What this covers

This episode of Business Breakdowns has Eric and Matt working through Take-Two as a business. They start with the structure of the games industry: the packaged-goods era, the rise of mobile around 2011 and 2012, and the shift to microtransactions and subscription-style models that turned games into recurring revenue. Eric describes console AAA as a limited Western market of high-spending 18- to 44-year-old men. Budgets of $100 million to $300 million, plus rumored marketing spend of $300 million to $400 million, give large publishers an IP Moat via Marketing Budget. He also argues that investors value Take-Two as a hit-driven business, applying a discount to peak earnings.

On GTA, the discussion covers why GTA V sold so well, with players buying it twice across hardware generations. It then sets that against the next release, which arrives mid-cycle with a much smaller installed base. Eric puts initial sales at roughly $25 to $30 million and suggests expectations may be too high. He expects premium editions at $80 to $100, and names player reluctance to abandon years of accumulated progress as the biggest risk. The NBA license gets a shorter treatment, framed as a partnership rather than a simple license.

The sharpest turn is on Zynga. Eric calls the deal a poor decision by Strauss Zelnick. He ties mobile's roughly 10% decline to Apple's IDFA changes and a collapse in UA arbitrage, and he warns of a death spiral. He contrasts it with Activision's purchase of King as a multiple arbitrage. He also contends that games are consolidating the way television did, and that Amazon or Comcast could use the IP; that consolidation point is marked contested.

Sharpest takeaway

Eric Kress argues Take-Two's value rests almost entirely on GTA and NBA 2K, while the Zynga acquisition bought a declining mobile asset at the peak and Take-Two lacks the studio teams to build new AAA hits.

  • GTA and NBA 2K are the only clearly profitable franchises, and the rest of the portfolio is unlikely to matter financially
  • Apple's IDFA and privacy changes are structurally eroding mobile user acquisition economics, and Zynga was acquired near the top of the cycle
  • Take-Two never built the internal AAA studio capacity that EA built through acquisitions like Respawn

The argument · threads15 threads · 85 claims
0.71

GTA and NBA 2K, not the rest of the portfolio, deliver most of Take-Two's profitability.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Activision and Take-Two did not invest in other studios, so beyond GTA and 2K they lack strong franchises, and the portfolio's other titles will not be profitable.

    “Activision and Take-Two in particular, just did not do a good job of investing in other studios.”

  • Porting GTA across consoles is less complicated than it used to be because Microsoft and Sony now both use PC-style architectures, and a PC SKU allows building for different hardware levels.

    “now that everything is basically a PC, both Microsoft and Sony have come out with consoles that are PC architecture.”

  • Rockstar receives a percentage of every dollar of profit as revenue share, which the company optimizes to reward its team, a structure that is very hard to replicate across Take-Two's portfolio of studios.

    “So they get a percentage of every dollar profit. So that's very hard to replicate across the entire portfolio of studios.”

  • The 15% to 20% royalties paid to the NBA and its players association are similar to the percentage paid to Rockstar, so the EBIT margins of GTA and NBA 2K are likely very similar.

    “the type of license or 15% to 20% that you're giving to the NBA and the Players Association is probably very similar to the percentage you're giving way to Rockstar”

  • The next GTA will sell roughly 25 million to 30 million units just by coming out because of extreme anticipation, regardless of quality, though what happens afterward is more debatable.

    “it will sell a gazillion units, like probably between 25 million and 30 million units just by coming out.”

  • Apart from GTA and NBA 2K, Take-Two's portfolio is not meaningfully profitable, and by Eric's estimate those two franchises deliver 80% to 90% of the story, with other titles unlikely to contribute much.

    “Basically, the only thing that's profitable from my perspective on the business is those two franchises.”

0.71

The next GTA's launch and sales face installed-base, timing, expectation and player-resistance constraints.

11 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Eric's best guess is that the next GTA will not launch next year as implied by management, and will more likely come out in May 2025 in Take-Two's next fiscal year because Rockstar has issues to iron out.

    “gun to my head, I don't think it's coming next year. I think likely it will come out in May of '25.”

  • Because the next GTA launches mid-cycle as a PS5 and Xbox Series X exclusive, the installed base is much smaller than during GTA V's launch, so initial sales are likely around $25 million to $30 million and expectations may be too high.

    “it will sell a gazillion units, like probably between 25 million and 30 million units just by coming out.”

  • CEO Strauss Zelnick has no control over Rockstar's release timing, and his guidance that the next GTA arrives next year is an exercise in managing Wall Street rather than a reliable signal of launch date.

    “So this is just Strauss managing Wall Street. Full stop.”

  • GTA V's record launch came at the tail end of the PS3/Xbox 360 cycle with the next generation arriving simultaneously, so players bought it twice for PS4 and PS5 and again on PC, creating a perfect storm of sales.

    “So certain customers bought multiple copies, one for the PS4 and then one for the PS5 within 12 months of each other.”

  • Only about 30% to 40% of the existing console installed base will buy the next GTA, which caps the potential audience and means not everyone with a console is a buyer.

    “There's only a certain amount of attach rate, maybe 30%, 40% of the existing installed base that will buy GTA.”

  • The biggest risk to Take-Two is that expectations for the next GTA get ahead of reality, given a smaller installed base and TAM, plus possible player burnout and reluctance to abandon years of collected digital assets.

    “My biggest worry is that people's expectations on GTA get ahead of themselves.”

  • To lift revenue per user, Take-Two must manage the GTA online service better, because it needs to offset the large installed base of GTA V players with better monetization mechanics.

    “in order to really see an increase of revenue per user, they have to do a better job of managing the service, the online service.”

  • A five-to-six year development cycle for a GTA-scale game is on the shorter side because the scope of these worlds is so large that no one else could replicate Rockstar's quality, even with thousands of developers.

    “That's on the shorter side. You have to imagine, these games are absolutely massive in scope and scale.”

  • The next-generation console cycle is roughly three to four years away and the PC version of the next GTA will likely be delayed at least a year after the console release.

    “we won't see another next-gen console for another three years, maybe even four”

  • GTA's biggest risk is that players with hundreds of cars and boats built over thousands of hours may resist starting over with a new GTA, so monetization requires better service management.

    “You have to imagine people have collections hundreds of cars, hundreds of boats”

  • A leak of video from Rockstar about six to eight months earlier was unprecedented because the company normally keeps tight information control.

    “That leak that happened maybe six months or eight months ago was unprecedented for Rockstar”

0.69

The Zynga acquisition was an overpriced, poorly timed, ego-driven mistake amid weakening mobile economics.

10 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Although Zynga will be a significant part of Take-Two's business going forward, it will be a declining asset that weighs on the company as an albatross.

    “it is going to be a big part of their business, but I think it's going to be a declining asset for them, which will be an albatross on them going forward.”

  • Take-Two's acquisition of Zynga was a poor decision: Zynga is a declining independent publisher, and Strauss bought it at a premium when no one else would pay that valuation.

    “which I think was really a dumb acquisition. But he ended up acquiring Zynga”

  • Take-Two bought Zynga at the peak, months after Zynga's stock was around $6 and when Zynga already faced no-growth prospects, so the timing was among the worst acquisitions in Eric's career, and waiting three to six months would have halved the price.

    “which I think was really a dumb acquisition. But he ended up acquiring Zynga”

  • Zynga contributes about $2 billion of Take-Two's $5.3 billion in revenue, roughly 40% on a revenue basis, though its profitability is much lower.

    “I think that they're, what, $2 billion out of the $5.3 billion. So that's about 40% of the business on a revenue basis.”

  • Combining mobile and console publishers offers very few synergies; Strauss was pressured into mobile without understanding it, driven partly by ego and a desire to match EA and Activision scale, and he dislikes free-to-play mechanics.

    “Very, very little. No. I think Strauss had a lot of pressure to get into mobile.”

  • Activision bought King at about 10x EBIT while its own stock traded near 20x EBIT, a multiple arbitrage that made the King deal a success, whereas Take-Two's Zynga purchase was the reverse.

    “King was bought for like 10x EBIT, while Activision was trading at 20x EBIT.”

  • Strauss was pressured into the Zynga deal to gain a mobile presence quickly, and ego may have driven a desire to match the scale of EA and Activision, both of which have mobile businesses.

    “Very, very little. No. I think Strauss had a lot of pressure to get into mobile.”

  • After almost a decade of roughly 20% annual growth, mobile game revenue fell about 10% last year, partly due to a tough COVID comparison but mainly due to Apple's privacy changes.

    “after a decade of almost 20% growth year-on-year, the business was down 10%”

  • Google's changes to its processes and its removal of fingerprinting will make identifying and targeting users more difficult, compounding Apple's privacy-driven headwinds for mobile publishers.

    “They are removing fingerprinting. Google is changing their processes, which will make identifying and targeting more challenging.”

  • Take-Two gave up about 40% of its company in the Zynga deal, and Zynga's cash-flow value is poor because it is a declining business with no pipeline to offset its core weaknesses.

    “which I think was really a dumb acquisition. But he ended up acquiring Zynga”

0.58

NBA 2K offers steadier, more reliable revenue visibility than unpredictable hit-driven gaming.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Take-Two's NBA license is open rather than exclusive, but 2K significantly builds the NBA brand, so the relationship is more a partnership than a licensee-licensor arrangement, reducing renegotiation risk.

    “It's more of a partnership than a licensee-licensor relationship.”

  • For sports games like NBA 2K, there is almost a 100% guarantee of significant revenue from both packaged and digital sales, supported by basketball's growing global popularity in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia.

    “you can almost anticipate perpetual growth for the foreseeable future for that franchise.”

  • Hit-driven gaming remains unpredictable: Epic went 15 years without a successful game before Fortnite became the biggest game in the world after two failed titles, so investors must track buzz on new games.

    “after two really failed games from Epic. Epic hadn't created a good game, a successful game for like 15 years”

  • Annual sports games like NBA 2K have near-certain revenue for both packaged and digital sales, giving investors much better one-to-two-year visibility than the GTA franchise.

    “For the sports games, it's pretty much almost 100% guarantee that you're going to get a significant amount of revenue”

  • NBA 2K has perpetual growth prospects because basketball popularity is rising in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia, including China, offsetting slower U.S. growth.

    “So you can almost anticipate perpetual growth for the foreseeable future for that franchise.”

  • Even mature games businesses remain hit-driven, so new games in the buzz pipeline can surprise and should be tracked closely.

    “this is still a hit-driven business. Regardless of how mature it gets, there are still things that can surprise you”

0.49

Zynga's decline and casual portfolio drag on consolidated revenue, though largely priced into the stock.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Individual mobile products that scale can reach roughly 40% margins, as King's Candy Crush does, but Zynga's portfolio overall was a business with a 15% margin at best.

    “for something like King's Candy Crush, I think they are at 40% margins and certain big games do scale in that way.”

  • Take-Two's casual sports and arcade games, such as its tennis and arcade basketball titles, do not fit a AAA business and the company's claims of 52 games planned for three years, including 17 immersive core games, are narrative rather than credible.

    “they have 52 games planned for the next three years, including 17 immersive core games, it is just nonsense”

  • Zynga has no pipeline of new games to offset the weaknesses in its core businesses, so the consolidated P&L will be a constant drag on Take-Two's profitability and revenue.

    “it is going to be a big part of their business, but I think it's going to be a declining asset for them, which will be an albatross on them going forward.”

  • Zynga faces a death spiral in which revenue declines force cost cuts, cuts to user acquisition further depress revenue, and the resulting cycle makes the asset increasingly destructive to value.

    “And the minute you start cutting UA and this is UA-driven business, then revenue suffers. And then revenue goes down. And then you get in this death spiral.”

  • A large part of Zynga's problems are priced into Take-Two's stock, and the market now cares almost exclusively about GTA rather than Zynga.

    “I think a lot of that is priced into the stock.”

  • Zynga's major franchises, including Merge Dragons!, Empires & Puzzles, Toon Blast, Toy Blast and Golf Rival, are each down 15% to 20% year-on-year after a weak prior year.

    “if you look at all of them, they're all down 15% to 20% year-on-year after a s***** year last year.”

  • A key investing lesson is to focus on the businesses and franchises that make up most earnings, watch downside risks in declining assets like Zynga, and apply that discipline to all publishers.

    “Clearly, you have to focus on the businesses that make up the majority of their earnings.”

  • The Zynga deal price was a premium to a stock trading around $6, and waiting three to six months would have halved the cost, though Eric believes much of the decline is now priced into the stock.

    “There was a reason why it was at $6 before this acquisition. If they had waited three to six months, they would have gotten it for half as much.”

0.49

Premium console GTA fits poorly with free-to-play and pay-to-win monetization, its revenue resting on premium pricing.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Pay-to-win or pay-to-progress mechanics in the next GTA would raise spend depth and revenue per user substantially, which would be very bullish, but Eric does not expect it to happen.

    “which I don't think will happen, this would be really bullish for them is they start to do more pay-to-win, pay-to-progress type mechanics”

  • Free-to-play on console is the wrong market because console is a premium market where games must compete with premium titles; GTA has given content away for free only after selling many units.

    “It's the wrong market to do free-to-play. This is a premium market, and you have to compete against premium games.”

  • Only a small share of GTA's buyers engage in GTA Online, and a small group of heavy spenders drives most free-to-play revenue, so monetization must be designed around that core.

    “the free-to-play business model is very small group of people that are actually spending insane amounts of money.”

  • Red Dead Redemption 2 sold well on packaged goods but its services side underperformed because players have no reason to chase cosmetic ownership like they do with cars and houses in GTA Online.

    “there's no real chase for the customer in the Red Dead Redemption world”

  • Although the new standard game price is $70, GTA will offer premium SKUs at $80, $90 or even $100 that consumers will buy.

    “The new price being set now is $70. But with something like GTA, they'll have premium SKUs that go for $80, $90, even $100 and people will buy it.”

  • GTA V's load times and matchmaking were horrific, and the company's success despite that is remarkable; SSD hardware in the next generation should enable better load times and more monetization mechanics.

    “the technology behind GTA V was so bad in terms of load times and all the issues around matchmaking, and it was horrific.”

  • Brand placement and advertising in GTA is unlikely because of mature content and immersion concerns, since ads that pull players out of the game undercut the experience, though in-game advertising is growing elsewhere.

    “GTA, I don't know if it's a really great fit. Because the one thing about GTA is you want to be immersed in the world”

  • For the most recent GTA, upfront unit sales have generated far more total money than in-game recurring revenue, with the split estimated at about 70-30 or 60-40 in favor of unit sales.

    “But the recurring revenue, if I were to guess, I would say it's like 70-30, maybe 60-40, that's typical.”

0.41

Apple's privacy changes shrank mobile's user acquisition and paying-conversion economics, driving decline.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Mobile accounts for almost 50% of global video game revenue, but only about 25% to 30% in the West, a distinction that matters for understanding the market.

    “Almost 50% of the revenue worldwide is from mobile. And maybe it's like 25% or 30% for the West, which is an important distinction, frankly.”

  • Mobile declined about 3% so far this year because of new titles, but removal of fingerprinting will hit toward year-end, so expect 5% to 10% mobile declines over the next two years across the industry.

    “we should still see 5% to 10% declines in the mobile business over the next two years, which is impacting basically everybody in the industry”

  • Apple's removal of IDFA and its anti-fingerprinting moves destroyed the ability of mobile publishers to target users, breaking the user acquisition arbitrage that drove a decade of roughly 20% annual growth, and caused a 10% decline last year.

    “Apple became completely hostile against these type of user acquisition tactics and targeting and removing IDFA has removed the ability for them to target the audiences that they need”

  • Apple does not care about mobile publishers; its privacy push is primarily a marketing message to sell phones, and it is differentiated against Google and Samsung while harming the mobile industry.

    “Apple is just rolling over them with these crazy privacy things for literally a marketing message.”

  • Mobile's audience is far larger and more diverse, but a much smaller percentage of players spend significant money, so conversion rate rather than audience size is the limiting factor on mobile.

    “In some sense, the conversion is the limiting factor on mobile.”

0.38

Take-Two should be valued on peak-earnings logic, since hit-driven GTA release years are lumpy.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • An ideal EBIT margin for these types of live-service game businesses is about 30% to 40%, though lifetime margins are complicated by front-loaded capitalized development costs that make ongoing margins higher than launch-period margins.

    “I would say like 40% -- 30% to 40% for these type of businesses.”

  • GTA revenue ebbs and flows with the content release cadence, and cannibalization and monetization depth are the questions analysts must answer when a new GTA game arrives.

    “How much does that cannibalize the existing game? How big is that market? How well do they monetize the audience?”

  • Now that games operate as SaaS businesses, their valuation multiples expanded to about 20% to 25% range, since revenue like FIFA is predictable and loyal player bases keep spending.

    “But now that they are a SaaS business to some degree, their multiple definitely expanded to the 20% to 25% range.”

  • Take-Two is valued using traditional private equity logic, with investors taking peak earnings in a hit-driven business and applying a discount, and the next GTA year is being treated as a peak earnings year.

    “It used to be more of a hit-driven business, so you would take peak earnings, et cetera, and then do some discount on it.”

0.25

Mobile and emerging platforms never threatened console's premium, AAA-focused audience.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Predictions that mobile would take over and destroy console were never going to happen, because loyal console fans would not give up their PS5 for a mobile experience.

    “you're going to basically have to pull the PS5 out of the cold dead hands of those loyal fan base”

  • VR, AR, cloud gaming and blockchain are nascent platforms that will not have much impact in the next 5 to 10 years, and once the VC and big tech hype is removed they are not really viable.

    “I don't think these will have that much of an impact in the next 5 to 10 years, but I'm of the minority on that opinion”

  • An estimated 95% of the content that makes money on mobile is driven by non-AAA production value, so mobile never threatened to destroy console despite earlier predictions.

    “It's actually 95%, I would estimate is driven by non-AAA production value.”

  • Console AAA gaming is focused on the West and primarily driven by 18- to 44-year-old males who have high disposable income and will spend large amounts on IP and experiences, a distinct and somewhat limited market.

    “it is primarily being driven by 18- to 44-year-old males. That is a very distinct market.”

0.25

Building AAA creative teams takes years, so studio structure and autonomy matter for Take-Two.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • EA acquired Respawn along with its management team, and Vince Zampella built several AAA studios under him, a move that Take-Two should have made long ago because building creative teams takes years.

    “EA did the smart thing. They bought Respawn. And they bought that management team and that group.”

  • Rockstar has complete autonomy from Take-Two, a structure set up in the acquisition and maintained because of its hit record, and it is locked away in New York so little information leaks out.

    “They have complete autonomy, 100%. A lot of these deals were made that way.”

  • New AAA studio teams start at 10 to 20 people in concept phase, grow to 50 to 60 in pre-production and about 200 in full production, and need years of working together to build experience.

    “Early concept is like 10 to 20, but pre-pros is 50 to 60 and then you go up to full production at like 200.”

  • Rockstar used to have multiple teams but now iterates on Red Dead Redemption and GTA with a single team, which is why GTA development takes five to six years.

    “So Rockstar used to have multiple teams but it feels nowadays, they have one team”

0.25

Mobile and publishing economics push the industry toward fewer, larger franchises and consolidation.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Mobile game development costs far less than console, enabling experimentation, but user acquisition now costs more than development, which is the reverse of console and drives consolidation among big publishers.

    “But you spend more on user acquisition than you do on game development, which is not the case for console.”

  • EA once built about 30 games a year, while today a company releasing six games is considered a lot, as the focus shifted from many titles to revenue per user and the audience consolidated around fewer franchises.

    “Historically, when I was the first at EA, we were building like 30 games a year. Now if they do six games, that's a lot.”

  • Mobile is evolving toward a winner-take-all dynamic in which a few genres drive most revenue, a pattern that has been present since about 2014.

    “mobile is evolving in that way, too, where it is almost a winner-take-all type thing where certain types of genres are the main revenue drivers”

  • Games, like movies and television before Netflix, consolidated into fewer studios or networks as the market matured, and new platforms are what create new opportunity, as Netflix did for television.

    “Gaming is no different than even movies and television, which consolidated to a few studios or to a few networks until Netflix came out”

0.22

Microtransaction and subscription models turned major franchises into recurring, high-revenue-per-user streams.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Over the last decade, microtransactions and Software-as-a-Service models turned games like Call of Duty, FIFA, Madden, NBA 2K and GTA into ongoing revenue streams with dramatically higher revenue per user, which has been the biggest benefit for Take-Two.

    “making these games more like SaaS businesses as opposed to hit-driven packaged goods businesses”

  • The games industry has gone through three fundamental shifts: the PC and console packaged-goods era, the rise of mobile starting in 2011 and 2012, and the move to microtransaction and Software-as-a-Service models that made games recurring revenue streams.

    “there's been three fundamental shifts in the industry, all of which have been adopted and taken on by the big publishers in the business.”

  • In the early packaged-goods era, winners were determined by publishing and distribution, and relationships with retailers across North America and especially Europe, which required local people in major countries.

    “It was all a retail-driven business. It was about what relationships you had with the retailers in North America and particularly Europe”

0.22

Rising AAA budgets and marketing costs create a moat that blocks new entrants and AA titles.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • AAA game budgets now run $100 million to $300 million, and GTA may cost $400 million to $600 million, so new entrants without deep pockets cannot compete and AA titles have little market.

    “these budgets are over $100 million to $200 million even $300 million for games to be competitive even. Something like GTA is probably like $400 million or 500 million, maybe even $600 million”

  • Big publishers spend rumored $300 million to $400 million on marketing, and customer expectations are so high that new hits are rare, so large IP holders gain a moat that is an advantage for the big publishers.

    “It creates quite a moat for the big game developers.”

  • Take-Two has not built the teams that can build contemporary AAA games, and this capability gap, not marketing budget, is what prevents it from producing another hit.

    “They don't have any teams. That's it. They have not built the teams that can build contemporary AAA.”

0.16

Amazon, Comcast and other non-Chinese buyers are the likely acquirers of major publishers.

6 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Acquirers like Amazon and Comcast would gain cross-media leverage from game IP such as Red Dead Redemption, Max Payne and BioShock for movies and television, as shown by The Last of Us and The Witcher.

    “It's also leveraging the existing IP from that acquisition to do cross media”

  • Microsoft's acquisition of Activision suggests everything is open for acquisition, and non-Chinese buyers like Amazon, Comcast, Netflix, Apple and Disney could target major publishers, with Amazon and Comcast the most likely in Eric's view.

    “it's open season on gaming companies. Now they're expensive, but could be a strategic pillar for any of these companies.”

  • Chinese companies are unlikely to acquire big Western publishers for obvious political reasons, which narrows the field of likely buyers.

    “the Chinese will not likely be able to acquire big publishers in the West for obvious reasons.”

  • If the Microsoft-Activision deal goes through, which Eric thinks it will, gaming companies will be open to acquisition, and it is hard to imagine EA and Activision remaining independent over the next five years.

    “It's really, really hard to think that EA and Activision will be independent in the next five years.”

  • Many acquisitions were structured to give creators autonomy, as with Blizzard under Activision, which was granted independence for a long time before it was reined in.

    “A lot of these deals were made that way. Even when Blizzard was first acquired by Activision, they had that autonomy for a long time until they didn't.”

  • Amazon and Comcast are the most likely strategic buyers of Take-Two, and Savvy Games Group, a Saudi sovereign wealth fund, is another deep-pocketed candidate looking for a console and PC publisher.

    “Right now, I think Amazon and Comcast are the ones that are the most potential to do something in this space.”

0.05

Gearbox's uncertain ownership and retail-driven distribution shape Take-Two's publishing position.

2 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Take-Two only distributes Borderlands and does not own the franchise; the Gearbox team is owned by Embracer, which is collapsing, so the outlook for Gearbox is unclear.

    “They're only a distributor of record. It's really the Gearbox guys, which were acquired by a terrible, terrible, terrible acquisition by Embracer.”

  • Historically the game business was retail-driven, and success depended on relationships with retailers in North America and local distribution teams across Europe, which EA, Take-Two and Activision used to differentiate themselves.

    “It was all a retail-driven business. It was about what relationships you had with the retailers in North America and particularly Europe”