What this covers

This is a conversation with Harvey Sawikin of Firebird, an emerging markets fund, about how the firm was built and how he reads markets now. It starts in mid-1990s Russia, where privatization vouchers let companies be bought at about 1% of the value of Western comparables. Foreigners had to trust a Russian broker to tender the vouchers, a risk large institutions would not take. Dan Cloud's observation that early fortunes went to traders buying through local accounts, before funds had custody and GDR listings, shaped Firebird's design. Ordinary Russians sold their vouchers for a bottle of vodka, while sophisticated buyers became billionaires.

The range after that is wide. Sawikin describes the shift in emerging market analysis from headline multiples to free cash flow, so that a stock on a 3 P/E can still be a value trap. He explains why he wants dividends paid in markets where money has been stolen, and cites a Russian steel company whose payout policy rivals copied. He tells of walking through Magnit stores, then selling the position and moving into X5. He also draws a line between frontier markets and post-political countries such as Estonia and Lithuania, and he explains why consensus picks like Iran often fail outsiders.

The more contested turns are his opinions. He says index funds suit emerging markets badly because state-owned enterprises drag them down, and that allocators should pay high fees for a specialist active manager. He wants politics weighted about equally with valuation rather than 80/20. He forecasts that coordinated global growth will favor emerging markets, with capital inflows around early 2019. He also explains how Benjamin Graham's earnings-yield rule guided his early equity allocation, and why he doubts Treasuries are too cheap.

Sharpest takeaway

Sawikin argues that emerging market returns come from being first into hard-to-access, illiquid markets, backed by on-the-ground diligence, disciplined patience, and equal weighting of politics alongside valuation.

  • Early entry where custody and access are hard, such as Russian voucher auctions priced at a fraction of Western comparables, produced outsized returns
  • Politics deserves roughly equal weight with valuation, because political shifts have repeatedly wrecked emerging market returns
  • Index funds are poorly suited to emerging markets because the largest companies are often state-owned enterprises that destroy shareholder value

The argument · threads4 threads · 66 claims
0.73

Emerging markets are in a bull run that investors fail to recognize and act on.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Firebird invested early in Estonia's Hansabank in December 1994, earning roughly 75 times its money before the stake was taken out by Swedbank in 2004.

    “we got in early in Estonia on Hansabank in December '94, made 75X until we were taken out by Swedbank in 2004”

  • Firebird's Russia fund rose in 23 of the prior 25 months yet attracted little new money, and Sawikin believes people fail to realize EM has been in a bull market for two years.

    “my Russia fund has been up like 23 out of the last 25 months or something, and yet we're not being inundated with new money.”

  • The 2003 to 2007 period of roughly 4% global growth was a strong environment for cyclicals, resource stocks and emerging-market equities, and the recent synchronized recovery resembles it.

    “That reminds me of the period from 2003 until 2007, when 4% global growth was happening.”

0.57

Managers must resist benchmark and consensus pressure, since forecasting markets and analysts is unreliable.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • In a bear market, a manager must sell even long-term holdings that will perform badly in the next couple of years, which Sawikin considers the hardest thing a fund manager does.

    “I think the single hardest thing for a fund manager to do is to sell a long-term buy because it's going do badly in the next couple of years.”

  • No manager is truly benchmark-unaware because investors measure against benchmarks; Sawikin describes himself as benchmark-afraid, tolerating short-term underperformance while keeping an eye on the index, which is why he holds index-weighted SOEs.

    “I'm benchmark afraid. I'm afraid of the benchmark beating me and beating me badly and for a long time.”

  • Analysts telling a turnaround story about Magnit's reformatted stores may be trying to offload shares, and Sawikin found the refurbished stores still dirty with empty shelves because of a failing just-in-time logistics strategy.

    “This is the story that the analysts are telling while presumably they're still trying to offload Magnit shares onto people.”

  • Claiming to know the fair value of the 10-year Treasury better than the market is a losing argument, since many forces set bond yields.

    “There's like a 10-year process of getting the fed out.”

  • Long-standing investors' heirs are often not adequately prepared to manage their inherited investments, and Sawikin finds the answer is usually no.

    “Sadly, I find that the answer is usually no.”

0.53

Political settlement and custody determine whether a country is investable for outsiders.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Frontier markets lack normal custody that lets institutions invest, often have currencies pegged or in the euro as an indicator of maturity, and are still subject to elections that can change outcomes, whereas post-political EM countries like Estonia and Lithuania have a settled path toward EU convergence regardless of which government is elected.

    “countries that already have normal custody where anybody can go in and the institutions can go in. Certainly, if their currencies are either pegged to the dollar or the Euro, or they're in the Euro, those are the indicia.”

  • Iran's revolutionary guard controls the levers of power, including financial markets and listed companies, so a large economy with potential may still be unplayable for foreign investors, and the key question is whether outsiders can actually make money.

    “So you have to ask yourself, is this a game where I can play?”

0.26

Via's algorithm shapes routes so riders perceive fairness, applying psychology to service design.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Via, a private ride-sharing van service in New York and other cities, is positioned as an alternative to buses using an algorithm that matches riders on routes and designs pick-up sequences to feel psychologically fair, since riders will accept detours they believe are necessary.

    “they know that you're going to believe that they took you out of the way and it made it longer, even if it made it shorter.”

  • The ride-sharing company Via uses an algorithm that sets routes to be psychologically attractive, sometimes taking a seemingly longer path so riders believe they were not taken out of the way, and Sawikin invested in it alongside Mercedes.

    “they know that you're going to believe that they took you out of the way and it made it longer, even if it made it shorter.”