What this covers
Adam of Workweek is the main voice here, with Matt and Dom joining him. He starts from why digital media economics are poor. Newspapers paired low-churn subscriptions with ads, while digitally native outlets just placed ads beside content. Almost no digital media company has reached $10 billion, only about three reached $1 billion, and valuations sit near 0.5x. Adam also argues that most operators misclassify cost of goods sold. With production costs included, he puts gross margins at 35 to 45 percent and net margins at 20 to 25 percent. Workweek passes a large share of that margin to its talent. Of its roughly 14 people, five had never made content before.
The middle of the conversation turns to tooling and growth tactics. Adam calls Substack's 10 percent cut too high and says it should be 3 to 5 percent. He cites a beehiiv comparison of Auto Opt-In subscribers showing a 9.3 percent unsubscribe rate and a spam rate six times normal. He treats list counts as Vanity Metrics vs Real Signal. He also explains why newsletters are a must-win channel, using Attention vs Intention, and why podcasts are a black hole for advertisers. That leads to his claim that Spotify should buy Substack.
The last stretch covers who should write and where the openings are. Adam says journalists see only 20 to 30 percent of a B2B industry, which he sets against the Knowledge Expert Paradox. Dom questions whether a practitioner who turns writer eventually loses touch, and he names Ben Thompson as the counterexample. Adam closes with market calls. State Affairs could reach $500 million to $1 billion, franchising is badly underserved, and The Information, Puck, and Punchbowl may top out at $25 to $30 million.
Adam Ryan argues that media is shifting from institutions to individuals, and that a brand-plus-individual structure with performance-based talent equity, funded by margins the traditional media model left on the table, can fix digital media's broken business model and seed secondary businesses.
- Consumer attention follows individuals, so pairing a brand with a named operator-expert scales better than either alone
- Digital media's ad concentration and low exit values make pure content businesses poor economics, so value must come from talent equity and secondary products
- Growth tactics like auto-opt-in list building inflate vanity metrics and harm the ecosystem
Talent should be selected and judged for monetizable expertise, mindset, and grinding ambition, not existing audience size.
- The more successful someone is in business, the less likely they are to share their knowledge publicly, creating a paradox that Workweek was built to solve by offering a path for experts to share.
“The term we call that and the one we wanted to solve is this knowledge expert paradox. And the idea is the more successful someone is in business, the least likely they are to share.”
- A cannabis-beat writer hired early at Workweek left to pursue crypto, illustrating that people in early career stages are prone to shifting ambitions that can break a long-term content commitment.
“he was covering cannabis. He was amazing... 'Hey, I want to get into crypto.'”
- People in their first roughly 15 years of a career are changing and adapting, while later in life family and other priorities take over, so seasoned professionals are better long-term creators because their careers and commitments are more stable.
“finding people that are more seasoned in their career, that have been around a little bit is much easier to do this with.”
- Workweek expected finding four creators to take about four months but completed it in about five weeks, and afterward began doing persona and buying-behavior research upfront, since five of its roughly 14 creators had never created content.
“Becca and I thought it'd take about four months to find four people, and it took like five weeks to find four people.”
- Workweek's talent selection now starts with whether the industry monetizes easily and fits a playbook, then requires top expertise, and finally a grinding mindset with ambition, since a top expert in a weak-monetizing industry will not work.
“the first thing that we now look for is what industry do we want to be in.”
- The hardest part of turning operators into creators is mental: they must come to see publishing online as their job rather than as something outside selling, a shift that marks a real turning point for them.
“is my f***** job just to like create content on the Internet, like that's what I do.”
- Talent should be identified by having real conversations with smart people, since Twitter's echo chamber and LinkedIn's vanity metrics mislead about who has genuine expertise.
“if you really kind of take away the echo chamber of Twitter or the like vanity metrics of LinkedIn and just go talk to really smart people”
- The hardest trait to judge in talent is mindset, specifically the ambition to be the biggest voice in the room, which requires an ego and a willingness to grind, and it is harder to assess than industry expertise or natural ability.
“mindset is harder to judge and takes time and practice to get better at”
- Of the roughly 14 people Workweek works with, five had never created content before, and most were barely active on social media, which Adam sees as evidence that real expertise matters more than visible online metrics.
“out of the 14 or so people that we work with, five had never created content before at all”
- Partnering with emerging experts early creates mutual investment and a clean financial model, whereas joining an established institution like SportsCenter after it has become a 15-year brand creates friction between talent and executives.
“starting from scratch is just a much easier way to have that alignment and then the financial model”
- Workweek avoids fixed multi-year contracts like those used by Barcel, and instead pays talent based on success, so if the talent succeeds, the talent is paid more.
“It's pay. If we're having success, you're having success.”
Digital media is a business-model problem, so most of its businesses remain lifestyle outcomes rather than venture-scale.
- Almost no digital media companies have reached $10 billion in value, only about three reached $1 billion, and current valuations for these businesses sit around 0.5x, which reflects weak exit velocity that makes venture capital unwilling to fund them.
“can you name one comp that hit $10 billion, just one, no. Can you name one comp that hit $1 billion? Three companies, basically”
- Advertising is structurally choppy, and monopolies like Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Snap capture 80 to 90 percent of the market, so the rest of digital media must split roughly 10 percent.
“there's not been monopolies like Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Snap that like just take up 80%, 90% of the market. So now, it's still choppy... but the rest of us have to eat this 10%.”
- Most media operators misstate their cost of goods sold because they do not know how to classify it; when all production costs are included, most media businesses have gross margins around 35 to 45 percent and net margins of about 20 to 25 percent.
“every media operator lies about their COGS because no one knows how to classify it. But if you include everything that goes into it... most media businesses are somewhere between like 35 and 45 gross margin.”
- The decline of media value and influence is fundamentally a business model problem: newspapers had low-churn subscriptions plus ads, whereas digitally native media companies just placed ads next to content and faced higher churn and more audience options.
“this is just a business model problem. It is like really what it comes down to.”
- State Affairs is rolling up state political newsletters and building an enterprise and consumer offering, and while mostly subscription-funded its narrative control and growth could support a $500 million to $1 billion outcome.
“They are doing a roll-up strategy of state political newsletters... when I think about like actual $500 million, $1 billion potential ideas”
- Building secondary businesses after a media company is established is very difficult unless the company planned for them from the beginning, because The Hustle lacked the culture and financial backing to launch tools even with a large audience and influence.
“it wasn't built to launch. Even if we cashflowed, well, it wasn't built to launch a lot of tools.”
- Content businesses are not winner-take-all because when ad-supported players share the remaining market, communication and alignment among peers lift the whole category, a rising-tide dynamic.
“I never believe that in content it's a winner take all... There's a rising tide lifts all boats aspect to this”
- Many newer media businesses that started with trends are lifestyle businesses that took venture money but cannot become venture outcomes; they can be good and cash-flowing but will not reach massive scale, as with The Information, Puck, and Punchbowl, which may top out at $25 to $30 million.
“We're in a wave where I think there's more lifestyle businesses that did new trends that then took venture and they're not venture businesses.”
- PRIME with Logan succeeds because followers buy consistently while the brand can stand alone, reaching shoppers such as Adam's mother who do not know Logan Paul but buy the drink in a grocery store.
“my mom doesn't know who Logan Paul even is, but she can walk in the grocery store”
- Venture capital has driven U.S. innovation for the last 50 years, and investors have stopped funding digital media because it lacks plausible outcomes, which Adam views as a collapse of the industry's value over the last 30 years.
“investors aren't stupid. They're like, hey, this isn't going to get any outcomes.”
Creator pay should track success through incentive alignment rather than fixed contracts or taking margin.
- Most talent platforms, agencies, and services make more money by signing people who already have large audiences and optimizing the take rate, which becomes a race to zero because those talents feel they already did the work and are just paying for distribution.
“most of the trader platforms, agencies, services, their business is much more successful when they go after people who already have huge audiences and they almost just optimize the end. And that to us was where that's a race to zero”
- Traditional TV talent is paid far below the value they create, and a better model is pay that tracks success (you have success, we have success) rather than fixed multi-year contracts, since incentive alignment is central to fixing media.
“Ultimately, the compensation and value of that talent is normally not even remotely equitable to the value that they create.”
- Workweek's secondary businesses, which it calls theme parks, each have their own capital structure because a tech-enabled service, a service business, and a vertical SaaS business have very different capital needs, but alignment is ensured by giving all contributors long-term incentives.
“all the cap structures are unique to the business itself... what we absolutely do is make sure there's alignment.”
- Workweek gives a large portion of the margin that media companies usually keep to its talent in a predictable, incentivized way, because a professional earning $300,000 from a practice would not write newsletters and podcasts unless the economics were worth it.
“let's literally give a huge portion of that, that margin to these talents... why the hell would you write a newsletter and do a podcast. You do have to make it financially worth it.”
Pairing a brand with an individual persona is the strongest formula for media growth.
- Consumer behavior has been following individuals more than institutions, as shown by audiences following specific writers and personalities (e.g., Sara Fischer over Axios) and by people tiring of not knowing who editors and voices behind content are.
“ultimately, consumer behavior was following individuals more than institutions. And there's a lot of different data points around that.”
- Workweek used a consistent yellow-background profile picture and visual through-lines across its sites to signal membership in the brand, which helped attract inbound talent, with about 3,000 applicants in Q1.
“The reason why we, I think, originally put a lot of effort in getting the yellow backgrounds on that is it allows us to track talent. We have 3,000 applicants in Q1 inbound.”
- Pairing a brand with an individual leader is the best formula for media: a brand makes scaling and market expansion easier and reaches people who do not know the individual (PRIME with Logan's Gatorade-style reach), while the individual provides the pressure and trust that drives engagement.
“it's using a brand strategy and/or an institution strategy with an individual leading it is the perfect formula compared to going one way or the other.”
- Workweek's business model is to grow a persona's perception within an industry first and then capture value from that perception, and perception must be built per persona and per channel, since the same content cadence can be noticed in one industry and ignored in another.
“Workweek's business model is fairly easy, is can we grow your perception and then capture the value across the way?”
- Rather than requiring every creator to do everything, Workweek identifies each person's strength (e.g., deep-dive newsletters) and backfills weaker channels such as Twitter with team support, so the individual is perceived as the star while a team does the work.
“let's have him focus there because that's how you build the perception. And then the other aspects that you're not 10x at, let's replace that with someone.”
Media companies should build differentiated products and look beyond their core product, as Disney did.
- Launching products just because a creator has a large audience (distribution) without differentiated service or scalable technology produces a short-term win that is shortsighted and usually fails.
“You're just using your distribution like have a short-term win. And I think that's totally fine, but it's -- in many ways, it's shortsighted and probably won't work out well.”
- Walt Disney's decision to launch an amusement park, which even his brother thought was crazy, is one of the boldest business bets of the 20th century and shows why media companies should look beyond their core product.
“one of the boldest business bets in the 20th century was a production company saying, suck it, let's launch an amusement park”
- Workweek's first products are HireFor, a talent search business built from its large candidate database that serves executive hiring, and Krokit, a vertical SaaS financial planning platform for franchisors and franchisees, with more launches planned over the coming months.
“we announced HireFor, which is a talent search business... We also announced Krokit, which is a vertical SaaS platform for franchise owners and franchisors.”
- Audience data showed that over 50 percent of franchise owners own only one location, which changed Workweek's view of its franchise market from wealthy multi-unit chain owners to small business owners who lack transparency and financial access.
“over 50% of franchise owners only own one location, like the definition of small business owners.”
Longform written content and LinkedIn drive intention, while podcasts and Twitter fail to produce measurable returns.
- Newsletters are a must-win channel because longform written word drives intention (action taken based on what someone says), not just attention, and because written business communication is how professionals already operate, while podcasts build attention but produce no usable data.
“Intention is I will take an action based on what you say. I think longform written word is still one of the best ways to drive intention, especially in business”
- Twitter remains strong for most Workweek categories, but Workweek leaned into LinkedIn for HR and marketing last year because sales audiences are essentially absent from Twitter while LinkedIn is everywhere despite being noisy.
“Sales is ghost on Twitter. Like no one's basically there. LinkedIn, it's everywhere. It's a little noisy, but it's everywhere.”
- Spotify should buy Substack, because if it could show acquired creators' revenue like newsletters do, marketers would spend on audio; podcasts currently feel like a black hole to advertisers because they produce no measurable return.
“If Spotify could start to say, this person you acquired for this much and now this is how much you're making like we can do in newsletters, the entire ecosystem would grow by magnitudes”
Auto opt-in and subscriber-based pricing inflate lists without proving content-market fit.
- Auto opt-in list growth is like junk mail: once people realize they were auto-enrolled, they stop opening anything, which damages the whole ecosystem's trust and reach.
“it's kind of like someone realizing that they could send junk mail in the physical mail for the first time and then everyone would be like, oh, I can do this like all the time”
- A beehiiv comparison of SparkLoop auto opt-in users showed a 9.3 percent unsubscribe rate and a spam rate six times normal, which hurts deliverability and harms all senders sharing the same IP.
“the unsubscribe rate was 9.3%, and the spam rate was 6x the normal.”
- Growing a subscriber list through low-friction sign-ups proves nothing about content-market fit: creators can have 10,000 subscribers yet get zero course sales because the audience never chose to follow them, so list counts mislead creators about whether their content is good.
“The foolery of it is that it's not proving content market fit for new people... I have 10,000 people on my list. I am like, bro, that was an auto checkbox. No one knows who you are.”
- Email platforms like ConvertKit and beehiiv charge by subscriber count, which incentivizes them to push creators to grow lists, while beehiiv's engagement-based paid model and opt-in choice are better aligned with the ecosystem.
“ConvertKit and beehiiv basically charge you by subscribers. So like, of course, they want you to grow that account.”
- Email platforms that charge by subscriber count are incentivized to encourage list growth, which can inflate subscriber numbers without proving that content has market fit.
“The foolery of it is that it's not proving content market fit for new people... I have 10,000 people on my list. I am like, bro, that was an auto checkbox. No one knows who you are.”
- Beehiiv does not auto-opt users into lists and charges paid-tier fees based on engagement, which Adam considers better than competitors, though he acknowledges he is somewhat biased because Beehiiv's cofounder advised Workweek.
“they've never done auto opt-in. They make you like choose.”
- Podcasts are one of the best ways to build intention, but they produce no measurable data, so Adam says he spends nothing on podcast advertising because it feels like a black hole.
“I don't spend $1 on podcast because that just feels like a black hole.”
B2B niche media is a large, early opportunity but difficult to execute well.
- The franchise industry controls around $800 billion in purchasing power, yet only one newsletter in the category has more than 5,000 subscribers, showing a large overlooked niche with high potential for generational businesses.
“the franchise industry just using that $800 billion total. There's one newsletter with more than 5,000 subscribers total.”
- Despite talk of a niche media trend, it is still very early: most Americans have never heard of niche industries like waste management, and video and podcast content in interview formats is only beginning to reach niche audiences.
“We're still way, way early, not even remotely close to like if we think about the other content trends”
- Although no-code and AI lower the cost of building tools, B2B is a different animal from B2C, and vertical SaaS products do not come out of the box, so product creation remains harder than in consumer markets.
“will there be like an out-of-the-box vertical SaaS business? No. It just doesn't work that way... B2B is a different animal than B2C.”
- Journalists typically have insight into only 20 to 30 percent of a B2B industry and business audiences do not want to hear from them, so the barrier to great B2B content is high because it requires people who actually have insider insight willing to publish.
“I don't think people in these spaces want to hear from journalists typically, even the best ones only have insights into 20%, 30%.”
- A weekly podcast for franchise owners makes people in the franchise industry see the host as the leading voice, but a weekly podcast in marketing barely registers, so the perception payoff of identical tactics varies by industry.
“If you do one a week in marketing like no one even notices or cares, right?”
Substack's fee is too high relative to its technology and business model.
- Substack's 10 percent revenue cut is far too high and should be closer to 3 to 5 percent, because the platform's tech stack and features do not justify the fee at roughly $3 million in revenue paid to a basic ESP-type service.
“the 10% was just way too high, probably 200% too high. I mean, it probably should be like 3%, 4%. You can maybe get away with 5%”
- Substack will be viewed historically like MySpace: a culturally relevant first mover that introduced many people to a new format, which other players later improved on.
“they're going to be viewed historically as kind of like a Myspace, like very cultural, relevant, first mover in the space”
- Substack deserves credit for recognizing that many talented people want to create content more easily and for embedding distribution in the newsletter format, eliminating steps that made blogging harder.
“They just eliminated steps, and the ease to create is phenomenal.”
- Substack's business model is weak because a publisher with about $3 million in revenue pays a price similar to a low-quality email service provider despite Substack having a strong tech stack, and it depends on growth to make up the difference.
“if you essentially have $3 million in revenue on Substack, you're paying like the same amount for kind of a s***** ESP”