#235 Steve Jobs (The Pixar Story)
What this covers
This episode is David Senra working through Lawrence Levy's account of Pixar's early years, with Steve Jobs at the center. Levy joined when Pixar had burned through almost $50 million of Jobs's money and showed negative $50 million in stockholder value on its books. It was later sold to Disney for $7.6 billion. Senra follows the money month to month: no business plan, Ed Catmull going to Jobs for a check each time, and RenderMan software that at roughly $3,000 a copy brought in only about $3 million in a very good year. Hardware, commercials, and shorts ran alongside Toy Story until about 75 percent of what remained was cut. Senra links this to Jobs's inventory-and-cull move on returning to Apple.
The middle of the episode is about economics and timing. Senra covers the Film Library logic a Disney executive laid out, and how the home video market could make a hit like Toy Story far more profitable than its box office suggests, with Snow White's roughly 28 million copies as the benchmark. He also covers Jobs's choice to time the IPO after release, when a projected $30 million opening weekend pushed the price range from $12 to $14 toward $20. Because no computer-animated feature had ever shipped, Pixar was in effect inventing its own Total Addressable Market.
The negotiation with Michael Eisner is the most detailed stretch. Jobs and Levy listed both sides' leverage on a whiteboard. Jobs walked away over co-branding, and two months later Eisner conceded it, along with an equity stake. Bill Gates is quoted on Jobs's use of time. The closing turns are contentious: John Lasseter winning creative approvals for the story team, Senra's view that a hit only sharpens the problem of a second act, and Catmull's case that animation is closer to building a tech product than shooting live action.
Using Lawrence Levy's account of Pixar's early years, Senra argues that Steve Jobs built companies by ruthlessly cutting everything outside the core mission, using a founder's stubborn financing and walk-away negotiating leverage, and by backing creative talent over safe, process-heavy oversight.
- Pixar survived for years on Jobs's personal checkbook while it chased side businesses, and only cut to a single focus on feature films after the IPO and Disney deal
- Jobs won better terms from Disney by being willing to walk away, which Bill Gates is quoted as saying was his real edge
- Creative decisions were left with the story team because the founders believed a company built on creative talent should not be managed by fear-driven oversight
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Filmmaking is a poor business for new releases but a strong one over time because good films keep being rewatched, and technologies like home video increase that value, so a film library becomes a durable asset that justifies holding on.
“It's hard to succeed by releasing new films. The value often comes from the library.”
Joe, a Disney live-action executive, argued that filmmaking is not a great business by itself because value comes from the library, since good films get rewatched for decades and new technologies like home video make that more likely, and Steve Jobs took this as the insight that Pixar's library would grow more valuable over time.
“Filmmaking is not a great business," he said. "It's hard to succeed by releasing new films. The value often comes from the library."”
Pixar had no business plan and ran month to month; Disney covered film production, RenderMan sales and commercials brought some revenue, and Ed Catmull had to go to Jobs every month for a check covering the shortfall, which was close to $50 million in total.
“Every month we go to Steve and tell him the amount of the shortfall, and he writes us a check.”
Levy and Jobs estimated that Disney's home video sales of animated films were enormous, with Snow White selling around 28 million copies, and that Toy Story could earn profits of $150 million or more, largely from home video.
“Home video was turning animated feature films into big business, bigger than we had ever imagined.”
Jobs was willing to walk away from the Disney deal over co-branding, saying Pixar would be miserable seeing Disney take the brand credit again, and Lasseter and Catmull agreed; two months later Eisner conceded co-branding and an equity stake in Pixar.
“We'll have our self-respect if we walk away, and I think we'd get better terms later on anyways.”
Jobs deliberately timed Pixar's IPO to follow Toy Story's release so that the film's box office success would support the offering, and the opening weekend projection of about $30 million raised the IPO price range from $12 to $14 toward $20.
“Robertson Stephens thinks that they can now price it over $20 per share.”
Home video turned animated feature films into a big business, with Disney earning a fortune because consumers paid $30 to $40 per movie to own them, meaning a hit like Toy Story could generate far more profit than its theatrical gross suggested.
“Home video was turning animated feature films into big business, bigger than we had ever imagined.”
Jobs' first move on returning to Apple in 1987 was the same as at Pixar: an inventory of everything the company was doing, which eliminated roughly 70 to 80 percent of the product line and led to a 2x2 matrix of four core products.
“I think he eliminated something like 70% or 80% of the product line. He does that famous like 2x2 matrix.”
Jobs and Levy wrote Disney's leverage points in one column and Pixar's in another on a whiteboard, which let them see both sides of the negotiation and recognize that each side had real leverage.
“Steve made two columns, Disney and Pixar. Under the Disney column, he would write the points that gave Disney leverage.”
When Lawrence Levy first talked to Steve Jobs about Pixar in late 1994, the company had burned through almost $50 million of Jobs's money, and its stockholder value on the financial statements was negative $50 million, yet it later sold to Disney for $7.6 billion.
“The value assigned to Pixar's stockholders on its financial statements at that time was negative $50 million.”
Pixar ran hardware, RenderMan, commercials, and short films simultaneously while building Toy Story, and eventually cut about 75 percent of what remained so it could focus only on Toy Story, which Senra says was smart because the film would open every future opportunity.
“Eventually, they're going to cut 75% of what was left and only focus on Toy Story”
Before Toy Story, nobody could predict the market for a computer-animated feature because no one had released one, so Pixar was inventing its own total addressable market, a situation Senra compares to a Peloton CEO's comment.
“There was no way to predict the market for it.”
At an average price of about $3,000 per copy and a very good year of 1,000 copies, RenderMan generated roughly $3 million, and it would have needed to grow tenfold to matter, which was impossible given the small customer base.
“In a very good year, Pixar could sell 1,000 copies of RenderMan. At $3,000 per copy, that's $3 million.”
Disagreement and intense debate between leaders, handled by seeking mutual resolution rather than imposing an outcome, produced better strategy at Pixar, and Jobs later described the choices as the product of a just process.
“Time and time again, I saw how Steve preferred that we come to a mutual resolution, marching forward together rather than acting on an outcome that he imposed.”
Jobs's negotiating strength came from developing a religious-like conviction about what he wanted and being willing to walk away if he did not get it, since nothing else would take its place, which made him incredibly strong at the table.
“In his mind, if he didn't get what he wanted, nothing else would take its place, so he'd walk away.”
Ed Catmull argued that animation lets a studio iterate on story, storyboards, character models and tests repeatedly, while live action locks in footage once shot, so animated films have a higher chance of consistent success and resemble building a tech product.
“Once the film has been shot, you're locked into using the footage you have. That is why so many films don't quite hit the mark.”
Jobs's stubbornness in continuing to fund Pixar for close to 10 years went beyond normal start-up norms, and no other investor would have stuck it out this long, which made his personal patience a competitive asset.
“I don't know any other investor who would have stuck it out this long.”
Jobs and Levy listed Disney's leverage in one column and Pixar's in another, including Disney's no-obligation contract, its ability to build animation in-house, inferior alternatives for Pixar, and Pixar's single hit, and Disney's dependence on Pixar for animation.
“Steve made two columns, Disney and Pixar. Under the Disney column, he would write the points that gave Disney leverage.”
Jobs argued Eisner would work hard to keep Pixar because losing it to DreamWorks, led by former Disney executive Jeffrey Katzenberg, would make Eisner the Disney CEO who lost animation, which gave Pixar leverage.
“If Eisner loses Pixar to another studio and DreamWorks succeeds in animation, Eisner would go down as the Disney CEO who lost animation.”
According to Bill Gates, Jobs used time in negotiations to wait out Disney, and by the third round Disney was 'flat on its back' and needed a win, so Pixar gained a large stake in the combined company.
“When he has the upper hand, he's good at using time. He knows -- he would wait people out.”
Lasseter argued that the story team should hold creative approvals because safe films fail, and Jobs agreed that films should come from the filmmakers' hearts rather than from executive oversight, a decision Levy described as unprecedented in the industry.
“We want to keep breaking barriers in story and in animation. Our story team is like no other.”
Pixar's development was driven by two opposing plates: the creative pressure of artistic excellence and inventing computer animation, and the real-world pressure of raising money, selling tickets, and increasing production pace, and these forces grinding against each other produced the company's growth.
“These two forces ground ceaselessly against each other.”
Senra argues the real goal of a company is sustained long-term excellence, and that a single hit like Toy Story only raises the harder problem of producing a second act, because success itself changes a company by dulling its edge.
“Success has a way of taking away your edge.”
A company building a durable business should refuse to become a house-brand supplier for a larger partner, as Akio Morita refused Sony's anonymous order and Ralph Lauren refused a department store's terms, because owning the brand is what builds long-term value.
“I'm building one of the greatest -- like I'm building a legendary brand.”
Jobs refused to let Pixar be only a subcontractor, insisting Pixar must have its own brand, as Akio Morita and Ralph Lauren had refused to put their names aside for a large house-brand order, and he was willing to walk away from Disney over this term.
“We cannot build a company without a brand.”
Senra argues that claims that business is impersonal are false for founders who give their heart and soul to a company, and that selling a company can produce a real emotional loss even when the financial outcome is excellent.
“It is personal.”
Max Levchin described the people he admires most as founders with an almost irrational lack of fear of failure and irrational optimism, and Senra connects this to Jobs' belief that Pixar would succeed without a rational basis.
“One key ingredient of being this kind of person is an almost irrational lack of fear of failure and irrational optimism.”
After examining Pixar's business, Levy and Jobs concluded that RenderMan software, animated commercials and short films were side shows that diverted talent from making feature films, so they cut everything except film, which is the principle of eliminating businesses that are not the main focus.
“There were not enough customers. This wasn't a business. It was a side show.”
Creative companies are best led by the founders who embody the creative vision, as Jobs and Lasseter argued at Pixar, and Senra parallels this with Elon Musk's view that the founder, though erratic, is a creative force who should run the company.
“The founder maybe bizarre and erratic, but this is a creative force, and they should run the company.”
Pixar's four pillars were quadrupling its share of profits via renegotiating with Disney, raising at least $75 million via IPO for its share of production costs, making films far more often, and building a worldwide brand, which Levy called a piece of cake.
“Number one, we had to quadruple our share of the profits.”
Entrepreneurs who sell their company often realize afterward that they did not want to sell, and the emotional loss can be severe even when the financial outcome is excellent.
“you'll see Lawrence's experience with a lot of entrepreneurs that we've studied experience, when they sell their company, when they think that's not what they actually want.”
Positional bargaining, where a party takes a position it knows is not final while holding a backup in reserve, is a weaker approach than negotiating from clearly defined wants, because stated conviction makes walking away credible.
“The natural tendency in negotiations is to engage in positional bargaining.”
Levy's decision to join Pixar was irrational by any spreadsheet measure, and Senra argues that following one's gut against rational analysis can still produce the best decision of a career.
“Him joining Pixar was irrational, and it was the best decision he ever made.”
Pixar decided to become a computer-animated feature film company rather than diversify, a choice Senra suggests was made after reviewing 1980s evidence that film IPOs were difficult and then deciding to proceed anyway.
“They eventually say, "Hey, we're going to go all in."”
Bob Iger put his cards on the table and made animation central to his Disney vision, which changed the tone of the relationship and led to Disney acquiring Pixar in 2006 for about $7.4 billion, a deal Jobs had found easy to work with.
“With Iger, there were no games, no politics, no posturing.”
Jobs's stake in Pixar grew from negative $50 million in company value to a Disney stake that made him Disney's largest shareholder and eventually worth over $13 billion, making Pixar his largest source of personal wealth.
“making his investment in Pixar by far the largest source of his personal wealth.”
Levy's view of Pixar changed after a private screening of partial Toy Story footage, which Senra argues fits the advertising principle from Claude Hopkins, David Ogilvy and Albert Lasker that a demonstration is the best advertisement.
“there's not a better advertisement than a demo.”
Levy adopted a mentor's guidance that you cannot control where the pieces are and that only your next move matters, which helped him avoid being emotional about things outside his control.
“It's only your next move that matters.”
Senra paraphrases Warren Buffett as saying time is a friend to the great business and an enemy to the mediocre one, arguing that founders cannot foresee how technologies emerging 5 to 20 years out will benefit their companies.
“that time is a friend to the great business and an enemy to the mediocre.”
Time is a friend to great businesses and an enemy to mediocre ones, because a product that lasts gets more valuable over the years, which is why a company should build assets that compound rather than depend on fleeting releases.
“that time is a friend to the great business and an enemy to the mediocre”
By 1994 Steve Jobs had been Silicon Valley's most visible celebrity yet had not had a hit in a very long time, since his Lisa and original Macintosh were commercial failures and NeXT could not compete with Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics, which made the Pixar opportunity look unappealing to friends.
“More and more, Jobs was looking like yesterday's news. When I told friends that I was meeting Steve Jobs about Pixar, the most common response was, why would you want to do that?”
Walt Disney bet everything on Snow White, including mortgaging his house, and the success still did not prevent his company from struggling financially again, showing that animation was a fickle business.
“Walt Disney had bet it all on Snow White, including mortgaging his house.”
Levy's reflection that an apparently detrimental event may be part of a larger pattern we cannot see captures why Jobs's canceled 2004 Disney talks later led to a better outcome, through Eisner's departure and Iger's arrival.
“One never knows if an event that appears detrimental at that time is, in fact, part of a larger pattern that we cannot see.”
Disney sold roughly 28 million copies of Snow White on home video, which illustrated how a single animated film can keep generating revenue decades after release.
“Disney sold 28 million copies of Snow White.”
Levy noted that there was no modern precedent for taking an independent animation company public, and that Disney's diversification made the case for a pure animation IPO different, yet Jobs was undeterred by the lack of precedent.
“There was no modern precedent for taking an independent animation company public.”
Pixar's short films won several Academy Awards but made no money and were expensive, so they existed as labors of love or as tests of technology and story development, which made cutting them a difficult but necessary decision.
“Animated short films had no commercial value.”
Jobs and Levy studied Walt Disney's early history, including Snow White being financed by a mortgage and Disney's diversification into TV and theme parks, and used that history to test whether Pixar should diversify or stay focused.
“Walt Disney had bet it all on Snow White, including mortgaging his house.”
Levy's early research revealed that Pixar had a checkered history, including George Lucas's failed imaging computer investment, so the company's value was not evident from its public track record and needed a new thesis.
“The result: not much. Pixar had long abandoned the quest to develop an imaging computer.”
Fear and ego conspire to rein in creativity, and it is easy to let creative inspiration take a backseat to safety, so filmmaking could benefit from Silicon Valley's bet-on-innovation mindset.
“Fear and ego conspire to rein in creativity, and it is easy to allow creative inspiration to take a backseat to safety.”
Larry Ellison argued that Disney's film library, TV channels and theme parks made it far more valuable than Yahoo's web page and free email, reinforcing the view that content libraries and brands beat portals during the Internet bubble.
“They have the most valuable film library in the world, the most valuable TV channels in the world, and successful theme parks everywhere.”
Disney's diversification into television and theme parks made the idea of a pure animation company seem doubtful, because if the undisputed king of animation had to diversify, few others could succeed as a pure animator.
“If the undisputed king of the animation world hadn't pulled it off, what was the likelihood that anyone else could?”
Bob Iger's direct, no-games style and his stated belief that animation was the heart and soul of Disney transformed the Pixar-Disney relationship, and his candor was a style that worked like magic with Jobs.
“With Iger, there were no games, no politics, no posturing.”
Levy described Jobs as having permanent intensity, shifting from zero to 100 miles per hour instantly, and Nolan Bushnell said Jobs at 19 had only one speed, go, which Senra presents as a lifelong trait.
“He's like, 'If I needed something done, I'd give it to Steve because he had one speed, go.'”
Ed Catmull taught Jobs the value of an extremely high talent bar, since Pixar was the first company Jobs saw made up entirely of A players, and that lesson helped recruit talent, investors and press.
“Pixar was the very first company he ever saw that was an entire company full of A players.”
Jobs repeatedly told the story of a rock tumbler, where rough rocks smashed together become smooth and beautiful, as a metaphor that disagreement among talented people produces refined outcomes.
“the rock tumbler story, how when he was a young person growing up, his neighbor would show him what a rock tumbler was.”
Levy recommended disclosing Pixar's business risks upfront because investors would figure them out anyway, and Jobs agreed without concern, believing that investors would see beyond the risks once they saw the product.
“We'll have to disclose what we know about Pixar's business risk upfront. Investors will figure it out anyway. It's better coming from us.”
Levy wrote that creative vision does not spring forth fully formed, which implies that great creative work requires iterative development and that a company cannot expect its best ideas to arrive complete.
“Creative vision does not spring forth fully formed.”
Levy had told himself he would be happy with $10 million in the opening weekend, but Disney projected close to $30 million, which tripled his expectation and led Robertson Stephens to raise the IPO price range above $20.
“Disney predicts a weekend box office close to $30 million.”
Pixar faced challenges over its stock option plan and worried whether its best people would stay and see the company through, a concern Levy recalled as part of his years there.
“I recalled the challenges over Pixar's stock option plan and worrying whether our best people would stay and see Pixar through.”
Under Pixar's original Disney deal, Pixar would have received only about $17 million of an estimated $170 million, with Disney taking the rest, which is why Pixar had to renegotiate.
“out of the $170 million that would have come in, they only would have gotten $17 million, and Disney would have taken the rest.”
The idea that business is impersonal is untrue for people who give their heart and soul to a company and mission, as Levy, Jobs, Catmull, and Lasseter did at Pixar.
“you'll hear people say that business is impersonal. It's just business. But when you give your heart and soul to a company... that's simply not true. It is personal.”
Catmull described Pixar's process as a combination of making a tech product and making a movie, which gives it the best of both worlds because it can iterate like software while producing art.
“It's almost like the combination of what Pixar is doing, it's a combination of like making a tech product and making a movie, and you have the best of both worlds.”
Just because someone in the past failed at taking a film company public does not mean it cannot be done, and Jobs refused to accept products that lacked a shot at greatness, which is why Pixar kept pursuing its own path.
“There was no part of Steve that bought into the idea of making products that might not have a shot at greatness.”
Jobs used stress-test questions in interviews, such as challenging a candidate's career choices and his prior employer, and the candidate's willingness to push back was itself the test.
“Jordan saw the questions for what they were: a Steve Jobs stress test.”
Because Pixar's product is a movie that people pay to watch, investors could see the product before the IPO, which reduced the weight of business-model skepticism in their assessment.
“their product is a movie. Toy Story at its time was truly revolutionary. So investors could watch it before the IPO.”
Founders can learn from historical companies by treating their past strategies as stress tests for present choices, which is what Pixar's leaders did when they studied Disney, Sony, and Ralph Lauren to inform their own decisions.
“Okay, we need to stress-test these ideas we're learning.”
Michael Jordan argued that dominant people should still listen to creative ideas from others because successful people listen and those who do not listen do not survive long, and Senra links this to Jobs' debate style.
“Successful people listen. Those who don't listen don't survive long.”
Disney CEO Michael Eisner appeared to be losing interest in animation as he prioritized television and other media after spending $19 billion on ABC, which gave Pixar a negotiating argument.
“He was more interested in television and other media outlets than animation at this time. He had just spent $19 billion to buy ABC.”
Jobs argued the markets were healthy and that Netscape's IPO would boost interest, so Pixar would be bigger and better, and his optimism was unmoved by Levy's warnings that investors were focused on the Internet, not animation.
“Netscape is going to be as big as offering as we've seen in a while. I think Pixar is bigger and better.”
Jobs argued that Disney's executive oversight was not the model for Pixar because Pixar needed creators like John Lasseter, whose team was inventing storytelling for the new medium of computer animation.
“But did they have a John Lasseter?”
Pixar sold 6 million shares at $22 per share, well above the initial $12 to $14 range, and the stock immediately jumped into the high 30s, making Jobs a billionaire within a week.
“6 million shares of Pixar stock was placed with investors at $22 per share.”
Pixar's animated commercials kept a small talented group busy but offered no strategy for growing the company, so they were another dead end that reduced the options for growth.
“as a strategy for growing a company, animated commercials was another dead end.”
Pixar's team had found a book from 1987 warning that film companies going public had failed, but Hal Vogel later agreed with the banker view that this time was different because Pixar combined the right ingredients, showing that past failures do not preclude success.
“Just because something -- somebody in the past was unable to do it doesn't mean that you can't.”
Levy left his law practice because billing in six-minute increments felt like a grind, and he yearned for the adventure of the entrepreneurs he represented, so the move to Pixar was an emotional choice more than a financial one.
“I looked at my start-up clients. And to me, they were on an adventure. I yearned for the kind of adventure that they were on.”
Senra recommends Ed Catmull's Creativity, Inc. as the book with the most highlights in his database, and says its epilogue on Steve Jobs is worth the price alone.
“I highly recommend reading that book if you haven't done so already.”