Conversations with Tyler - Joel Mokyr
What this covers
Tyler Cowen interviews economic historian Joel Mokyr, starting from the puzzle of why Rome, for all its creativity, never turned its science into practical technology. Mokyr points to a contempt for manual labor that Romans inherited from Plato and Aristotle. In a slave society it kept artisans and scholars from talking to each other. He also points to the absence of the Industrial Enlightenment, the belief that nature could be studied to improve life, which took hold in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. The comparison with China then fills out: steppe frontiers that kept China unified while Europe stayed fragmented, the sinification of conquerors like the Mongols, and the Catholic Church's bans on marriage between distant cousins as a solvent of kinship.
The middle of the conversation is about Britain and Germany. Britain's edge, Mokyr argues, lay in skilled workers who could install, maintain and scale up inventions. Britain's laws against emigration of artisans could not be enforced. Yet Britain was slow to adopt science-oriented higher education. Germany's Humboldtian university reform, its technical colleges, Ralf Meisenzahl's finding on workers' proximity to universities, and firms putting professors on boards all show a different route.
The talk turns contrarian on living standards. Mokyr says Britons in 1840 were probably not much better off than in 1760, that industrial cities were dreadful, and that the gains went to grandchildren. He cites Engels' reliance on local doctors, and British soldiers who stood about two inches taller than French ones. Other threads include Europeans spreading New World crops, Europe imitating Chinese porcelain, and the recency of China's big cities.
Mokyr argues the Europe-China divergence began when European institutions shifted toward non-kin corporations (universities, guilds, cities) that supplied local public goods, while China stayed organized around extended clans. He also argues that Europe's belief in progress, its market-based skill training, and its scientific capacity explain the later Industrial Revolution, not religion or geography alone.
- Europe's non-kin corporations provided local public goods that clan-based China did not, and this divergence started in the Middle Ages
- The European idea of progress and the Industrial Enlightenment, absent in Rome and China, drove sustained technological change
- Britain's industrial lead came from competitive, market-based apprenticeship that produced more skilled workers, not from Protestantism
Fukuyama's trust-based prediction that China could not build large corporations has been refuted by existing Chinese giants.
- Francis Fukuyama argued in Trust that large Chinese corporations would be hard to establish because China lacked trust unlike Japan, a prediction Tyler Cowen says looks obviously wrong decades later because large Chinese corporations now exist.
“He argued that large Chinese corporations were going to be very difficult to establish because China did not have enough trust, unlike Japan. Now, a few decades later, that seems obviously wrong.”