WaterBridge: Oil and Water
What this covers
Matt Reustle hosts a conversation with James and James Davolos, who frame WaterBridge through the lens of land and royalty investing. The starting point is the Delaware Basin, where about four barrels of produced water come out for every barrel of oil and gas. The discussion explains why tier two Wolfcamp locations cost more to produce (more water, not more depth), with ratios moving toward 5-to-1, 6-to-1, or beyond 10-to-1. It also puts disposal in context: about a dollar per barrel of water adds roughly four dollars of operating cost per barrel of oil, against about forty dollars of net revenue.
The middle of the conversation is the physical and legal constraint on disposal. Deep injection triggered seismic scrutiny from the Texas Railroad Commission, pushing most wells into shallower formations that bring pressure problems, sinkholes, and blowouts through old capped wells. Water has no eminent domain, so building long pipelines depends on landowner consent. New Mexico permitting that takes over two years explains why the Speedway line sends water east into Texas. The speakers also compare acreage dedications with minimum volume commitments and note WaterBridge's contracts average around 11 years.
The last stretch moves to portfolio thinking. They argue for separating land from operated midstream and for benchmarking against waste companies at 14 to 18 times EBITDA instead of gas midstream at about 9. They trace the Texas Pacific Land buyback thesis, its joint interest with Five Point on the state line, and Northwind's acid gas injection business, sold to MPLX.
WaterBridge's produced-water disposal business is a capital-light, long-duration contracted infrastructure asset whose volumes grow as Permian wells age and disposal capacity tightens, so it should be valued like infrastructure or waste services rather than conventional midstream.
- Water cuts rise as shale wells age, so water volumes stay stable or grow even as oil declines
- Disposal pore space is scarce and state-line and eminent-domain constraints make switching vendors hard
- Long-term acreage dedications with CPI escalators give contracted, utility-like cash flows at roughly 50 percent EBITDA margins
Water handling is consolidating into an oligopoly with growing pricing power over time.
- Because disposal wells sit on 640-acre sections and neighbors' injection can cause pressure problems, operators cannot control their own pore space, and once longer-haul pipelines are added, switching disposal vendors becomes increasingly difficult and may approach infeasible.
“in the future it's getting closer to infeasible than just difficult.”
- Saltwater disposal wells drilled thousands of feet deep must be encased in steel and concrete, and operators monitor downhole pressure and flow rates to prevent leaks, making them technically complex and capital-intensive.
“So it needs to be encased in steel and concrete. And the WaterBridge of the world have a lot of technology to monitor that downhole pressure”
- The limiting factor for WaterBridge's PP&E is land: pore space and easements that allow drilling saltwater disposal wells, with the state-line areas around New Mexico and Texas especially scarce while the far reaches of Culberson and Crane counties have plenty of pore space but need pipe to reach them.
“But the limiting factor today, which is making it harder and harder, is the land. So the pore space and then the easements”
- Produced water from the Permian's ancient seabed formations is many magnitudes more saline than seawater, contains corrosive compounds and very high total dissolved solids, so in every sense it is a waste product that must be remediated.
“It's actually many magnitudes more saline than seawater. It also has a variety of corrosive compounds and then very high total dissolved solid content.”
- The industry is running out of usable pore space for injection, so operators must be deliberate about transporting and remediating water, and new disposal capacity near constrained areas such as the New Mexico-Texas state line is very valuable.
“So as you sit today, we are running out of quote pore space.”
- As pore space becomes scarcer and contracts reset, WaterBridge should gain pricing power, although this is about a decade away.
“as this becomes more and more scarce, there's going to be pricing power as these contracts reset, although that's a decade out”
- Injecting produced water into the oil and gas formation or interfering with a producer's formation can create liability, which is a huge risk relative to disposal fees of about 10 to 12 cents per barrel historically, so disposal depth requires careful layer selection.
“If you interfere with somebody's ability to extract their minerals, you can be held liable, which is a huge liability relative to what you might be getting 10 cents, 12 cents a barrel for water disposal.”
- Only a few companies, with WaterBridge most prominent, operate longer-haul produced water pipelines, so the industry will likely become an oligopoly as E&Ps who handle water internally find it uneconomic to build 80-mile easement systems.
“I really think it's going to end up being an oligopolistic industry where today a lot of it is controlled by the E&P.”
- Produced water handling has escalated from a junior marketing or gathering-team decision to a CFO-level decision, because at four to six dollars of lease operating expense per barrel it flows directly into company-wide economics.
“Now it's up in the CFO's office because if you're talking four, five, six bucks with your LOE, this goes directly into every decision at this company.”
- WaterBridge earns about 78 cents per barrel of run-rate water handling revenue, with about 85 percent of pro forma revenue from handling water and roughly a 56 percent operating margin per barrel, and a run-rate EBITDA of about 400 million dollars at roughly 51 percent margin.
“they're getting about 78 cents a barrel right now on a run-rate, pro forma basis for handling that water.”
- Kinder Morgan has a water business, but it does not appear to have a large market share in the Permian.
“They don't really come across as having a big market share in the Permian at least.”
- Third-party share of produced water handling will grow substantially, partly organically and partly through consolidation of systems, and while some are owned by E&Ps and a few remain independent, the industry is headed toward oligopoly.
“I think there's going to be very large market share growth for third parties. Some of what's going to be organic and then some of which is going to be consolidating systems.”
Water assets are undervalued inside midstream while LandBridge's future options are overpriced.
- The IPO targeted a peer multiple with a one-turn discount to incentivize book-building, and the deal priced at the top of its range and was upsized, though the pricing reflects the need to anchor an idiosyncratic business to a familiar comp set.
“The IPO process targeted a peer set to GNPs with a one turn discount to incentivize the IPO book build.”
- Water assets buried inside midstream businesses do not get the multiple they deserve, as with Aris within Western, so investors need to be able to isolate the water business to value it correctly.
“Aris probably never got the multiple that they deserved. But I think that it was really important if you want the market to appreciate and capitalize this business appropriately, you need to allow investors to isolate the water business for what it is.”
- The market has focused on LandBridge's next-generation optionality such as data centers and beneficial water reuse, while underpricing the water business that generates cash today, and those options may be over-priced on near-term timing.
“people ignored how great the water opportunity is today”
- The valuation hinges on three toggles: whether Delaware volumes stay stable or grow, what price the company can capture, and what margin and incremental return it earns, with the second layer being whether incremental returns and addressable market are as large as assumed.
“as long as volume is stable, if not growing, then you have the addressable market established and then it's really, can they capture volume? Can they push price?”
Produced-water volumes are growing while disposal capacity remains scarce.
- In the Delaware Basin, the largest and fastest-growing part of US oil production, about four barrels of produced water come out for every barrel of oil and gas, creating a large waste-disposal need that WaterBridge addresses.
“in the Delaware Basin, which is the largest and fastest growing part of U.S. oil production, about four barrels of this water are produced for every barrel of oil and gas”
- If the Permian produces flat oil for the next 20 years, water volumes will almost certainly grow in the mid to high single digits per year because operators drill into lower-tier, higher-water locations.
“If the Permian produces flat oil for the next 20 years, water volumes will grow almost certainly mid to high single digits, if not higher. I don't think very many people appreciate that.”
- The produced-water disposal industry was essentially non-existent before the shale boom, which began around 2014, so it has developed in roughly a decade as well volumes exploded.
“This industry was completely non-existent before the shale boom. Call it 2014. So to be generous it's about a decade.”
- Other basins such as the Eagle Ford and Bakken do not have nearly as high water cuts as the Permian, and they also produce far less oil and gas, so the water opportunity is most acute in the Delaware for the foreseeable future.
“They don't have nearly as high of water cuts, but they also don't have nearly the amount of oil and gas produced.”
- Everyone in the market acknowledges there is not enough disposal capacity, whether in transportation or disposal wells, even though people disagree on whether the shortage bites today or in 2027 or 2028.
“everybody acknowledges there is not enough disposal capacity either from a transportation or a disposal well standpoint.”
- Devon Energy paid WaterBridge for the right to reserve pore space for a well pad that may not be drilled for three or four years, a first-of-its-kind transaction showing how scarce disposal capacity has become.
“Devon Energy in a first-of-its-kind transaction has paid WaterBridge for the right to use pore space in the future.”
WaterBridge deserves waste-peer multiples, with DCF reconciled against trading comps.
- The valuation process builds volume, pricing and margin bottom-up and discounts them at a fairly conservative rate, then reconciles the DCF against static trading comps for a more discernible answer.
“We ultimately build everything bottom up. We look at our volume pricing margin, discount it back using a fairly conservative discount rate.”
- Because WaterBridge has better returns on invested capital and growth than midstream, it should be compared to infrastructure and waste peers such as Casella, GFL, Waste Management and Clean Harbors, which trade around 14 to 18 times EBITDA, rather than to gas midstream at about 9 times.
“this is really more of an infra waste business than it is a midstream business.”
Acreage-dedicated long-term contracts make water volumes durable and high-return.
- Because a well's water cut rises as its oil and gas decline, total water volume stays nearly constant for decades, so a water business avoids the treadmill of having to drill ever faster just to hold production flat.
“despite the overall decline in volume of oil and gas of that well, what's actually coming out of the ground is very similar amounts of volume. It's just more and more water.”
- WaterBridge has identified about 3.5 billion dollars of capex that could generate about 1 billion dollars of EBITDA when fully utilized, implying around a 30 percent unlevered return on incremental invested capital, which James expects to drift higher with pricing power and utilization.
“they've identified about $3.5 billion of capex, which should contribute about a billion of EBITDA on a fully utilized basis. So call it around a 30% unlevered return on incremental invested capital.”
- WaterBridge's contracts are long-term fixed-fee arrangements with a weighted average term of around 11 years, with CPI-linked escalators that benefit from nominal growth.
“I believe WaterBridge is around 11 years weighted average contract.”
- As a heuristic, maintenance capex for produced water infrastructure is about 10 to 15 percent of undepreciated PP&E, probably on the high side, with equipment useful lives from 7 to 28 years and high free cash flow conversion once growth capex is built out.
“10 to 15% of undepreciated PP&E just as a heuristic, probably on the high side.”
- Paying about one dollar per barrel to dispose of water with a 4-to-1 water cut adds about four dollars of LOE per barrel of oil, while the net revenue from a Permian barrel can be around 40 dollars, so disposal is a meaningful but not dominant cost.
“if you're paying a dollar a barrel to get rid of water and have 4 to 1 water cuts, it's $4 of your LOE and you're lucky if you're netting $40 in the Permian”
- James's team believes WaterBridge can grow organically at 15 percent or better for three to five years through expansions such as Kraken and Speedway and isolating the sour gas window, and the base case excludes multiple expansion.
“We think the business can grow on a fairly organic basis for 15% or better for three to five years.”
- An acreage dedication, where the producer commits all drilling on a defined acreage to the provider with penalties for not using it, is far more powerful than a minimum volume commitment, which only guarantees a floor and lets the producer route water elsewhere.
“acreage dedication, where there's actually penalties to not using them for some of your disposal on that acreage dedication is much more powerful.”
Capital-light, low-cyclicality land businesses are preferable for keeping value with minimal reinvestment.
- Royalty holders earn a percentage of production off the top with no operating or capital expenditure, which Texans call mailbox money, making royalties a near-pure margin exposure to operator spending.
“So you participate in no OPEX and no CAPEX. In Texas parlance, they call this mailbox money.”
- Oilfield services, E&P and integrated companies are capital-intensive and cyclical, so the investment team prefers businesses with lower capital intensity and less cyclicality, accepting that cyclicality cannot be fully removed.
“We prefer to look at companies that have lower capital intensity and less cyclicality.”
- Three lessons from TPL and WaterBridge are to build a core competency while watching for adjacent opportunities, to prize capital-light business models that remain good even under maintenance-only capex, and to recognize land as the ultimate capital-light real asset with perpetual optionality.
“The last one is probably the ultimate capital-light real asset is land.”
- Texas Pacific Land was created through the bankruptcy of the Texas and Pacific Railway in the late 1880s and received land grants for every mile of railroad built in Texas, leaving it with a couple million acres that were impossible to sell off at once.
“They got land grants for every mile of railroad that was built in the state of Texas. Impossible to sell off a couple million acres”
- Horizon Kinetics' original Texas Pacific Land thesis was that the liquidating trust's buybacks at a low implied per-acre price, such as $10 per acre against land worth $100, were the most accretive compounding machine, because each dollar bought back more acreage.
“if you're buying back stock at an implied price of $10 an acre and acres on the fair market were 100, it was the most accretive compounding machine you've ever seen.”
- Land is the preeminent asset in energy because it is essentially a pure-margin business that is perpetual, finite, and carries optionality, and royalty holders capture a share of production with no operating or capital expense.
“land is the preeminent asset because it's essentially a pure margin business that's perpetual with optionality.”
- A capital-light business model, where a business is still good even if cut to maintenance capex, is rare, and investors should be willing to pay more for such businesses because they have higher free cash flow.
“you tend to pay more for these businesses, but in many cases you should.”
Land and royalty assets deserve separate capitalization from operated midstream.
- The market will never give land and royalty assets the right multiple inside a broader portfolio, so land should be separated from operated midstream because it deserves a different capitalization rate.
“you would never get the appropriate multiple of land within a broader portfolio.”
- Newmont Mining bought Franco-Nevada and later spun it back out because the market would never credit its royalties inside Newmont, illustrating how land-like assets are undervalued within broader companies.
“Newmont Mining bought Franco-Nevada and then they spun it back out at the end of 2007 because they got frustrated that the market would never give them credit for their royalties.”
- LandBridge's IPO was originally slated to price at $19 to $22, roughly 15 times trailing or forward EBITDA, but it broke issue and traded at $17, before later rising to $80 by year-end and to the mid-$50s.
“it was originally slated to price in the $19 to $22 range ... It ultimately broke price and traded at $17.”
Five Point's land and infrastructure ventures built its Permian water footprint.
- Five Point closed the roughly 70,000-acre Hanging H Ranch in 2021 after a PE-backed sponsor failed to close during COVID, giving LandBridge its first toehold in the core of the Permian.
“The Hanging H Ranch was actually under contract by a PE-backed sponsor and they were unable to close during COVID. David and Five Point fortunately stayed in the vicinity of the deal and were able to close that in 2021.”
- Five Point and Texas Pacific Land agreed to an area of mutual interest, effectively a joint venture, to develop the state-line area in northern Loving County, with TPL acting as royalty taker on the saltwater disposal wells.
“they agreed to an area of mutual interest, essentially a joint venture with Texas Pacific Land Corporation to really exploit that state line area in northern Loving County.”
- David Capobianco founded Five Point in 2012 after his midstream experience and conviction that water would need third-party disposal, then bought a water company run by Jason Long and built WaterBridge from it.
“So that gave him the opportunity to go out and create Five Point in 2012.”
- Operators such as Devon and ConocoPhillips contributed their water systems to midstream partners that now run them, and more operators are expected to contribute systems and keep the growth partnership, which is a likely source of M&A-style value.
“One of the biggest holders of WaterBridge equity is going to be Devon because Devon said, look, I'm better off contributing this asset to you”
- Five Point launched Powerbridge, a portfolio company run by an ex-Talend CEO, to facilitate large-scale data center and power infrastructure development in Texas.
“they launched a new company called Powerbridge”
- Five Point's Northwind built acid gas injection infrastructure in the sour gas window on the eastern Delaware shelf, which developers were reluctant to tackle, and it was sold to MPLX after a contested bidding war.
“if we build these AGIs, basically you're setting the infrastructure for people to come up there and start really drilling in earnest.”
Near-term disposal faces seismic, pressure, and eminent-domain constraints.
- Deep injections caused seismic events that drew Texas Railroad Commission scrutiny, so roughly 75 percent of disposal wells have moved to shallower formations, which carry their own pressure and liability risks.
“But these deep injections started creating seismic events or earthquakes that caught the attention of authorities in Texas. It's the Railroad Commission. So more recently, about 75% of these disposal wells have been shallow.”
- Rising pressure from shallow saltwater injection has caused sinkholes and interference with old, capped vertical wells, sometimes producing blowouts of brackish brine and chemicals, which is why operators now need responsible pressure management.
“you've had sinkholes and you've had interference with these old legacy wells”
- Beneficial reuse of produced water, such as desalination, Pecos River replenishment, crops, livestock, and industrial cooling, is a real option that cannot be monetized or economically assessed in the next 12 to 18 months.
“But definitely not within 12 to 18 months.”
- Unlike oil and gas mineral holders, who have quasi-eminent domain to extract, water disposal has no eminent domain protection, so a rancher can refuse access or demand high payments, which makes disposal routes across many landholders hard to build.
“Water is not protected by eminent domain, even though it could shut in oil and gas.”
Sour gas, data center sites, and faster permitting create additional water infrastructure opportunities.
- The sour gas window on the Delaware Basin's eastern shelf is a largely overlooked growth source, because acid gas injection infrastructure unlocks it and may account for a significant part of WaterBridge's incremental capex.
“That again something very few people are talking about, but that's also probably a significant portion of that incremental capex and growth”
- Five Point has identified six or eight West Texas facilities that are essentially plug-and-play for multi-gigawatt data centers, with fiber, grid access, water, and cheap gas for direct generation, and hyperscalers will increasingly need them as co-location options disappear.
“they've identified six or eight facilities where basically they think it's essentially plug-and-play for multi-gigawatt data centers in West Texas.”
- Average permitting time in New Mexico was over two years, versus weeks or a month or two in Texas, so the Speedway pipeline routes water from New Mexico east into Texas to bypass slower permitting.
“The average permitting time in New Mexico was over two years.”
- The Permian Basin is the largest oil and gas producing region in the US at around 11 to 12 million barrels of oil equivalent per day, roughly 10 percent of global volume, and oil-specific share is even higher.
“the Permian Basin is the largest oil and gas producing region in the U.S. around 11 to 12 million barrels of energy equivalent”