Olympic Games: The Price of Glory
What this covers
Economist Andrew talks with host Matt about what the Games cost the cities that stage them. The numbers come first. A Summer Games brings in roughly $4 to 5 billion from international TV rights, tickets, and domestic sponsorship, against full costs of about $15 to 30 billion or more. Every Summer Games since 1960 has run over budget, by about 250 percent on average, and the seven-plus years between award and opening let construction inflation do its work. The Olympic Village, a small city for 13,000 to 14,000 people, and the 20 to 40 venues that must be maintained afterward show where much of the money goes. The IOC's nonprofit structure, its unsalaried but well-provisioned executives, and the shrinking share of broadcast revenue passed to hosts are also covered.
The history runs from Montreal 1976, more than ten times over budget and tainted by corruption, through Denver's voter rejection of the 1976 Winter Games and the thinning of bidders. Los Angeles stepped in for 1984 under Peter Ueberroth, refusing to guarantee losses, and the Pre-existing Infrastructure Advantage of UCLA and USC venues plus a new sponsorship model produced a modest surplus. Barcelona is treated as a success with a social cost, the loss of affordable housing. The 2017 withdrawals led to Paris 2024 and Los Angeles 2028 being awarded together.
The sharpest arguments concern economic side effects. Andrew describes a Displacement Effect in Tourism, with London 2012 tourism down about 5 to 6 percent and Beijing 2008 down about 20 percent, and he disputes the idea that hosting boosts later visits. He also covers construction-labor bottlenecks, bond-financed debt service crowding out later spending, and security staffing of 50,000 to 80,000 for Paris. The overrun data, the tourism claims, and the IOC's power are flagged as contested.
Andrew Zimbalist argues that Olympic hosting almost always loses billions because the IOC, as an unregulated monopoly, shifts costs onto host cities, and that cities benefit only when they use the Games to advance a plan they already had.
- The IOC has no effective regulator and plays cities against each other, so bids escalate in venues and promises rather than dollars.
- Costs overrun in every Games since 1960, with summer-game overruns averaging about 250 percent, while revenues cover only a fraction of the spending.
- Barcelona and Los Angeles succeeded because the host set its own agenda first and treated the Olympics as a funding source, not a goal.
Olympic hosting costs are undercounted and balloon, often exceeding the revenue the Games generate.
- Cities that want to host the Olympics should be extraordinarily cautious, because it takes an enormously lucky alignment of circumstances to come out even, let alone ahead, and most host cities lose billions while suffering social, economic, and environmental disruption.
“cities that want to host the Olympics should be extraordinarily cautious that it takes an enormously lucky alignment of the stars to come out even let alone come out ahead”
- After the Games, hosts must maintain 20 to 40 or more venues, and that upkeep is costly while tying up scarce urban real estate in facilities with no economically viable use before or after the 17 days of competition.
“maintaining these venues involves a lot of cost and also involves the use of scarce urban real estate for facilities that didn't have an economically viable use before the 17 days of the Olympics”
- The IOC rarely admits when Games lose money and instead uses accounting maneuvers to cover up short-term losses.
“the IOC will very rarely admit to that, instead they'll engage in accounting finagling to cover up the losses”
- Brisbane's initial plan of a few architectural drawings grew as officials realized the need for roads, transport, telecommunications, hospitality, and security infrastructure, and the plan was redesigned to be bigger, raising costs and debate over whether to withdraw.
“So then they start getting into it and they say, wait a minute, those beautiful plans that we drew up really aren't what we wanted to do.”
- Organizers often count only a slice of Olympic costs, and when all costs are counted the Summer Games cost far more than the revenue they generate.
“When you count all that needs to be counted because very often they just count a slice of it.”
- Costs ballooned as the Games expanded and expectations for luxury grew, with Beijing 2008 spending about 45 billion dollars and Sochi 2014 spending between 51 and 65 billion dollars.
“Beijing in 2008, where they're spending $45 billion to host the games. And then you have Sochi, Russia for the winter games in 2014, they're spending somewhere between $51 billion and $65 billion.”
- An Olympic Village housing roughly 13,000 to 14,000 people, about 11,000 of them athletes, is effectively a small city with cafeterias, training facilities, clinics, and entertainment, and could cost 2 to 3 billion dollars, with media villages, telecom centers, and airport expansions adding further costs.
“it could be $2 billion or $3 billion quite easily to do that.”
- IOC bidding has never been a competition on money; cities compete on the number, specialization, amenities, and cost of venues, so bid figures are not directly comparable and understate the full commitment.
“the bidding process never was. One city says, I'll bid $15 billion, the next city says, I'll bid $16 billion, never in money. It was always in venues”
- Because Games are awarded seven or more years in advance, a 5 to 10 year gap allows construction cost inflation, one of the strongest forms of inflation, to push budgets up.
“during the course of five years or seven years or 10 years, we have inflation, and one of the strongest areas of inflation is in construction costs.”
- The 1976 Montreal Summer Games went more than 10 times over budget and were accompanied by publicized corruption, further damaging the Olympics' reputation.
“you had the Montreal Olympics in the summer of '76 that ended up going more than 10 times over budget”
- Every Summer Games since 1960 has run over budget, with average cost overruns of about 250 percent, meaning prices more than doubled, though data before 1980 is less complete and Moscow 1980 lacks adequate data.
“the typical cost overruns since 1960 for the summer games is 250%, prices going up more than double.”
- Politicians submit bare-bones plans to win approval, then add amenities after approval, so a project budgeted at 7 billion dollars can grow to 10 or 20 billion dollars.
“what they like to do is put forward a bare bones plan without any bells and whistles. Then once there's political approval, then they start adding the bells and whistles.”
- Business interests behind New York's 2016 Olympic bid wanted to develop rail yards on Manhattan's west side, and they obtained rezoning needed for a concrete platform because the bid required showing viability, then lost interest in hosting once the rezoning was granted.
“Once they got the rezoning, they didn't really care very much about whether they hosted the games or not.”
Construction booms, bond debt, and shrinking host revenue shares undercut the Games' economic benefits.
- Hosting produces a construction boom that exceeds the local supply of skilled workers, forcing imports of labor, and if the sector is already fully employed the demand drives wages and inflation up, while if it is underemployed it can reach full employment.
“If it starts out at being fully employed, you'll drive it to inflation.”
- Financing Olympic construction with bonds creates debt service that reduces the money available later for other construction and for schools, so the short-term employment gain is offset by fewer jobs in the future.
“as you have to pay back the bonds, the city has less money to engage in other construction projects, less money to invest in their school system, and that means fewer workers will be hired.”
- As international broadcast revenue rose, the IOC shared a smaller and smaller portion with the host city, so the host's proportional take fell even as the total grew.
“As that number has gone up higher and higher, they've shared a smaller and smaller portion of it with the host city.”
The IOC is an unregulated monopoly whose wealthy members enjoy perks and historically took payoffs.
- The International Olympic Committee is an international monopoly with no world government regulating it, and the United Nations is ineffective in this area, so the IOC holds substantial power that varies with its popularity.
“We have no world government that regulates the IOC. We have the United Nations. They're basically effete on all grounds”
- IOC leaders receive expenses paid wherever they go and private plane service, and former president Juan Antonio Samaranch rented a permanent loft in the most expensive hotel in Lausanne.
“Thomas Bach, the President, gets all of his expenses paid for wherever he goes.”
- Organizing committees often include construction and development executives who award billions in contracts, creating opportunities for payoffs that escalate costs, with the degree of corruption varying by city.
“usually, the organizing committee has already involved bigwigs from the construction industry from development companies, construction companies.”
- The IOC is a nonprofit with no owners who take home profits, and its top executives receive no salary, though they get generous expenses, perks, and private travel.
“The IOC is a nonprofit. The top executives, like the President and the Vice President, they don't receive a salary.”
- IOC members historically took large payoffs because they voted on hosts, but Andrew believes that such corruption has since declined.
“Historically, it used to be a lot more corrupt, and since they were voting on who would be the next host, they get big-time payoffs. But I'm of the belief that that has abated.”
- The roughly 100 IOC members are mostly wealthy, well-connected businesspeople, some of them royalty, who receive free business or first-class travel and gifts instead of salaries.
“There's about 100 members on the International Olympic Committee itself. A large share of those members are very wealthy, very well-connected businesspeople.”
Hosting brings security threats, large venue footprints, and disruptive urban transformation for host cities.
- The 1968 Mexico City Games were marred by a government crackdown on student protests a week before the opening, in which dozens were killed, and by the city's high altitude and severe pollution, which hurt athletes' cardiovascular performance and brought bad publicity.
“The government could not countenance that level of discord being on the world stage, and they suppressed it and they ended up killing”
- Security for the Paris Games involves an estimated 50,000 to 80,000 personnel plus military equipment, high technology, and drones, and the threat environment makes the Olympics a magnet for political and terrorist attention.
“I've seen a figure of around 50,000, I've seen a figure of around 80,000, security personnel who are going to be staking out the grounds.”
- The IOC requires roughly 35 to 40 venues for the Summer Games, with each host able to add new events, such as baseball returning to the 2028 Los Angeles Games.
“what the IOC requires for the summer games, somewhere around 35 to 40 venues.”
- After Franco's death in 1975, Barcelona moved an obstructive warehousing and manufacturing district that blocked its waterfront, redesigned its roads and layout, and fitted the Olympic bid into its own plan, so the Games worked for the city.
“they take the position that we've got to move this warehousing and manufacturing district. We want to have access to the sea”
- The 1972 Munich Olympics were overshadowed by a terrorist attack on the Israeli team in which 11 Israelis were killed, giving Munich poor imagery.
“there was the attack by terrorists on the Israeli compound, 11 Israelis were killed”
Hosting pays off only when the Games fit a city's own plan rather than dictating it.
- The plan-first model works only for a limited subset of cities, and a city could simply pursue its own needs directly rather than dragging the Olympics along.
“if our city needs XYZ, why don't we just do XYZ? Why do we have to drag the Olympics along to do XYZ?”
- Barcelona's Olympic-era development removed a good deal of low-priced and affordable housing, so its success carried real negative social costs.
“Barcelona had a variety of negative outcomes as well, such as knocking out a good deal of low-priced housing or affordable housing.”
- Cities benefit from hosting only when they have their own city plan first and the Games fit into it, because when the Olympics dictate what gets built, the city ends up working for the Olympics and has a bad experience.
“if you, instead of letting the Olympics dictate to you what gets built and where it gets built, if you have your own plan that says this is what our city needs”
- Hosting can make sense for a politician who wants short-term jobs before an election and national exposure, but that differs from investment that creates lasting economic development for the city.
“Politician wants to get reelected, so generate a lot of jobs in the short run before the election.”
- Hosting-driven construction is justified only if it creates something sustainable for the city's economic development, not merely short-run jobs.
“So it only makes sense to do these construction projects if there's something sustainable, if it's recommended from the standpoint of economic development for the city”
Permanent summer and winter sites beat rebuilding venues each cycle, which raises costs and logistical strain.
- Olympic historian David Goldblatt has argued in a recent article that the Olympics should end, because athletic competitions can continue without convening the entire world in one city for 17 days.
“My friend David Goldblatt, who is an Olympic and sports historian and an excellent one, recently came out with an article where he argues, no, let's just end the Olympics.”
- Reform toward permanent sites is unlikely because the IOC controls the Games and its members pursue their own agendas rather than global warming or long-term economic sustainability.
“all of this ultimately is controlled by the IOC. And the IOC, as I explained earlier, has a bunch of members who have their own agenda”
- The most rational way to keep the Olympics is to designate one permanent summer host site and one permanent winter host site, so that cities need not rebuild infrastructure each cycle, with a 300 to 400 acre site between Athens and Olympia suggested for the summer Games.
“the most rational way to do it is to have one designated site to host the summer games every four years, and another designated site to host the winter games”
- The modern Olympic model was built in 1896 when international travel and telecommunications did not exist, so moving the Games around the world was necessary; with modern communications that rationale no longer applies.
“Because of international telecommunications, we don't need to do that anymore. And that old model doesn't make sense.”
- Andrew believes the Olympics have intrinsic virtues and are fun, so if they are kept they should be run in a more rational, single-host way rather than through repeated city rebuilds.
“I'm one who believes that there are some virtues to the games and that they're fun in any event”
- Los Angeles could host cheaply because UCLA and USC had major Division 1 stadiums, arenas, and swimming venues, so the city did not have to build most of its facilities from scratch.
“they also happen to have UCLA and USC, major Division 1 sports programs that, therefore, they have major stadiums and arenas and swimming competition venues.”
- After Montreal's overruns and corruption, fewer and fewer cities in the mid and late 1970s were willing to bid for the Games until Los Angeles stepped in for 1984 on the condition that it would not guarantee any losses.
“they weren't willing to guarantee any losses and the IOC had no choice. They went along with it.”
- Moving athletes between venues within a city, and between cities such as surfing in Tahiti for Paris 2024, plus feeding athletes and handling millions of visitors, creates logistical complexity that organizers constantly encounter for the first time.
“every week he's confronting some new issues that he never thought of before.”
Olympic tourism gains are uncertain, varying widely and often overstated by congestion-driven visitor avoidance.
- After hosting, Barcelona's tourism rose from around 20th or 21st most popular European city to a top-three destination, where it remains today.
“they go from the 20 or 21st most popular city in Europe to visit to the top three where they still pretty much are today.”
- Hotel bookings in Paris are down and hotel capacity utilization is substantially lower than a year earlier, and airport traffic is substantially down as normal tourism stays away during the 2024 Games.
“the bookings at the hotels are down, hotel capacity utilization is lower than it was this time last year, substantially lower. Airport turnover, number of people using the airport is substantially down.”
- During the Games, Olympic visitors flood in but regular tourists stay away because of congestion, security concerns, and higher prices, producing a net reduction in tourism; London 2012 saw tourism fall roughly 5 to 6 percent and Beijing 2008 about 20 percent.
“So you saw in London in 2012, tourism was down roughly 5% or 6%. In Beijing, in 2008, it was down roughly 20%.”
- Rio 2016 was an exception in which low-income tourists flooded in and stayed on beaches, slightly raising total visitor numbers, so Olympic tourism can outweigh displacement in some cases.
“Rio in 2016 is actually one such case, where low income tourists flood into the country during the Olympic Games.”
- The claim that hosting the Olympics raises future tourism by putting a city on the world stage is largely false, because people do not travel to cities for individual events, and Olympic visitors often report traffic and high costs rather than positive word of mouth.
“I think that that claim has been shown pretty much to be nonsense. People don't go to a city because they hosted a 100-meter running race”
- Word of mouth is the most effective tourism promotion, and visitors who attend the Olympics come home reporting traffic and expense rather than city attractions, so the Olympics function as a very expensive marketing campaign for tourism.
“I think that that claim has been shown pretty much to be nonsense. People don't go to a city because they hosted a 100-meter running race”
Most Olympic revenue flows to sports bodies while broadcast income stagnates for host cities.
- National Olympic Committees, such as the USOPC, use redistributed Olympic money to support sport federations, pay salaries and bonuses to athletes, and fund their own large operations.
“Increasingly, the athletes in these various programs get remunerated. You get a salary. They get bonuses if they win”
- Summer Games generate roughly 4 to 5 billion dollars in total revenue from international TV rights of 1 to 1.5 billion, tickets of 750 million to 1 billion, and domestic sponsorship, while full costs run from about 15 billion to 30 billion dollars or more.
“When you count all that needs to be counted because very often they just count a slice of it.”
- Of the roughly 4 to 5 billion dollars in international television revenue, the host city now receives about 20 percent, the IOC keeps about 10 percent for operations and benefits, and about 70 percent is distributed to the International Sports Federations and National Olympic Committees.
“So the host city these days gets about 20% of whatever that international number is. The rest of it, about 10% of it goes to maintaining the IOC”
- Olympic broadcast rights have risen steadily, but audience fragmentation across streamers like YouTube, Netflix, and Amazon makes it harder for networks like NBC to justify larger payments, so Andrew expects flat or declining media revenue.
“My own sense is that party is over. On the positive side, they might see flat revenues, but I also think there's a chance they'll see diminishing media revenues.”
Competitive bidding has given way to private deals as cities withdraw from hosting.
- Historically the IOC has placed cities in competition with each other, asking them to propose venues, transportation, and amenities, which led cities to make promises costing billions more than the revenue they would attract.
“they've been able to place cities off against each other, have cities compete to make proposals about the venues and the transportation and the amenities”
- After the embarrassment of 2017, the IOC changed its process so that bidding discussions happen privately, allowing cities to withdraw or face protest without public exposure, and the host is announced only once the terms are acceptable.
“we're going to start having bids in private and all of the discussions will happen in private.”
- As costs became clear, cities turned against hosting through referenda, city council votes, and petition drives, reducing the field of bidders from five to eight cities down to one to three.
“instead of having five, six, seven, eight cities bidding, you've got two or three cities or even one or two cities bidding.”
- Brisbane was announced as the 2032 host through the private process with no open competition, and Brisbane's residents and officials have become unhappy with the arrangement.
“The games in Brisbane, Australia, that were awarded for 2032, those games were awarded in the secret behind-the-curtain process.”
Bidding interest collapses after cost scandals and recovers only after surpluses.
- Melbourne, Australia, had been slated to host the next Commonwealth Games but canceled after reviewing costs, benefits, disruption, and security concerns, and Brisbane residents then raised similar questions.
“Melbourne, Australia was slated to host the next Commonwealth Games, and people started looking at the costs”
- Denver, which the IOC had awarded the 1976 Winter Olympics, held a referendum in which voters rejected hosting because they judged it too expensive and environmentally unsound.
“Then the people of Denver called for a plebiscite or referendum, which they had, and they voted it down.”
- In 2017 five cities withdrew from the competition for the 2024 and 2028 Games, leaving the IOC to choose between Los Angeles and Paris.
“what happened in 2017 is that five cities dropped out of the competition.”
- By the mid and late 1970s, the accumulated bad reputation caused fewer and fewer cities to be willing to bid for the Games.
“So fewer and fewer cities in the mid and late '70s were willing to bid.”
- Under CEO Peter Ueberroth, Los Angeles developed a new corporate sponsorship model that greatly raised sponsorship revenue, and combined with existing university stadiums and good management it generated a modest but real surplus.
“Peter Ueberroth is the CEO of it. He develops a new model for corporate sponsorships. The amount of money they garner from that goes way up.”
- After Los Angeles turned a surplus, the Olympics' reputation reversed from bad to good, and cities resumed competing eagerly to bid, a pattern that continued through the rest of the 20th century.
“once again, cities started this clamor to be able to enter the competition to bid to host the games”
- Los Angeles agreed to host the 1984 Games only on condition that it would not guarantee any losses, and the IOC had no choice but to accept.
“they weren't willing to guarantee any losses and the IOC had no choice. They went along with it.”
- Facing the risk of no bidders for 2028, the IOC gave Paris the 2024 Games and offered Los Angeles the 2028 Games with upfront payments, announcing two successive hosts for the first time.
“what happened in 2017 is that five cities dropped out of the competition.”