What this covers
Eric walks through HEICO as a business, beginning with where the PMA industry came from. After a 1985 British Airways engine fire, the FAA ordered a combustion chamber replaced on a Pratt & Whitney engine, and the manufacturer could not supply enough parts. A licensing deal created a second source. From there he explains how the model works: HEICO reverse engineers an OEM part, skips the design costs, and certifies it with the FAA. He leans on the Generic Drug Analogy and argues that PMA certification is stricter than the original because it examines a single part.
The middle of the discussion is about aftermarket economics. Suppliers to Boeing and Airbus often earn little on the original sale and make their return on maintenance parts, sometimes at three to four times the initial price. Parts can be sold for 35 to 40 years or more. Eric sizes the repair and maintenance pool against OEM production, then covers air travel's link to GDP and how little of the world has ever flown.
He also covers the defense side of the Electronic Technologies Group, where margins run above 30%, and the pandemic, when HEICO's organic decline was better than its competitors'. Cash conversion above 130% of net income and acquisitions made during industry slumps follow. Some points are contested or rest only on his own view: PMA parts being better than OEM parts, how little overlap there is with TransDigm, and the risk that a part failure could damage the whole PMA model.
HEICO's advantage comes from selling FAA-approved replacement aircraft parts at a sustained discount to OEM prices, reinforced by a decentralized, owner-minded management team that reinvests cash in acquisitions and gains share during downturns.
- PMA parts are approved, sole-sourced alternatives that sell at 30-40% discounts and widen over time as HEICO passes on less price increase than OEMs
- Management incentives, employee stock ownership, and counter-cyclical M&A compound value over decades
- Regulatory approval, customer friction, and scale create barriers that limit competition in PMA
PMA parts save airlines money and break OEM sole-source pricing power.
- HEICO passes on incremental savings over time rather than raising prices, while OEMs raise prices at a mid-single-digit rate each year, so a 30% discount can grow to around 50% within five years, which lengthens customer relationships.
“So what could be a 30% discount could be sitting in 5 years at a 50% discount.”
- Price is not always the main driver for airline decision makers, who default to OEM parts because nobody gets fired for buying one, while PMA parts add an approval process, friction, and perceived risk.
“nobody's ever been fired for buying an OEM part, but when you go to start looking at PMA parts, a separate approval process at the airline, it adds friction to that sales process”
- Because of regulatory certification and design-in, aftermarket parts are typically sole-sourced proprietary solutions, which gives their makers pricing power with airlines and creates the opening for HEICO as a second source.
“they typically are sole-sourced proprietary solutions that gives them even more pricing power when dealing with the airlines”
- Airlines buy PMA parts for two reasons: cost savings, which is obvious, and parts availability during supply chain crunches, when PMAs act as a second source and can catalyze adoption beyond price.
“nobody's ever been fired for buying an OEM part, but when you go to start looking at PMA parts, a separate approval process at the airline, it adds friction to that sales process”
- Because HEICO has no upfront development costs, the OEMs' parts are sold to airlines by HEICO at a 30% to 40% discount.
“because HEICO doesn't have the same upfront development costs as the OEMs are typically selling those parts to the airlines anywhere from a 30% to 40% discount.”
Disciplined, opportunistic acquisitions are HEICO's core growth engine, with overpaying as the main risk.
- The biggest investment risk is HEICO's ability to keep deploying cash through acquisitions at growing deal size or volume, since another Wencor-scale deal is unlikely, though many $10 to $100 million deals remain available; roughly half of the bull case rests on trusting the Mendelsons' capital allocation.
“I think that's honestly key, probably the biggest risk from an investment perspective as it is often with any serial acquirer is just how long can they continue to invest at increasing either deal size or deal volume.”
- The Mendelsons refuse to overpay for acquisitions because they treat capital as their own family's money, and management says a deal that is not accretive does nothing for them since they plan for equity value rather than salary.
“if it's not accretive, it doesn't do anything for us because they're not planning for salaries, they're planning for increase in equity value.”
- Since the Mendelsons took over, HEICO has done over 98 acquisitions, divested only 2, deployed over $5 billion in M&A across 34 years, and taken less than $10 million of cumulative restructuring or impairment charges.
“there's been less than $10 million of cumulative restructuring or impairment charges on those deals.”
- Six of HEICO's eight largest record M&A years came when industry M&A spending was down more than 10%, so big HEICO deals typically occur when competitors are at a disadvantage.
“6 of their 8 largest record M&A years came in years when industry M&A spending was down over 10%.”
- HEICO's overarching goal is to grow the bottom line at 15% to 20% annually, with about half of that growth historically coming from M&A.
“HEICO's overarching goal has been to grow the bottom line at 15% to 20% a year annually and about half of that growth historically has come from M&A.”
- Eric sees the bigger risk to HEICO as not finding enough acquisition opportunities rather than making a bad deal, because management will not overpay for assets.
“So I just don't see them overpaying for something. I think it's more of a risk that there isn't enough opportunity than it is that they do a bad deal.”
- Management says it could still reach 15% bottom-line growth without another PMA part by expanding into other areas, and would buy businesses with 20% margins even if they were ice cream cone stands.
“the Mendelsons will tell you that even if they didn't have another PMA part developed that they think that they can hit 15% bottom line growth by expanding into other areas”
- HEICO typically buys small and medium businesses at mid- to high-single-digit cash multiples, which yields a teens return before growth, and targets high-teens to 20% margins in critical technologies, usually leaving about 20% of equity with entrepreneurs.
“Most acquisitions that they do are smaller, medium-sized businesses that they're able to acquire mid- to high-single digits cash multiples. So that gets you right into a teens-type return”
- Eric is confident there is no other Wencor-sized (roughly $2 billion) deal in the market that fits FSG as well, but there is plenty of runway for many smaller $10 million to $100 million deals across a fragmented supply chain, which are trending toward niche electronics.
“I feel very confident saying that there's not another Wencor out there, which was a $2 billion deal”
Sticky, hard-to-replicate PMA aftermarket positions give HEICO durable, cycle-resilient revenue.
- HEICO's 12,000 parts and Wencor's roughly 7,000 parts had only about 10% to 15% SKU overlap, so combining them created a 19,500-part portfolio.
“Very little. I don't have an exact number, but I think it's somewhere around 10% to 15% range.”
- Barriers to PMA entry are high, and HEICO can only produce 500 to 700 new parts per year, so a startup would need multiple decades to replicate its portfolio, and new entrants find it easier to target uncontested white-space parts than HEICO's already-approved parts.
“they can still only pump out 500 to 700 new parts per year. So even if a start-up was looking to do that with no reputation, even if they could do that, you're talking about multiple decades before you replicate that portfolio.”
- The aftermarket is hit first in a downturn because planes are parked, but it ramps back fastest, making it a more stable business over the long run than the OEM cycle, which ramps down slowly and is hard to rebuild.
“the aftermarket tends to be what gets hit first because you immediately park your planes or you park the planes that aren't needing to be used, but it ramps back the fastest.”
- TransDigm and HEICO rarely compete head-to-head: TransDigm focuses on low-value, low-volume parts that are hard to PMA, and for some high-value parts it hires PMA companies such as Wencor as distributors, which removes those parts from PMA targeting.
“So TransDigm will often take for some of their more high-value parts and go have a PMA company be their distributor. And when you do that, you exclude the PMA company from PMA-ing those parts”
- A PMA-only company must persuade an airline to buy 20 to 30 parts from a hydraulic pump, a low share of the bill of materials, while adding repair and distribution lets HEICO offer lower-cost, faster repair, deepen the airline relationship, and inform which parts to PMA.
“that just gives you, a, a much stronger relationship with the airline where you don't have as much friction in the sales process.”
- Global passenger levels fell 90% for a few months during COVID, while outside COVID, travel has never declined more than mid-single digits, with only the early-1990s recession, post-9/11, and the Great Financial Crisis causing declines of 2% to 5%.
“For a few months stretch of time, global passenger levels were down 90%. Outside of COVID, there's never been more than a mid-single digit decline in passengers.”
- The lack of PMA competition traces to the Lufthansa investment, which made HEICO the first mover with an airline partner, and because PMA was nascent, competitors found it unattractive to fight over the same slim-margin pricing.
“it just gives you such an advantage in terms of being a first mover and being able to accelerate development”
- Once an airline adopts a PMA part, the incentive to switch back to the OEM is nonexistent, so PMA revenue is very sticky and HEICO gains share faster coming out of downturns.
“Once you adopt the PMA part, the incentive to switch back to the OEM is nonexistent. So it's very, very sticky revenue.”
Owner-driven, long-term management with low leverage and divestitures sets HEICO apart from peers like TransDigm.
- The Mendelson family, Eric and Victor in college in the 1980s, used family money to acquire an underperforming public company, buying 15% of it for $3 million, and their operating philosophy began with the insight that management owned no shares and was poorly incentivized.
“what they found was a management team and Board that own no shares and were not incentivized properly, and that's the cornerstone of the Mendelsons operating philosophy going forward”
- After taking control of HEICO in 1990, the company faced a near-death start: it was trying to exit laboratory equipment, had one Pratt & Whitney part, and was sued for $100 million by United Technologies, its parent of Pratt & Whitney, while worth about $25 million; HEICO was acquitted.
“the United Technologies company that owned Pratt & Whitney sued the company for $100 million to stop them making that part.”
- HEICO divested its original laboratory equipment business almost immediately, and the Mendelsons have only ever divested two businesses in their history.
“So that was divested immediately within, I think, a year, and they've only ever divested 2 businesses in their careers.”
- HEICO and TransDigm are alike in having high-quality defense and aftermarket exposure, part-sale profits, talented management, decentralized M&A, and ownership culture, but differ in that HEICO leads businesses alone and runs low leverage, while TransDigm cuts costs, divests, runs about 6x leverage, and raises prices.
“where HEICO tends to lead businesses alone, TransDigm has been very willing to go in and cut costs and divest pieces”
- In the third quarter of 2020, HEICO's organic growth was negative 44%, significantly better than competitors, whose declines were in the mid-50s to low-60s percent range.
“if you look at the third quarter of 2020, organic growth was negative 44%. And while that's drastic, it's significantly better than their competitors.”
- The Mendelson family owns about 8% of HEICO's equity, the rest of the board about 2.5%, and employees over 2%, partly because HEICO gifts stock in the 401(k) plan at 5% a year, creating over 400 employee millionaires.
“So the Mendelsons own about 8% of the equity of the company. The rest of the Board owns about 2.5%, but most importantly, the employees own over 2% of the company”
- HEICO's management does not give quarterly guidance or adjusted metrics, is more likely at industry conferences than sell-side conferences, and is frustratingly conservative in its estimates, behaviors Eric suggests signal long-term orientation.
“They don't give quarterly guidance, they don't give adjusted metrics. You're much more likely to find them at an industry conference than a sell-side conference.”
- The Mendelsons will not split off ETG because their philosophy is to own businesses forever in a decentralized structure, and the two segments have complementary manufacturing and technology that segment presidents are encouraged to share.
“I don't think the Mendelsons would ever split anything off because their entire operating philosophy is owned forever, and they operate in a very decentralized fashion.”
- Three lessons from HEICO are that aligned incentives across management, shareholders, customers, and employees compound powerfully; duration of growth matters at least as much as its magnitude; and great businesses are simple and obvious when you see them.
“I think, first off, incentives are important. And when you find a business that has incentives aligned across management, shareholders, customers and even down to the employee level in a growing industry, that's a very, very powerful formula for compounding.”
- HEICO has no middle management layer; subsidiary presidents are compensated on operating profit and operating cash growth at their subsidiary level, and over 90% of acquired entrepreneur-led businesses are still led by their founders who keep significant equity.
“they do that through base and compensation on operating profit and operating cash growth at each of the subsidiary levels.”
Strong segment margins, cash conversion, and complementary segments make HEICO a durable cash-flow vehicle.
- The Flight Support Group is about a $2.5 billion business running at low-20s percent margins, while the Electronic Technologies Group is about $1.3 billion at around 25% operating margins.
“So the FSG business is about a $2.5 billion business that runs at low 20s percent margins”
- The defense side of the Electronic Technologies Group has margins well north of 30%, which Eric attributes to mission-critical technology where price is not the main decision factor and to cost-plus contracts that reward cost growth rather than cost cutting.
“a lot of their revenue is driven by cost-plus contracts. And I don't want to say that, that incentivize you to ramp up costs, but it doesn't incentivize you to cut them in the same degree.”
- HEICO's free cash flow converts at over 130% of net income because amortization from acquisitions is high relative to the low capital expenditure needs, so cash margins run about 5 percentage points above GAAP margins.
“free cash tends to convert at over 130% of net income. So it throws off a lot of cash, and that's really what funds the M&A funnel.”
- The Electronic Technologies Group is about a third of revenue and about 40% of profit, is diversified across well over 100,000 SKUs, and resembles analog semiconductors but is less cyclical and grows more slowly.
“think analog semiconductors, but less cyclical, also less growth.”
- Since the Mendelsons took over HEICO in 1990, sales have compounded at 15% annually, net income at 18%, and the stock has returned 21% annually.
“since the Mendelsons took over HEICO in 1990, sales have compounded annually at 15%, net income at 18%, and that's driven a 21% annual return.”
- Succession is rarely a risk at HEICO because Eric and Victor Mendelson, both in their mid-50s, have run the company for over 30 years and the decentralized model has a deep bench of subsidiary presidents.
“I almost don't think about it as a risk. And that's because you have a management team that's been in place for now over 30 years”
- The two segments are complementary because ETG's manufacturing capabilities and low-cost solutions can be leveraged by FSG, and FSG's technologies are useful to ETG; segment presidents are incentivized to cooperate even though the company is never vertically integrated.
“ETG has some manufacturing capabilities in low-cost solutions that FSG is able to leverage.”
- Investing is simple but hard to do, and investors tend to overanalyze; truly exceptional businesses with an identifiable competitive advantage run by owner-like managers tend to reveal themselves, and the math usually works out for shareholders.
“truly exceptional businesses tend to hit you in the face when you see them.”
- Chairman and CEO Larry Mendelson would describe HEICO not as an aerospace or electronics company but as a very strong, well-managed vehicle for generating cash flow, so the business lines should be read as means to that end.
“a "very strong, well-managed vehicle for generating cash flow."”
- The Electronic Technologies Group is about one-third of revenue but about 40% of total profits, while the Flight Support Group is about two-thirds of sales and houses the PMA, repair and overhaul, and distribution businesses.
“FSG is about 2/3 of sales. ETG is about 1/3 of revenue, but it's actually a higher percentage of total profits about 40%”
PMA parts are FAA-certified, at least as good as OEM parts, with a strong safety record.
- Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) lets HEICO take an OEM part, reverse engineer it, avoid upfront design and development costs, and certify it with the FAA, a process Eric argues is more rigorous than the OEM's own certification because it is focused on that single part.
“they will take an OEM part, reverse engineer it, so they don't have the same upfront design and development costs”
- On average, HEICO's PMA parts are higher quality than OEM parts; a PMA is never worse, and because OEM parts are rarely improved over long product cycles, PMAs made years later can use better materials and last longer while matching form, fit and function.
“when you PMA the part 10 years later, sometimes it's used with better materials than were used in that original part and while it's the exact same form, fit and function, it will end up lasting longer.”
- The only way to sell a replacement part to an airline is if it is approved by the FAA, and the typical route is certification on the original aircraft through the OEM, which creates high regulatory barriers.
“the only way that you can sell a replacement part to an airline is if it is approved by the FAA.”
- HEICO has sold over 80 million parts over its life with zero service bulletins, zero airworthiness directives, and zero in-flight shutdowns attributed to those parts, a record Eric says no OEM could match.
“they've sold over 80 million parts over the company's life. They've had 0 service bulletins issued, 0 airworthiness directives and 0 in-flight shutdowns”
- HEICO tends to pursue less safety-critical parts, which are easier to sell to both the FAA and airlines, and each PMA part must pass separate airline approval, adding friction that creates a significant barrier to entry.
“And they tend to focus on less safety critical parts. Those tend to be an easier sell both to the FAA and to airlines.”
The aftermarket is a large, recurring profit pool driven by maintenance and long aircraft lives.
- Aerospace splits into original equipment manufacturing, dominated by the Boeing and Airbus duopoly, and aftermarket parts and services, with Boeing and Airbus relying on hundreds to over a thousand Tier 1, 2 and 3 suppliers for components.
“So underneath Boeing and Airbus is really 100 to over 1,000 different Tier 1, 2, 3 suppliers that are actually supplying the components for that aircraft.”
- Most suppliers that sell parts to Boeing and Airbus earn little or no profit on that initial sale and recoup their return through maintenance parts sold to airlines over the aircraft's life, and a company may sell to Boeing at one price and resell to an airline at three to four times that price.
“most of the suppliers that sell to Boeing and Airbus don't actually make any money on that sale. They recoup all of their return by maintaining those parts and selling to the airlines”
- Aircraft have an average life of 25 to 30 years and platforms have production runs of 10 to 20 years, so parts can be sold for 35 to 40 or more years into maintaining the fleet.
“I think average life of an aircraft is anywhere from 25 to 30 years. The average production run for an aircraft platform is 10 to 20 years.”
- OEM aircraft manufacturing is about a $100 billion annual industry, of which about 60% goes to growing the fleet, leaving roughly $40 billion for replacement, while airlines spend about $100 billion per year maintaining and repairing fleets; the aftermarket is a much larger profit pool than its revenue suggests.
“Airlines annually spend the same amount on maintaining and repairing the fleet, so $100 billion in maintenance.”
- Aftermarket revenue is driven by recurring maintenance spend, since some parts must be replaced on a time or utilization basis regardless of whether they break, giving high visibility.
“Certain parts have to be replaced just on a time and utilization basis regardless of if they break”
- Maintenance spending is the third largest expense for airlines, making it a material lever for cost cutting in downturns.
“maintenance spending is the third largest expense for airlines. So that ends up being a decently material driver.”
- Air travel historically grows around 4% to 5% per year and is highly correlated with global GDP, since rising GDP per capita and growing middle classes prompt people to fly first, creating a linear relationship between GDP per capita and flight growth.
“flights tend to grow around 4% to 5% a year, and it's very highly correlated to global GDP.”
HEICO's PMA leadership wins on quality, trust, and availability, not lowest price alone.
- HEICO is by far the largest PMA player with roughly 75% market share, and its portfolio of 19,500 parts is more than the next competitor, which has fewer than 2,000 parts after the Wencor combination.
“I think I could reasonably estimate that they have somewhere around 75% market share of PMAs.”
- HEICO wins in PMA through quality and trust rather than lowest price alone, which is why the sales process is about availability and risk reduction.
“It's, can I get this part?”
- TransDigm has over 300,000 parts versus HEICO's 19,500, about 15 times as many, while TransDigm's aftermarket parts revenue is roughly $2 billion versus HEICO's roughly $1 billion, implying TransDigm's parts are far lower in average value.
“TransDigm is over 300,000 parts and HEICO, as we mentioned, 19,500 in the portfolio. So 15x differential in total number of parts.”
- HEICO's PMA (Parts Manufacturer Approval) business works like generic drugs: it takes an OEM part, reverse engineers it, avoids the original design and development costs, and sells an identical-fit, identical-function part at a lower price.
“they will take an OEM part, reverse engineer it, so they don't have the same upfront design and development costs”
Industry risk comes from OEM retaliation and asymmetric blame when PMA parts fail.
- As HEICO grows to $3.8 billion in revenue and offers system-level solutions, it may poke the bear and face OEM responses, though OEMs have already used price gouging, bundling, long-term service agreements, and anticompetitive tactics.
“So I think there is a risk going forward that you start to poke the bear a bit more.”
- Although headlines blame Boeing, most recent aircraft issues are more attributable to Spirit AeroSystems, the fuselage supplier for most Boeing aircraft.
“With the recent industries, the majority of those issues, I think, actually are more placed on Spirit, which is the fuselage provider for most of Boeing's aircraft.”
- The biggest risk to PMA as an industry is a part failure causing a crash, which would be catastrophic for the model, though HEICO's focus on non-safety-critical parts makes this unlikely.
“front and center, the biggest risk is that you have a part failure that causes a crash. That would be Armageddon scenario for PMAs as an industry”
- When a part fails, regulators can trace the failure to the specific SKU, but OEMs bear less blame because they were originally certified, whereas a PMA failure would be viewed as a much bigger deal because the part is not the original.
“So if there was a PMA failure, it would be viewed as a much bigger deal than an OEM part failure.”
HEICO coexists with OEMs by avoiding life-limited parts and stopping near 30% market share.
- Aerospace parts makers often leave segments alone and cooperate, as shown by the TransDigm-HEICO relationship, because barriers to entry and industry structure make head-to-head competition less attractive.
“another example of the industry cooperation almost in terms of segments being left alone”
- OEMs run misinformation campaigns against PMA parts because PMA is a small share of the industry and OEMs have strong incentives to steer airlines, so an educated sales process is needed to counter them.
“there's been a lot of misinformation campaigns over time because PMA is a relatively small piece of the industry”
- HEICO avoids life-limited parts, which are the OEMs' most highly engineered, most safety-critical, and highest-margin parts that must be replaced after a set number of flight cycles, so that both HEICO and the OEMs can coexist.
“they don't go after what are called life-limited parts... they're the most safety critical parts and have the best margins for the OEMs.”
- HEICO's go-to-market strategy against OEMs targets about 30% market share and then stops, because above that level the OEM's contribution margin falls enough that it cuts prices, which removes the airline's incentive to keep the PMA part, so both sides are better off coexisting.
“the goal is to get to 30% market share and then leave the OEM alone... once you get above a 30% market share, you start incentivizing the OEM to cut price.”
OEMs used litigation and predatory tactics against PMA, yet the industry kept growing anyway.
- In 1997 Lufthansa invested in HEICO's PMA business for 20%, which accelerated PMA development, gave HEICO access to Lufthansa's technical data and high-volume part selection, provided an anchor customer, and validated PMA for other airlines.
“Lufthansa ended up investing in HEICO's PMA business acquiring 20% of it, which is a stake they actually still hold.”
- The birth of the PMA industry came after a 1985 British Airways engine fire, in which over 50 people died, led the FAA to mandate replacing the combustion chamber on a Pratt & Whitney engine, and Pratt & Whitney could not supply enough parts, so a licensing deal with Jet Avion created a second source.
“there was a British Airlines flight, and there was an engine fire and ended up killing over 50 people.”
- OEMs have repeatedly used predatory practices, including litigation, to try to push the PMA industry out of existence, with varying success, yet PMA has grown over more than three decades, which Eric argues proves regulators and airlines want it.
“over time, we've seen time and time again, predatory practices from OEMs trying to bully the PMA industry out of existence with varying degrees of success.”
Long-term air travel demand and defense spending cushion HEICO against cyclical downturns.
- Defense spending is driven more by the global threat environment than by economic cycles, so HEICO's defense business grew straight through the pandemic, providing a buffer.
“defense spending is more driven by the global threat environment than it is any economic cycle.”
- The Lufthansa stake is worth many multiples of its original investment, which was $25 million and later increased to $50 million, though the exact value is hard to track because the 20% stake was in a different business that was later combined with acquisitions.
“it's safe to say that it's many, many multiples of the initial, which was $25 million and increased eventually to $50 million.”
- Estimates suggest that between 20% and 50% of the world's population has ever been on a plane, implying a long runway for air travel growth.
“I've seen a wide range of estimates from as low as 20%, but certainly not higher than 50% of the world has ever been on a plane.”
- Pro forma for the Wencor acquisition, HEICO is roughly a $3.8 billion revenue business entering 2024, split about 55% commercial aerospace, 35% defense and space, and 10% other niche products.
“HEICO is about roughly a $3.8 billion revenue business going into 2024. And just to clarify, I'm pro forming for the Wencor acquisition”
- Coming out of the Great Financial Crisis, organic growth in HEICO's Flight Support Group was negative 10%, the worst organic growth year outside of COVID in company history.
“coming out of the great financial crisis, organic growth at FSG was negative 10%.”