Live Oak: The Small Business Bank
What this covers
Stephen works through Live Oak as both a business and an investment case, starting with its origin. Shortly after the bank received its charter in May 2008, the FDIC asked Chip Mahan and Neil Underwood to liquidate or sell it. Mahan refused, pointing to $40 million of loans to female veterinarians. From there the episode covers the Theory of Verticality: lend nationally, only to industries that repay. Live Oak got industry-level payback data through Freedom of Information Act requests, and veterinarians looked best. A worked example of a $1 million veterinary SBA 7(a) loan Loan) shows how gain on sale on the guaranteed portion produces a 35%-plus ROE. It also covers why the bank began holding far more loans around 2017-2018.
The middle of the episode ranges into technology and competition. Live Oak began writing software in 2010-2011 to manage the 148 documents behind an SBA loan, then productized it as nCino, Apiture and Finxact. Stephen describes banking as stuck on legacy core providers, and argues that fintechs renting a partner bank's charter pay for it in cost and lost innovation. He cites William Hockey buying a Chico, California, bank for $50 million. The more contested claims follow: community banking is a "lousy business," and Live Oak would beat Silicon Valley entrants even if regulation fell away, because they underwrite poorly.
The close turns to valuation and investor lessons: the arithmetic behind a roughly 15% return on equity on $850 million of equity, a low-penetration case with under 10,000 customers among 5 to 6 million small businesses, and founder-led culture as the differentiator.
Live Oak Bank built a branchless, national small-business lender by picking verticals with strong repayment, leaning on government-guaranteed SBA 7(a) loans for capital-light growth, and productizing its internal software into spinouts, so a disciplined founder-led bank can compound returns on equity at 15-20%.
- Verticality (choosing industries that repay loans rather than geographies) produced credit losses far below typical SBA lending
- SBA 7(a) guarantees and gain-on-sale let the bank build capital without dilution
- Internally built software became spun-out and invested companies that generated large non-dilutive value
Self-built, productized software and proprietary technology create Live Oak's platform edge and capital advantage.
- Most banks are not technology organizations and lack the culture to set wildly ambitious technology targets and recruit the people to execute them, which is why Live Oak's approach is rare.
“most banks, one, they're not technology organizations, but two, they don't have the culture to really paint this wildly ambitious target”
- Live Oak converted a roughly $10 million annual expense for online banking development into a 50% stake in a joint venture with First Data's legacy online banking business, valued at $68 million of Tier 1 capital, which Stephen argues turned a $100 million-plus valuation drag into book value.
“But their 50% stake in the JV is valued at $68 million of Tier 1 capital.”
- Live Oak began writing software in 2010-2011 to enable seamless handoffs across the 148 documents required to underwrite an SBA loan, using itself as the first customer and then productizing the code, following an Amazon-style playbook that turned R&D into revenue.
“they actually wrote code for themselves as the first customer and then took a page out of the Amazon playbook and turned this large R&D expense into a revenue driver by productizing that software.”
- Live Oak's stakes in Apiture, Live Oak Ventures and Canapi together represent about 20% of its current book value, which adds meaningful volatility but the marks appear conservative given the track record.
“it probably represents about 20% of their current book value.”
- Live Oak repeatedly built software for its own use and productized it, with nCino, Apiture and Finxact all following this pattern at a very high hit rate, which Stephen identifies as one source of the bank's edge.
“they're scratching their own itch, and they weren't just successful with nCino.”
- Live Oak invested about $13 million in Finxact, which Fiserv bought in 2022 for over $650 million, a roughly 10x return that put about $120 million in Live Oak's pockets to build capital.
“They ultimately invested about $13 million into Finxact. That was sold in 2022 to Fiserv for over $650 million.”
- Technology ventures let Live Oak build capital in a capital-efficient, non-dilutive way, and nCino gains were excluded from historical financials because the company was spun out rather than added to the bank's balance sheet.
“Historically, the tech piece was a great way for them to scale and build capital in a capital-efficient nondilutive way.”
- Live Oak spun out its loan-origination software as the subsidiary nCino, which later went public and is now valued above $3 billion, so building its own software created large value for the original Live Oak shareholders.
“nCino is now a publicly traded company, $3 billion-plus valuation.”
- Integrating Apiture's online account opening with Live Oak's Fiserv core took 18 months and 62 API calls, and the result was still clunky, illustrating how difficult legacy core integration is.
“it took 18 months and 62 API calls to do it.”
- Live Oak's Finxact is designed as an open, partner-friendly next-generation core system of record, where point solutions connect through a single API, which would help the industry modernize its roughly 280 billion lines of banking code.
“Chip Mahan likes to say that 280 billion lines of code in banking that all needs to get rewritten on a modern cloud-based architecture over the next 5 or 10 years.”
- Live Oak's ultimate vision is embedded banking, placing its banking services inside vertical software such as veterinary practice management systems via APIs, which would make relationships stickier and provide data for tailored products like working-capital lines.
“And then the ultimate vision is embedded banking.”
- Because Fiserv acquired Finxact about 18 months ago, there is a risk that the disruptive technology stalls, since Live Oak relies on Finxact for its embedded banking and technology vision, though integration appears to be going well so far.
“Whenever you have this disruptive technology company swallowed up by an incumbent, you have some risk where innovation just stalls and fades out into the sunset.”
- Technology investment gains will not affect Live Oak's earnings until the exits are realized, so core earnings come almost entirely from banking and lending.
“from an earnings perspective, it's not going to impact earnings until they realize some of these exits”
- Live Oak's technology success has three components: it is a regulated bank that builds products for itself as customer number one, it has access to talented people who have built systems before, and it has a culture willing to pursue wildly ambitious targets, which most banks lack.
“most banks, one, they're not technology organizations, but two, they don't have the culture to really paint this wildly ambitious target”
- Live Oak's Finxact and Apiture technology stack enables it to offer its products as API-first point solutions, which, as an incumbent-facing platform, creates advantages over standard community banks in customer stickiness and product integration.
“make it an API-first point solution”
SBA 7(a) gain-on-sale economics make originate-and-sell lending a highly profitable business.
- The SBA 7(a) program is the flagship small-business loan, and the government guarantees 75% of each loan originated, which incentivizes lenders to lend to small businesses with limited credit history.
“the government will guarantee 75% of the loan you originate.”
- Chip Mahan has said that a well-priced SBA 7(a) loan is the best piece of paper a bank can originate, because the guarantee and gain-on-sale economics combine into high-return originations.
“a well-priced 7(a) loan is the best piece of paper a bank can originate.”
- On a $1 million veterinary 7(a) loan, the guaranteed $750,000 sells at a 10% gain for $75,000 upfront, the 1% servicing fee accrues $7,500 a year, and selling down the remaining unguaranteed piece to 10% leaves about $10,000 of equity earning a 35%-plus ROE, with year-one revenue above $85,000.
“year one revenue is over $85,000 at extremely high incremental margins before the corporate overhead of the bank”
- Around 2017-2018 Live Oak began holding far more of the loans it originated, because public investors penalized the lumpy nonrecurring gain-on-sale revenue and accounting noise from valuing retained servicing assets, and now about 40% of the book is government-guaranteed.
“investors penalized them for that. And so around like 2017, '18 time frame, they started holding a lot more of the loans they were originating”
- The gain on sale exists because the government-guaranteed portion of a loan is low-risk and trades at a lower implied yield than the whole loan, so a buyer pays a premium: a guaranteed portion yielding 9% might sell for 110 cents on the dollar.
“If the guaranteed portion is $100, yielding, let's say, 9% today, a buyer may be willing to buy it for $110.”
- Most Live Oak loans are variable rate, which protects its duration, and about 40% of the loan book is the government-guaranteed portion, which can be sold to access liquidity and improves capital position relative to most banks.
“that 40% government guarantee provides them a lot of flexibility to access liquidity and just put-up better credit metrics over time.”
- Live Oak originated about $2.3 billion of PPP loans, generating over $80 million of fees and net interest income mainly in 2020 and 2021, which made up roughly a third of its income in that period, versus 5-10% of originations at other banks.
“they originated something like $2.3 billion of PPP loans generated over $80 million of fees and net interest income primarily in 2020 and 2021, which actually made up about 1/3 of their income during that period.”
Live Oak's regulated, safety-first, service-driven culture differentiates it from neobanks and fintechs.
- Although Live Oak is technically a neobank because it has no branches, it embraced regulation as a fully vertically integrated platform, while Silicon Valley fintechs typically try to avoid regulation.
“Whereas Live Oak, they really leaned into the regulation and they're a full vertically integrated platform, which is very different.”
- Live Oak's emotional, service-driven customer stories, such as the Recess With Bevin lending experience, create word-of-mouth virality that is more valuable than any paid advertising the bank could buy.
“that word of mouth virality is more valuable than any paid advertising they can do.”
- Live Oak's culture, like NetJets as Munger described it, puts safety first, customer service second and shareholders last, which Stephen sees as the differentiator versus neobanks.
“It's like, okay, safety first, customer service second, and then we'll worry about the capitalists that own the company.”
- When a $ wire failed to arrive and Stephen called Live Oak, a representative responded within 10 seconds, investigated with the wire team, identified the sender's flagging and called back before 5 pm with an update, and Live Oak charges no incoming wire fees and pays 4.4% on savings.
“Within 10 seconds, I get a gentleman named Ryan on the phone.”
- Investors should look for end companies that do it all, meaning profitable, organically growing, strongly run businesses with best-in-class service and savings rates, rather than settling for partial quality.
“search for end companies, you don't have to settle.”
- Fintechs and neobanks that try to grow fast with little underwriting discipline, such as CABG during PPP, suffered fraud ramps and inadequate controls, while subscale Live Oak originated over $2 billion with no issues because safety and soundness came first.
“Well, there was a ramp in fraud on their platform. They didn't have the appropriate procedures in place to catch some of the stuff that should have been obvious.”
National lending by industry vertical beats regional branch banking, which is structurally disadvantaged.
- The number of US banks fell from close to 15,000 when Stephen was born in 1984 to about 4,000 today, branches have declined over the past 15 years, and the top 50 banks hold roughly 75-80% share of over $20 trillion in US banking assets, all of them $40 billion-plus institutions.
“when I was born in 1984, you had close to 15,000 banks in the U.S. Today, 4,000.”
- Live Oak obtained historical SBA loan payback data by industry through Freedom of Information Act requests and found veterinarians had the best credit quality, which led them to build deep expertise in the veterinary vertical.
“they were actually getting this data by pulling Freedom of Information Act requests to get historical payback data by industry for SBA loans.”
- Instead of serving one geographic region around a branch, a bank can operate nationally and lend only to industries that historically repay their loans, which Live Oak calls the theory of verticality.
“why don't we take this novel approach to lending and only focus on the industries that tend to pay their loans back. And so that's called the theory of verticality.”
- Community banking is a lousy business: it is capital intensive, low margin and highly levered, so an 8% drawdown in assets can wipe out the entire equity stack, and branch fixed costs serve marginal customers poorly.
“It's capital intensive, it's low margin, and it's highly levered.”
- Large banks like Wells Fargo and JPMorgan are big SBA lenders, but at multi-trillion-dollar scale, originating $1-2 billion of high-margin SBA loans does not move the needle, so they leave the niche to others.
“So to originate $1 billion or $2 billion of SBA loans at high margins, it just doesn't move the needle.”
Verticality and high-touch service produce low charge-offs and borrower loyalty.
- Live Oak's charge-offs have averaged about 30 basis points over the past decade, roughly one-tenth the level of typical SBA loans, which Stephen attributes to the theory of verticality.
“something like 30 basis points of charge-offs for the past decade compared with most SBA loans, which is something like 10x that”
- Live Oak meets every borrower face-to-face, visiting them to review the business plan and judge whether they have the drive to succeed, which is a high-touch practice contrasting with branchless competitors.
“every borrower, they actually will fly to and meet face-to-face, belly to belly”
- Once a vertical is chosen, Live Oak becomes a domain expert by hiring a full-time veterinarian, attending trade shows, presenting at veterinary colleges, and building brand through thought leaders and word of mouth, then adds value beyond capital by helping clients with websites and facility build-outs.
“let's hire a veterinarian, full-time on staff, let's go to all the trade shows, let's present at all the veterinarian colleges”
- Live Oak's deposit offering pays a 4.4% rate and charges no incoming wire fees, and its high-touch service, with a call center that resolves issues within minutes, creates emotional attachment that justifies the relationship beyond price.
“By the way, there's no incoming wire fees on Live Oak. They're paying me 4.4% for the privilege of that customer service”
- Startups succeed by finding a highly fragmented industry with low Net Promoter Scores and then building a vertically integrated solution that radically improves the customer experience, which is the pattern Live Oak followed.
“find a highly fragmented industry with low NPS and then vertically integrated solution to radically improve the customer experience”
SBA lending in underserved small-business niches gives Live Oak a long growth runway.
- Live Oak's growth levers are more SBA loans across 35 of about 1,200 eligible industries, retaining repeat borrowers who now are only 20% of the base through conventional loans, and deepening deposits from 3% of customers with both loan and deposit relationships.
“only 20% of their borrowers are repeat borrowers.”
- Live Oak used the SBA 7(a) program, which was an afterthought for most banks, to become an at-scale lender in a subscale market, showing that small niches can become very large over time.
“And yet Live Oak through an innovative business plan was able to become the at-scale lender in subscale markets.”
- Live Oak made a loan to a mobile cycling studio during the pandemic, a deal no vendor would originate, because the bank understood the fitness-facility sector and saw in the borrower persistence that she would not quit.
“No vendor would originate this loan, and Live Oak did partially because maybe she's based in Wilmington, partially because they specialize in that sector of fitness facilities.”
- Excluding solopreneurs, roughly 5-6 million US businesses under $5 million of revenue with 200-500 employees are largely underserved by big banks, and Live Oak with under 10,000 lending customers and about 7% SBA share has a long penetration runway.
“you're still left with probably 5 million or 6 million businesses that are sub $5 million of revenue”
Legacy bank technology stacks block fintech innovation, so full national charters are valuable.
- Fintechs offering banking services depend on a partner bank and legacy middleware and core providers, which adds layers of cost that make profitable operation hard and prevents real innovation, which is why a full national charter is valuable.
“And so you can't truly innovate. And then there's this extra layer of costs that were it's hard to operate profitably.”
- Banks outsource their technology to a few legacy core providers such as Fiserv, FIS and Jack Henry, which hold dominant share as systems of record, and banking tech is stuck in the 1990s, comparable to running an ERP on-premise without NetSuite.
“The technology piece is completely outsourced. And so they're relying on the major core providers.”
- Wire transfers look clunky because banks impose manual, office-hours limits; the Fedwire protocol itself can send wires 23 hours a day, six days a week, so automation rather than the rail is the bottleneck.
“You can send a wire 23 hours a day, six days a week. And so those time limitations are actually imposed by the banks themselves”
Chip Mahan's people, capital relationships and early adversity built the franchise, though succession is risky.
- Chip Mahan has collected people throughout his career, and much of Live Oak's leadership and technology team traces back to S1, the software company he spun out of the bank, making talent networks a core asset.
“Chip Mahan, he has been a collector of people, his entire career.”
- Succession is a key risk because Chip Mahan is 72, Neil Underwood has stepped back from his operating role, and the new president BJ Losch, who joined in 2021 as CFO and has been at the bank only two years, has an open question of organizational goodwill.
“succession is definitely a risk here. I mean, Chip is 72, and he's still going strong.”
- Chip Mahan's attempted hostile takeover of a Kentucky community bank, offering shareholders three times the trading price, produced no shares, but the lesson that businesses are about people and relationships led him to build capital relationships that funded later bank acquisitions.
“That was his first realization that so many of us have that businesses just can't be contained in a spreadsheet, and it's ultimately about people and relationships.”
- Chip Mahan's father died in a company plane crash when Chip was 11, he later learned banking at Wachovia from 1973 by lending to distilleries in Kentucky and Tennessee, and his entrepreneurial itch led him to leave for owning rather than being an employee.
“you're either an employee or you're an owner. And he just had this entrepreneurial itch”
- Chip Mahan bought rural Kentucky banks with sticky deposits and combined them with banks lending in Lexington and Louisville, optimizing both sides of the balance sheet and net interest margins, which led to Cardinal Bank going public in 1992.
“He would take rural banks with sticky deposits and slap them together with banks making loans in larger cities”
- During the internet bubble, Chip Mahan raised capital from customers, which allowed the software business to survive the crash and eventually exit through M&A.
“right in the height of the mania, Chip had the foresight to raise a bunch of capital from his customers”
- Chip Mahan and his brother-in-law launched one of the first internet banks in 1995, but customer acquisition was hard, so they offloaded the banking operations to Royal Bank of Canada and spun off the technology into a software business selling to large banks.
“They started it in 1994. It launches in 1995.”
- Shortly after Live Oak got its charter in May 2008, before the financial crisis fully hit, the FDIC asked Chip Mahan and Neil Underwood to liquidate or sell the bank, and Mahan refused, citing $40 million of loans to female veterinarians, and the bank survived.
“I have $40 million of loans to female veterinarians. I need to take care of my customers.”
- Chip Mahan's father was killed in a company plane crash on September 4, 1962, when Mahan was 11, forcing him to grow up quickly, and the family moved to his grandfather's Kentucky farm, where he later set a goal at age 14 to marry his future wife Peggy, which he achieved at 22.
“his father had been killed in a company plane crash. So this is someone who had to grow up pretty quickly.”
Live Oak's national SBA niche strategy requires deposit and loan integration to scale.
- Live Oak's business plan rests on three pillars: focus on the profitable SBA 7(a) niche, rethink the bank as a national rather than geographic franchise that lends only to industries that repay loans, and rebuild customer service as both high touch and high tech.
“let's focus on this profitable niche called the SBA 7(a) loan”
- A standard community bank confined to one geographic region around its branch cannot achieve scale by issuing only SBA 7(a) loans, so SBA lending must be done nationally to matter.
“You just can't issue 7(a) loans exclusively and have any semblance of scale.”
- Only 3% of Live Oak's customers had both a lending and deposit relationship, so the bank launched fully featured checking accounts in September, funding every loan into a Live Oak checking account, with the goal of lowering funding costs and improving net interest margin.
“only 3% of their customers both have a lending relationship and a deposit relationship”
- Live Oak's lending NPS is 67 but only 20% of borrowers are repeat customers, because successful borrowers graduate to larger banks, so adding conventional loans is meant to keep those relationships longer.
“I think it's 67 for borrowers. But only 20% of their borrowers are repeat borrowers.”
- Because the SBA guarantee makes the floating-rate paper trade at par, the government-guaranteed portion has a liquid secondary market, which is what lets Live Oak sell it readily to fund growth.
“there's a liquid secondary market for that guaranteed piece of paper”
Shares near 2x book are reasonable given the earnings economics and cheap bank acquisition math.
- Gain-on-sale spreads move over time, have stayed roughly near 10% overall, and compress when rates rise because borrowers are incentivized to repay faster, which prepays the loans.
“as rates rise, the borrowers are more incentivized to pay the loan back quicker. And so spreads may compress a little bit”
- On roughly $10 billion of earning assets with a 3.75% net interest margin, $375 million of net interest income plus $125 million of fee income gives $500 million of pre-provision revenue; at a 60% efficiency ratio and 40 basis points of provisions, pretax profit is about $160 million, or about $130 million after tax, which is roughly a 15% ROE on $850 million of equity.
“So you're left with $160 million of pretax profit, something like $130 million post tax. So on the $850 million of equity, that's how you get to the ROE.”
- Live Oak trades just under 2x book value, which at a 15% ROE next year equals about a 13x earnings multiple with no credit given for the technology investments, and Stephen considers the multiple reasonable with potential upside.
“It's trading just under 2x book value today. And so if they are in that 15% return on equity next year, something like a 13x earnings multiple”
- A community bank trading at 25% of book value could be acquired by paying shareholders three times the market price and still getting the bank for less than free, which is why Mahan saw an opportunity.
“the bank was trading at 25% of book value and he sees this opportunity where you can pay shareholders 3x what the stock is trading at and still get the bank for less than free.”
Fintechs lose lending because pricing competition exposes their weak underwriting discipline.
- If fintechs like Column eliminate regulatory barriers to entry, Live Oak would still win because lending is a pricing competition that Silicon Valley-style firms handle poorly, since they tend to grow too fast without underwriting discipline.
“To me, Live Oak is still going to win.”
- Live Oak's regulatory compliance is a competitive barrier that fintechs trying to avoid regulation cannot match, and even if regulatory barriers fell for fintechs, Live Oak would still win on underwriting discipline and culture.
“let's say, Column, which is William Hockey's company is successful and you eliminate all of that regulatory barrier to entry and fintechs can operate on a level playing field. To me, Live Oak is still going to win.”
- Fintechs offering banking services depend on a partner bank and layers of middleware and legacy cores, which adds costs and prevents true innovation, so William Hockey bought a single-branch bank in Chico, California, for $50 million in 2021 to gain direct access to Fedwire rails.
“And so you can't truly innovate. And then there's this extra layer of costs that were it's hard to operate profitably.”
- Banking is selling money with universal product-market fit, so it ultimately comes down to pricing, and a lender can build a large book quickly by cutting price, which is why fintechs grow fast but often underwrite poorly.
“you're selling money, and it's something that has universal product market fit, and it ultimately comes down to pricing”
Live Oak's deposit strategy is not essential, and its low uninsured deposits kept it resilient.
- Live Oak had zero impact from the Silicon Valley Bank failure beyond a temporary stock sell-down, because only about 18% of its deposits were uninsured versus the average bank, and it quickly raised liquidity to three times that coverage.
“I think it was something like 18% of their deposits were uninsured and they quickly increased liquidity to have 3x that coverage amount.”
- Live Oak reached $11 billion of assets and $850 million of equity without a deposit-led strategy, so deposits are not a necessary ingredient; it could still earn about 15% ROE next year, while reaching high-teens ROE requires growing noninterest-bearing checking.
“They've scaled to $11 billion of assets and $850 million of equity without that, any component of the business plan.”
- For its first decade, Live Oak funded its originate-and-sell model with relatively high-cost wholesale deposits and a 2014-2015 high-yield savings account priced against Goldman Sachs Marcus and American Express savings, so price rather than service drove deposit growth.
“they were funding that with relatively high-cost wholesale deposits.”
Exceptional founders drive power-law outcomes and long-term compounding for concentrated investors.
- Power-law outcomes in investing come from exceptional people, so a long-term concentrated investor should look for founders like Chip Mahan who disrupt industries by design rather than chase casual or quarterly-focused management.
“people are power laws and the best ones change everything.”
- If Live Oak sustains about 15% ROE and grows organically in a non-dilutive way, investors should compound at a similar rate, and if execution holds, 15-20% compounding is achievable for a very long period.
“I think investors will compound at that rate of growth. I think if they execute, investors will compound in that 15% to 20% range for a very long period of time.”
- Stephen's framework for finding power-law outcomes is to find companies that can grow above average for decades, which requires low market penetration combined with strengthening competitive advantages; Live Oak fits with roughly 5 to 6 million addressable small businesses and under 10,000 lending customers.
“to me, the formula to achieve that is low penetration paired with strengthening competitive advantages.”