It’s what the EU is for.”
- Excellence in a future historian is spotted through a love of reading and a capacity for triangulation—the active function of interpretation that positions oneself between the subject matter, the point of view of the observer, and the type of argument connecting the two; the more self-consciously one can locate oneself in that triangle, the more sophisticated the history writing, treating arguments as a shared repertoire available to everyone rather than merely subjective.
“an ability to, as it were, triangulate between the subject matter that’s being discussed, the point of view of the observer of that subject matter, and then the type of argument they’re offering that connects the two.”
- The case of IG Farben—a world-beating, cosmopolitan, globalized chemicals firm with Nobel Prize winners on its board, not an obvious supporter of German economic nationalism—building the largest chemicals plant in Europe at Auschwitz demonstrates that giant capitalist corporations carry a historic responsibility and can find themselves in situations burdened with vast moral consequences despite their activities usually being innocuous.
“how a totally cosmopolitan, globalized company — not by any means an obvious supporter of German economic nationalism — how it could end up building the largest chemicals plant in Europe at the time at Auschwitz.”
- Sharing on Twitter has become a key motivator and structuring mechanism for consuming information—the act of trying to figure out the interesting nugget worth sharing (the three telling sentences, the key graph compressed to 280 characters) focuses the mind on the core, to the point that being deprived of Twitter reduces motivation to read at all.
“when I’m, for whatever reason, deprived of Twitter, I feel suddenly that I’m less motivated to read.”
- Evergrande, with roughly a hundred billion dollars in foreign exchange borrowing on its balance sheet, is the most likely weakest link in the highly leveraged Chinese real estate development sector, though whether its collapse alone would be systemic is an open question.
“Evergrandeis, I think, most people’s favorite as the weakest link in the Chinese real estate development sector. Our ballpark — a hundred billion dollars in foreign exchange borrowing on its balance sheet.”
- The 2020 pandemic response chose an extraordinarily high-cost route via comprehensive national lockdowns, a strategy that was never attempted or even considered as an option during the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu, when efforts were only local and city-by-city.
“We have chosen a comprehensive lockdown as the default strategy for dealing with this. As far as I’m aware, no one attempted anything remotely like that in response to Spanish Flu.”
Structural economic differences, not within-sector productivity gaps, explain divergent national outcomes in industrial economies.
- In the 1928 pre-Depression elections, Hitler's party gained only 1.5 percent of the vote, the Communists were doing badly, and centrist parties held a vast majority forming a center-left government—demonstrating that Weimar had survived the early hyperinflation shock and offered a plausible prospect of prosperity, so the question is why this was broken apart.
“in 1928, in the last, as it were, pre–Great Depression elections in the Weimar Republic, Hitler’s party gains 1.5 percent of the vote.”
- Interwar European economies were marked by two distinct types of productivity gap: a transatlantic gap where the US had dramatically higher productivity per hour across all sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, services), and a structural gap between Germany/France/Italy and Britain that was NOT about within-sector productivity (German and British manufacturing output per hour were similar) but about economic structure—Britain had under 10% of its workforce in agriculture by 1911 while Germany had four to five million women working full-time in farms in the 1930s.
“you have two different types of productivity difference: one is across all sectors, which is a transatlantic difference, and then a huge sexual difference between the German economy and that of Great Britain.”
- Recovery from the COVID shutdown is more likely to follow a 'swoosh' shape (slow, gradual) than a V-shape, because comparisons treating China as a national aggregate are misleading—China contained an acute outbreak in one province while the US and Europe have had multiple Wuhan-style outbreaks.
“This time round, I’m definitely in theswoosh camp, modified swoosh.”
Inflation moderately above zero would alleviate debt burdens through nominal growth, reversing the wage-price spiral resistance built since Volcker.
- A strong inflation scenario of 15-20% is unlikely in advanced economies because it requires the sociological underpinnings of a wage-price spiral and indexation, which were systematically stripped out in a conflictual way from the Volcker shock onward; without trade union power to defend wages against price shocks, spiraling inflation is hard to envision.
“it’s not obvious to me that we have, as it were, the sociological guts that would... the underpinnings of a wage price spiral, which I think would be crucial to drive the kind of inflation that you’re talking about”
- Inflation of 4-5% would actually solve many problems by acting as a tax on nominal assets, which is one of the historically proven ways of dealing with large debt burdens, as seen in the 1950s-60s when rapid nominal GDP growth (partly inflation) was key to managing post-WWII debt.
“if we could have inflation of 4 percent or 5 percent, in many ways, that would solve a lot of our problems because it would act as a tax on nominal assets.”