What this covers

Matt interviews Ethan Strauss, a basketball writer, about the NBA as a business: where its money comes from, who captures it, and why franchise prices ignore ordinary valuation. Matt brings the numbers. The Clippers sold for about $2 billion in 2013 on roughly $18 million of EBITDA, and in 2017 the Lakers earned about $150 million in local media rights against Memphis's $10 million. Ethan supplies the explanations: teams are vanity purchases chasing a fixed supply of 30, and owners with no shareholders can't be removed without their consent, as the Donald Sterling and Robert Sarver cases showed.

The middle of the conversation covers media and stars. Ethan describes broadcasters paying more because guaranteed live audiences are scarce, an Anchor Tenant Effect, while big-game viewership is roughly half its 2016 level, a claim marked as contested. He also argues that Nielsen's out-of-home ratings inflate the recent good headlines. On stars, merchandise revenue is shared across all teams, so Stephen Curry jerseys help Atlanta too. LeBron James may be worth tens of billions to the league, and Nike may matter more to top players than their teams do. Ja Morant serves as an example of star leverage.

The last stretch is historical and cultural. Ethan recalls the tape-delayed 1980s Finals, the Bird–Magic rescue, and the rule changes behind the Suns-era offense, a recovery he says was forgotten. He credits David Stern's hands-on product protection, criticizes the lesson Adam Silver drew from the Sterling ban, and calls the league's push into China, including its academies, a neglect of its American base. He adds that owners welcome expansion fees but resist removing a peer.

Sharpest takeaway

Ethan argues the NBA's rising media value is a scarcity-driven illusion layered over a roughly halved viewership, and that the league's loss of hands-on governance, marketing discipline, and control over its stars and owners is the real long-term risk.

  • Broadcasters overpay for a shrinking product because cable and streaming need anchor live content, so national deal growth masks an audience decline of about half.
  • Owners buy franchises as vanity assets, and the commissioner lacks the structural authority to remove them, so prices rise while control weakens.
  • China and the international player pipeline show the league misjudging its core US customer, and the post-Jordan rescue has been forgotten.

The argument · threads4 threads · 76 claims
0.80

The NBA's rise and decline turned on marketing, complacency, and clear messaging.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The NBA's arc runs from the 1980s rise with Bird, Magic and Jordan, through a post-Jordan slump, a rescue via rule changes, complacency, and a China bet that failed, leaving the league to lose half its customers while still making enough money to avoid major punishment.

    “then forgetting about it, thinking that they're going to just print money in China”

  • The NBA's I Love This Game campaign worked because it captured the spontaneous joy of basketball with a simple message that matched the sentiment of its time.

    “the I Love This Game ad campaign was a good ad campaign”

  • Media outlets have been uncomfortable telling the story of the NBA's post-Jordan revival, especially the role of dress code changes, so the league's rescue has gone under-heralded.

    “I think people are uncomfortable with potential implications of that it succeeded.”

  • The NBA's marketing has become directionless, and a clear message plus top marketers could fix the league's decline more than talent alone, because talent is already abundant.

    “nowadays, it's just also directionless and amorphous, and they need the top marketers of the sport to find a message that resonates.”

  • Companies that succeed can over-rely on past lessons and become complacent, as the NIKE and NBA examples show, so companies must keep learning from the strategies that once made them successful.

    “Sometimes companies can over-rely on those lessons and chase it to their detriment.”

0.66

The NBA's China and global-star push misfired, alienating the US audience that drives profit.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Silver should treat the U.S. the way he treated China, as a place to cultivate homegrown superstars, because if the NBA produces fewer American superstars it will hurt its connection with the wealthiest country with a huge population.

    “Adam Silver perhaps should look at the U.S. in the way that he looked at China”

  • Adam Silver's 2019 comments wishing for Chinese stars and complaining about China's Olympic performance seemed tone-deaf for an American commissioner, exposing the league's frustrated expectations.

    “Adam Silver at the 2019 finals was expressing his dismay over it and actually saying, I wish we could get some Chinese stars, which was weird in a way.”

  • The NBA's push for global superstars resembles a monkey's paw wish: it got superstars from Europe and Serbia that help international revenue little while alienating the US audience that drives profit.

    “It's not really doing anything for the league profit-wise.”

  • Under David Stern, the NBA's China adventure was a mistaken imperial venture, with arenas built and deals chased through intermediaries, and the expected profits from a Disney-style relationship never materialized.

    “I think it was always a bit of a mistake written imperial adventure for the NBA.”

  • The NBA's efforts to build arenas in China resembled Stringer Bell in The Wire trying to work through Clay Davis, who siphoned money off, illustrating that outsiders struggle to build in China.

    “It reminds of Stringer Bell in The Wire trying to build and do it through Clay Davis, who actually knows and manages to siphon money off of him.”

0.57

Owners and league governance operate like personal fiefdoms, with strong personalities valued for entertainment.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Owners have shifted from old-money figures like Jerry Jones to younger quants and private equity investors who want profits and are less knowable, and Mark Cuban was an early new-money tech owner whose followers lacked his personality.

    “you've got a lot of younger, hungrier guys who are quants in their respective industries”

  • NBA owners operate like kings in castles, without shareholders, so a bad owner like James Dolan keeps control because he inherited the team, and the league's informal aristocratic governance intersects modern business in an unusual way.

    “You don't have shareholders. If everybody's mad at James Dolan and how he's run the New York Knicks into the ground for decades, tough.”

  • Joe Lacob, not yet a billionaire and partnered with Peter Guber, beat Larry Ellison at an auction run out of Sal Galatioto's office to buy the Golden State Warriors, an unusual old-world sale process.

    “The Warriors were sold out of a shop run by a guy named Sal Galatioto”

  • Owners with strong personalities, including Jerry Jones and Golden State Warriors owner Joe Lacob, are good for the league's entertainment value even if they are unpopular, because the league is effectively a TV show.

    “It's all one big TV show. You want as many good characters as possible.”

  • Nike wanted Kevin Durant on the Golden State Warriors and wanted him to be the face of the brand, suggesting that sponsor preferences may influence major player moves even when players deny it.

    “I know NIKE wanted him with the Golden State Warriors when he was with the Thunder. That's something that NIKE wanted to happen desperately.”

  • Silver's reluctance to act publicly against Ben Simmons, who left the Sixers, reflects a hands-off approach that avoids taking responsibility, unlike how a company should be run.

    “I don't want to ruffle feathers, and so I'm not going to say much about Ben Simmons basically leaving the Sixers because he doesn't feel like it.”

0.29

Star players and the US-based structure generate outsized value for the league.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Morgan Stanley estimated that Steph Curry might be worth $12 billion to Under Armour while he was still in his 20s, showing how young stars can be valued far beyond their salaries.

    “Morgan Stanley was saying, he might be worth $12 billion to Under Armour”

  • LeBron James likely added tens of billions in value to the NBA over the life of its TV deal, because he helped generate media interest; the 2007 deal was around $800-900 million versus $2.7 billion under the 2014 deal.

    “You could make an argument that LeBron was not just worth billions to the NBA, but worth tens of billions over the lifetime of the deal.”

  • The NBA's US-based structure gives it a huge advantage over rival leagues because American players are reluctant to play in Canada, which makes the Raptors harder to staff than US teams.

    “These players don't want to play in Canada. That's a huge issue for them. It's very hard for the Raptors to get American players to come play in Canada.”