Conversations with Tyler - Liaquat Ahamed
What this covers
Liaquat Ahamed and Tyler Cowen start in the gold-and-silver world of the 19th century and then move to the interwar years and the present. Ahamed says a better title for his book would have been The First Great Deflation. Much of the conversation tests counterfactuals. Could a coordinated group of central banks holding both metals have sustained bimetallism? Why was France its linchpin until 1873? And did the South African gold discoveries rescue a gold standard that was tightening into a vice? Ahamed names Otto von Bismarck the period's biggest villain.
The middle of the discussion is more particular. William Gladstone put about 40 percent of his net worth into Egyptian bonds, and Britain's invasion of Egypt made that profitable. Egypt was made to repay in full while Turkey's debt was cut. Ahamed traces the 1873 crisis into American politics, from Democratic revival to the end of Reconstruction and on to Jim Crow. He defends the financiers behind America's three railroad booms and busts as mostly heroes. He also doubts that Malthus and Mill were right to think Britain could remake the world along liberal lines without moral cost.
The later sections turn to the 20th century. They cover Britain's 1925 return to gold, and when a fiat currency is credible enough to be feasible. Ahamed argues that German hyperinflation was deliberate. He calls Hjalmar Schacht an opportunist. The talk ends on the IMF under US pressure, and on the eurozone and housing crises, where Ahamed would restructure debts rather than defend them. Cowen and Ahamed also discuss judging bubbles by their rate of change, using Ireland as the example.
Ahamed argues that financial crises matter most for the political and distributional order they reshape, not for aggregate growth: the 1873 deflation and the collapse of bimetallism damaged liberal politics for decades even as output kept rising.
- The 1873 crisis produced a 'First Great Deflation' whose distributional and political damage outweighed its economic damage
- Bismarck's reparations and destruction of bimetallism, not growth failure, initiated the deflation that followed
- Stabilizing central banks could have preserved bimetallism and credibility, and the South African gold discoveries rescued the gold standard
Deflation caused more political and distributional damage than economic harm, and bimetallism could have prevented it.
- The 1873 crisis did not plunge the world into a Great Depression like the 1929 crisis, but it set off a sequence of effects that damaged the world's political economy for the next 20 years, so a better title for the book would have been The First Great Deflation.
“A better title would have been The First Great Deflation.”
- The distributional consequences of the 1870s-1890s deflation, and their political impact, were much more damaging than its pure economic consequences, because flexible prices let nominal wages fall and shifted the burden onto wage earners and debtors.
“I think the distributional consequences and the political impact of those distributional consequences were much more damaging than the pure economic consequences.”
- The post-1873 period was not a happy time politically: it brought populism in the United States, a resurgence of protectionism in Europe, a retreat from liberal ideas, and a British imperial revival that included the invasion of Egypt.
“it's populism in the United States, the resurgence of protectionism in Europe, the retreat from liberal ideas, the revival of imperialism by Britain when it invaded Egypt.”
- The 1873 crisis and the monetary policy decisions that followed set back the Republican Party's dominance; Democrats revived in the 1874 congressional elections, nearly won the 1876 presidency, and their gains ended Reconstruction, a path Ahamed traces to Jim Crow.
“The 1873 depression or crisis and the subsequent monetary policy decisions set that back.”
- Growth between 1873 and 1896 was far from steady: half of that period was classified as recessionary, so the era was highly unstable despite decent average growth.
“Did we have steady growth? Half the period from 1873 to 1896 was classified as recessionary. The growth was very opposite of steady.”
- Bimetallism need not collapse into monometallism: a stabilizing central bank could have kept gold and silver prices stable even after large increases in the supply of one metal, and collectively central banks could have sustained the system through the 1880s and 1890s silver expansion by shifting holdings between metals.
“Not if you have a stabilizing central bank.”
- France was the linchpin of bimetallism, held the largest stock of precious metal reserves, and stabilized gold and silver prices throughout the early 19th century until 1873.
“France was the linchpin of bimetallism, and held the largest stock of precious metal reserves, stabilized gold and silver prices”
- Germany claimed to emulate Britain by adopting gold, yet a global bimetallic system with individual countries on gold or silver had worked between 1820 and 1870, as long as some key countries and central banks stabilized the gold and silver price.
“You just need some key countries and key central banks to stabilize the gold and silver price.”
- Countries on silver, such as India and China, devalued against gold-standard currencies, which meant they avoided deflation but their currencies fell and they could not serve as reserve currencies, and a US silver standard would have delayed its rise as a financial market.
“They didn't face deflation. There was no deflation in India. There was no deflation in China, but it meant their currencies were going down.”
- Otto von Bismarck was the biggest villain of the period: by imposing a huge reparations bill on France he disrupted European financial markets, and by destroying bimetallism he initiated the deflation that caused damaging distributional consequences in the late 19th century.
“The biggest villain in my whole book is Bismarck.”
Interwar German stabilization and rearmament resulted from Schacht's deliberate monetary choices, not spontaneous collapse.
- German hyperinflation of the 1920s happened over a very short period and the authorities lost control, and the only plausible rational explanation is that they deliberately let it run to convince creditors they could not pay reparations, since no revenue-maximizing logic justified it.
“The only plausible explanation is that they said, look, the only way that we will get out of paying reparations is if they realize that it'll destroy our financial system, which they did.”
- Gustav Stresemann was an underrated figure of the 1920s who, under his tenure, secured the appointment of Hjalmar Schacht as central bank governor, and Schacht stabilized the currency.
“I think it was under him that we got the appointment of Schacht as the governor of the central bank. He's the one who stabilized the currency, so yes.”
- Schacht held unusual spiritualist beliefs, such as the claim that people could walk through walls, and reflected a 1920s generation that dabbled in esoteric spiritual practices, possibly theosophy.
“I think he claimed that people could walk through walls. He had some very weird spiritualist beliefs.”
- Schacht always believed the Allies should have reduced reparations more, and he was bitter about it, even though under his stewardship Germany's reparations were brought to reasonable levels.
“He always thought that the Allied powers should have done a better job about reducing reparations, and he was quite bitter about that.”
- Under Hitler, Schacht presided over a second economic miracle by using constant controls and import quotas, because Germany had no reserves and world trade had collapsed, enabling it to finance rearmament.
“devise this remarkable system of essentially constant controls and import quotas, and managed to see Germany through the whole rearmament boom.”
- The economic growth of the 1873 to 1896 period was surprisingly resilient even though the depression portion was not that severe, and the striking feature of the era was the fractured political economy rather than the downturn itself.
“the downturn, the depression portion, was not that great. Surprisingly, the economic growth was surprisingly resilient.”
Gold-standard credibility and constraints, not gold itself, determined which monetary regimes were feasible.
- Had Britain abandoned gold altogether in the 1920s for a fiat currency, it would have caused a global financial crisis, because investor confidence would not have allowed it, as the examples of postwar Germany and France showed.
“I think the fear was that ultimately—and the example of Germany and France in the immediate post-war period, with no link to gold—investor confidence would not have allowed Britain to do that.”
- Britain's 1925 decision to re-peg the pound at its prewar parity was defensible, though a better approach would have been to revalue gold by about 50 percent to match wartime price inflation, which would have increased global reserves and eased 1920s constraints.
“I think that would have been a much better decision because that would have, with the stroke of a pen, increased the availability of global reserves and eliminated many of the constraints of the 1920s.”
- The South African gold discoveries essentially rescued the gold standard: during the 1870s and 1880s gold drought the standard was becoming a tightening vice, and another decade of falling prices could have pushed the US to abandon gold for silver.
“I think the South African gold discoveries essentially saved the gold standard.”
- The postwar system was a global fiat currency system in practice, with the dollar's link to gold a weak constraint, as the 1971 collapse of the gold link showed.
“It was both. It was not really a tie to gold. Witness what happened when they broke the link with gold in '71.”
- A fiat currency order is feasible when there is credibility, meaning a belief that the authorities will not let the currency collapse, so Sweden could have gone fiat around 1890 but Britain in the 1920s could not.
“As long as you had credibility, as long as there was a belief that you would not allow the currency to collapse, people could do it.”
Intellectual life flourishes in open settings, valuing stimulation over policy focus or commercial payoff.
- The UK has an educational system that produces many innovative thinkers, including many inventors of AI, yet it cannot capitalize on that talent economically or politically, which signals something is wrong.
“One of the striking things is how many inventors of AI were British. An educational system that can throw up that many innovative thinkers and yet not be able to capitalize on it, there's something wrong there.”
- The 1920s American novels were creatively rich because Victorian constraints were eliminated, yet a shared sense of what counted as great writing remained, which combined freedom with common standards.
“Because we'd eliminated the sort of constraints, the Victorian constraints. And yet there was a much more sort of a shared belief in what was great art, great literature.”
- France has settled into an equilibrium where people value the balance between work and leisure, and it remains remarkably innovative, with more startups than most other European countries.
“It seems to have hit upon an equilibrium where people like the balance between work and leisure and a lifestyle that works very well.”
- Think tanks offered a better environment than universities for generating ideas, but their work was almost entirely policy-focused, and since 2016 little policy has been driven by great ideas, leading Ahamed to become disillusioned.
“I suppose 2016 was the turning point in my mind. That since then, for the last 10 years, so little policy is driven by great ideas.”
- Replacing top-down think tanks requires a less top-down model that lets great writers and thinkers pursue their interests and lets the best ideas rise to the surface, akin to allowing a thousand flowers to bloom.
“A model that essentially was more allowing a thousand flowers to bloom and create institutions where you allow people”
- Writing a book is a remarkably good way to learn a subject, and Ahamed seeks intellectual stimulation through writing to stave off dementia, since ideas stimulate him more than athletics.
“When you want to find out about something, writing a book about it is a remarkably good way of learning it. That's what I'm trying to maximize to stave off dementia.”
- David Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest was remarkable for opening up the US political system, and Ahamed learned how the United States worked from it after arriving in 1974.
“I find it's just remarkable how it opened up the US political system.”
- Ahamed's next book would likely be a narrative of the global economy driven by a few central characters, possibly on the 1971 collapse of Bretton Woods, though he doubts it has broad enough appeal.
“I thought initially, or the one that I've stumbled across is the '71 collapse of Bretton Woods.”
- Ahamed co-produced The Situation, set in Iraq, out of frustration with the worsening situation after the 2003 invasion, and the film was a financial failure though a fascinating project.
“It was a total failure financially, so I would not do it again, but it was a fascinating project.”
- Ahamed's third book on the IMF was based on embedding himself for a few weeks to describe what institutions do, and it did not do well.
“It didn't do well. It turns out I'm not a very good journalist.”
- Ahamed's reasoning that he wants to maximize intellectual stimulation rather than income means that post-finance writing is driven by learning, not commercial payoff, and his Iraq film was a financial failure he would not repeat.
“It was a total failure financially, so I would not do it again, but it was a fascinating project.”
Egypt's bonds yielded large profits and unequal debt treatment, reflecting imperial finance contrary to liberalism.
- Imperialism is definitely contrary to the spirit of liberalism, even though many liberals of the era favored it.
“No, I think it's definitely contrary to the spirit of liberalism.”
- William Gladstone put about 40 percent of his net worth into Egyptian bonds, which at their peak yielded roughly 12 to 14 percent, and the British invasion of Egypt in the 1880s made the investment highly profitable because Britain forced Egypt to repay at par.
“Gladstone had put 40 percent of his net worth into Egyptian bonds.”
- Egypt received a raw deal in debt treatment compared with Turkey: Egypt owed about 500 million dollars (as stated) to British and French investors and was made to repay in full, while Turkey, owing about 1 billion, had its debt cut in half and then effectively paid around 30 cents on the dollar because of its geostrategic significance.
“The differential treatment of Egypt and Turkey suggests that Egypt got a raw deal.”
- A 14 percent nominal yield on Egyptian bonds was a brilliant investment at a time when prices were falling, because the real return was even higher than the nominal rate.
“at a time when 14 percent nominal and goodness knows what real because prices were falling, it was a brilliant investment.”
- Gladstone probably believed full repayment by Egypt was the moral outcome and did not invade Egypt to profit from his bond holdings, though Cowen suggested he may have traded on inside knowledge that he would enforce repayment.
“I'm sure he thought that it was the moral thing for Egypt to pay its debts in full.”
Bubbles and eurozone crises reflect institutions failing to allocate costs or manage problems.
- Ahamed is not optimistic about India because of environmental damage and water problems that authorities are unable to handle.
“I'm not very optimistic about India because of the environmental damage and because of the water problems and the inability of the authorities to deal with that.”
- The eurozone lacked a mechanism for allocating the costs of debt restructuring across countries, and what it needed was a hegemon such as Germany to take charge and decide how losses should be distributed.
“What you need is a sort of, I don't know, a hegemon, Germany, taking charge and deciding how that should have happened.”
- A mania should be judged by the rate of change of prices as well as the level: Ireland's prices rising at an unsustainable rate, with people buying three to five houses, signals an unstable bubble, as seen in the US and Spain.
“I don't think you can judge a mania purely by the level. I think you can judge a mania by the rate of change as well.”
- Ireland's problem was not only speculative trading in existing homes, since it needed to build many more homes and actually built too few, so the bubble-versus-shortage question is about construction as well as prices.
“They didn't have a big enough bubble, ex post.”
Unsustainable debts should be restructured rather than defended, and IMF lending should resist US pressure.
- The IMF's economically reasonable lending practices are distorted by US pressure to lend money to unsustainable countries, since the US has used the IMF as a vehicle for foreign policy objectives, and an IMF led by Ahamed would refuse this pressure.
“I would not respond to pressure from the US to put money into unsustainable countries. It's happened time and time again.”
- The eurozone crisis and the US housing bubble shared the same flaw: too much debt was owed by people who could not repay it, and the optimal response is to restructure those debts rather than defend them.
“The optimal thing when people borrow too much is to find a way to restructure their debts.”
Historical actors were not simple heroes or villains, since many lacked monetary understanding or moral clarity.
- Although thinkers like Malthus and Mill believed Britain could reengineer the world along liberal lines without morally troubling themselves, the long-run consequences of that project were not happy.
“They didn't think that they were damaging these societies, but I think the long-run consequences weren't happy.”
- The United States had three railroad booms and three busts in the late 19th century, and despite the cycles, the railroads produced a transportation system that knitted the country together, so the financiers who extended credit should be considered heroes, with only a few villains.
“We had three railroad booms and three busts. We ended up with a fantastic transportation system that knitted the country together. No question, we should think of them as heroes.”
- Policymakers of the 1870s to 1890s did not divide neatly into good and bad guys, because essentially all of those in charge had no clue how the monetary system worked, unlike the 1920s and 1930s where moral roles are clearer.
“Essentially, all of the people in charge had no clue how the system worked.”
- Hjalmar Schacht was an opportunist: he resigned when the Great Depression hit to avoid blame, then returned as Hitler's economics minister and central bank governor, where he managed rearmament through controls and import quotas with no reserves and collapsed world trade.
“I think when the Great Depression hit, he realized that he did not want to take the fall for that. That's why he resigned and resurfaces later as Hitler's minister of the economy and central bank governor.”
Ismaili progressivism rests on the Aga Khan's moral authority directing community change.
- Ismailis are relatively pro-progress because they follow the Aga Khan, a living imam whom they regard as a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, and his moral authority lets him direct the whole community toward enlightened change, such as moving to Africa.
“he's invested with so much moral authority that if he says, move to Africa, big chunks of the community will do that.”
- Few people join Ismailism because believing in the potential divinity of a man is not widely accepted, not because of barriers to entry.
“Perhaps believing in the potential divinity of a man is not something that people believe in.”
- Cowen proposed that the Ismaili imam being present rather than hidden is useful as a source of ongoing change, and Ahamed agreed this was the rationale for Shiism.
“Yes. That was the whole rationale for Shiism.”
- The Ismaili community is small, perhaps two or three million worldwide, and once had 20,000 to 30,000 members in Iran in the late Shah era, a number whose current size Ahamed does not know.
“There are maybe two or three million Ismailis in the world.”
- The Ismaili community was once very important in Iran in the 19th century, with the Aga Khan originating there before the British sponsored him in India, and perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 Ismailis remained in Iran under the late Shah.
“It was a very important community in Iran in the 19th century. The Aga Khan, in fact, came from Iran and moved to India.”