#284 Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick
What this covers
This Founders episode, with David Senra and Dan Senra trading off, follows Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick from their separate starts to the breakup of their partnership. Carnegie learns industry from the inside as a telegraph messenger and then a railroad employee under Thomas Scott, where the contacts and information were worth far more than a $2,400 salary. Frick starts at 21 in coke, borrows from Judge Thomas Mellon, buys distressed rivals during the 1873 depression, and is a millionaire by 30.
The middle of the episode is operating detail. Carnegie carries railroad freight cost accounting into his foundries, so he can bid below rivals knowing he still profits. He scraps expensive Bessemer converters for open-hearth furnaces, pays top wages for the best operators, and secures his inputs through ventures like Cyclops Iron. He also turns down a cartel offer of 9 percent of profits. The hosts tie this to Counter-Cyclical Expansion: he built his mill in the Panic of 1873, a point flagged as contested. They place it against the growth of the railroads and a United States that came to out-produce Britain, France and Germany combined, and compare the cost-and-price loop to Jeff Bezos's shareholder letters.
The last stretch is the rupture. The ironclad agreement let three-quarters of the partners force a sale at book value, which stayed near $50 million while profits reached about $21 million. Frick's lawsuit, and a document showing a $500 million valuation, follow from that. The hosts treat Homestead as the product of Accumulated Slights, and draw a lesson about Detachment Before Decision. The episode closes on Charles Schwab carrying the $480 million price to J.P. Morgan.
Carnegie and Frick built their steel fortune on obsessive cost control, early adoption of better technology, and counter-cyclical expansion, but ego-driven feuds and an accumulation of small grievances, not business logic, ended their partnership.
- Carnegie's edge came from knowing his costs to the penny and cutting prices to scoop the market, with profits following from lower costs.
- Frick and Carnegie shared the same cost-first philosophy, which made Frick a natural partner and successor.
- Their decades-long conflict escalated through emotional, ego-driven decisions such as the ironclad agreement, the forced buyouts, and the lawsuit, which hurt both of them.
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Morgan decided not to fight Carnegie's steel company because Carnegie controlled his own raw materials, transport, and manufacturing and was far more deeply capitalized, so a long battle would only dent his armor while Carnegie would eventually run rivals into the ground.
“Morgan understood the folly of a long-term battle with the Carnegie company, a firm that controlled its own sources of raw materials, transport and manufacture”
Because Carnegie opposed revaluing the company, its book value stayed at $50 million while profits reached about $21 million and true valuation was estimated at $200 to $250 million, so buyouts at book value were a way to transfer value cheaply.
“Since Carnegie had always opposed the reevaluation of the company, the book value of Carnegie Steel in 1899 remained $50 million.”
The ironclad agreement required any partner, living or dead, to sell his interest when three-quarters of the other partners voted for it, and at book value, so the majority owner could squeeze out any troublesome partner while staying exempt himself.
“The agreement included a provision that required any partner, dead or living, to sell his interest upon a vote of 3/4 of the other parties.”
Carnegie applied freight-hauling cost standards from the railroad to his foundries, so every bid by his firms rested on precise cost knowledge, which let him undercut rivals with confidence that he could still profit.
“If Carnegie chose to undercut a rival's figure, he did so with absolute confidence that he could deliver what he promised and make a profit.”
Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller, and Frick all pursued lower costs so they could charge less, which won more customers in a repeating virtuous cycle, a pattern the host says Jeff Bezos also described in his shareholder letters.
“They were able to charge less. Lowering the price to the customer, got them more customers in this like virtuous cycle”
Violent labor conflicts like Homestead do not go from zero to one hundred; they build through a slow accumulation of slights, disagreements, and fights until someone takes up arms.
“It's a slow accumulation of slights and disagreements and fights and the pressure just builds and builds and builds”
Carnegie and Frick both relentlessly invested in new technology to cut costs, with Carnegie scrapping hundreds of thousands of dollars of Bessemer converters to adopt open-hearth furnaces because he believed saving even $0.50 per ton justified large expenditure.
“Even if we save $0.5 per ton by the changes, it would justify a large additional expenditure right now.”
Carnegie's early career as a telegraph messenger and railroad employee under Thomas Scott gave him a front-row seat to the leading industries of his day, including oil, iron, and transport, and the practical business education and contacts he gained there, rather than his salary, made his later fortune possible.
“yet, he understood that it was the contacts he made and the information he derived from his association with the railroad that made everything else possible.”
The vast expansion of the US railroad network, from under 30,000 miles of mismatched track at the Civil War to about 163,000 miles in the 1890s with standardized gauge, and the mass production of steel advanced together, creating a dual technological tailwind that made iron and steel the indispensable supporting industry.
“as the civil war began, there were fewer than 30,000 miles of track in all of the United States... The 1890s saw the width of railroad track standardized and nearly 163,000 miles of railways put into use.”
Business leaders in the 1800s and early 1900s disliked competition and tried to collaborate and fix prices, as when a steel pricing pool or cartel offered Carnegie only 9 percent of total profits and he rejected it because he could produce more efficiently than the others.
“they're going to like -- I guess, cartel is the way to think about this.”
Carnegie wrote a price of $480 million on a piece of paper which Charles Schwab carried to J.P. Morgan, who accepted it without negotiation, creating what the host describes as one of the most storied deals in American business history and the world's first billion-dollar corporation with U.S. Steel.
“When Morgan examined this document, he said simply, "I accept this price".”
Frick, starting at 21 with his cousin Abraham Tinstman's coke operation, borrowed from Judge Thomas Mellon, who approved loans because Frick knew his business down to the ground; by 1873 Frick & Company owned 200 coke ovens, and Frick bought distressed competitors during the 1873 depression, reaching about 1,000 ovens and 3,000 acres of coal lands by 1882.
“He knows his business down to the ground.”
By the time Carnegie's steel business matured, the United States had gone from trailing most of Europe to producing more steel than Great Britain, France and Germany combined.
“the United States goes from being behind most of Europe to actually turning out more steel than Great Britain, France and Germany combined.”
Carnegie believed there is no labor so cheap as the dearest in the mechanical field, meaning that hiring the very best operators and paying them top dollar lowers total cost because they are more productive.
“he says there is no labor so cheap as the dearest in the mechanical field”
Frick figured out how to produce high-quality coke far more cheaply than Carnegie could, so Carnegie stopped making his own coke and bought from Frick, which led to the partnership.
“Frick figured out a way to produce high-quality coke way cheaper than Carnegie tried to.”
Henry Clay Frick built a dominant position in coke, the fuel needed for steel, and used his coke business and the loans from Thomas Mellon to grow into a millionaire by age 30, which made him the exclusive supplier to Carnegie's steelworks and eventually a major equity partner.
“By the age of 30, Frick reckoned himself a millionaire and was fielding more demand for his coke than he could possibly handle.”
By the time Carnegie was still a railroad employee, his investments and other income exceeded $45,000 a year against a $2,400 railroad salary, showing that the contacts and information from the job were worth far more than the wage.
“Carnegie was earning more than $45,000 a year from this and all his other investments compared with just $2,400 from his railroad salary”
Carnegie consistently sought control over every input his business needed, such as forming Cyclops Iron to secure raw materials without a middleman, because more control meant less cost and more profit.
“Carnegie, like I said last week, he always wants to control over -- he wants control over anything that his business needs, more control means less cost and more profit is the way he thought about it.”
Carnegie started his steel mill during the Panic of 1873, when the New York Stock Exchange closed for 10 days and a quarter of railroads went bankrupt, and the depressed demand and labor costs let him build the mill about 25 percent under his original projection, showing that the best time to expand is when no one else dares to take the risk.
“Turned out the best time to expand is when no one else is actually willing to take the risk.”
Carnegie believed profits and prices are cyclical and subject to transient market forces, while costs can be strictly controlled, so any savings in cost of goods were permanent gains.
“profits and prices are cyclical, subject to any number of transient forces of the marketplace. Costs, however, could be strictly controlled”
Frick accepted an arrangement in which Carnegie came to own more of his coke business than he did, because Frick viewed coke as a path to what he really wanted, an entry into steel, and he was willing to nearly divest his coal and coke holdings to reach it.
“What Henry Clay Frick longed for was an entry into steel. He was willing to divest himself almost completely of his holdings in coal and coke”
The ironclad agreement, drafted after Carnegie's illness, required partners to sell their shares at book value on a three-quarters vote, and it became the linchpin of the decades-long war between Carnegie and Frick because book value was artificially depressed while the company's profits grew far larger.
“this ironclad agreement is going to be the linchpin that starts this gigantic war between Carnegie and Frick, a war that last until the day they both die.”
Frick sued Carnegie for forcing him out below value and held documents showing Carnegie had put a $500 million valuation on the business when he refused to renew the Moore Brothers option, which would undercut Carnegie's claim that the company was worth only $50 million.
“revealing that Carnegie had refused to renew the option for the Moore Brother purchase unless the value of the property was raised to a more rightful by Carnegie's own reckoning $500 million.”
The host argues that narrowed focus and emotional attachment cause people to make decisions that cost business and personal value, and that detaching and taking an overall look at a situation prevents such mistakes, as the Carnegie–Frick feud illustrates.
“stepping back and detaching and taking an overall look at the situation can cause you to avoid making these emotionally charged decisions”
Carnegie and Frick were among the most formidable and intelligent men of their time, yet they were still petty, emotional, and ego-driven, and host argues the whole feud could have been avoided with better detachment.
“they're still capable of being petty and emotional and ego-driven, all of this could have been avoided.”
Carnegie and Frick shared a business philosophy that set them apart from peers focused on net profits and dividends, because both knew their costs to the penny and invested to reduce fixed costs.
“Furthermore, they shared a business philosophy that set them apart from their peers, most of whom were more concerned with net profits and dividends than with the reduction of fixed costs.”
Frick had his partner Phipps, who designed the ironclad agreement, examine its fine print and find its flaws, which gave Frick the legal ammunition to sue Carnegie for unjustly forcing him out at a price far below his holdings' value.
“Frick had Phipps pouring over the fine print of the ironclad agreement since it was Phipps' brainchild in the first place, he was the logical person to discover its faults.”
Carnegie's decision to buy Frick out at book value, roughly $1.5 million for stock worth at least ten times that, was driven by ego and revenge rather than business logic, and it cost him a bitter lawsuit and a settlement.
“this is what I mean he's blinded by ego because we'll see the smart strategies used by Frick to prove that you don't actually believe what your document says.”
Carnegie's career moved through each leading technology of its era, from telegraph to railroads to oil to iron and then steel, and each was the most important ingredient of its day for the businesses it touched.
“He learned how to be a telegraph operator. Telegraph is the leading communication technology of its day, right?”
After a scattershot approach to wealth, Carnegie decided to concentrate his capital in a single high-potential basket, steel, reasoning that focused commitment to one leading industry beats diversified small bets when you can identify the winner.
“perhaps it made more sense to end the scattershot approach to accumulating wealth and put all good eggs in one basket and then watch that basket.”
Carnegie settled with Frick because public disclosure of Carnegie Steel's finances would reveal enormous profits and inconsistent valuations, and George Westinghouse and others urged him to pay Frick, since in court Carnegie could not prove a low valuation without also undermining his ability to find a buyer.
“if he were to prove in court, for instance, that the value of Carnegie Steel was just a fraction of what Frick claimed, how on earth would he attract a buyer”
The conflict over Frick's resignation ended in a closer partnership, since Carnegie came to see Frick as no puppet but a principled, capable manager, and so Carnegie rewarded him with a larger share of the company and the chairmanship.
“Frick was named Chairman of Carnegie Brothers and Company. And as a result, he now owns 11% of Carnegie's company.”
Carnegie, owning most of the equity, stacked the Henry Clay Frick Coke Company board with five loyalists out of seven, abolished the chairman office, and then had the steel board invoke the ironclad agreement to buy Frick's shares at book value of $1.5 million, a price the host calls a dishonorable act.
“Frick would receive $1.5 million for stock that was worth at least 10x as much.”
Frick and Henry Phipps tried to sell their stakes to an undisclosed buyer without telling Carnegie who it was, in a deal that would have paid Frick and Phipps a broker's fee of $5 million if they could get Carnegie to buy the company, while the bidders lacked the money to complete the purchase.
“Frick and Phipps try to sell the company, but they won't tell Andrew who the bidder is.”
Frick hired roughly 300 Pinkerton detectives to take over the Homestead plant after the union refused his terms, and when they landed on the river they faced about 5,000 workers, leading to a gunfight that killed several people and ended with the Pinkertons surrendering and being beaten.
“The plant is right next to this body of water, so they're going to show up on this boat. Boat is going to get to the edge of the water, is going to be met by 5,000 workers”
Alexander Berkman, posing as an employment agent, shot Frick twice in the neck and back in 1892 after the Homestead massacre, and Frick refused anesthetic, insisted on having his wounds sewn in his office, and finished his day's work before going to the hospital.
“When a surgeon was rushed to the office to attend his wounds, it was said that Frick refused any anesthetic.”
Technology is defined simply as a better way to do something, so the Bessemer process, which cut steel production from about two weeks to 15 minutes, is a textbook technological advance that created an opening for whoever commercialized it early.
“Technology is just a better way to do something.”
During the Civil War, sabotage and arson threatened wooden railroad bridges, and Thomas Scott asked Carnegie to assemble a group to build bridges of a far harder-to-burn material, which Carnegie later called the parent of all his other works.
“Carnegie's mentor, Scott, approached him with the notion that he might take advantage of his contacts around the Pittsburgh iron mills and railyards”
A main theme of late-1800s business history is the constant conflict between ownership and labor, which was so violent that it is fair to describe it as a war.
“a main theme of the book is this constant conflict between ownership and labor. It was very common.”
The Bessemer process transformed iron into steel so quickly that a quantity of steel that formerly took as long as two weeks could be made in about 15 minutes, which convinced Carnegie that demand for cheaper steel would skyrocket.
“a quantity of steel might -- that might have formally have taken as long as 2 weeks to produce could now be made in 15 minutes.”
Frick refused anesthesia while bullets were removed from his neck, insisted on finishing his letter before going to hospital, then issued a statement saying the company would pursue the same policy, and returned to the office 13 days later after his infant son's funeral.
“On the following morning, he rode a streetcar to his downtown offices and began his day promptly at 8:00 a.m., 13 days after being gunned down.”
Carnegie believed in a form of social Darwinism, so Frick's rise from humble origins marked him as one of the fittest, and Carnegie sought to align himself with such people.
“this also touches on this idea that Carnegie believed in a form of social Darwinism.”
Carnegie noticed that Henry Clay Frick had independently adopted the same cost-accounting obsession in monopolizing the coke industry, and Carnegie saw him as another version of himself, which drew the two together.
“when he discovers that Henry Clay Frick has the exact same ideas that Carnegie is applying”
The final break between Carnegie and Frick was caused by an accumulation of small slights over a decade, with the 1899 buyout attempt, the board purge, and the lawsuit ending a partnership that had lasted about 20 years, and the two never met again before both died in 1919.
“So this is happening in the year 1900... they never meet again. They both die in 1919.”
The death of Carnegie's brother Tom from pneumonia opened the way for Frick to become a full partner in Carnegie's steel company, because Carnegie judged that Frick would be less risk-averse than his brother.
“Carnegie saw advantages in promoting Frick to fill the void at Carnegie brothers.”
After the merger Frick held a $61 million interest in U.S. Steel and sat on the board, Charles Schwab served as president until he resigned under about two years of annoyance at Frick's continuing board influence, and Elbert Gary then led the company for more than 26 years with Frick as adviser for more than 15 of them.
“Gary remained at the helm of the U.S. steel company for more than 26 years and for more than 15 of those years, he counted on the advice of his partner, Henry Clay Frick.”
The settlement valued Carnegie Steel at $250 million and Frick Coke at $70 million, merged them, and removed Frick from management, leaving him with $31 million, which the host notes was a fortune in 1900 money and a fair consolation for losing the friendship.
“Carnegie Steel was to be valued at $250 million Henry Frick Coke Company to be valued at $70 million, and they would be merged.”
Carnegie intended to retire after selling to Morgan, while Frick sought a CEO role at U.S. Steel, which led to Frick's ongoing influence that frustrated Carnegie.
“After the sale is complete, Carnegie is not going to have any role in the company.”
Carnegie concluded that he could never get rich as a salaried man, so he resigned from the Pennsylvania Railroad and concentrated all his energy on iron, moving to New York to be among the people he aspired to join.
“Determined to make a fortune and certain that he could never do as a salaried man, he tendered his resignation to the Pennsylvania Railroad”
Frick repeatedly threatened to resign whenever Carnegie second-guessed his decisions, and three or four times he did, which forced Carnegie to back down because nobody could replace Frick as the best manager.
“anytime that he feels he's like, listen, if you want me to run the company, then I'm going to run the company.”
During an 1877 strike at his coke company, Frick physically flung a striker and his belongings into a creek when the striker refused to leave a shack on company property, reflecting his lifelong hardline stance on labor.
“Frick grabbed the striker by his hands and feet and flung him off the embankment”
By 1888, dividends from Frick's coke operations totaled almost $2 million, slightly more than the dividends from Carnegie's own iron and steelworks, showing that the coke business was initially more profitable than the steel company.
“by 1888, dividends from Frick's operations would total almost $2 million, which is slightly higher than the total of those from Carnegie's iron and steelworks themselves.”
Carnegie's Keystone Bridge Company, formed in response to wartime sabotage of wooden railroad bridges, was the investment he later called the parent of all his other works, and by then his investment income ($45,000 a year) far exceeded his railroad salary.
“The Keystone Bridge Company was formed. And to Carnegie, it was the investment that turned out to be what he said, "The parent of all other works."”
Frick purchased land in downtown Pittsburgh and built a skyscraper tall enough to cast Carnegie's office building in perpetual shadow, and later built a mansion meant to dwarf Carnegie's.
“he had gone out of his way to purchase a part of land in downtown Pittsburgh. Then he built a skyscraper tall enough to cast Carnegie's own office building next door in perpetual shadow.”
After losing two children, including an infant son who died a few months after birth, Frick attended the funeral and was back at his downtown office 13 days after the shooting, which illustrates his relentless work ethic.
“On the following morning, he rode a streetcar to his downtown offices and began his day promptly at 8:00 a.m., 13 days after being gunned down.”
Frick advised his protégé Charles Schwab that one must not be discouraged even if things go badly for a long time, and should keep doing the best one can without putting oneself in a compromising position.
“you must not allow anything to discourage you in the least. Even if things do not go well for some time to come”
The host defines technology simply as a better way to do something, and argues that steel was the leading technology of its day because it was the key ingredient in the railroad and bridge revolution.
“Remember, we define technology as, it's just the better way to do something.”
Following Jeff Bezos's shareholder-letter advice, entrepreneurs should identify major technological trends and use them as tailwinds rather than headwinds, which is why Carnegie's early entry into steel, the leading technology of the day, mattered so much.
“you should really pay attention to technological trends and use them as tailwinds instead of headwinds”
Carnegie's response to positive reports from subordinates was always 'good, but let us do better,' so even when his firm had the best results he kept pushing for improvement, much like Bezos's approach at Amazon.
“To almost every positive report, Carnegie's response was good, but let us do better.”
Frick resigned as president after Carnegie insisted he settle with striking workers, and Frick's resignation letter declared that Carnegie as majority owner held control, which left Carnegie with no ready replacement and forced him to reconsider.
“I, therefore, enclose my resignation. And the problem with that is Carnegie knew there's nobody that he could replace Frick with.”
After becoming chairman, Frick worked from dawn to dusk without holidays and learned every detail of the company's business, applying the same management approach he used at his own coke company.
“Frick worked from dawn till dusk taking no holidays and familiarizing himself with every detail of the company's business.”
Carnegie personally acted as the principal salesman for his iron and steel companies rather than running the plants, which the host finds surprising and compares to Bill Gates doing nearly all sales at early Microsoft.
“He actually was the principal salesman for his iron and steel companies.”
Financial panics are just older names for depressions and recessions, and the host argues the 'panic' label is a better name than modern terms.
“Financial panics are just the name that they used to put on depressions and recessions.”
In 1894 Frick wrote Carnegie a resignation letter accusing him of nonsensical talk about Frick being unwell, denouncing Carnegie's business methods, newspaper interviews, and unwarranted interference, and demanding that Carnegie purchase his interest.
“I desire to quietly withdraw, doing as little harm as possible to the interest of others because I become tired of your business method”
The host believes Les Standiford's book is easier than Carnegie's own autobiography for learning about Carnegie because the book focuses on the partnership with Frick and the author's writing quality.
“I actually think this book is easier to learn about the life of Andrew Carnegie than his own autobiography.”
The host recommends that every entrepreneur should read Les Standiford's book on the Carnegie–Frick partnership as a case study in business history.
“I think this book should be in every entrepreneur's library”