What this covers
Marc and Zack trace Blackstone from its first deal to its current size. Transtar, a corporate transportation unit bought in 1987, returned about 4x within two years and 26x when fully sold in 2003. The first fund reached roughly 2.5x, which let the firm raise a second about six years later. The episode also sets out the economics: a 1 to 2 percent annual management fee plus carried interest of about 20 percent of realized gains, so most profit arrives at exit. The 2007 IPO is framed as a choice to use stock as acquisition currency.
The range is wide. Corporate private equity is about 30 percent of assets, with around 250 portfolio companies and Medline, a $30 billion-plus LBO. Hilton, bought just before the financial crisis, ended up returning about $14 billion. Credit, about 25 percent of assets, grew from banks pulling back after the crisis and from the GSO acquisition. The conversation covers three funding channels (insurers, institutions, private wealth) and how Apollo tied insurance balance sheets to alternative managers, a route to permanent capital. It also covers the reach for yield that pushed alternatives to about $14 trillion.
The contested parts concern durability. Marc discusses whether scale really escapes diminishing returns, the older melting ice cube view of fund earnings, and the 2019 re-rating as recurring fee-related earnings outgrew lumpy performance fees. He also covers the principal-agent tension between managers who want more assets and investors who want lower fees, the slow feedback of a "virtuous circle" in ten-year funds, and regulatory risk.
Blackstone compounded into a $650 billion alternatives manager because scale, cross-strategy integration, and a long performance record let it convert low-yield investor demand into durable, recurring fee streams, and the public market re-rated it only after those results were proven over time.
- Scale allows larger deals and cross-unit information sharing with a small headcount, producing roughly 45% EBIT margins
- Growth in permanent capital from insurers and private wealth shifted revenue toward recurring management fees that the market values more highly
- The stock market lagged LP confidence and re-rated the firm in 2019, only after a multi-decade track record was visible
Blackstone's scale, rather than deal-by-deal selection, drives its rising returns and margins.
- Active fund management usually shows diminishing returns to scale, but Blackstone argues its scale is a niche because it can execute much larger deals than competitors can.
“Certainly on the active side, there are diminishing returns typically to scale. Blackstone argues that their scale is their niche, because they can do much large deals, than others can do.”
- Overall EBIT margin is about 45 percent, high relative to most S&P 500 companies, because the firm can run a trillion dollars with few more than 3,100 people, producing increasing returns to scale.
“the overall EBIT margin on the business, is about 45%. It's pretty high relative to most S&P 500 companies, because of the scale economics”
- Blackstone now invests top-down by industry theme, such as life sciences or e-commerce via content studios, rather than bottom-up cost-cutting, because its scale requires large mathematically-driven allocations.
“Increasingly, they think about investing on a kind of mathematic basis, rather than being bottom up”
- Operating across private equity, hedge funds, real estate, and credit lets Blackstone share information and capital across units, such as entering life sciences through both real estate and direct company buys, while keeping only about 3,000 employees for roughly $650 billion of assets.
“there's an integration there, because they do private equity, and hedge funds, and real estate, and credit.”
Low rates, deregulation, and regulatory change have been tailwinds behind its buyout returns.
- Low interest rates in the late 1980s and Wall Street deregulation about a decade earlier gave Blackstone's first fund opportunities it might not otherwise have had, though the firm still had to execute.
“So, first of all, they benefited from some tailwinds.”
- Blackstone bought Hilton in 2007, just before the financial crisis, and showed losses at one point, but operating improvements in the hotel and management businesses turned it into about $14 billion returned to investors.
“they turned it around through operating improvements in the underlying business, and ultimately they returned $14 billion to investors”
- Over its 35-year history, Blackstone's private equity has delivered a realized return of 2.1x, real estate 2.2x, and tactical opportunities 1.8x.
“Private equity has delivered over those 35 years, a realized return of 2.1x. Real estate, 2.2x. Tactical opportunities has done 1.8x.”
- When Blackstone went public in 2007 it took in investment from a Chinese sovereign wealth fund.
“When they went public in 2007, they actually took in some money from the Chinese sovereign wealth fund.”
- Fixed-term funds give managers discretion over exit timing, which lets them manage realized performance better than liquid managers can.
“certainly on the fixed term fund business, they have discretion over when to make the exits”
- Alternative managers benefited from post-crisis bank constraints, especially in credit, but face no direct regulatory pressure, so regulatory change is an ongoing risk to which Blackstone has historically adapted well.
“But there's no regulatory pressure on the private equity firm to dial back from that. And so, it is a risk.”
- Blackstone has shown the ability to adapt to a changing regulatory environment over its 35-year history, and regulatory change has historically been more of a tailwind than a headwind for the firm.
“if they're shown one thing that's been quite good over the 35 years, it's an ability to adapt to the changing regulatory environment.”
Recurring management fees now make up more of revenue, easing the AUM-versus-fee tension.
- Blackstone went public in 2007 because publicly traded stock would serve as currency for acquisitions and attract attention, and the decision had to be reconciled with the tension between managers' interest in growing AUM and LPs' interest in lower fees.
“Blackstone decided it wanted to go public in 2007. It decided it wanted to do that, because the currency of the stock would be useful for attention, and also to allow it to make acquisitions.”
- In asset management, managers want to grow AUM because they take 20 percent of larger pools, while allocators prefer lower management fees, creating a principal-agent tension that carried interest only partly aligns, and public shareholders add a third stakeholder that complicates it further.
“it's in the interests of the asset manager, to grow as big as possible in order to take 20% of a bigger piece.”
- Historically performance and incentive fees made up about two-thirds of Blackstone's earnings and management fees one-third, but this has reversed so that recurring management fees now represent about two-thirds and performance fees about one-third.
“Historically, that was about two-thirds of the pie. Management fees were one-third. More recently, that has reversed.”
- Private equity firms earn a management fee of about 1 to 2 percent of committed assets every year, plus carried interest of typically about 20 percent of realized gains on exits, so the bulk of profit arrives back-loaded at exit.
“The first is a management fee. They take a management fee, just like any classical asset management company can be between 1% and 2%”
- Blackstone earns about 0.9 percent on fee-earning assets under management, which translates to roughly $5 billion a year of fee-related earnings, since not all $650 billion of AUM is fee-earning at any moment.
“which is about just, less than a percent, it's about 0.9% of assets under management. That translates into about $5 billion a year of fee related earnings.”
Real estate, hedge funds, and diversified credit and wealth strategies broadened the platform.
- Schwarzman recognized the firm was at the bottom of a US real estate cycle in the early 1990s and began investing in real estate out of the corporate private equity business, a move that now makes real estate about 30 percent of AUM.
“Steve Schwarzman recognized, and the team board, recognized that they were at the bottom of a real estate cycle in the United States.”
- Blackstone's hedge fund business began around 1990 as an internal vehicle for partners' own money allocated to other hedge funds, was later opened to outside investors, and is now one of the world's largest allocators to third-party hedge funds, representing about 15 percent of AUM.
“is now one of the world's largest allocators to third party hedge funds.”
- Insurers need returns of about 5 percent but bond markets could not provide them, so Apollo pioneered tying insurance balance sheets to alternative managers, giving managers permanent capital that is not redeemed the way fund capital is.
“This would be capital that wouldn't go away, wouldn't be redeemed the way a traditional fund structure would be redeemed. So it was permanent capital, very attractive.”
- Blackstone's credit business, about 25 percent of AUM, emerged after the financial crisis when banks pulled back from lending to the real economy, creating room for alternative managers to lend directly through business development companies or credit funds; the firm later acquired GSO to become one of the largest credit managers.
“this business dates, really, to the aftermath of the financial crisis. When banks pulled back from lending to the real economy.”
- Alternatives are defined as everything outside traditional public bonds and equities, including private equity, real assets such as real estate and infrastructure, private credit, and typically less liquid hedge funds.
“Alternatives, which are defined as everything else. So, private equity, real assets, be they real estate, or infrastructure assets, private credit, and hedge funds”
- Private wealth investors will give up some liquidity for slightly better returns than public markets but not the top alternative returns, which is why Blackstone's private wealth strategy works at lower target rates.
“There are private wealth individuals who are prepared to give a bit of liquidity for slightly better returns, but not those top returns.”
- Coming out of the financial crisis, Blackstone identified rental housing and turned a portfolio of rental properties into a platform that was then spun off, an example of linking a real estate theme with an operating theme.
“turning a portfolio of rental properties into a platform which is then spun off. That's another example.”
- Blackstone's roughly $650 billion of assets under management is divided about 30% corporate private equity, 30% real estate, 25% credit, and 15% hedge fund solutions.
“corporate private equity is 30%, real estate is 30%, hedge funds are about 15%, and credit is 25%.”
Scale, information integration, and institutional culture let Blackstone outlast its founder.
- Investment firms are often so tied to founders' skills that they are hard to institutionalize, so small hedge funds grow fast and then become family offices or close, while large institutional managers like BlackRock and Fidelity rely more on marketing than fund-level performance.
“an investment management business, can be so linked in with the investment skills of the founder, that is very difficult to institutionalize”
- Blackstone's advantage includes access to deals other investors cannot reach because of its scale, relationships, and long franchise duration, which combine with performance and integration as the three pillars of its success.
“Integration, and their ability to access deals, that other investors can't access, because of the scale, because of the relationships, because of the duration of the franchise, is another.”
- Schwarzman regards information as the most important asset in business, and Blackstone's integration across strategies lets it cross-reference information to make better investment decisions.
“he talks about information being the most important asset in business.”
- Blackstone manages about $650 billion with just over 3,000 employees, so people know one another, and Marc argues the firm could run a trillion dollars with barely more than 3,100 people, making returns to scale increasing rather than diminishing.
“Arguably, they could run a trillion dollars with not many more than 3100 people. Hence the increasing returns to scale.”
- Blackstone's ability to institutionalize its culture and outlast its founder is rare in asset management, which makes it an exception that is very difficult to replicate.
“It's really hard, and actually it's the exception, I think rather than the rule.”
- Blackstone has succession in place, so it will outlast Schwarzman, and the founder's central idea has been that not losing money keeps a firm in business, with patience required as shown by over a year spent raising the first fund.
“And then the final thing is, don't lose money.”
Capital preservation, patience, and fuller information form the core of Blackstone's culture.
- Schwarzman's central principle over 35 years has been not losing money, since preserving capital keeps a firm in business the following day, and this principle is central to Blackstone's culture.
“So over the 35 year history of Blackstone, this has been a preeminent idea that Schwarzman has conveyed, is this idea of not losing money.”
- Blackstone describes a virtuous circle linking investment performance, investor confidence, and innovation, but in asset management the loops are slow because customer satisfaction shows up only after three to five years and fixed-term funds may take 10 years or more to adjudicate.
“the company itself talks about a virtuous circle. And they talk about three elements within that virtuous circle. Investment performance, investor confidence, and then innovation.”
- Blackstone has succession in place, with John Gray as president and COO, so the firm is designed to continue beyond Schwarzman, unlike many investment firms that depend on their founders.
“Succession is in place. So, unlike other investment firms, it will continue beyond Schwartzman.”
- Schwarzman started as a securities analyst at DLJ, was frustrated that CEOs withheld information in public markets, and moved to private markets to access fuller information, which he views as the most important asset in business.
“investing is hard enough with the information, never mind having one hand tied behind your back.”
- Schwarzman spent more than a year raising the first private equity fund in 1985 to 1987, and Marc presents that willingness to put in time as a central trait of the firm's culture.
“It took him over a year, when raising the first private equity fund, in '85-87, to raise that money, but he did it in the end.”
Markets re-rate Blackstone only after its track record and fee mix become visible.
- Blackstone was re-rated in 2019 as its fee-earning assets grew relative to performance fees, because the market applies a higher multiple to recurring management fees than to lumpy performance fees.
“And the market would typically place a higher multiple on the management fees, $5 billion a year, because of their recurring nature”
- Fee-related earnings carry a margin of about 55 percent after roughly 46 percent of the fee revenue goes to investment professional compensation, and the margin has risen about one percentage point per year for five years.
“So about 46% of that five billion, goes to investment professionals, in compensation.”
- Schwarzman publicly complained for years that Blackstone's stock was undervalued relative to listed liquid asset managers, but the market needed to see the track record before re-rating.
“Steve Schwarzman, several years ago, would frequently bemoan the valuation. Complained publicly about the valuation of the stock”
- Hedge funds and credit funds typically charge performance fees of between 10 and 20 percent, compared with about 20 percent in fixed-life private equity and real estate funds.
“in the case of the hedge funds and the credit funds, it varies between, let's say between 10 and 20%.”
- Blackstone's greater churn of capital generates fees the market likes, even though the firm has little net asset value to support its valuation.
“So there's a greater churn in Blackstone. That generates fees, which the market likes, but there's no net asset value to speak of”
- Stock markets take years to accept a new alternatives business because they need to see the numbers, even though LPs had confidence much earlier, and Blackstone was re-rated in 2019 only after its track record became visible, about 12 years after the 2007 IPO.
“the stock market needed to see those numbers. I needed to see that track record before the re-rating happened.”
Early fundraising and first-deal returns built the founding-era track record.
- Blackstone's first fund targeted $1 billion, a size no private equity fund had reached before, and closed at about $850 million.
“They targeted a billion dollars. No private equity fund had been raised of that magnitude, ever before. They didn't get a billion dollars. They got about $850 million.”
- AIG took a stake in Blackstone in 1998 and was already a managed-money client, and the relationship crystallized further as Blackstone managed AIG capital.
“Back in 1998, AIG took a stake in them, but also that kind of crystallized the relationship, because they were managing AIG money.”
- Strong returns from the first fund, which reached about 2.5x overall, gave Blackstone a performance record that let it raise its second fund about six years later.
“when they went back to the market a few years later to raise their second fund, they had a performance track record to raise that off the back of.”
- Peterson was ousted as Lehman chairman in 1984 after losing a power struggle to trader Louis Glickman, reflecting a banking-versus-trading tension inside Lehman that led the founders to start their own firm.
“There was a tension within Lehman between the banking side of the business, and the trading side of the business.”
- Blackstone was founded in October 1985 by Steve Schwarzman and Pete Peterson, both ex-Lehman executives, with about $200,000 of their own money each, initially as a private investment bank with an M&A franchise but aiming at leveraged buyouts.
“They threw $200,000 each of their own money.”
- The first deal, Transtar, bought a corporate transportation unit in 1987 with a small equity check and bank debt from Chemical Bank, achieved about 4x on the equity within two years, and returned 26x when fully sold in 2003.
“So they bought the business '87, they sold the last chunk of it out in 2003, ultimately 26x return.”
Growing alternatives assets and lower return expectations expand the market Blackstone can serve.
- Alternatives used to promise about 20% gross and 15% net returns in exchange for illiquidity, but with lower rates investors now accept roughly 4 to 8 percent returns, which opens the market to Blackstone's broader product set.
“the kind of rule of thumb going back to the foundation of Blackstone, was kind of 20% target return. Gross, maybe 15% on a net basis.”
- Alternative assets total about $14 trillion against roughly $250 trillion of tradeable public securities, up from about $8 trillion five to eight years earlier, driven by investors reaching for yield.
“That's about $14 trillion of assets under management, against 250, in the public markets.”
Permanent capital and a balance-sheet-light model changed how Blackstone is valued.
- Warren Buffett developed the insurance-float strategy in 1967 through Berkshire by buying an insurance company in Omaha, but the approach was not copied at scale in alternatives until Apollo, then KKR and Blackstone, adopted it.
“Warren Buffett developed this strategy back in 1967, went through Berkshire, he bought an insurance company in Omaha.”
- The market long suspected Blackstone's funds were melting ice cubes, meaning earnings would end when each fund was liquidated and the firm would have to raise new funds from scratch, a view that changed as the firm attracted perpetual capital.
“There was the suspicion actually, that these funds were kind of melting ice cubes”
- Blackstone runs a balance-sheet-light model, investing only about 5 percent of its own capital in its funds, so it has little net asset value to support valuation, unlike Berkshire, whose valuation tracks the value of the assets it owns.
“Blackstone runs a balance sheet light model. Blackstone, of the $650 billion, directly invests 5% or so, of its own balance sheet”
- Blackstone raises capital from three channels: insurance companies, institutional investors such as pensions and endowments, and high-net-worth private wealth, with private wealth now adding about $20 billion of sales a year.
“right now, they're taking in about $20 billion a year of sales, through that channel.”
Its value creation is distinct from LBO-era asset stripping, and returns are shared broadly.
- Blackstone says it does not practice the asset-stripping legacy of the LBO era, citing benefits to employees of the 250 portfolio companies and a shift to larger transactions where value extraction differs from small cost-cutting deals.
“they will tell you that the kind of asset stripping legacy, of the LBO, is not what they do.”
- Over the last five years, limited partners netted about $100 billion in absolute-dollar returns after fees, employees took about $10 billion in compensation, and shareholders took about $15 billion.
“the limited partners, the investors in the funds, have taken out net of fees, about $100 billion has been their return”
Corporate private equity remains the legacy LBO business, owning large companies with debated externalities.
- A leveraged buyout buys a company with a small slice of equity and the rest in debt, then uses management intervention to create value at both the operating and financial levels.
“leveraged buyouts are simply a structure where you buy a company, inject some equity, usually quite a small piece of equity, raise some debt, and through corporate intervention, through management intervention”
- Corporate private equity is about 30 percent of AUM, owns about 250 companies employing over half a million people indirectly, and its largest recent deal, Medline, was a $30 billion-plus buyout, the biggest LBO since the financial crisis.
“They now own 250 companies. They employee, indirectly, over half million people, in these companies.”
- Corporate private equity is the legacy business and is doing broadly the same things today as in 1986 and 1987.
“private equity is the legacy business. They are doing, broadly, the same kinds of things now, as they were doing back in 1986-a87.”
- Blackstone argues it owns 250 companies, employs over half a million people indirectly, and has moved away from the asset-stripping legacy of the LBO era toward larger transactions, although Marc acknowledges the question of externalities is a live debate.
“they will tell you that the kind of asset stripping legacy, of the LBO, is not what they do.”