What this covers

This is a conversation with Rob Small of Stockbridge, who is both a long-time TransDigm shareholder and a director on its board. It follows his path from private equity at Berkshire Partners to running a public-markets strategy. He explains why a 2005-2007 credit boom, when private companies sold for more than comparable public ones, led Berkshire to look for control premium over liquidity premium mispricings in public stocks. The conversation then turns to TransDigm itself as the test case for that approach.

The business discussion starts with parts economics. A 737 has roughly 600,000 parts and is built in low volume, so a second source struggles to make the numbers work. Small argues that gross margin misleads here, because the value lies in design IP and reliable delivery rather than metal and labor. He adds that the aftermarket holds up better than new-aircraft sales because flying rarely shrinks. He also recalls that Hexcel's CEO once thought TransDigm was poorly positioned because it sold older, simpler parts.

The investing side is the more contested ground. Small describes Stockbridge's five-year IRR discipline, its portfolio where the top ten positions exceed 80 percent, and its purchase of about $150 million of stock after 2008. He defends the view that investors underestimate serial acquirers' deal pace. He also covers how Nick Howley runs TransDigm like a private equity business, and how it sold off non-fitting units after buying McKechnie from JLL, even though those units added EBITDA. He also explains how he came onto the board.

Sharpest takeaway

Rob Small argues that TransDigm's persistent undervaluation came from forecasts that underestimated its acquisition pace and exit multiple, and that its aftermarket margins reflect owned intellectual property and switching costs, which are captured through disciplined operations and superior execution.

  • Aftermarket parts earn high margins because of intellectual property, sole-source positions, and switching costs, not because of the metal and labor in them
  • Five-year IRR models kept showing attractive returns because they understated TransDigm's acquisition pace ($30M to $50M EBITDA per year) and its exit multiple (12x to 14x, later 16-17x)
  • TransDigm's operating discipline on portfolio pruning and SKU-level pricing lets it outbid rivals for acquisitions and sustain the M&A engine

The argument · threads6 threads · 52 claims
0.85

Long-term earnings power and a five-year IRR, not today's exit multiple, should drive valuation decisions.

8 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Stockbridge bases its analysis on a five-year internal rate of return, which requires a view of the company at least ten years out so the team can judge what a future buyer would pay in five years, and this forces a very long-term focus that only high-quality businesses can support.

    “we do all our analysis on a five year IRR, which takes understanding or having a view on the company for 10 years at least, so we understand what someone might pay for it in five years.”

  • Rob believes TransDigm's earnings are at a depressed level and that aerospace has a brighter outlook once people return to flying, so today's exit multiple matters less than the long-term earnings power the company will have.

    “we have a brighter view for aerospace ahead after people decide they want to get back on planes. And so we think we're on a depressed earnings level now.”

  • Investors commonly underestimate the pace of acquisitions at serial acquirers, which may be a source of opportunity in public markets.

    “the pace of acquisition, which I think is a very common thing in companies that are serial acquirers for people to underestimate.”

  • TransDigm's persistent apparent undervaluation came from Stockbridge's forecasts underestimating the pace of acquisitions, which were initially modeled at $30 million of EBITDA per year and later raised to $50 million, and underestimating the exit multiple the company deserves.

    “we started assuming that TransDigm was going to acquire at $30 million of EBITDA per year. And we ended up raising that after a couple years to $50 million of EBITDA per year.”

  • Stockbridge raised its TransDigm exit multiple assumption from 12 times EBITDA to 14 times, and later to about 16 or 17 times, based on its judgment of the long-term returns on capital a future buyer would earn, because a high multiple at entry would double the risk on the performance thesis.

    “we started with a 12 times EBITDA multiple... we went from 12, then we ultimately went to 14.”

  • TransDigm has consistently traded in a range where its five-year IRR is attractive, around 15 percent at the low end and higher during shock periods, and unlike other holdings Stockbridge never had to sell it because its models showed insufficient returns.

    “TransDigm has always traded in an attractive range. In the 15% range at the low”

  • Stockbridge's base case excludes large future acquisitions beyond the roughly $50 million of EBITDA acquired per year, treating the possibility of additional large acquisitions as option value on top of the base case valuation.

    “we don't put that in, but then we realize that there's potentially option value on top of that.”

  • Stockbridge updates its five-year IRR model daily with the current stock price while revising the underlying operating assumptions only as new information arrives, because a five-year forecast should not change quickly.

    “We don't update our models weekly... we update daily with the price and run that through the model”

0.71

Aerospace aftermarket parts earn durable margins because flying rarely shrinks and reliable parts are hard to replicate.

8 pointscentrality 4/5
  • TransDigm's aftermarket business is more stable than its OEM business because flying rarely shrinks, even when new aircraft orders slow; the aftermarket shrinks only in very large shocks such as global pandemics, and its gross margin rises as it becomes more aftermarket-weighted.

    “flying is pretty steady and the rate of growth can slow. And, other than when there's global pandemics, it rarely shrinks.”

  • General Electric's engine aftermarket likely earns very high margins, perhaps in the 90s on gross margin for some parts, because GE is the sole supplier of its engine parts and customers find it very hard to trust a PMA supplier for critical components.

    “I bet for some other parts, they're in the 90s in gross margin. It has to be on things they sell. They're the only supplier for their engines.”

  • Gross margin is misleadingly defined as the markup on metal and labor, but in aftermarket aerospace parts the economic value captured is the intellectual property and switching costs, not the raw materials, and the value comes from how reliably the part is made.

    “margins are basically defined as the markup on the metal and the labor to shape the metal, but it's really the intellectual property and the switching costs that you're getting paid for.”

  • Aftermarket aerospace parts earn strong margins because the combination of low volume spread across end customers, high barriers to entry, the need for flawless performance, and IP from original design makes it hard for a second source to make the numbers work, while regulation ensures new parts are only as safe as already approved ones.

    “So the combination of low volumes, large barriers to entry, the need to be responsive on a very diverse set of products, and the intellectual property that was built up from the original design allow for very strong margins in the aftermarket.”

  • TransDigm's capital expenditure is about 2 percent of revenue, which is roughly 4 percent of profits because of its high margins, so the company's capex burden is small relative to earnings.

    “unfortunately, 2% of revenues means 4% of profits since they have such a high margin.”

  • Hexcel's CEO initially believed TransDigm was poorly positioned for the future because it sold older and less complex parts and did not lead industry R&D, a view Rob Small realized missed where aerospace value actually lies in the aftermarket.

    “They just sell some of the older parts and some of the less complex parts. And they're not leading the R&D of the industry.”

  • A 737 has roughly 600,000 parts and Boeing plans to build fewer than 400 737s a year, so the product is extremely complex with low volume, which means suppliers that design parts and deliver them reliably add value that gets paid for.

    “I've seen numbers that sell you the 737 now has about 600,000 parts... Boeing, in their latest forecasts, hopes to ramp to only about making a few less than 400 737s a year.”

  • Analyzing aerospace suppliers requires different methods for OEM and aftermarket: OEM analysis asks how few planes Boeing might build, while aftermarket analysis looks at sales per aircraft set and how that plays out over the fleet, which reveals the steadiness of aftermarket revenue.

    “Our Hexcel analysis was how few planes could aerospace and Boeing actually go to?... This was much, much more, what was the sales per ship set?”

0.68

TransDigm's acquisition engine and operating playbook create value through proprietary, sole-source businesses.

7 pointscentrality 4/5
  • TransDigm's acquisition discipline focuses on companies with proprietary technology, a sole-source position, and product diversity, and it avoids excessive concentration in any single product type because that concentration is what would prevent the company from earning high margins.

    “They focus on companies with proprietary technology, a sole source position and some product diversity. They don't want too much concentration, any single product type”

  • TransDigm's typical acquisition model expects acquired EBITDA to double within five years, and it usually achieves that goal faster, as happened with AmSafe.

    “Their typical acquisition model calls, if you have to guess, I would say typically a doubling of EBITDA over five years, which then I believe they usually achieve quicker.”

  • Rob's early worry that TransDigm's strategy was so distinctive it could be copied and make acquisitions harder faded after he saw the McKechnie and AmSafe deals, where he observed the operating playbook produce large improvements.

    “I had a misplaced view that the business strategy was so brilliant... that always left me with the fear that it could be copied”

  • TransDigm's capital allocation follows a clear order: first invest in internal productivity projects with strong payback, second buy complementary businesses that fit, and third return capital while keeping a carefully leveraged balance sheet.

    “So their first choice is to invest in the business. Anything they can do to create productivity that has a strong payback, they'd love to do. Next is buying those additive businesses that fit. And then finally, returning capital”

  • TransDigm's operational execution at AmSafe, including portfolio pruning and SKU-by-SKU pricing, gave it confidence it could outbid anyone for assets, so execution itself drives its M&A success because it makes TransDigm the logical winning bidder.

    “The execution drives the M&A because it makes them the logical bidder and the logical winner in all of these. And it's because they run it better.”

  • After TransDigm acquired McKechnie from JLL, it immediately sold business units that did not fit its strategy despite those units adding EBITDA, and the rest of McKechnie's operations improved so much that EBITDA roughly doubled within about five years.

    “They immediately sold off some pieces. There's always the temptation to grow larger, because if you can grow, it's good for valuation.”

  • TransDigm's diversified product base means a wrong acquisition will not sink the company, which gives management more freedom to make bold acquisition moves than a concentrated company would have.

    “It's not going to sink the company if they make a wrong move on any particular one, so that gives them a little more freedom.”

0.54

Stockbridge built conviction in TransDigm through verified judgments, cheap valuations, and concentrated buying.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • After 2008, Stockbridge judged TransDigm remarkably cheap relative to its models, had the private equity fund run an independent second review, and then bought about $150 million of stock in the open market when Warburg was not willing to sell.

    “We came to a similar conclusion and we approved a $150 million investment in the stock.”

  • In the 2005-2007 credit boom, private companies sold for more than the public trading value of comparable companies for the first time in Berkshire's experience, meaning the control premium outweighed the liquidity premium, which motivated Berkshire to look for undervalued public opportunities.

    “for the first time in our history, we started to see comparable sheets when we were trying to value private companies where the private company would sell for more than the public company was trading for. So the control premium, in some ways, outweighed the liquidity premium.”

  • Stockbridge's TransDigm position started in the high single digits as a share of the portfolio and grew over time as the team accumulated data on how often its judgments were right, building the conviction and courage to hold larger positions.

    “So we built up to having the conviction and the courage to have larger positions. So it was probably closer to high single digits at that point”

  • Rob Small and a partner bought TransDigm shares personally shortly after its 2006 IPO at about $24 per share, and Rob believes he bought slightly more at a lower price, which has become a wonderful investment.

    “My memory is that the price was about $24 a share.”

  • Stockbridge chose a concentrated portfolio where the top ten positions make up more than 80 percent of the portfolio, reasoning that deep knowledge of the best investments beats spreading capital across a 25th idea.

    “believing that deep knowledge of our best investment would be better than trying to figure out a 25th investment”

  • Sizable open-market public stock purchases are unusual for private equity firms because limited partners want exposure to private deals, making a public investment a riskier and higher-bar decision.

    “your investors often have you in a category where they're trying to manage their exposure. So they often want their exposure to be in private deals.”

  • Stockbridge's first TransDigm purchase near $35 a share rose into the low $50s quickly, leading the team to credit its public-market skill, but the stock fell back to the purchase price and below in 2008, teaching the team not to count gains too early.

    “We bought in it around, I think at that time, $35 a share... The stock went up into the low 50s very quickly... And we got an initial learning that you don't count too quickly.”

0.33

Stockbridge launched with modest internal capital to prove public-market conviction before raising outside money.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Stockbridge's founders initially planned to run the new public strategy part-time while still doing private equity deals, but they concluded this was hubris because they were competing against people who worked full-time on public markets, so they assigned a partner full-time for two years.

    “to think that our senior presence could be part-time ... was exactly that, hubris.”

  • Rob Small agreed to devote two years to launching Stockbridge, a commitment that has stretched to nearly fifteen years, and he was picked because he may have been the most expendable partner or because he preferred investment process and business analysis over the deal process.

    “So I was probably the best fit for that. So I went off for two years with the goal.”

  • Stockbridge's original $30 million capital base has grown to closer to 200 times that, with about $6 billion of capital under management.

    “Closer to 200 times, I think. We're around $6 billion of capital under management now.”

  • Berkshire's pricing of its investments as a multiple of uninvested capital is an unremarkable framing detail.
  • Berkshire launched Stockbridge in 2007 with about $30 million of internal commitments because it did not know whether it could reach investment conviction using public-market data alone, and it wanted to prove the approach with its own money before attracting outside partners.

    “We were unsure about whether we could get to conviction with public only data.”

0.29

Berkshire's 2003 auction loss and a private-equity-style board link shaped Rob's TransDigm involvement.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Rob Small considers Berkshire Partners' loss of the 2003 TransDigm auction to Warburg the most painful loss of his private equity career, because TransDigm was the best company he evaluated in that period and he wanted to partner with Nick Howley and Doug Peacock.

    “From then on, I've always referred to that as the most painful loss in my private equity career. That was the one that got away.”

  • During the final rounds of the 2003 TransDigm auction, the banker asked whether the tax savings from option proceeds were on top of Berkshire's bid, and Rob believes that if he had said yes, Berkshire might have won, though Warburg's motivation to avoid another industrials loss probably meant it would have paid more anyway.

    “Are you sure that the tax savings from the option proceeds are on top of your bid and not included in your bid?”

  • The TransDigm board resembles a private equity board because directors are engaged and focused on adding value, and because TransDigm's decentralized structure means the executive team acts as a board for each business while the board oversees the combined company.

    “the executive management team acts like a board for each of the individual businesses. And then we act like a board for the combined business.”

  • Nick Howley treated TransDigm as a private equity business in public markets, so he wanted a board member with a private equity background who was also a public investor, which made Rob Small a fit when Warburg's director left in 2010.

    “Nick viewed very much the company as private equity in the public market.”