What this covers

Patrick hosts a conversation with Kobi Platt, Matt, and Ian about the weekend the OPEC Plus alliance came apart. They work through why Russia declined further cuts, reading it as a refusal to keep transferring value to US shale, and why Saudi Arabia answered the way it did. They also cover the Coronavirus shock: Chinese refinery runs fell by three to four million barrels a day, and crude already at sea piled up as inventory. The talk then turns to what the episode means for shale operators and for investors in them.

The range is wide. Kobi explains why cheap oil helps the US consumer less than it once did, since gasoline is about 2 percent of disposable income against 6 percent in 1980. He also explains how the futures curve pays for floating storage and how the marginal barrel sets the price. The geopolitics includes the US passing Saudi Arabia and Russia as top producer in 2019, the sanctions leverage that gave Washington, and Saudi power consolidation. Matt covers the financial side: why book value and the price deck mislead, and how moral hazard built up over a decade, including the roughly $30 billion of equity raised in 2016 on the bet that OPEC would rescue the sector. Ian supplies timing and sorting, with volumes slipping only by late 2020 and shale cost structures splitting between scaled and over-levered producers.

The contested parts are Matt's claim that shale is more resilient at low-30s prices than OPEC or Russia assumed, the argument against a TARP-style bailout, and Kobi's case that Texas producers flare less than foreign peers.

Sharpest takeaway

The oil price war, set off by the collapse of the OPEC Plus deal and amplified by the Coronavirus demand shock, will force high-cost shale producers to shrink or fail, and a healthy market can only emerge if governments and OPEC Plus avoid bailouts and let prices discover a new equilibrium.

  • The 2016 OPEC Plus floor was a temporary subsidy to US shale, and Russia's refusal to cut further ended it.
  • Shale cost structures are bifurcating, so low prices will separate efficient producers from over-levered ones.
  • Government bailouts or OPEC blinking would only prolong oversupply and delay price discovery.

The argument · threads2 threads · 52 claims
0.85

Low prices will force high-cost shale producers to retrench, shrinking US volumes and spreading losses to lenders.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Occidental Petroleum cut its dividend by 90 percent and reduced its budget by 25 percent, and three or four other producers had announced reductions, with more expected.

    “Occidental Petroleum just cut their dividend 90%, and shaved 25% off of their budget.”

  • Without an OPEC Plus reversal or zero-interest government loans, high-cost shale producers will go bankrupt or be impaired enough to lose drilling capacity, shrinking by 10 to 20 percent a year, while the strongest producers can cut to maintenance capital and survive two to three years.

    “They'll shrink in the magnitude of 10 to 20% a year.”

  • Capital spending cuts take six to twelve months to affect volumes because wells drilled and completed over the last six months determine production for the next six months, so US volumes should only start declining gradually by the end of 2020 and fall by 500,000 to 700,000 barrels a day by the end of 2021.

    “It will take something between six and twelve months for these activity cuts to hit volumes.”

  • Even in a low-price environment, energy companies are incentivized to keep production up as much as they can while preserving capital, because falling prices plus falling volumes cause EBITDA to fall, further impairing the capital structure.

    “when their EBITDA is falling from both prices, and then also volumes, it's a further impairment to their capital structure.”

  • Shale bankruptcies would hit banks that hold the debt of impaired producers, and midstream pipeline operators with distressed tenants, with ripple effects in energy-dependent metros such as Houston.

    “their loans and debt are held by banks that are going to feel the impact of potential bankruptcies.”

  • The most interesting uncertainty is how companies will respond to an unknown-duration price war, since the spectrum runs from waiting for first-quarter earnings in May to drastic moves like Occidental's, and there is extreme path dependency in how the information unfolds.

    “It was, what are the companies going to actually do in response to very severe but unknown duration, price war?”

0.56

Shale producers are being sorted by marginal cost and balance sheet strength.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The shale cost structure is bifurcating: scaled producers have moved operating and capital costs to a level that can compete with greenfield projects globally, while another class has added debt for two years and sits above its marginal cost, so the market is now sorting producers by marginal cost.

    “The cost structure of shale is starting to be pretty bifurcated”

  • Service costs are not static, and producers with baseload activity will demand price concessions from service providers to keep activity in the field, which could help capital efficiency.

    “service costs aren't static, and ENPs that do have some baseload activity are going to ask for price concessions”

  • Within energy, growth has held up well because it is measured as debt-adjusted cash flow growth per debt-adjusted share, which rewards companies using their balance sheet for high-return projects even in a downturn, while bad balance sheets underperform.

    “Growth and energy, we look at pretty strictly as debt-adjusted cash flow growth per debt-adjusted share.”