What this covers

In this conversation, Jacqui, Rick, and Paul trace Jacqui Morby's early years at TA in the late 1970s, when venture investing was a cottage industry. TA was about ten people managing roughly a $100 million fund and was still the largest VC firm in the world. The backdrop is software's rocky start as an investment category. After IBM's unbundling of software from hardware in 1969, many investors lost money because mainframe software firms did not know how to build packaged software. Venture capital then avoided the field for about a decade. Many founders had self-funded and needed growth capital, not the cash-burning early-stage money venture firms typically supplied.

The middle of the discussion covers the mechanics. Morby screened technology magazine advertisements for interesting products and proposed simply calling those companies. Her pitch to founders who did not need money was future liquidity, such as a 10% stake once a company hit $5 to $10 million. She leaned on market evidence over technical review, and a Chicago company with roughly 20% pre-tax margins and 30 to 40% annual growth helped persuade TA. Rick calls the approach a radical innovation that sparked growth equity. He also notes how quickly competitors piled in once a few exits made the pattern public.

The rest turns to partnership culture. Peter Brooke brought her into TA, and she credits Kevin Landry with teaching her to be nurturing toward entrepreneurs while still pushing for change. Rick's claim that diversity of thought improves a firm's decisions is flagged as contested. So is Jacqui's account of Digital Research and Microsoft. Briefer detours cover the 346 women listed in Pratt's Guide in 1995 and the Alzheimer's foundation the Morbys started after learning Jeff carries two copies of APOE4.

Sharpest takeaway

Morby argues that her early success in venture capital came from necessity: cold-calling bootstrapped companies that did not want funding, and backing software as a product business when the field saw it as technology. Her approach rested on market signals and an open partnership culture rather than on her own technical expertise or inherited networks.

  • Lacking the Boston old-boys' network, she cold-called profitable companies that were not seeking capital, which became the basis of growth equity
  • She judged software by market traction and customer adoption, not by technical evaluation
  • TA's partnership culture let partners with different styles succeed without being forced into a single approach

The argument · threads7 threads · 62 claims
0.85

Proactive cold-calling and liquidity pitches, not technical expertise, sourced her deals.

10 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Morby began cold-calling companies out of necessity: she had no useful network beyond her husband's Harvard Business School contacts, so she searched technology magazines and called companies that were not seeking funding.

    “Self defense. And it worked.”

  • Morby's sales pitch to companies that did not need money offered future liquidity, such as buying a 10% stake once the company reached a $5 to $10 million milestone, or support for an acquisition, which appealed to founders who were not otherwise seeking liquidity.

    “we'll maybe buy 10% from you when you get your first 5 million, $10 million, or whatever—and that was appealing to some of them.”

  • Roughly half of the time that Morby's firm visited a cold-called company, the visit did not lead to an investment, because the company was not one the firm wanted to back.

    “And 50% of the time you get out and visit and you're not visited, you're not interested.”

  • Living in Argentina and Brazil, where she had to adapt to new languages and circumstances, helped Morby become proactive in finding deals, and she saw a crossover between adapting abroad and approaching new companies.

    “There was probably a crossover between figuring out life in foreign countries, Argentina and Brazil, and applying whatever those experiences were for me to addressing new companies.”

  • Morby felt that her proactive deal-sourcing was aggressive, learned from living abroad, and was the key to her success, not any technical expertise.

    “I don't know how much my past life mattered, but I'm sure that by living in South America”

  • A successful cold call opened with praise of the company's product and a reference to the firm's investments, then offered a visit to share what the firm does.

    “telling them how great their product looks... flattering them and then saying we'd like to come out and visit”

  • Morby used Dun & Bradstreet reports to identify and approach companies, buying reports for specific regions such as Texas before cold-calling companies there.

    “I had never heard of Dun & Bradstreet reports before... So then my husband had a trip to Texas. So I took all my Texas D&Bs with me”

  • After her first cold-call trip to Texas, Morby concluded that cold calling was not hard, and she later taught associates to make calls so she could step back from calling herself.

    “And it was just saying, this is not hard, this is easy. We ultimately taught our associates to.”

  • Morby screened technology magazines for advertisements of interesting products and took those companies to partners, asking whether they knew them and proposing to simply call them.

    “So I started tearing through the technology magazines, looking at ads for interesting products.”

  • Offering founders future liquidity or acquisition capital was something most people in the market were not doing in that era, which made the pitch appealing.

    “which was something most people weren't doing.”

0.59

Software was sold as a repeatable product, judged by market demand rather than technical depth.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • In 1978 investors largely saw software as a technology cost rather than a packaged product, and Morby's observation that software could be sold as a repeatable product was a revolutionary reframing that opened the field to investment.

    “all of a sudden, everybody understood that software was a product, not just a technology, and you could make it a product. And that was a revolution, a revolutionary idea.”

  • Morby did not need deep technical evaluation of software; she judged companies by what the market was buying and succeeding with, using reference calls and customer checks along the way.

    “I think the market would be telling you... So I didn't have to evaluate the software very much.”

  • Morby made a few early software startup investments that did not grow or succeed, which showed that the market-first approach did not guarantee wins.

    “I did invest a couple times in software startups which didn't turn out so well”

  • Software businesses divided into packaged products that could be sold repeatedly and custom developers solving specific problems; the latter were hard to invest in because their founders often believed they could also do marketing, which is a different skill.

    “The software that was made into a product and a package and could be sold over and over again.”

  • Gary Kildall's Digital Research, an operating-systems company, was hurt when Microsoft allegedly copied its technology after Kildall used Gates as a beta test site, which damaged Digital Research's future.

    “He was copying the technology, and Gary was very naive in thinking he was his friend.”

  • Morby met Bill Gates in Seattle, where he was hours late and flustered, and she was interested in Microsoft; a planned follow-up with Kevin Landry was canceled because of a competing deal, and TA never got back in.

    “and we canceled the Microsoft meeting—the famous canceled meeting—and could never get back in after that.”

0.55

Her unconventional entry into venture capital followed barriers, living abroad, and her husband's networks.

9 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Morby initially rejected Harvard Business School because very few women had attended, and she chose Simmons Graduate Management School for Women after learning about its founders' Harvard background.

    “there may have been two women who had ever gone there.”

  • Morby found her route into venture capital through her husband's suggestion and his introduction to the head of TA, Peter Brooke, after a PaineWebber interview led her to TA.

    “Jeff had some contacts for me to be able to get introduced to Peter.”

  • Most of Morby's classmates had never heard of venture capital, so she was unusually early to the field, and her unconventional path was a product of living abroad and of her husband's networks.

    “most of my classmates, when I told them what I was going to be doing, they'd never even heard of venture capital. So it was so early.”

  • Morby moved with her husband to Argentina and Brazil as he ran banking and finance roles abroad, and the family faced kidnapping threats in Argentina that led them to leave after an American executive was killed.

    “some of these kidnappers killed one of the heads of another American company instead of kidnapping him.”

  • Morby joined TA Associates in 1978 as an intern after a PaineWebber meeting, when TA was investing its third fund and had about 10 people, and she was hired at a low salary, around $28,000.

    “It was 1978. At TA, I think they were investing their third fund. Maybe TA was maybe 10 people, not many.”

  • Morby was a woman in a male-dominated firm and was older than her partners Kevin Landry and Andy McLean, which made her position at TA unusual.

    “it was very unusual to have a woman in the midst. And what's more, I was older than Kevin and Andy”

  • Morby moved from an unpaid-style internship at TA, which she took after her Simmons program, to a low-paid full-time role by telling Peter Brooke how productive she was, and her family's wealth let her accept a low salary.

    “I went to Peter and said, I really love it here. I'm working, I'm being productive”

  • Morby moved across Boston, Los Angeles, Argentina and Brazil with her husband's career, and she pursued teaching and then an MBA at Simmons when she decided to re-enter working life.

    “So I went to Simmons Graduate Management School and had a very interesting education for two years”

  • A PaineWebber head told Morby that a woman with a family could not carry on that kind of working life, and she was sent toward TA instead by a neighbor's suggestion.

    “I just don't think you could do it.”

0.43

Investment judgment came from real product testing and valuation discipline with founders.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Morby learned from Kevin Landry to be nurturing and flattering toward entrepreneurs while still making suggestions for change, a delicate balance that matters once an investor is involved.

    “to be very nurturing in a sense, to the entrepreneur, but also be flattering while still making suggestions for change.”

  • Morby invested in Sierra On-Line after testing its software with her children, and she found the company hard to locate in the mountains and unfamiliar with board governance at the first board meeting.

    “I took the software home to my children, probably your age, and I knew that the software was great because I could see how my son could play with it.”

  • TA's investment in the Chicago company SSA succeeded right away, and it was made alongside McCormack & Dodge and Greylock, with Henry McCance also pursuing software at the same time.

    “the Chicago company, SSA, we invested in was a hit right away. McCormack & Dodge invested along with Greylock together.”

  • A near-closed investment in Larry Ellison's company fell apart when partner Kevin Landry insisted on a minimum annual return that Ellison refused, showing how valuation discipline could kill deals the team had worked hard to source.

    “Kevin said, "We're not making this investment unless we make X interest per year on this." Larry said, "No way am I doing this."”

  • Ken Williams was technology-oriented and Roberta Williams provided much of the story and dialogue in Sierra's games, and Morby judged the software's quality by testing it with her own children, showing how product quality could be assessed through real use.

    “I took the software home to my children, probably your age, and I knew that the software was great because I could see how my son could play with it.”

0.43

TA's leaders gave her autonomy, letting different investing styles coexist and succeed.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Morby, Kevin Landry, and Andy McLean were very different investors, but they shared a desire to make investments and persuade entrepreneurs, and the firm let these different styles coexist.

    “Andy, Kevin and me, we're absolutely, completely different.”

  • Peter Brooke, not Kevin Landry, was the partner who brought Morby into TA, and Morby believed Landry was initially surprised by the decision.

    “Peter Brooke was the one who brought me in. Kevin didn't.”

  • How open a firm is to letting someone pursue success in their own way strongly shapes whether that person can succeed, and TA's leaders gave Morby autonomy without asking for justification.

    “A lot of it has to do with the environment within a firm—how open are they to letting someone succeed in whatever way they find possible?”

  • Kevin Landry was reportedly surprised at hiring a woman to the firm, while Peter Brooke pushed for it and Kevin later accepted the decision, which is reflected in his line that the deal either happens with Jacqui on the board or not.

    “Kevin probably gasped, 'What are we doing? Why are we doing this? I don't know.'”

  • Peter Brooke, not Kevin Landry, brought Morby into TA, and she argued that a firm's openness to letting people succeed in unconventional ways shapes whether they can do the work.

    “Peter Brooke was the one who brought me in. Kevin didn't.”

0.26

Genetic testing revealed Jeff's APOE4 risk, prompting the couple's Alzheimer's research foundation.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The genetic testing that revealed Jeff's APOE4 status happened during a health and exercise visit to Canyon Ranch, which the couple had kept private until Jeff died.

    “I'd gone to Canyon Ranch for exercise and health things and so forth. And we got genetic testing.”

  • After genetic testing revealed that Jeff Morby carried two copies of APOE4, a strong Alzheimer's risk gene, the couple founded a foundation to find a cure, working with Rudy Tanzi at Harvard and Mass General.

    “I just got my Canyon Ranch results. I'm double APOE4.”

  • Morby's philanthropy reflected long-standing cultural interests, including Stanford art history courses, docent work in Boston, and a modern art collection she built with Jeff.

    “Part of that... was the cultural part. I was definitely very interested in theater and the symphony”

  • Morby stated that carrying two copies of the APOE4 variant means a person will get Alzheimer's, while she herself carries the more common double APOE3 genotype.

    “it means you're going to get Alzheimer's. And we're both stunned. And I already knew that I was double APOE3, which is common.”

0.23

TA's internal divisions and rival investors shaped the firm's competitive position in software.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • TA in 1978 had two internal groups: a technology side investing in companies like Biogen, and a media, TV, and radio group, which created a competition that later led the media group to split off.

    “And this is a division, almost a competition between the technology side and the other side of the business.”

  • When Morby joined TA in 1978, the firm was roughly ten people investing its third fund of around $100 million, and it was split between a technology group and a media-and-broadcast group.

    “TA was maybe 10 people, not many... there were actually two groups of people.”

  • Henry McCance of Greylock and Morby pursued software companies at the same time, sometimes co-investing, and their competition was more collaborative than adversarial.

    “He and I were going after software at the same time and had success there.”