Sherwin-Williams: Brushstrokes of Success
What this covers
Matt and Todd work through Sherwin-Williams as a business, with Todd carrying most of the analysis. The episode starts with how the company is built: it makes paint in its own plants, ships it on its own trucks, and sells it through more than 4,700 company-owned stores. Those stores account for over half of sales and two-thirds of segment profit. From there it covers the financial profile: gross margins near 50%, ROIC above 40%, capex under 2% of sales, free cash flow above net income, and 45 straight years of dividend increases alongside steady buybacks.
The middle of the discussion is about why demand is steady and pricing holds. Paint is applied to an installed base of roughly 270 billion square feet that gets repainted repeatedly. It is cheap and unfinanced, so Paint Stores sales fell only about 15% in the 2007 to 2009 bust, against roughly 25% at Home Depot. For professional painters, about 90% of a job is labor, so a 10% paint price increase adds roughly 1% to cost. That helps explain the Margin Ratchet after each inflation cycle and the five-to-one pro preference over Benjamin Moore.
The more contentious turns come later. Todd argues that comparing margins with Masco or Benjamin Moore misleads, because Paint Stores compounds at 8% against Masco's 3%. He also covers the debt-funded Valspar deal that built Performance Coatings into a rival to PPG and AkzoNobel, and the claim that every two Sherwin openings force three independent store closures. A closing tangent uses Boeing to ask what operators should outsource.
Sherwin-Williams' dominance comes from a vertically integrated, company-owned store network that serves professional painters, and its exclusive distribution produces share gains and returns that peers selling through third-party retailers cannot match.
- Sherwin-Williams paint is sold only through its own stores, so it controls brand, pricing, service, and store expansion
- Professional painters' labor-heavy cost structure makes service worth paying for, and Sherwin captures that willingness to pay
- Peers with similar margins grow far more slowly because they sell through other retailers' stores
Dedicated, vertically integrated stores form a moat that drives share gains and compounding growth.
- The Paint Stores Group is Sherwin-Williams' largest segment, representing over half of sales and two-thirds of segment profit, and operates over 4,700 dedicated paint stores in North America, more than all Home Depots and Lowe's combined.
“This is its largest segment, representing over half of sales and two-thirds of segment profit. Sherwin operates over 4,700 dedicated paint stores in North America. That's more than all the Home Depots and Lowe's combined.”
- Sherwin-Williams paint can only be bought in its own stores, which distinguishes it from most paint brands that are sold through other retailers' stores.
“You cannot buy Sherwin-Williams paint at any other retailer. This distinguishes it from most other paint brands, which are sold in other stores.”
- Sherwin has consistently raised its store target, from 3,000 to 4,000 to 5,000, and is likely to aim for 6,000, opening 80 to 100 stores per year for decades, so there is still considerable runway.
“I imagine they're going to talk about opening stores to level of 6,000. So there's still considerable runway”
- Over the last ten years the Paint Stores Group compounded sales at 8% per year, roughly 6 points from same-store sales growth and 2 points from store growth, versus low single-digit growth for the rest of the industry.
“Over the last 10 years, the Paint Store Group has compounded sales growth at 8% per year, and that breaks down as roughly 6% same-store sales growth and 2% annual store growth.”
- A Sherwin paint store costs about $1 million to open and generates about $600,000 in annual profit, with sales of about $2.7 million per store, which makes payback and returns very attractive.
“When you consider that a paint store costs about $1 million to open, makes $600,000 in annual profit per store, the payback and returns are very attractive.”
- Sherwin has exclusive agreements with 23 of the top 25 national homebuilders and 17 of the top 20 property management companies, and controls an estimated 75% of the professional paint market.
“It has exclusive agreements with 23 of the top 25 national homebuilders and 17 of the top 20 property management companies. Overall, I estimate that Sherwin might control about 75% of the professional paint market.”
- Competitors have never seriously threatened Sherwin's model because Sherwin has relentlessly kept opening stores and gaining share, which discourages rivals from trying to keep up.
“It really hasn't. Sherwin has just relentlessly continued to open stores and gain share, and I think that's discouraged competitors from trying to keep up with them.”
- Sherwin has said that for every two stores it opens, three independent paint stores are forced to close, with dedicated paint stores falling from about 12,000 before the housing downturn to roughly 8,000 today.
“Sherwin used to say for every two stores they open, they forced the closure of three independent paint stores. And that stat bears out.”
- Given PPG's exit and Kelly-Moore's bankruptcy, the industry is reaching a tipping point where Sherwin is the only remaining serious supplier for professional painters.
“So it does feel like we're reaching a tipping point in the industry where it is Sherwin and no one else, at least as it relates to serving professional painters.”
- Given Sherwin's size, buying PPG's architectural portfolio would likely be unrealistic on antitrust grounds, so Sherwin would instead capture the business by using its own store base and employees.
“Given their size in the market, I don't think it would be realistic from an antitrust standpoint. But that being said, I don't think Sherwin needs to buy PPG.”
- PPG announced plans to sell its U.S. and Canadian architectural coatings business, which Todd says has been shrinking for years and is essentially breakeven, compared with Sherwin's Paint Stores margin above 20%.
“PPG announced its intention to sell its U.S. and Canadian architectural coatings business. Despite being one of the larger and more tenured competitors in the industry, PPG revealed that its architectural paint business has been shrinking for years and is essentially breakeven.”
- Sherwin never reduced its net store count, even during the Great Housing Recession, continuing to open stores and add sales reps, which allowed it to gain share from weakened competitors.
“No. Even during the great housing recession, Sherwin kept opening stores, kept adding sales reps. So it really took advantage of the downturn”
- Masco's Decorative Architectural Group and Benjamin Moore have operating margins similar to Sherwin's, so a simple margin comparison misleads investors, because Sherwin's controlled distribution produces growth rates far higher, with Paint Stores compounding at 8% versus Masco's 3%.
“So while the margins and even returns look somewhat similar, the growth rates have been anything but similar.”
- Within about a year of the Valspar close, Sherwin became the exclusive paint supplier to Lowe's, displacing PPG, which benefited Lowe's by giving it one partner controlling the paint department and avoiding a confusing multi-brand sale.
“But Lowe's now then got the best paint retailer in the country and the best paint manufacturer exclusively selling paint in their paint stores”
- Automotive refinish, where Sherwin participates, looks more like the professional paint market, with fragmented end customers, a labor-heavy cost mix, and service as a crucial factor, unlike auto OEM which is consolidated and cost-driven.
“if you're talking about automotive refinish, which is where Sherwin is involved, that business looks a bit more similar to the professional paint market.”
- R&D is a relatively small part of total sales at Sherwin, and paint performance differences between brands are modest, so Sherwin's competitive advantage comes from service rather than chemistry.
“It's a relatively small part of total sales. There is always R&D going on, improving paint performance, coatings performance.”
- Sherwin's stores produce about $2.7 million in sales each, comparable to Chipotle's sales per restaurant, making them highly productive relative to top quick-service restaurants.
“those 4,700 stores generate about $2.7 million in sales per store. So these are highly productive stores comparing favorably to some of the best QSRs.”
- Sherwin-Williams was founded in 1866 by Henry Sherwin and Edward Williams and was one of the first companies to sell ready-mixed paint rather than ingredients customers mixed themselves.
“It was founded by Henry Sherwin and Edward Williams. Also, it was one of the first companies to sell ready-mixed paint.”
- No competitor has tried to replicate Sherwin's dedicated-store model: Benjamin Moore sells through independent dealers, PPG runs an omnichannel approach with a few company stores, and Benjamin Moore's approach avoids overhead, so the model has never been a real threat.
“Sherwin has just relentlessly continued to open stores and gain share, and I think that's discouraged competitors from trying to keep up with them.”
- Annual employee turnover at Sherwin stores is under 10%, which is remarkably low for a retailer and reflects the service quality painters receive.
“Annual employee turnover at stores is less than 10%, which is remarkably low for a retailer”
- Sherwin is the only paint player of significance with a controlled distribution, near vertically integrated model: it manufactures paint in its own plants, ships it on its own trucks, and sells and delivers it through its own stores and staff.
“You cannot buy Sherwin-Williams paint at any other retailer. This distinguishes it from most other paint brands, which are sold in other stores.”
Inflation and paint's small cost share let Sherwin ratchet prices and premium margins higher, though growth may moderate.
- Paint stores mix thousands of colors on demand from a base paint and pigments in minutes, so unlike other retailers they do not need to anticipate color demand or hold markdown-prone inventory.
“So unlike many other retailers, a paint store does not need to anticipate demand for certain colors or products and then hold their markdown unwanted inventory when they're proven wrong.”
- Highly inflationary cost periods lower gross margins briefly, Sherwin then restores them through price increases, and because it never lowers can prices, gross margins ratchet structurally higher after each inflation cycle, as seen in the 2010s and after COVID.
“Sherwin then never lowers the price of a can of paint, allowing gross margins to rise even higher and set new baselines. This happened in the previous two inflationary environments in the 2010s.”
- Sherwin's same-store sales growth breaks down into roughly 1 to 2 points of volume, about 2 points of price, and 1 to 2 points of share gains.
“that's Sherwin's same-store sales growth breaks down as roughly 1% to 2% volume, 2% price and 1% to 2% share gains.”
- Because paint is only about 10% of a painting project's cost, even a 10% paint price increase adds only about 1% to the total cost of a job, which gives Sherwin pricing power.
“Because paint represents only 10% of a painting project, price increases do not have a meaningful impact on the total cost of a project. I mean, even a sizable 10% price increase only adds 1% to the total cost of a job.”
- When raw material costs fall, no supplier has much incentive to cut paint prices because a small price change barely stimulates new paint projects, which keeps the industry rational on pricing.
“when raw materials fall, there's little incentive for any one supplier to cut price because it'll have little impact stimulating demand for new paint projects.”
- During the COVID period gross margins declined by about 400 basis points from peak to trough, and they are now recovering and likely to march higher.
“gross margins declined by about 400 basis points from peak to trough. And now they're recovering that and likely will march even higher.”
- Because Sherwin's share of the professional paint market has become so large, its results will eventually track the broader paint market more closely rather than continuing to outgrow it.
“Given that share of the professional paint market has become so large, at some point, its results will start to more closely mirror that of the broader paint market.”
- SG&A is around 30% of sales, which is high versus peers, but this spending on controlled distribution and service to painters is what distinguishes Sherwin, generates loyalty, and forms its moat.
“SG&A as a percent of sales is around 30%, which is high relative to many peers. And that's because of Sherwin's controlled distribution model”
- Sherwin traded around 20 times earnings for most of the last 15 years, which looked expensive versus building products and chemicals peers, but it now trades near 30 times earnings, so future returns may be more modest.
“perhaps future stock returns may be more modest given a higher starting point with regards to valuation, which is now close to 30 times earnings.”
- Sherwin is a tweener viewed as either a building products or a chemicals company, and comparisons to those average peer groups have grounded its multiple, discounting the superior quality and durability of its growth and returns.
“Investors can tend to homogenize things they don't totally appreciate. As a result, I think those comparisons have grounded Sherwin's multiple a bit”
- Company gross margins are nearly 50%, resembling best-known consumer brands rather than building products or chemicals companies, reflecting pros' willingness to pay for Sherwin's brand and service, while 85% of COGS are petrochemical-derived raw materials.
“Company gross margins are nearly 50%, which more closely resemble margins for some of the best-known consumer brands rather than a building products or a chemicals company.”
Recurring, unfinanced repaint demand on a growing installed base has held up through downturns.
- Paint is a low-cost, high-value home improvement project that does not need to be financed, so paint sales are less influenced by interest rate changes and tend to hold up better in downturns than many other home improvement categories.
“Therefore, paint sales are less influenced by change in interest rates, and they tend to hold up better in downturns than many other home improvement categories.”
- Paint must be applied to the installed base of square footage, which grows about 1% per year from roughly 270 billion square feet, and each building gets repainted again and again over time, making demand recurring.
“they will all get painted initially, and then again and again over time. As of 2023, there's roughly 270 billion square feet of residential and nonresidential space, and it grows consistently about 1% per year.”
- In 2023 the U.S. industry sold roughly 800 million gallons of architectural paint, about $22 billion in sales, and Sherwin-Williams controls roughly 65% of the market.
“So in 2023, the industry sold roughly 800 million gallons of architectural paint.”
- During the 2007 to 2009 housing bust, Paint Stores sales fell about 15% and profits about 20%, far less than Home Depot's roughly 25% sales decline, many building products companies' 50%, and homebuilders' 75%.
“from peak to trough, 2007 to 2009, Sherwin's Paint Stores sales declined by 15% and Paint Stores profits dropped by 20%.”
- Roughly 80% of painting demand comes from repainting existing square footage, driven by home price appreciation and resulting homeowner equity, housing stock aging past 40 years on average, and existing home sales, since sellers and buyers each repaint.
“Roughly 80% of painting demand is driven by repaint activity of existing square footage. And that's driven by a combination of factors, mostly home price appreciation”
- By end market, roughly 35% to 40% of paint projects are DIY, 30% to 35% residential repaint, 10% to 15% new home construction, 10% to 15% property management, and 5% to 10% commercial.
“So by end market, roughly 35% to 40% of paint projects are do-it-yourself or DIY.”
- The main substitution risk is wallpaper making a comeback, but it would only affect the interior portion of residential repaint, about one third of the market, and would recapture only a small share, so its impact would be modest.
“could there be some substitution risk in the form of wallpaper making a comeback? It would only be a risk for the interior portion of residential repaint.”
- The greatest risk to Sherwin is the overall health of the U.S. housing market, which matters because the Paint Stores Group is central and the other segments have similar housing exposure.
“the greatest risk factors for Sherwin are those outside of its control, most notably the overall health of the U.S. housing market”
Professional painters, who value time over paint cost, drive most of Sherwin's demand.
- In the 1980s about 60% of paint projects were DIY and 40% were done by professional painters, while today about 65% of projects are completed by professional painters, driven by appreciation for professional quality, dual-income households with home equity, and aging or less handy homeowners.
“In the '80s, about 60% of paint projects were DIY, while the other 40% were done by professional paint contractor. Today, that percentage is more than flipped”
- The cost of a paint job is roughly 90% labor and only 10% paint and materials, rising to about 95% labor on larger projects, so for a professional painter time is literally money.
“As a result, the cost of a paint job is roughly 90% labor, while only 10% of the cost is paint and other materials. On larger projects, labor can represent 95% of the total cost.”
- Professional painters make up 85% of Sherwin's paint sales, and the store network is designed to serve them, while DIY buyers shop mainly for color and price rather than quality.
“its paint stores network is designed to serve that professional painter, who make up 85% of Sherwin's paint sales.”
- Sherwin has about 3,800 outside sales reps, nearly one per store, who actively canvass the market for new painters and help them bid projects and select paint, acting as business partners rather than waiting for walk-in traffic.
“Sherwin says, we don't open the door and wait for business to come through. We go out and bring it to the store. So Sherwin has 3,800 outside sales reps. That's nearly one per store.”
- Professional painters prefer Sherwin-Williams over the number two brand, Benjamin Moore, by a margin of five to one, and the preference reflects service differences rather than meaningful paint performance differences.
“When you think about them preferring Sherwin-Williams by a margin of five to one, it's not because the paint is that much different. It's because the service is that much different.”
- Sherwin delivers paint to job sites with about 3,300 vehicles and 3,000 drivers, and the company estimates this saves painters one day per month, which makes the service a major value add.
“In fact, Sherwin estimates that they save their painters one day per month by delivering paint to the job site because, again, time is money.”
The capital-light model generates excess cash that is returned to shareholders rather than held.
- Sherwin bought Valspar for over $11 billion entirely with debt, a substantial deal for a company then worth about $30 billion, avoiding issuing equity that would later have been worth far more.
“Sherwin was able to purchase Valspar for over $11 billion entirely with debt.”
- Free cash flow conversion has averaged over 100% of net income over time, and incremental margins have averaged about 25% to 30%.
“So incremental returns on invested capital have been attractive and free cash flow conversion has averaged over 100% of net income over time.”
- CapEx runs under 2% of sales, mainly for new stores and periodic manufacturing expansion, net working capital is about 11% of sales, and ROIC exceeds 40%, up from the mid-20s ten years ago.
“The capital intensity of the business is rather low with CapEx under 2% of sales.”
- Sherwin does not hold excess cash, returning it through dividends raised for 45 consecutive years and buybacks that cut share count about 2% per year, and it retired roughly 15% of shares over three years after the GFC.
“Sherwin has raised its dividend each of the past 45 years. And Sherwin has also been a consistent repurchaser of its own shares with share count declining by 2% per year on average.”
- Sherwin's ongoing store openings consume little capital, so the business generates a lot of excess cash flow that funds shareholder returns.
“It doesn't consume that much capital. So there is a lot of excess cash flow from the business.”
- After funding M&A, Sherwin's consistent policy is not to hold excess cash, returning it to shareholders through dividends and buybacks, and most future M&A is expected to be in Performance Coatings.
“After M&A, Sherwin's always had a consistent policy that it will not hold excess cash, choosing to return it to shareholders in the form of both dividends and buybacks.”
Disciplined capital allocation, including the Valspar deal, reflects management's long-term, value-creating approach.
- The 2017 Valspar acquisition, Sherwin's largest deal ever, transformed Consumer Brands by adding Valspar and Lowe's relationships and built a scaled Performance Coatings platform, while previously these segments were about 30% of sales and 25% of profits.
“This was far and away Sherwin's largest acquisition in its history, and it transformed both of these segments”
- Before Valspar, Sherwin kept leverage less than a turn below industry peers, frustrating investors who thought its cash flows could support more debt, and afterward it adopted leverage targets of 2 to 2.5 times.
“Sherwin always managed its balance sheet with less than a turn of leverage below that of industry peers”
- The Consumer Brands segment should grow at a low single-digit rate, below overall home improvement spend, and Sherwin should not commit much more capital to it, though it has been rationalizing weak brands.
“I would not expect much more than low single-digit sales growth from this division going forward”
- Operators should think carefully about which aspects of their business they outsource, because outsourcing can make a business more profitable and less capital intensive near term but ties its fortunes to others, as Boeing's problems illustrate.
“operators should think carefully about what aspects of their business they outsource to others.”
- Financing Valspar with debt and ignoring short-term market pressure, then not issuing equity that would now trade near $360 versus about $100 at the deal, shows management is long-term focused and willing to create value patiently.
“this was a clear sign that management is long-term focused, willing to be patient and ignore the market short-term demands in order to create substantial long-term value for shareholders.”
Sherwin has grown sales steadily, with mid-to-high single-digit growth expected ahead.
- Over ten years Sherwin's Paint Stores added almost $7 billion in sales while Masco added under $1 billion, about a 7x difference in incremental growth.
“In those 10 years, Sherwin has added almost $7 billion in sales, whereas Masco has added under $1 billion. That's a 7x difference in 10 years.”
- As of last year Sherwin generated over $23 billion in sales with more than 65,000 employees, over 5,000 paint stores, and coatings sold in 120 countries, across three segments: Paint Stores, Performance Coatings and Consumer Brands.
“today, the company has more than 65,000 employees, operates over 5,000 paint stores, sells coatings in 120 countries and as of last year, generated over $23 billion in sales.”
- Sherwin's logo, showing the earth being doused in paint with the slogan Cover the Earth, is one of the least ESG-friendly corporate logos, and the host found it humorous.
“in what has to be one of the least ESG-friendly corporate logos, Sherwin's is the earth being doused with a can of Sherwin-Williams paint and the slogan, Cover the Earth.”
- About 85% of Sherwin's cost of goods sold is raw materials such as resins, latex, pigments, additives and solvents derived from petrochemical feedstocks, which makes COGS volatile and draws heavy sell-side analyst focus.
“85% of COGS are raw materials such as resins, latex, pigments, additives, solvents and other products derived from various upstream petrochemical and related commodity feedstocks.”
- Paint Stores should grow mid to high single digits as the fastest segment, Performance Coatings mid single digits with more cyclicality and the most M&A white space, and Consumer Brands low single digits, so total sales should grow mid to maybe high single digits absent a housing or economic downturn.
“So adding all up, I would expect Sherwin to continue to grow sales at a mid- to maybe high single-digit rate, barring any economic or housing downturn.”
Performance Coatings grew into a major player after Valspar and is the focus for future M&A.
- Industrial coatings margins depend on end-market customer concentration, the labor-to-material cost mix, and how technical or specified the coating is, which is why some segments are close to commodities while others are highly differentiated.
“the margin profile really will depend on that end market customer concentration, that mix between labor versus cost and also how highly technical the paint is or the coatings are.”
- Total company operating margins are in the high teens, with the Paint Stores Group above 20%, Performance Coatings in the high teens with a target of 20%, and Consumer Brands in the mid-teens but more volatile.
“total company operating margins are in the high teens, with the Paint Stores Group being the most profitable at over 20%.”
- Before Valspar, Performance Coatings was subscale with under 10% segment margins, less than half the Paint Stores margin; after Valspar it became one of the largest industrial coatings companies globally, behind only PPG and AkzoNobel.
“the acquisition allowed Sherwin to gain significant scale in performance coatings, expand into other end markets and geographies and become one of the largest industrial coatings companies globally behind only PPG and Akzo Nobel.”
- Sherwin's newly appointed CEO comes from outside the Paint Stores Group, having joined from Valspar, which Todd reads as a signal that management focus and capital allocation will shift toward Performance Coatings, where white space is larger.
“the hiring of someone not from the Paint Stores Group likely signals to me that a bit more of management focus and capital allocation will be directed towards Performance Coatings”