What this covers

Nick traces the London Stock Exchange Group from John Castaing posting prices at Jonathan's Coffee House in 1698 to the business as it exists now. He argues the modern company only began around 2007–2009, after the 1986 Big Bang, the 2000 demutualization that replaced member ownership with profit incentives, and a 2007 rule change that exposed the exchange to challenger venues. He then reworks the revenue mix: capital markets is under 20% of the group, against over 60% a decade ago, and both equities trading and FX sit near 3%.

The middle of the episode covers the plumbing. LCH is the example of a central counterparty, shown by its unwinding of Lehman's roughly $9 trillion rate book over three weeks using a third of the margin posted. He contrasts LSEG's Open Access Model with rivals' closed silos. FX is put in scale: about $450 billion a day cleared against $6.5 trillion of notional, earning a fraction of a basis point. He also covers the purchase of Refinitiv at about 4x sales and 12x EBITDA, and the roughly $12 billion Tradeweb stake, about a quarter of LSEG's market cap.

The more contested turns concern disruption and investing. Nick argues that technology alone is a thin wedge against incumbents, that regulators protect systemically important markets, and that a scaled platform can absorb innovators, blockchain settlement included. He closes on process: pairing Due Diligence plus Imagination with a 3–5 year cash flow view, because the bear case always sounds sharper, and weighing Option Value from future customers.

Sharpest takeaway

LSEG is a high-margin, recurring-revenue financial market infrastructure and data platform whose moat comes from network effects, open access and regulation, and whose value is underappreciated because investors still treat it as a stock exchange. The Refinitiv integration is the key swing factor.

  • Roughly 70% of revenue is recurring and gross margins are about 90%, but the stock was historically valued as a stock exchange, whose equities business is now only about 3% of group revenue
  • Liquidity and data network effects plus open access make the platform sticky and hard to displace
  • The Refinitiv acquisition roughly doubled the business, so execution on integration determines whether the thesis plays out

The argument · threads13 threads · 70 claims
0.73

Investors misread LSEG as an exchange, undervaluing its Tradeweb stake and information business.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • LSEG owns 53% of the economic interest and 80% of the voting rights in Tradeweb; that stake has an open market value of about $12 billion, equal to about 25% of LSEG's market cap, which highlights a valuation gap.

    “LSEG own 53% of the economic interest and 80% of the voting rights. The stake has an open market value of $12 billion, which is equivalent to 25% of LSEG's market cap”

  • Investors have long asked why LSEG's share price has performed well despite selling the stock exchange; the answer is that when investors stop calling it a stock exchange, far more is at play in the business.

    “And our answer has been when investors stop calling it a stock exchange, there's a lot more at play in this business.”

  • Investors look for domain experts, whose views the industry wants to hear, as a sign of quality management, and this was the case under Xavier Rolet and is hoped to be true of David Schwimmer.

    “we like looking for what we call domain experts. So domain experts of the industry are the ones where everybody else wants to know what they're thinking”

  • Investors who do due diligence can find a prize because LSEG's underlying characteristics, such as structural growth, barriers to entry, 5–7% growth, and 70% subscription revenue, are hidden in plain sight behind a complex, misunderstood structure.

    “I think there's a prize for investors who roll up their sleeves and do their due diligence because it's hiding in plain sight.”

  • LSEG's characteristics of structural growth, barriers to entry, 5-7% revenue growth, about 70% subscription revenue and high gross margins are shared by information services peers such as S&P, MSCI, TransUnion, Wolters Kluwer and RELX, so these are the natural comparison set.

    “And I would look at it as a business on those characteristics and then a peer group of the likes of S&P maybe MSCI in parts of the business or information services.”

  • The London Stock Exchange's equities business is about 3% of group revenue, so investors who value LSEG as a stock exchange are misjudging it; the investment case should be judged as an information and infrastructure business.

    “And our answer has been when investors stop calling it a stock exchange, there's a lot more at play in this business.”

0.62

Recurring mission-critical infrastructure delivers high margins, cash conversion and earnings visibility.

7 pointscentrality 4/5
  • For the global economy to create wealth and raise living standards, it needs global financial markets built on reliable, efficient, scalable infrastructure so capital and data can move, and LSEG is a critical part of that architecture across the whole value chain.

    “In order for the global economy to create wealth and raise standards of living around the world, it needs global financial markets that are built on a reliable infrastructure”

  • LSEG's customers range from sell-side and buy-side firms, private equity, issuers, individuals and wealth managers to asset owners, corporate treasuries, governments, regulators and central banks, and they interact with the platform in very different ways.

    “the customers include sell side, the buy side, private equity, issuers, individuals, wealth managers, asset owners, even corporate treasury”

  • LSEG's services are mission critical, deeply embedded in customer workflows and sticky; they account for a low proportion of customer cost in the value chain but a high proportion of value creation.

    “the services account for a low proportion of cost in the overall value chain, but a high proportion of the value creation”

  • Because growth is largely recurring and needs little capital, LSEG has high cash conversion and high incremental return on sales and capital.

    “because of the visibility from recurring revenue and low capital intensity of the growth, cash conversion is high. And the incremental return on sales and return on capital is also high.”

  • LSEG generates roughly £7 billion of revenue a year, guides to 5–7% growth, has about a 90% gross margin because its production units are digital, and about 70% of revenue is recurring, giving high visibility.

    “The business generates around rule of thumb, £7 billion of revenue per annum. Management guide for this to be growing 5 to 7%. It's a 90% gross margin business”

  • LSEG's operating margins are currently in the mid-thirties, with ambitions to expand through technology and scale, and many peers earn group margins in the 40s, 50s or higher.

    “This comes through currently with operating margins broadly in the mid thirties. There are ambitions to expand over time through efficiency”

  • LSEG is a leading financial market infrastructure and data and analytics platform and is the most global of its kind, with over 40,000 organizations plugged into the platform across around 190 countries.

    “It's a leading financial market infrastructure and data and analytics platform, and it's also the most global. There's over 40,000 organizations plugging into the platform in around 190 countries”

0.57

A non-strategic Refinitiv purchase and LSEG's ownership history let it fix underperforming assets.

10 pointscentrality 3/5
  • About one third of trading and banking revenue comes from ICON Premium, a one-size-fits-all desktop product that has been shrinking due to poor product-market fit and a falling trader headcount, offsetting growth elsewhere.

    “It has been going backwards due to poor product market fit and a reduction in trader headcount.”

  • LSEG bought Refinitiv at roughly 4x EV/sales and about 12x EV/EBITDA, a strategic asset at a non-strategic price, because gross margins were high but growth and EBITDA were weaker than they should have been, creating an opportunity to be a better owner.

    “It was a strategic deal at a non-strategic price around four times EV sales and around 12 times EV/EBITDA.”

  • A Bloomberg terminal costs around $20,000 while the Refinitiv offering is a fraction of that, so trading and banking data is a small part of customer cost with room to move to the cloud.

    “You might work off a broad cost for a Bloomberg terminal of perhaps $20,000. The Refinitiv offering is a fraction of this.”

  • The roughly $27 billion Refinitiv deal, bought from Blackstone, roughly doubled LSEG's enterprise value and lifted revenue from a little over £2 billion to close to £7 billion.

    “The significance of the deal is that it doubled the enterprise value of the business more or less. And it took revenue from a little over £2 billion to closer to £7 billion.”

  • LSEG is a better owner of the Refinitiv assets than Thomson Reuters or Blackstone, because its scale, expertise and track record in technology integration make it more capable of fixing the underperformance.

    “I think they're probably a better owner than Blackstone. Now they're a partner of Blackstone's, but the scale and expertise and track record in tech integration at LSEG makes them a better owner.”

  • LSEG let the London International Financial Futures Exchange be bought from under its nose in the early 2000s, and has regretted it ever since, which is why such scarce assets must be acted on quickly.

    “LSEG allowed LIFE, which is the London International Financial Futures Exchange, to be bought from under their nose in the early 2000s. They've regretted it ever since.”

  • Fixing assets that underperform under a capable owner can create substantial value, as happened with FTSE and LCH, and this is a core competency of LSEG.

    “this has been a core competency of LSEG.”

  • Operational execution of Refinitiv is a key risk because systems must be integrated and migrated to newer platforms, underperforming assets must be turned around, and moving ICON desktop from on-prem to cloud comes at a large cost and takes time.

    “There's work to do in both organizations. So there's work to do in both of the organizations. Management are very upfront about that.”

  • The origins of the London Stock Exchange trace to 1698, when John Castaing began posting stock and commodity prices at Jonathan's Coffee House, though the exchange officially came into being in 1801.

    “in 1698, a gentleman named John Castaing began posting the prices of stocks and commodities.”

  • The 2000 demutualization of the London Stock Exchange changed ownership from members to shareholders, which switched incentives from not-for-profit to profit generation.

    “in 2000, the London Stock Exchange demutualized, which means there was a change in ownership. It had shareholders as owners, but previously it had members. Which means a switch in incentives from being not for profit to generating profit.”

0.56

Data and analytics is a sticky, large and growing core revenue driver.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • LSEG can be understood as four modules: primary capital markets, data and analytics, secondary capital markets, and post-trade, which interact as an ecosystem rather than a linear trade flow.

    “You can think of LSEG as being comprised of four modules.”

  • Data and analytics is mission critical and recurring, and its cost to customers is low single digits as a percentage of total cost, so it is very hard to displace.

    “it's mission critical and recurring revenue. And ballpark cost to customers can be low single digits as a percentage of total cost.”

  • Data and analytics is the most important revenue driver at a little under 70% of group revenue, in a TAM of about £40–45 billion growing about 4–6% a year, where LSEG holds just over 10% share with around £5 billion of revenue.

    “Data and analytics is the most important driver of revenue for the group at a little under 70% of revenue. TAM is around £40 to £45 billion”

  • In the most recent third quarter, the data and analytics business grew about 6%, and early integration signs are promising, with growth rates improving from self-help.

    “In the recent third quarter, the data and analytics business was growing about 6%.”

  • All top 30 banks and top 10 asset managers globally are customers of Enterprise Data Solutions, and some banks run up to 500 applications dependent on Refinitiv data.

    “the top 30 banks in the world are all customers. The top 10 asset managers in the world are all customers.”

0.56

Refinitiv's data scale and network effects create a winner-take-most position in financial markets.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Refinitiv is seen as a poor man's Bloomberg but is actually a colossus hiding in plain sight, and the combined entity's shared open-access philosophy with Reuters' 180-year history gives it global scale and network effects.

    “It's seen as a poor man's Bloomberg, but it's actually a colossus hiding in plain sight.”

  • Network effects on liquidity and data are very powerful in financial markets, because people go where liquidity is, and liquidity begets liquidity and data begets data, creating a virtuous cycle that produces winner-take-most markets.

    “Liquidity begets liquidity and then increasingly data begets data. So there's a virtuous cycle of momentum. That's why you get these winner take most markets.”

  • LSEG and Refinitiv have about 6,000 data professionals, 2,500 salespeople, a presence in 70 countries, and more than half their people in Asia Pacific, which gives distribution leverage for new products.

    “There are 6,000 data professionals around the world working for Refinitiv and LSEG. They're present in 70 countries, they have 2,500 sales people”

  • Refinitiv's data asset, with decades of history, hundreds of thousands of sources processed daily, and open standards, would be very hard and expensive to replicate and extremely difficult to beat.

    “It would be very, very hard and very, very expensive to replicate, and extremely difficult to better because it has quality and breadth and depth of data.”

  • Revenue is roughly 40% Americas, 40% EMEA and 20% Asia, making the business largely global.

    “Geographically, the revenue is broadly 40% Americas, 40% Europe, Middle East and Africa. And 20% Asia.”

0.46

Clearing reduces systemic risk, and open-access LCH drives high, expanding margins and market value.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • During the financial crisis LCH unwound Lehman Brothers' roughly $9 trillion interest rate portfolio, covering 66,000 trades over three weeks, using only a third of the collateral margin Lehman had deposited.

    “LCH was responsible for unwinding Lehman Brothers $9 trillion interest rate portfolio. And this involved 66,000 trades over a three week period.”

  • A clearing house provides transparency and stability by standing between two counterparties and becoming both sides of the trade, which takes risk out of the banking system and is why regulators favor the model.

    “the role of a clearing house is to provide transparency and stability to financial markets by standing between two counterparties and becoming both sides of the trade.”

  • LCH clears over $1.1 quadrillion of interest rate swap notional per year, earns membership fees and compression fees, and in 2020 saved partners over $30 billion of regulatory capital.

    “In 2020, the business saved partners over $30 billion of red cap.”

  • LSEG's open-access clearing serves other venues, whereas competitors run closed silos that force customers to clear where they trade and monetize that lock-in, so LSEG's incentives are aligned with solving customer problems.

    “Competitors generally operate what are called closed silos, which is why if you trade assets at their venues, you have to clear them there as well.”

  • When LSEG became majority owner of LCH in 2012, investors were suspicious because the business barely covered its cost of capital, but operating profit margins almost doubled over the next eight or nine years through an open access model with members.

    “And in 2012, they announced another partnership with banks to become the majority owner of London Clearing House, LCH.”

  • Post-trade is a little over 10% of group revenue with a 20% revenue CAGR over the past decade, and margins expanded from the low thirties to about 55% as LCH became central counterparty and trade compression provider.

    “It's a 20% revenue CAGR over the past decade and margins have expanded from the low thirties to 55%.”

0.40

Electronification structurally grows fixed income and FX trading while equities decline.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Tradeweb, a Nasdaq-listed venue, is seen as a likely structural winner in the electronification of global fixed income and derivatives, which is far from fully penetrated, with mid-teens top-line growth and about 50% EBITDA margins.

    “Tradeweb is seen as a likely structural winner in the electronification of global fixed income and derivatives trading, which again still has quite a long way to run.”

  • FX is about 3% of group revenue and structurally growing as customers migrate from voice to electronic trading and from brokers to specialized solutions like FXall, and there is still far to go in electronification.

    “Hard as that may be to believe, there's still further to go in electronification of FX”

  • Capital markets (primary and secondary) is a little under 20% of group revenue growing at high single digits, and a decade ago it was over 60% of the group, mostly equities, which were not growing much.

    “A decade ago, capital markets was over 60% of the group. Most of that was in equities, which wasn't growing very much. Today, the equities part is around 3% of the group revenue”

  • Regulators are cautious about fast innovation in systemically important markets, which protects incumbents, and in cross-border payments, fat margins were attacked, while FX is only a fraction of a basis point so less disruptable.

    “Regulation is your friend here because we can see that regulators are cautious about allowing fast innovation in systemically important financial markets.”

0.40

Index licensing is a recurring revenue stream growing with the shift to passive investing.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • In 2011 LSEG bought the other half of FTSE Indices from the Financial Times, valuing the business at £900 million, and by 2020 the division generated £800 million of gross profit, a strong deal that benefited from the active-to-passive shift.

    “In 2011, they bought the other half of FTSE Indices, which was a JV operated with the Financial Times.”

  • LSEG looks like a paradox against comparable information services businesses such as TransUnion, Wolters Kluwer, RELX and S&P/MSCI, because it has similar characteristics but a different market valuation.

    “So this business overall seems to be something of a paradox versus comparable businesses.”

  • Around $18 trillion of assets are benchmarked against FTSE Russell indices, making index licensing a large recurring revenue stream tied to the shift from active to passive investing.

    “there are around $18 trillion of assets that are benchmarked against FTSE Russell Indices.”

  • The shift from active to passive investing, enabled by technology, has been a strong play for LSEG, with index revenues recurring through subscriptions and licenses and growing 5–7% in a roughly £10 billion TAM.

    “Overall, it's been a very strong play on the use of technology to increase the attractiveness of passive investing and to take it to a wider audience.”

0.32

Strong leadership and Rolet's strategy position LSEG well.

6 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Xavier Rolet left as CEO in 2018 after nine years, having received stock options at a low strike price and holding shares worth about £40 when he left.

    “He got stock options at about £3,88 or specifically at £3,88. I know because he has told us the shares were £40 when he left.”

  • David Schwimmer, the new CEO succeeding Rolet, spent 20 years as a partner at Goldman Sachs, including early work with Jeff Sprecher building out ICE, so he has been part of financial market infrastructure from the start.

    “David Schwimmer who spent 20 years as a partner at Goldman, including at the start working with Jeff Sprecher on building out ICE.”

  • Xavier Rolet, appointed CEO in May 2009 after 25 years in investment banking including co-head of global equity trading at Lehman, was the right person at the right time because he understood customers and saw opportunity where others saw threats.

    “In May 2009, LSEG appointed Xavier Rolet the CEO, and it was a very shrewd appointment.”

  • Increased regulation of banks has been a talent advantage, letting LSEG attract entrepreneurial, forward-thinking people, such as CFO David Warren who came over from Nasdaq after trying to buy the business.

    “David Warren came over as CFO from Nasdaq having tried to buy the business. He came to join it, which is always a good sign.”

  • Xavier Rolet's strategy had four prongs: drive efficiency and share it with customers, build scale to leverage fixed costs, get close to customers, and innovate, and these remain the building blocks in management communications 12 years later.

    “The first one was drive efficiency and share it with customers. Second was build scale to leverage the assets and fixed costs.”

  • Investable management teams get close to customers, reinvest rather than extract value to keep the flywheel turning, invest in innovation with culture rather than just budget, and run disciplined fill-or-kill capital allocation.

    “We don't like seeing companies that extract value or too much value. We like seeing companies that reinvest to keep the flywheel going”

0.32

Deep-pocketed platforms absorb innovation through acquisitions, partnerships, and bolt-on deals.

6 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Innovation from new entrants is not as threatening to scaled platforms, because platforms with deep pockets can acquire or partner with innovators, run them through their system and scale them, which LSEG could do with blockchain settlement.

    “innovation happens, but the players with platforms and scale can acquire that innovation, put it through their system and move it”

  • The roughly $30 million acquisition of MillenniumIT, a high-performance trading systems provider, cut LSEG's own platform costs by 90%, transformed speed of service, and was estimated to pay for itself well inside the first year.

    “It was a $30 million deal that enabled them to cut the costs of their own platform by 90% and transform the speed of service.”

  • Platforms with deep pockets can use bolt-on acquisitions to absorb innovation, and in information services this has been repeated frequently, with scale providing efficiency that is passed back to customers.

    “So there's another advantage of being a platform with deep pockets for bolt-ons. We've seen this at length repeated frequently in information services.”

  • Moving from on-premise to cloud and digitizing workflows, as seen in other industries, creates new growth avenues including fintech entrants at the financial industry's fringes that could move to the center.

    “it's this digital transformation to go from on-premise into the cloud, which we have seen in other industries creating extra avenues of growth”

  • In 2009 LSEG took control of Turquoise, a pan-European trading venue operated cooperatively with banks, as a counterattack against disruption of its core exchange, even though the venue was underperforming and loss-making.

    “it took control of Turquoise, which was a pan-Euro trading venue. It was to fight back against disruption of the core stock exchange.”

  • Technology alone is the thin end of the wedge against disruption: the real barrier is the combination of skills, heritage, scale, distribution, regulatory relationships and productization, which makes it hard to break in and hard to build something orders of magnitude better.

    “technology can often be a double edged sword because it creates opportunities for growth, but it also often lowers barriers to entry. And in this industry, the growth has come, but the barriers to entry have remained high.”

0.26

Technology and regulation keep industry barriers high while reshaping LSEG's structure and culture.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The lineage runs from John Castaing posting stock prices at Jonathan's Coffee House in 1698, to official founding in 1801, but the modern business began in 2007–2009, after the 1986 Big Bang and the 2000 demutualization changed incentives from not-for-profit to profit.

    “in 2000, the London Stock Exchange demutualized, which means there was a change in ownership. It had shareholders as owners, but previously it had members. Which means a switch in incentives from being not for profit to generating profit.”

  • Technology is often a double-edged sword that creates growth but lowers barriers to entry, while in this industry growth has come but barriers have stayed high because of network effects, regulation, relationships, heritage, and trust built country by country.

    “technology can often be a double edged sword because it creates opportunities for growth, but it also often lowers barriers to entry. And in this industry, the growth has come, but the barriers to entry have remained high.”

  • LSEG is moving from roughly 5,000 people to about 25,000 people through the Refinitiv deal, creating a cultural integration challenge between legacy and newly acquired staff.

    “LSEG is moving from being a business of 5,000 people to 25,000 people. So there is potentially a cultural challenge of integrating these two businesses.”

  • A 2007 regulatory change increased transparency and competition for stock markets, exposing the London Stock Exchange for the first time to challenger exchanges and forcing a sink-or-swim moment.

    “in 2007, it was a regulatory change, which increased transparency and competition for stock markets. And this was a paradigm shift”

0.26

Option value from future customers and growing digital markets should counter the bear case.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • A good investment process combines consistent due diligence with imagination and a 3–5 year cash flow framework, because the bear case always sounds sharper, while option value from future customers can be large relative to current revenue.

    “imagination is what really creates value for investors. The bear case always sounds smarter and more pointed and more focused. And the bull case is often a bit wooly and nebulous.”

  • The digital financial markets industry is largely a proxy for global capitalism, and it has grown in pockets well ahead of global GDP over 20 years; its drivers, including computing power, data demand, electronification, indexation, and regulation, remain intact.

    “this is broadly a proxy for the development of global capitalism. And the industry has grown in pockets substantially ahead of global GDP over the past 20 years.”

  • LSEG's option value is still very large relative to its revenue because more people in the world will connect into finance over time, and the company is still early in that trend, so investors should think about who future customers could be and how they will behave.

    “I'd suggest it's still very large relative to the revenue that LSEG are generating. ... I just feel strongly that more people in the world are going to connect into finance relative to how many you're doing so currently. And we're still early in that trend.”

  • The bear case always sounds smarter and more focused than the bull case, which tends to be wooly and nebulous, so investors should use option value and imagination to counter the bear case.

    “The bear case always sounds smarter and more pointed and more focused. And the bull case is often a bit wooly and nebulous. But imagination can pay off.”

0.23

FX volume tracks real trade, with fees amounting to tiny fractions of a basis point.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Real-economy FX demand, such as a California bike maker importing Japanese components and converting dollars to yen, feeds the FX trading system, which is why FX volume grows with trade.

    “They need to move Dollars into Yen and back again, maybe hedge their exposure in the future. And that demand is what's feeding the system.”

  • Tradeweb charges about $2 to trade a million dollars of rates notional and about $50 for credit, meaning fees are fractions of a basis point, while monthly subscriptions add a fixed revenue layer.

    “In rates, it costs $2 dollars to trade a million dollars of notional. And credit is more, it's still only $50.”

  • LSEG handles about $450 billion of FX volume per day against roughly $6.5 trillion of daily FX notional, generating about $1 million of revenue, which means users pay a fraction of a basis point to transact.

    “On this $450 billion of volume, LSEG generates around $1 million of revenue, which means you're paying a fraction of a basis point to transact in FX markets.”