Goldman Sachs: Fortune Favors The Old
What this covers
Marc and Matt work through Goldman Sachs one business line at a time, with Marc supplying nearly all of the analysis. They start from the Risk Intermediation Model: the bank takes risk onto its own balance sheet, matches it between counterparties, or packages it into structured products for investors who want it. They then price each activity. Investment banking takes roughly 3% of an IPO, 50 to 60 basis points of global M&A, and only a few basis points on investment-grade debt. Sales and trading has no explicit fee. The firm earns the bid-offer spread, which widens with volatility. The segment figures follow: financing around $5 billion, fixed income and equities together bringing sales and trading to $14 to 16 billion, and asset management near $15 billion, most of it principal investing.
The middle of the conversation covers 2008. Goldman moved from SEC-regulated broker-dealer to bank holding company, and the talk covers the Asset Valuation Hierarchy, its habit of mark to market, and the contested claim that its aggressive marks helped set off AIG's collateral calls. They also cover the record 2009 revenue and the "vampire squid" backlash from Matt Taibbi. From there the discussion moves to deposits, now above $350 billion, as a hedge against the funding fragility that sank Bear Stearns.
The later sections are more forward-looking and contentious. They cover valuing the firm through ROE against cost of equity, the fall in employee pay from about 50 to 30 cents per revenue dollar, and Scale Advantage Concentration among the top three banks. Private credit competition, SPAC economics, a Dunbar-number reading of the partnership, and doubt that 2021's near-$60 billion revenue will recur are also covered.
Goldman Sachs earns its returns by intermediating risk between clients, and its moat rests on scale, balance-sheet capacity, and partnership-style culture. Valuation should therefore track return on equity against cost of equity, and the firm's shift toward deposits and recurring fees reduces its exposure to cyclical trading.
- Investment banks profit by sitting between clients who want to offload or take on risk and taking a fee or spread for matching them
- Price-to-book reflects whether return on equity exceeds cost of equity, so ROE is the key metric
- Scale, technology spend, and the top-three market concentration are widening Goldman's advantage over smaller rivals
Bank holding status and deposit gathering give stable funding and consumer distribution, absorbing regulatory costs.
- Prior to 2008 Goldman was regulated by the SEC as a broker-dealer. To access emergency government funding facilities at the end of 2008, it reclassified as a bank holding company regulated by the Federal Reserve, making it a fundamentally different entity.
“In order to gain access to some of the emergency funding facilities that the government allowed at the end of 2008, Goldman was forced to reclassify as a bank holding company.”
- Deposits are a long-term, stable funding source uncorrelated with capital-markets funding. Bear Stearns, which ran into trouble before Lehman, relied heavily on short-term unsecured funding, so diversifying into deposits is a key lesson from the financial crisis, though deposits remain regulated and cannot be freely deployed into principal investing.
“by tapping into deposits, which are long term, uncorrelated with other capital markets oriented funding sources, that's a healthy source of funding.”
- After becoming a bank in 2008 Goldman absorbed many new regulatory costs for years. Under CEO David Solomon, the firm realized it could extract benefits from being a bank, and the main benefit it pursued was a deposit franchise.
“having suffered all the costs of becoming a bank, maybe there was some benefits that they could extract as well. One of those benefits was an ability to set up a deposit franchise.”
- Goldman's balance sheet today holds about $1.5 trillion of assets, with only about $25 billion of Level 3 (hard-to-value) assets. Much of the rest is Level 1 or Level 2 and easier to value, including large cash holdings and about a third in sales and trading inventory.
“Goldman's balance sheet today is one and a half trillion dollars of assets.”
- Goldman now holds about $100 billion of capital against a balance sheet that is larger but less risky, compared with roughly $35 billion in 2006 and 2007. Even then, Goldman was better capitalized than Lehman Brothers, which failed.
“Goldman today runs with about a hundred billion of capital on this balance sheet. If you go back to 2007, 2006, they had 35 billion of capital”
- Goldman's roughly 12,000 corporate clients who had used its M&A or underwriting services historically kept their cash management and treasury business with other banks. Once Goldman became a regulated bank, it launched transaction banking to capture those deposits, and total deposits now exceed $350 billion.
“The firm now has over 350 billion of deposits from a much lower base a couple of years ago.”
- Goldman, unencumbered by a branch network, used its technology expertise to launch Marcus as an online bank to gather deposits in the US and then the UK, and has raised substantial deposits through it.
“Goldman unencumbered by a branch network tapped into its technology expertise and launched a Fintech, launched Marcus as an online bank to gather deposits.”
- Beyond the classic build-versus-buy decision, the most interesting strategic choice is build versus buy versus partner. Goldman's partnerships with fintech and big tech firms, and how they evolve, reveal how incumbents and new players adapt to each other.
“There's this famous decision of build versus buy, but I often think the most interesting is build versus buy versus partner.”
- Goldman has partnerships with Stripe in payments and Apple around credit cards, which it is not yet exploiting to its full degree. These partnerships reflect Goldman's shift toward pairing risk management with consumer distribution.
“Goldman has a agreement with Stripe in payments, it has an agreement with Apple around credit cards”
- The most formidable competitor in financial services would be a combination of an investment bank with risk management expertise and balance sheet, like Goldman, and a consumer-facing technology company with distribution and consumer trust. Neither FinTech startups nor big tech alone is as threatening.
“what I think would be the most formidable competitor would be a combination of, let's say Goldman Sachs, and a consumer facing technology company.”
- Goldman now has over $350 billion of deposits, up from a much lower base only a couple of years earlier, driven by its consumer and transaction banking launches.
“The firm now has over 350 billion of deposits from a much lower base a couple of years ago.”
- Google's deposit product with Citibank was disbanded, and Amazon is active in financial services in India, showing that big technology companies are moving into finance with mixed results.
“Google did an agreement with Citibank to launch a deposit product. Actually that was disbanded”
Client risk appetite, not GDP alone, drives investment banking's cyclical revenue.
- Investment banks let clients take on risk they want or offload risk they don't want. They sit in the middle and make that happen through three channels: taking risk onto their own balance sheet (e.g., underwriting an IPO), matching risk between counterparties (e.g., a Mexican oil producer hedging against falling prices and an airline hedging against rising prices), and sourcing risk by packaging it into structured products and derivatives for investors seeking it.
“allow clients which can be corporate clients or they could be institutional clients to take risk. A client has a risk they don't want or they want a risk they don't have.”
- Goldman's revenue is cyclical and sits at the nexus of risk-taking and risk appetite. Record 2021 revenue of close to $60 billion reflected very high risk appetite that year, and it is unlikely that level of revenue will recur in the short term, even though over the long run revenue tracks roughly GDP.
“It's unlikely we're going to see that level of revenues again in the short term.”
- In sales and trading there is no explicit take rate. Goldman earns money as a market maker by quoting a bid and offer and capturing the spread between them, and the spread widens with volatility.
“Typically when volatility is higher, those spreads will go up and the opportunity to make money sitting in the middle goes up as well.”
- Observers distinguish good volatility, meaning movement within a range that lets intermediaries widen spreads, from bad volatility, which creates risk-management problems for the balance sheet. A healthy amount of volatility is good for the sales and trading business.
“Good volatility is kind of volatility in a range, which allows the intermediary to increase that spread. Bad volatility has implications for risk management.”
- Investment banking revenue is cyclical and is best described as linked to GDP and economic activity, but the more precise driver is risk appetite. Risk appetite is correlated with GDP to a degree yet overshoots and undershoots it, and the instincts of corporate and institutional clients drive revenue.
“I would probably impose an overlay on that, which links to risk appetite, which is correlated to a degree to GDP, but can overshoot and undershoot.”
Diversifying into recurring asset management and financing reduces dependence on volatile trading.
- Investment banks historically built asset management businesses to counterbalance the volatility of sales and trading. Morgan Stanley's E-Trade acquisition and asset management deals are examples of diversifying into recurring revenue.
“The reason why banks employ asset management activities is often to counterbalance the volatility inherent in a sales and trading business.”
- Goldman operates four segments: global markets (sales and trading, equities, fixed income) at about 40% of revenue, investment banking (M&A and underwriting) at about 20%, asset management at about 25%, and consumer and wealth at about 15%.
“global markets about 40% of revenues, investment banking, which is M&A and underwriting about 20%, asset management around a quarter, 25%, and the rest 15% is the consumer and wealth business.”
- Goldman's asset management earns stable management fees on third-party assets (typically around 0.2% of AUM) plus incentive fees, making it far more predictable than trading. Its roughly $15 billion of asset management revenue includes about $11 billion from principal investing with its own balance sheet.
“They earn typically maybe not 0.2% of assets under the supervision.”
- Goldman's stated goal is to reduce the capital it allocates to investing on its own account and grow its less capital-intensive, recurring third-party asset management revenue instead.
“The target of the company is to reduce the capital it allocates to investing on its own account and increase the less capital-intensive, more recurring revenue-oriented third-party assets”
- Goldman's financing business, including prime brokerage margin lending, warehouse loans, and corporate lending, historically generated about $5 billion a year but is volatile and difficult to project. Together with fixed income intermediation ($5 to 10 billion) and equities ($4 to 8 billion), sales and trading yields roughly $14 to 16 billion.
“Goldman has made maybe $5 billion a year on the financing side”
Capital intensity and return on equity define banking economics beyond labor cost.
- A rule of thumb: the more capital-intensive the activity, the lower the labor cost share. Banking is labor-intensive but not capital-intensive, so its operating margins may be lower but its returns on capital can be higher, while fixed income and equities let the firm keep more margin by deploying its own capital.
“the more capital-intensive the activity, the more balance sheet the company is putting behind it, then the higher the efficiency from a labor perspective.”
- Investment banking takes a percentage of deal value that varies by product and size: about 3% for an IPO, about 50 to 60 basis points for global M&A (lower for very large deals of $10 billion-plus), and only a few basis points for investment-grade debt offerings.
“For an IPO, that might be 3%.”
- Over the past 20 years, the share of revenue going to employees at Goldman and across the industry has fallen from about 50 cents per revenue dollar to about 30 cents, driven by growing balance-sheet importance, consolidation, and technology.
“20 years ago, 50 cents in every dollar of revenue was attributable to employees.”
- Goldman no longer targets a compensation ratio. It now targets an overall efficiency ratio, because non-compensation costs such as technology and infrastructure spending have become as important as people costs were 20 years ago.
“They now target the overall efficiency ratio on the basis that non-compensation costs, not the people, but the technology spend and the infrastructure spend is as important as people were 20 years ago.”
- The most important metric for a bank is return on equity, and Goldman's target is 14% to 16%. With growth discounted, a bank can be valued by comparing its ROE with its cost of equity, treating it like a bond, so a 15% ROE against a 10% required return justifies a price-to-book of about 1.5.
“the way to value a bank or an investment bank is simply to compare that return on equity to its cost of equity.”
Advisory and underwriting fees are structurally resilient because they are sticky and favor the largest players.
- Market share is concentrating among the top three global players, which had about a third of the market six to seven years ago and have been gaining share. Scale benefits, particularly technology spending of over $4 billion a year, give large players an advantage that smaller competitors struggle to match.
“There is across many industries, increasingly a scale benefit, linked not least technology spend. Goldman spends over $4 billion a year on technology.”
- The SPAC process was probably more profitable for investment banks than a traditional IPO, because it generated M&A fees, distribution fees, and other fees, even though SPACs were pitched as an alternative to banks' IPO fees.
“the SPACs were a huge profit center for these investment banks. And actually from beginning to end, the entire SPAC process was probably more profitable than the IPO business”
- Goldman's position at the center of the financial system, a growing financial system, and a concentrating share of players means its core advisory and execution businesses are structurally resilient. Corporate advice and sales and trading execution are perennial needs that rise as the world financializes.
“The need for corporate advice, as discussed in the McKinsey episode, is perennial. The need for sales and trading execution is perennial.”
- Investment bank fees for IPOs and M&A are sticky because CEOs make few strategic decisions in a career and, when they do, want experienced advisors and are not price sensitive. Academic work shows IPO and M&A pricing has proven very sticky over time, and consolidation among the top three is likely to strengthen this.
“a CEO won't be making that many strategic decisions over his tenure. When he or she is ready to make one, they will want a advisor with experience by their side and they won't be too picky around price.”
Crisis-era marking and government aid produced record profits alongside backlash, despite prior caution.
- Before the financial crisis, Goldman's access to global deal flow let it take large pre-IPO positions in Chinese banks during their mid-2000s listings, including a large stake in ICBC, which it could exploit through its own balance sheet.
“Goldman was able to take large pre-IPO positions in certainly one of the biggest Chinese bank, ICBC.”
- For most of its 150 years, Goldman stayed out of consumer business on purpose, because management worried about the liabilities that would come from Main Street exposure. Its risks were transacted between institutions and corporates who understood them, so consumers largely did not know the firm.
“Historically, the management of Goldman Sachs had taken the view that they didn't want to get too close to consumers because of the potential liabilities that would arise.”
- Goldman was forced to take government financial aid during the 2008 crisis, then in 2009 posted record revenue of about $45 billion versus a historical range of roughly $15 to $25 billion. Post-bailout record profits looked like profiting from the crisis, which triggered intense backlash from commentators, the media, and politicians and led to the Taibbi 'vampire squid' quote.
“In 2009, the company made $45 billion of revenue. Historically, it was making maybe between 15 and $25 billion.”
- Goldman's crisis outcome stemmed from its habit of marking assets to market frequently, including hard-to-price ones. This let it recognize problems early and profit from being short housing assets in 2007 and 2008, and it arguably precipitated AIG's collateral calls by marking more aggressively than others.
“Goldman was very quick to identify what was going on because on a very regular basis, it would look to mark to market its assets”
Conservative balance sheet valuation and regulated capital make Goldman's earnings hard to value.
- The common equity tier 1 ratio measures capital against assets and is a key metric analysts watch. Before the financial crisis that ratio was wafer thin, and now regulatory requirements govern it.
“The common equity tier one ratio is the ratio of capital to assets that the bank holds.”
- Goldman's approach to valuing its balance sheet, marking to market even hard-to-value assets, gave it an edge in crisis recognition, and its current Level 3 exposure is small relative to total assets.
“Goldman has always been a proponent of marking to market.”
- Assets are classified by how easy they are to value. Level 1 assets trade on exchanges with observable prices and liquidity, Level 2 are less easy, and Level 3 are hard to value. Banks were stuffed with Level 3 assets going into the financial crisis, which made the crisis's valuation problems severe.
“three types of assets, assets that are very easy to value. They trade on the New York stock exchange.”
- Sales and trading is hard to value because its earnings are volatile and its earnings power is difficult to project, which constrains how investors can value Goldman.
“There's a kind of black box to the sales and trading business. It's very difficult to project what earnings power is from that business”
Intermediation power is shifting from banks toward private capital, exchanges, and passive investing flows.
- Post-crisis regulation created room for competitors such as private equity and private credit firms, which now compete with Goldman in providing capital to clients. M&A boutiques, which have a long history like Lazard, have also expanded. The power to intermediate has moved away from banks.
“Post the financial crisis, the regulatory framework constructed around banks was sufficient to create an environment where competitors popped up elsewhere.”
- Investment banks no longer sit at the center of financial markets. Private equity firms, global exchange groups that own clearing, and benchmark index companies that drive passive flows now hold significant power, and the 'masters of the universe' moniker has shifted accordingly.
“The investment banks used to sit at the center of financial markets. They don't anymore.”
- Growth in passive investing reduces the order flow that market makers rely on, making it harder to be a market maker. It also reshapes asset pricing and valuation, so understanding what sits in passive ETFs and what drives their flows matters for investors.
“the less flow there is, the more challenging it is to be a market maker, but it goes well beyond that in terms of asset pricing, valuation of businesses”
Partnership culture and institutional memory sustain Goldman's longevity and strong talent.
- Although Goldman is a public company, it preserved partnership culture through a partnership class of about 440 senior managing directors among its roughly 45,000 employees. This group spans all departments and provides horizontal communication and institutional memory, sustaining the firm's longevity.
“The way it does that is it has a partnership class.”
- For a firm with 150 years of history, Goldman has had surprisingly few CEOs, and CEO turnover has been low. This continuity contributes to the firm's culture.
“So in the 150 year history of Goldman, there haven't been that many CEOs.”
- Goldman's senior leadership has cycled between banking and trading backgrounds: Lloyd Blankfein came from trading, his predecessor Hank Paulson from banking, and current CEO David Solomon from banking. These shifts change strategy and priorities.
“Historically, Goldman has drawn its senior management from both banking and trading sides of the business.”
- The roughly 440 senior partners sits within a range suggested by Dunbar-number research, where 150 is the number of people an individual can know, so Goldman's senior layer is reasonable enough that its members likely know each other.
“A lot of work have been done around Dunbar numbers, 150 being the number of people that anyone could know. 440's reasonable.”
- Cultural problems, such as the litigation and losses at Credit Suisse around Archegos and prime brokerage, eventually impact culture, causing the best people to leave. Goldman has largely avoided these pitfalls that smaller peers have confronted.
“often it takes time, but these things eventually impact culture, the best people leave”
- Goldman's alumni go on to senior roles in politics, commerce, and public-company leadership, and the name on the resume carries weight, similar to McKinsey's mystique. The firm's talent is consistently strong, and interactions with intelligent colleagues at all levels build ambition beyond the firm.
“there's a certain benefit to just the name on a resume that goes a long way”
- As a financial analyst Marc believes culture is often overlooked in investing, and Goldman has retained a small-firm culture at scale because reputation reinforces reputation. This institutional memory contributes to the firm's longevity.
“I think culture matters. I think as a financial analyst, which is my background, it's something that's often overlooked.”
- A key lesson from Goldman is that you do not need to know the answer to a question, only the person who does. Goldman pushed cross-team coordination so that research could be reused across asset classes rather than repeated in silos.
“you don't need to know the answer to the question, you just need to know the person that knows the answer to the question.”
Goldman ranks first in global investment banking by market share.
- Goldman is number one in global investment banking alongside JP Morgan, with a market share of roughly 15% to 20% depending on the product line (M&A, equity underwriting, or debt underwriting).
“Goldman is the number one in investment banking globally alongside JP Morgan. They have a market share between 15% and 20%”
- The top 15 global investment banking players together generate roughly $200 to $210 billion of revenue across M&A, underwriting, equities, and fixed income.
“you're looking at 200 billion, $210 billion of revenue across M&A underwriting equities fixed income businesses.”