What this covers

This Business Breakdowns episode has Zack and Michael walking through Adyen from its founding to its valuation, with Michael carrying most of the analysis. It begins with how a card payment is split. On a $100 Nike purchase, the issuing bank takes about $1.50, Visa or Mastercard about $0.30, and Adyen as acquirer about $0.20. The conversation then covers why processing is so sticky, with RFPs every three to five years and high switching costs. It also covers how Pieter van der Does, a round two founder who had spent time inside Worldpay, built Adyen, from its first live transaction in 2007 to the Groupon win in 2009.

The middle of the episode ranges widely. One strand is the economics of authorization rate: moving from 85% to 90% on $100 million a month is worth roughly $60 million a year, and online transactions decline about 20% of the time against 5% offline. Another is why 1980s-90s mainframe architectures are hard to fix, with Worldpay's estimated £600-700 million replatforming effort and the defensive consolidation around FIS's $43 billion deal. A third is culture: hiring one candidate in 171, one-week release cycles against an industry norm of three to six months, and an equity structure that put off many venture firms.

The episode ends on the skeptical side. Michael cites fintech funding above $130 billion and argues that capital competition erodes profits. He says Checkout.com has copied much of Adyen but not its omnichannel offering. He names volume churn, below 1% so far, as the KPI to watch. He also separates business quality from stock return, asking whether free cash flow growth can offset multiple compression.

Sharpest takeaway

Willar argues Adyen's single end-to-end platform, which combines acquiring, gateway, and issuing under one codebase with its own licenses, plus a culture that refuses acquisitions and outsourcing, gives it durable margin and share-gain advantages over legacy processors and next-gen rivals like Stripe, so payments is not winner-take-all.

  • A single platform with local acquiring and banking licenses raises authorization rates and data access, which merchants value as incremental revenue
  • Legacy processors are stitched-together systems that are costly to replatform, so they keep losing share
  • Adyen's culture and lean, in-house operating model produce high EBITDA margins that few growth businesses achieve

The argument · threads12 threads · 74 claims
0.80

Full-stack single-platform control with direct network connections raises authorization rates and differentiates Adyen in enterprise.

11 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Adyen is a full-stack acquirer that has obtained many local acquiring licenses and holds banking licenses in the EU and US, so it controls the whole payment stack end to end, which gives merchants higher authorization rates, lower transaction costs, and faster settlement.

    “They're what you call a full stack acquirer where they've obtained a lot of the relevant local acquiring licenses around the world and now have two banking licenses in EU and the US.”

  • On a $100 Nike purchase made with a Bank of America credit card, the issuing bank earns about $1.50 in interchange, Visa or MasterCard earns about $0.30 in assessment and data processing fees, and Adyen as acquirer earns about $0.20, so the merchant pays a roughly $2 merchant discount rate and nets about $98.

    “So the total cost of buying a pair of Nike shoes with my Bank of America credit card is $2, but importantly, this $2 is paid by Nike, the merchant”

  • For a merchant processing $100 million a month, raising authorization rates from 85% to 90% would add roughly $60 million of incremental annual revenue, so the ROI from better authorization far outweighs any small price premium, which is why processing should be treated as a revenue game rather than a commodity.

    “increasing authorization rates by 5% on that 100 million in turnover equates to $60 million difference in incremental revenue a year.”

  • Card networks such as Visa and MasterCard act as gatekeepers that set the rules and interchange fees and require licenses to operate on their network, and together they process a large share of global GDP.

    “They are effectively the gatekeepers of payments and literally make the rules for participants”

  • Next-gen processors like Checkout have largely copied Adyen's capabilities, but they have not copied its omnichannel solution, which gives Adyen a differentiation edge in RFPs.

    “Interestingly, the one thing that they didn't copy was their omnichannel solution”

  • Working with the largest and fastest-growing merchants gives Adyen transaction data it uses to keep innovating, and since no competitor has the same data, that data is a clear defensive mechanism.

    “Working with the largest and fastest growing merchants gives them all this data, which they can use to continue to innovate, which I think is a clear defense mechanism”

  • Online transactions are declined about 20% of the time versus about 5% offline, and Adyen's single platform and direct network connections let it raise authorization rates, which enterprise merchants treat as the key currency because each point of approval is incremental revenue.

    “20% of all online transactions are declined. And this is versus 5% in the offline world”

  • A card transaction splits into an authorization phase, where the acquirer runs risk checks and the network routes the request to the issuer for identity and funds validation, and a later settlement phase, where acquirer and issuer exchange data and the acquirer deposits funds into the merchant account.

    “These transaction will be separated into the authorization phase and the settlement phase”

  • The digital consumer-to-business payments market is roughly $38 to $40 trillion and growing every year, with growth driven partly by cash being displaced in real time.

    “it is roughly 38 to $40 trillion”

  • Existing processing infrastructure was built decades ago for the analog age, and Adyen set out to build modern pipes that connect directly to card networks with little data degradation, giving the largest merchants higher authorization rates.

    “They knew that the existing processing infrastructure was built decades ago and for the analog age”

  • Michael highlights that in payments today the 20% decline rate online is a problem Adyen directly targets, which frames the business as a solution-oriented processor rather than a cost-cutting utility.

    “they exist to solve problems for merchants”

0.71

Deliberate, selective culture sustains speed, loyalty, and durability as Adyen's hardest-to-copy competitive advantage.

13 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Adyen hires only one out of 171 candidates, a board member interviews every candidate in the final round including office assistants, and after hiring it invests heavily in training with only expecting payback within about a year.

    “They only hire one out of 171 candidates.”

  • The Adyen formula structures the company to be highly decentralized from day one across seven global offices, so it can adapt faster to change than competitors, and it stipulates that managers have worked the same work themselves, communicates directly by phone, and is blunt.

    “It means they've structured the company from day one in such a way that's very decentralized and ensures they can be nimble to adapt to ongoing change and faster to the markets than competitors.”

  • A key risk is that key developers and commercial staff leave for higher pay, since Adyen's stock-based compensation was only about 10 million euros in 2020 (about 1.5% of net revenue), no employee earned more than 1 million euros, and the CEO earned roughly 600,000 euros, far below US peer CEOs at 15 to 25 million dollars.

    “if key developers and commercial people start to leave, that could certainly start to dilute their advantage.”

  • Adyen's culture, called the Adyen formula, enables one-week release cycles on its platform, while the payments industry norm is three to six months, and this speed let Evernote move from processing in yen to 30 currencies within two weeks of switching.

    “The Adyen formula is why they do one week release cycles, meaning they push new things on their platform, which is just unheard of in the payments industry.”

  • Adyen has made no acquisitions in its 16 years because it believes acquisitions can destroy company culture, and it protects the Adyen formula at all costs, which Michael presents as a key reason for culture durability.

    “This is why they haven't done any acquisitions and won't in 16 years, which they think can destroy cultures among many other things.”

  • Adyen deliberately avoids type-A candidates who seek elite credentials and quick stock option wealth, and it has been quick to let such people go when their behavior does not fit the Adyen formula, creating loyalty among the employees it keeps.

    “So they're really not looking for your typical type A personality, who went to an Ivy league school and wants to clear over 1 million in stock options alone before he or she is 28”

  • Maintaining a strong culture requires almost obsessive focus, which is hard for a young business trying to scale and satisfy near-term investor expectations, and Adyen has maintained it by making deliberate chess-like moves on hiring, promotion, board composition, and refusing bids.

    “But what the Adyen story shows is that it also requires almost obsessive focus to maintain it.”

  • The name Adyen translates to start again in Surinamese Dutch, reflecting the founders' premise that the existing way of doing payments is broken and should be rebuilt from scratch.

    “Adyen translates to start again, as in, let's start from scratch because the existing way of doing things is broken.”

  • Adyen discloses that no employee earned more than 1 million euros in total compensation, which is part of a culture that differs sharply from industry norms, and it paid only about 10 million euros in 2020 stock-based compensation.

    “if key developers and commercial people start to leave, that could certainly start to dilute their advantage.”

  • Adyen bootstrapped with its own money until its 2011 Series A led by Index, the year it first became profitable, and it structured its equity with only common stock, no board seats for investors, and no preferential liquidity or minimum returns, which deterred many top venture firms.

    “they started again with their own money and bootstrapped the business until 2011 when they did their Series A led by Index.”

  • Adyen runs separate work streams for new and ongoing projects so it can quickly tell whether work is adding value or wasting time, and it stops bad decisions as soon as they are identified.

    “they have what they call separate work streams for new and ongoing projects”

  • Adyen seeks a specific cultural profile rather than the typical type-A candidate, and though it sounds cultish, the approach creates high employee loyalty and a space where smart, creative people such as young engineers can get resources for their own ideas.

    “Now, it does sound quite cultish because it kind of is, and this allows them a lot of employee loyalty”

  • Adyen's culture, called the Adyen formula, is its most notable competitive advantage, shaping a decentralized structure across seven offices that lets it adapt faster than competitors and make many small good decisions that compound over time.

    “I think their culture that they have implemented is the most notable, competitive advantage that they have”

0.62

Lean in-house operations and operating leverage produce rising, exceptionally high margins and free cash conversion.

9 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Adyen has about 2,200 full-time employees, roughly one-tenth of Worldline's headcount, and fewer than Worldpay at about 8,000 to 8,500 and Stripe at over 6,000, which makes it far more efficient than its competitors.

    “To compare their full-time employee count to peers, Worldline, which is a European legacy processor, they have close to 10X the number of employees.”

  • Adyen's margins have increased by close to 20% over four years through operating leverage, and Michael believes they could exceed 70% within a few years.

    “So this has resulted in a fair amount of operating leverage where margins have increased close to 20% in four years. And I think they could be north of 70% in a few years.”

  • About 80% of Adyen's growth comes from its existing merchant base through organic volume and wallet share gains, which is why it needs relatively few salespeople and little sales and marketing spend.

    “The catch is that 80% of their growth comes from their existing merchant base.”

  • In 2021 Adyen processed 516 billion euros of TPV, generated just under 6 billion euros of gross revenue and just over 1 billion euros of net revenue after paying issuers and card networks, implying a blended take rate of about 19 basis points.

    “So as an example, for 2021, Adyen processed 516 billion euros in TPV.”

  • Adyen's blended take rate is a function of merchant size, since larger merchants receive tiered volume discounts that lower the cost per transaction, so growth in large merchants pushes the blended rate down even as net revenue grows.

    “the larger the volumes of a merchant, the more tiered volume discounts, meaning a lower cost per transaction.”

  • Adyen's CFO Ingo Uytdehaage manages the business to grow TPV and net revenue rather than take rates, and net revenue has grown about 40% per year since 2017.

    “I don't manage the business or take rates, but rather growing TPV and net revenue”

  • Adyen's operating expenses are only about 41% of net revenue, with salaries roughly half of opex, while many fast-growing payments and software businesses spend over 100% of revenue on operating costs.

    “which is only about 41% of their net revenue”

  • Adyen built its entire payment stack on a single codebase, runs its own data centers instead of third-party cloud, and produces even its own earnings videos in-house, which lowers operating costs by eliminating outsourcing.

    “They even built up their own data centers around the world, instead of building on third party cloud infrastructure.”

  • Adyen has a 64% EBITDA margin and converts 90% of it into free cash flow, placing it in the top 5% of MSCI World constituents and only a few points below Visa, an extremely rare combination with 40%-plus revenue growth.

    “Today, Adyen has a 64% EBITDA margin business and converts 90% of that into free cash flow.”

0.39

Legacy processors are structurally disadvantaged, losing share, and too costly to replatform.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Legacy processing platforms were built in the 1980s and 1990s on mainframes that minimized the data stored per transaction, because memory, processing power, and bandwidth were costly, but data is now mission-critical to merchants, so those architectures are structurally disadvantaged.

    “these legacy platforms were built on mainframes to be economical and use only the bare minimum of the data in a transaction given the high costs.”

  • Just under 70% of global payments volume is still processed by legacy players who are struggling to compete and losing share, which means the share shift to next-gen processors has a large remaining runway.

    “just under 70% of volumes globally is still being processed by the legacy guys who are struggling to compete and are losing share.”

  • The late-2010s wave of processor consolidation, including Worldpay to Vantiv to FIS at $43 billion, First Data with Fiserv, and Global Payments with TSYS, was driven by defensive motives rather than the revenue synergies companies advertised, with three large platforms integrated at once.

    “And these were all defensive acquisitions and less about the revenue synergies they were talking about.”

  • Worldpay is an amalgamation of 18 to 20 different platforms and many more systems glued together, which creates high maintenance costs, reconciliation headaches, and slower innovation for merchants operating across many markets.

    “If I just pick on Worldpay, they are almost an amalgamation of 18 to 20 different platforms and even more systems that have been literally glued together.”

  • Replatforming is very hard: Worldpay spent an estimated 600 to 700 million pounds between 2010 and 2015 on a new platform with no announcement, JPMorgan also spent heavily without traction, and merchants face costly re-integrations, so most would rather integrate with a modern provider.

    “And in the five years from 2010 to 2015, and I think somewhere between 600, 700 million pounds later nothing was announced.”

0.39

Enterprise stickiness and deep product integrations make Adyen's volume hard to move.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Adyen's omnichannel solution turns point-of-sale terminals into software-connected devices that unify online and offline sales, return handling, and shopper data, and merchants such as Dick's, Subway, and McDonald's say it was a deciding factor in winning their RFPs.

    “they said that was a deciding factor when they won the RFP.”

  • Payment processing is B2B and very sticky, with RFPs every three to five years and extremely high switching costs once a merchant is integrated, so volume only moves if a competitor significantly outperforms technically.

    “Once they are plugged in, there's extremely high switching costs and will only shift volume away from Adyen should a competitor significantly outperform them from a technical standpoint.”

  • Adyen's issuing product, launched in 2019, targets marketplaces that need faster seller payouts and OTAs, and it should consolidate more transaction volume on Adyen's platform, though Michael expects only single-digit revenue impact over four to five years.

    “I don't think it'll have more than single digit revenue impacts in the next four, five years, but could act as a further retention mechanism.”

  • Around 2014 or 2015 Adyen allocated its developers to work alongside Nike's developers to build a fully customized offline application, an engagement that Michael says would be hard for any competitor to match regardless of price.

    “Adyen allocated developers to Nike developers, and they built this fully customized application.”

  • Adyen's early pivotal win was Groupon in 2009, and in payments you need volume to get volume, similar to fund management needing AUM to attract AUM, which is why its first live transaction in 2007 and early wins mattered so much.

    “And in payments, you need volume to kind of get volume. It's similar to fund management. You kind of need AUM to get AUM.”

0.34

A great business may not be a great stock given severe valuation multiple compression risk.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Adyen is a great business but not necessarily a great stock, so investors must test whether it can withstand severe multiple compression and whether free cash flow per share growth can offset that compression and still deliver a low-to-mid-teens return.

    “Clearly, Adyen is a great business, but doesn't make it a great stock.”

  • Volume churn has stayed below 1% for virtually Adyen's entire history, meaning it is not losing volume, and volume churn is the most important KPI for investors to monitor, with any rise demanding an explanation.

    “The most important KPI for investors to watch is for volume churn, which has remained less than 1% for pretty much the entire history.”

  • Adyen's 2018 IPO sold no new shares and served mainly to give early investors the option of liquidity, many of whom are still invested today.

    “Even in Adyen's IPO in 2018, they didn't sell any new shares”

0.30

Adyen stays ahead of Stripe in enterprise, unlike Stripe's SME-oriented pricing and upmarket moves.

7 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Some of the largest merchants have compared Adyen and Stripe and concluded Adyen is still ahead on local payment methods, authorization rates, and omnichannel, with some having moved from Stripe to Adyen, while others use both for different markets.

    “some have actually left Stripe for Adyen. But then there are also some merchants who use both for certain markets”

  • Stripe could outcompete Adyen in enterprise over time, but building a single platform and acquiring licenses is a long-term game that takes years, and Michael believes the next-gen share gains will make head-to-head rivalry less relevant than the shift from legacy processors.

    “I wouldn't be surprised if this mix completely flips to 30% legacy and 70% to the Adyens, the Stripes checkouts of the world”

  • Adyen and Stripe are like Messi and Ronaldo, both top-tier and better because of each other, since Stripe Connect prompted Adyen to build Adyen for Platforms and Stripe's omnichannel build-out was driven by Adyen's solution.

    “Ronaldo also wouldn't be Ronaldo without Messi, they've made themselves better. It's the same with Stripe and Adyen.”

  • Stripe launched in 2011 with a developer-friendly front end that let a startup integrate in two lines of code, grew out of Y Combinator focused on startups and online SMEs, and dominated marketplaces through Stripe Connect, while Adyen was built from day one to serve the largest global enterprises.

    “Stripe, they came to the market in 2011 and said, Look, we've created this beautiful looking front-end application where a startup with two employees can easily integrate with two lines of code”

  • Pricing for small and medium businesses is much higher than for enterprises because of volume, so an SME-focused processor like Stripe can charge more per transaction, while enterprise needs such as local licenses and data differ greatly.

    “your pricing for SME is a lot higher than what you can charge enterprises because of volume.”

  • Adyen raised only just under 300 million dollars in private markets and did not sell new shares in its 2018 IPO, whereas Stripe and Checkout collectively raised about 4 billion dollars.

    “I think they only raised just under 300 million or thereabouts in the private market. If you compare that to Stripe and Checkout's, they've collectively raised four billion.”

  • Stripe has moved upmarket into large enterprises since around 2017 to retain its grown-up merchants such as DoorDash and Shopify, it has moved off First Data to connect directly to the card networks, but it still relies on Wells Fargo and PNC for US acquiring and has not obtained local acquiring or banking licenses.

    “They haven't gone down the routes of getting local acquiring licenses, and certainly not banking licenses.”

0.28

Rising digital penetration and Adyen's small share imply a multi-fold growth runway.

6 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Given low-to-mid-teens annual growth in the underlying digital payments market and accelerating share gains, Adyen's TPV base could be more than four times its current level within five years.

    “their market share is accelerating, which I think equates to a TPV base that could be over four times of where it is today.”

  • Adyen's offline business now accounts for roughly 14% of its TPV and is growing more than 100% a year, a sign it is building a larger presence beyond its online skew.

    “which now counts for roughly 14% of their TPV and is growing north of a hundred percent.”

  • Digital payments penetration of consumer-to-business payments has risen from about 25% (75% cash and check) 15 years ago to just under 40%, and could approach 70% within eight years, which Adyen benefits from because it participates whenever a non-cash method is used.

    “I don't think it's totally unrealistic to say that digital payment penetration could increase closer to 70% in the next eight years.”

  • Adyen processed $610 billion of total payment volume last year, just under 2% of the global addressable market, and about low-teens percent share of the online-only market, which is about 86% of its volume.

    “So Adyen processed $610 billion in TPV last year, which is just under 2% market share.”

  • The top three US merchant acquirers collectively process just under $4 trillion, with JPMorgan's Paymentech the largest at about $1.5 trillion, followed by FIS (which owns Worldpay) and Fiserv (which owns First Data).

    “if you look at the US specifically and you look at the top three merchant acquirers, they collectively process just under $4 trillion.”

  • The US now accounts for 24% of Adyen's business, up from just under 10% in 2017, after a new US leader with a product background and changes to the commercial approach helped Adyen win domestic volume it had previously struggled to capture.

    “The net of this is that the US is now 24% on the business, which is up from just under 10% in 2017.”

0.25

Keeping promises and close merchant relationships creates trust rivals cannot easily displace.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Visa or MasterCard could build a comparable single platform and disintermediate processors, but Adyen's accumulated merchant trust, reputation for keeping promises, and proven delivery make that hard to displace.

    “I think it's certainly possible, and something to monitor for investors.”

  • The Dutch saying goedkoop is duurkoop, meaning cheap can be expensive in the long run, captures Adyen's philosophy that the cheapest processor is often the most costly over time.

    “Goedkoop is duurkoop, meaning you get what you pay for, and cheap might indeed be expensive longer term.”

  • eBay now uses Adyen exclusively after dropping PayPal in 2018, which got the market's attention and was a notable win that shows merchants can consolidate on one processor.

    “There are exceptions such as eBay, which is now exclusively using Adyen and got everyone's attention”

  • Adyen's engineers travel to see merchants about once a year to review what they have built and how to improve it, a level of closeness that is rare in the industry and builds trust.

    “Adyen's engineers will travel once a year to see merchants, to check in and chat about the products”

  • Adyen builds a trust-based moat by not making promises it cannot honor, being transparent about timelines, and often delivering earlier and with better customization than promised, while legacy competitors overpromise and underdeliver.

    “I think it's certainly possible, and something to monitor for investors.”

0.23

Long-term orientation in capital, reporting, and ownership builds sustainability.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Adyen will likely keep building cash, projected above 10 billion euros by 2024, rather than doing large acquisitions, dividends, or heavy buybacks, because the cash signals sustainability to merchants and regulators and helps win RFPs and licenses.

    “for them it shows merchants and regulators around the world that they have a sustainable and very profitable business, which can certainly help winning RFPs and licenses around the world.”

  • Adyen did not sell to JP Morgan or other bidders before its IPO, reflecting a discipline in which the company stuck to its principles rather than selling at a price.

    “how they didn't sell to JP Morgan and many other bidders, pre-IPO”

  • Adyen reports results only twice a year, avoids quarterly window dressing, and has not changed its IPO prospectus guidance in almost four years except to raise its margin guidance, which Michael presents as a sign of long-term orientation.

    “They only report results twice a year, they don't play the quarterly game”

  • Pieter van der Does said that when you intend to keep a business rather than exit it, your decisions change drastically, and Michael considers this the basis for building longevity and sustainability.

    “When you have a business and you want to keep the business, not exit it, your decisions start to drastically change.”

0.21

Multi-processor hedging and capital-fueled competition keep incumbents alive and cap Adyen's share.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The idea that incumbent processors will go to zero is objectively wrong, because merchants use multiple processors as outage hedges and to keep processors competing on price and authorization rates, usually splitting volume roughly 75-80% primary and the rest backup.

    “the primary reason why a merchant won't generally use one processor is almost a hedge if you will in the event that there's a outage.”

  • Adyen capturing 50 to 60% of the addressable market is highly unlikely for three reasons: its offline presence is still small, domestic low-sophistication retailers will keep using cheap legacy providers, and merchants historically split volume across processors as a hedge.

    “I think highly unlikely and there's a few reasons to pull out.”

  • Fintech funding exceeded 130 billion dollars according to CB Insights, up 160 to 170% from 2020, and if enough capital pours into any industry, profits will be competed away regardless of business quality, which Michael calls basic economics.

    “if enough capital pours into any industry, no matter how good the business, profits can be computed away. It's just Economics 101.”

0.05

Founder's Worldpay experience informs Adyen's attack on incumbents.

2 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Pieter van der Does helped create the incumbent processor Worldpay after Bibit was sold to RBS and spent two years inside it, then founded Adyen to attack its weaknesses, making him a round two founder who knows incumbents' vulnerabilities better than anyone.

    “Pieter is what's called a round two founder, who knows better than anyone on the planet how to attack the vulnerabilities of these incumbents.”

  • All of Adyen's first seven employees came from Bibit, a payments processor Pieter and others started in 1999 as a layer on top of old banking infrastructure, and Bibit was sold to RBS in 2004 and became the core of Worldpay.

    “all of the first seven employees at Adyen were from another payments processing business called Bibit”