The Future of Asset Management
What this covers
Three voices carry the conversation: host Patrick, Brent, who speaks from owning and operating businesses, and Ted, who speaks as an allocator to hedge funds. It begins with the economics of active management. Patrick uses LeBron James and Renaissance Technologies to argue that elite talent could justify higher pay, while fees cluster in the same range regardless of skill, so the typical manager collects what amounts to a tax on assets. Ted explains why management fee levels are falling, framing it as Fixed Cost Versus Returns, and adds a rate-driven headwind: cash that once gave a fund a head start now earns almost nothing. He also disputes the idea that small managers reliably win, and says picking managers has become harder.
The wider range is where it gets contentious. Brent predicts that rising rates will purge low-margin companies propped up by cheap debt, and that semi-public private companies could shrink the stock universe. Patrick points to the gap between cap-weighted and equal-weighted returns as a proxy for active versus passive results, and argues that Signal Half-Life will make today's satellite-photo edges look as quaint as Ben Graham's filings. Several threads concern Duration of Capital: short-term systems reward turnover, and a three-year exit horizon distorts decisions. Brent contributes operator lessons, including Hygiene Alpha, the case that boring industries earn higher returns, and Peter Kaufman's Glenair. He also argues that print-heavy media companies have outlasted the consensus. Throughout, he and Patrick return to the Circle of Competence.
Asset management's fee and incentive structures are misaligned with investor outcomes, and in a low-rate, high-valuation environment durable edge comes from long-duration capital, less-trafficked niches, and deep circle-of-competence intuition rather than from fast information or scale.
- Hedge fund fixed management fees are falling because returns shrank as markets became more efficient, and fee pressure makes it hard for new managers to fund operations.
- Short-term capital and quarterly-focused systems reward turnover, while long-duration capital and private structures create an advantage.
- Information edges have shifted from acquiring data to processing it differently, and the pace of change determines how much luck matters.
Asymmetric payoffs and luck reward asset gathering over genuine alpha and skill.
- A high management fee combined with an asymmetric payoff pushes managers toward being capital gatherers and deployers rather than true investors, and the industry should place a premium on managers who generate genuine alpha rather than luck.
“the higher the management fee is, and the more of heads I win, tails you lose structure that you set up, the more natural tendency you'll have towards capital deployment, capital gathering”
- Many investment structures in venture capital, private equity, and hedge funds are asymmetric heads I win, tails you lose arrangements where managers collect upside and limit downside, and relative outperformance may be due to luck rather than skill, which creates misaligned incentives.
“I think the world is moving much more towards heads I win, tails I also lose, or at least that's where I hope moves towards in that direction. I think there's a lot of misaligned incentives.”
- Andreessen Horowitz committed to spending its management fee income, which Brent described as 2%, on servicing portfolio businesses rather than on exorbitant partner salaries, a model Brent hopes might be a signal for hedge funds even though the analogy is imperfect.
“We're going to take all of our 2%, all of our management fee and apply it, instead of towards exorbitant salaries and towards enriching the partners”
- Talent acts like a curve that gets you further and faster, but hard work is still required to take you the rest of the way, so things that come easily to someone are still difficult and still need room to grow.
“your sort of talent can take you so far, and then hard work's got to take you the rest of the way.”
- Anything that appears easy is usually because you lack enough information or got lucky, and most value comes from powering through the dip when the novelty of a project wears off and the work turns out to be harder than expected.
“Anytime anything appears easy it's because you either don't have enough information or you got lucky.”
- Brent's career path was shaped by luck, grabbing onto a fast-moving bus, and he believes a Monte Carlo simulation of career paths would not always end as favorably as his did.
“I feel like I grabbed the bus that was driving 60 miles an hour down the road”
Small-business moats are tied to the owner's intuition and relationships, hard to replicate.
- Seller packets that claim the replacement value of an owner is 150,000 dollars a year fail to capture the intuition and personal relationships that tie most small-business moats to the owner, which are almost impossible to replicate.
“the replacement value of the owner is $150,000 a year. ... it's almost impossible to replicate.”
- Intuition is an algorithm that pings every past experience, reading, and stored pattern at once and renders an immediate result, and in a domain where someone has deep circle of competence and fluency, that intuition is almost impossible to replicate with a hired replacement.
“it's like pinging every potential experience you've had in the past, the thing you've read, sort of everything that's it's somehow in you, all at the same time and then rendering an immediate result.”
- Most moats in small businesses are tied up with the owner, so the average small business earns a return on the owner's time, and the businesses that are unsaleable often have deeply ingrained bad habits, so basic cash management is the core of building value.
“most of the moat in any of these small businesses are going to be tied up with the owner.”
- People who have done very well keep a tight circle of competence, the area where they know more than most and have first principles to judge things, and push its edges outward; most people, including Brent, tend to stray outside it and become overconfident about what they know.
“Circle of competence being the area that you actually know more than most people, that you have a good firm grounding in and you have first principles that you can sort of judge things by.”
Basic operational hygiene and advertising spend separate growing small businesses from stagnant ones.
- Small businesses stay small because they skip basics like tracking where cash comes from, where it goes, and what consumes it poorly, and this basic business hygiene, which Patrick named hygiene alpha, matters more than theoretical strategy books.
“a lot of businesses stay small because they're not willing to do the basics”
- Business owners should spend on advertising until the marginal utility of an extra advertising dollar is virtually zero, because advertising is partly tax-deductible and outspending competitors builds a moat, yet small businesses usually minimize ad spend.
“you want to spend until the marginal utility of that advertising dollar is virtually zero, because Uncle Sam is paying for half your advertising dollars”
- Small businesses stay small partly because a owner with a $100,000 ad budget can only hire people who are probably not qualified to spend that budget well, a survivorship and selection bias among small-business service providers that goes largely unaddressed.
“The only people that you can hire to spend that $100,000 on your behalf. Probably aren't qualified to spend the $100,000.”
- Peter Kaufman's Glenair pays line workers well above competitors and aligns everyone on the same metrics, so workers and executives eat from the same trough, producing above-average margins and gains of 5 to 10 times in productivity rather than marginal improvements.
“he's perfectly aligned the incentives between the line-workers and the executives. Everyone's eating from the same trough and the metrics are the same.”
Long holding horizons and downturn capital beat artificial exit markers and forced cyclical selling.
- Investment time horizon materially changes the decisions a business owner should make, so owners planning to exit in three to four years make different choices than those planning to hold for five to ten years or in perpetuity, and an artificial exit marker is pure insanity for a great business.
“If you're planning on holding it in perpetuity, assuming the business continues to perform well ... it just seems like pure insanity to put some sort of artificial marker at the end.”
- In downturns capital providers tend to shrink back rather than buy, so having both capital and the courage to buy when others must sell, for reasons like health or marital issues, is an attractive advantage that a buyer can use to become the buyer of choice.
“counterintuitively, most capital providers shrink back and try to sit on the sidelines”
- Exiting a great business in three or four years is an artificial marker that distorts decisions, since the choices that help a business in five or ten years differ from those made with a short exit in mind, and private equity's long lockups still feel short given the same language but different durations.
“If you're planning on holding it in perpetuity, assuming the business continues to perform well ... it just seems like pure insanity to put some sort of artificial marker at the end.”
- As interest rates rise, many low-margin businesses that were kept alive by cheap debt will fail, because their margins cannot absorb higher interest costs, producing a large purge and possibly a broad ripple through credit markets.
“I feel like there's an incoming purge that's going to occur as interest rates rise”
Media value rests on changing consumer behavior, not vanity metrics like views or likes.
- The bottom line for any media business is attention: vanity metrics like views and likes can be faked, and what matters is whether a business can reliably change consumer behavior, which means print-heavy newspapers can outperform despite the narrative that digital is the only path.
“The bottom line when it comes to media of any sort is it's all about attention.”
- All media economics are fundamentally about attention, and vanity metrics such as views or likes are easily faked, so the only meaningful test is whether content reliably changes consumer behavior in a particular direction; Craigslist destroyed the classified revenue that had subsidized newspaper editorial operations.
“The bottom line when it comes to media of any sort is it's all about attention. There's a lot of vanity metrics around views or likes”
- Social media sentiment is an interesting area for signals, but many startups in that space have bombed, and so far they have proven to be more noise than signal.
“a lot of them have bombed out and not proven to be... Well, has proven to be more noise than signal”
- Most newspaper value is still driven through print even though digital is growing faster, and some of the best-performing media companies are print-only or mostly print, so consensus narratives that late digital adopters are doomed are often wrong and contrarian patience can still earn real returns.
“Most of the value, if you look at that's being driven is still being driven through print. Even though digital is growing faster”
Self-investment in learning and exemplars compounds more than purchased research.
- Tim Keller's Making Sense of God lays bare the alternatives to faith, helping readers understand the cohesive worldview they have accepted, regardless of their faith position.
“it's a book that lays bare the alternatives to faith”
- The best place to invest is in yourself through education, knowledge, and relationships, since that is where the most compounding occurs, and Brent is saving for his daughters' future in a broad index while hoping they invest in themselves.
“I think the best place to invest is in yourself.”
- Peter Attia takes nothing for granted in health and experiments on patients in ways that Brent believes represent the future of medicine, what medicine will look like in 30 to 50 years.
“I think it's the future of medicine. I think that whenever you see what Peter's doing, it is what medicine's going to look like in 30, 40, 50 years.”
- A useful mental-model collection should focus on the 20 to 40 models that are constantly applicable, with their nuances, rather than a catalog of 200 or 250, because most models are only occasionally used while a few carry heavy freight in everyday decisions.
“you need to have the 30, maybe 40 that are just constantly applicable and you need to pound them into your head”
- Custom research firms repackage the same industry information and sell it for around $10,000 for a 50-page report, and a 25-page general industry version would be valuable, though many of these facts are findable online.
“they have the same information, but they twisted a tiny bit and repackage it and then sell it for $10,000 for a 50-page report”
Overlooked boring industries and their suppliers offer better returns than visible ones.
- The non-obvious business-to-business suppliers in any industry, such as barrel makers for the wine business, often have more favorable economics and protection than the visible consumer-facing businesses.
“the more non-obvious the role is in the industry, the more protected it's naturally going to be.”
- Industries that look attractive attract competition that drives returns down, so the more boring an industry, the higher its average returns, and the most obvious participation points like realtors or whiskey brands earn the lowest returns while suppliers to them earn more.
“The real money in the real estate industry is not in being a realtor. It's selling stuff to realtors.”
- Many attractive software businesses are built to serve very boring operators, such as software providers that help local pest control businesses, and finding these niches that support the economy without being obvious is the key to investing.
“there's a lot of amazing software businesses that are built on helping very boring operators, like the pest control business.”
Shrinking public markets and private capital are reshaping the signals investors rely on.
- The number of public companies is shrinking, and firms can raise tens of millions of dollars privately with few disclosures, so semi-public companies may create an entirely different stock exchange and reduce the universe that quantitative signals are built on.
“the universe of publicly traded companies seems to be diminishing. And so, as that happens, do you continue to slice the pie thinner”
- Abundant private capital lets companies such as Uber reach huge scale without going public, so high-burn companies now look semi-private and still draw money from mutual fund firms like Fidelity, changing what public ownership means.
“Availability of capital with private markets. I mean, look at it Uber.”