What this covers

Matt and Dom treat Forbes as a business case: where its money comes from, who has owned it, and what a buyer actually gets. The numbers anchor the discussion. Forbes took in about $260 million in 2021, a little over half from media, and print circulation fell from roughly half of revenue in 2010 to about 5 percent. The rest comes from events, consumer products, and a Brand Extension line of about $55 million that bundles licensing, reprints, and events. Dom walks through the consumer lineup: paid adviser profiles at $3,500 to $10,000 a year, Forbes Vetted, an affiliate Marketplace, and Q.ai, a robo-investment product built by Quantalytics.

The ownership history carries much of the drama. Integrated Whale Media bought 95 percent in 2014, with reported friction with Steve Forbes. Elevation Partners, led by Bono, wrote down its stake by 80 to 90 percent. Binance announced a $200 million investment that never closed. The latest buyout is led by Austin Russell, though only about $10 million of the roughly $800 million is his own. An earlier Sun Group deal drew regulators' worries about Chinese influence, a point presented as contested.

Along the way the pair take up the Contributor Model, with about 2,500 writers and 300-plus posts a day. They trace 30 Under 30 back to Fortune's 40 Under 40 and debate whether the list is simply pay-to-join. They also cover survivorship bias among old business magazines, bankers' choice of flattering comparable companies, and the idea that media earns an influence premium beyond its cash flows.

Sharpest takeaway

Forbes is a powerful brand whose list-driven influence and monetization-first scaling have diluted its editorial quality, and its reported roughly $800 million sale price looks unsupported by media-business economics.

  • Revenue shifted from print circulation to digital, and growth now comes from licensing, consumer products, and events rather than core media.
  • A large contributor network and advertising-driven view maximization have eroded the quality bar that gave the brand its value.
  • At about 16x EBITDA, the reported valuation is far above the 6-8x a run-rate media business would typically support, so the price is likely driven by influence rather than cash flows.

The argument · threads6 threads · 67 claims
0.81

Page-view advertising model has eroded Forbes' editorial quality and reader trust in the brand.

7 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Forbes' contributor model resembles Harvard Business Publishing's use of outside professors and writers who want Harvard's brand, but Forbes' contributors likely lack the editorial skill and unbiased approach of Harvard's paid case-study writers and editors, so the quality gap is the core problem.

    “many of these contributors probably don't have the same literary capabilities or unbiased approach or just general skill set that the Harvard editorial contractors have”

  • Forbes' monetization model depends on maximizing page views to sell advertising, which pushes it to compete with platforms like Facebook; Matt notes that Forbes claims 80 million-plus monthly active users while Facebook has close to $3 billion in the same space.

    “the monetization model was how do I get more views because more views are what fuels advertising”

  • Forbes generated about $260 million in revenue in 2021, with the media business producing a little over 50 percent (about $138 million), and the company has flipped from roughly 50 percent of revenue from print circulation in 2010 to about 5 percent today.

    “So if you go back to 2010, just over 10 years ago, 50% of revenue was coming from print circulation. Today, that is 5%.”

  • Matt believes the editorial quality at Forbes has deteriorated over the years so that readers cannot predict what they will get, which breaks the basic brand promise that a known outlet will meet a certain quality bar.

    “The editors deteriorated over the years where I don't know what I'm going to get when I show up there and a lot of it just isn't great.”

  • Forbes has diluted its brand until it resembles an aggregator more than a curated publication, and Matt says it looks more like Facebook than Harvard Business Review, since readers visit only for specific articles rather than the brand.

    “they've moving in the direction of just aggregator of everything rather than having a unique approach”

  • Forbes's monetization model rewards page views because views fuel advertising, which pushes it to compete with platforms like Facebook on volume, so it has traded away the quality bar readers once expected.

    “it's very much fueled by the monetization model. And the monetization model was how do I get more views because more views are what fuels advertising”

  • Matt says he visits Forbes only for specific articles he already knows about and does not browse it, so the brand no longer gives him a reason to trust its unknown content.

    “The only reason I go to Forbes is because I know a specific article. I don't just browse Forbes.”

0.64

Media influence and monetizing featured people create value beyond audiences and advertisers.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Media businesses can monetize the people they feature, creating a third value stream beyond audience and advertisers, but this creates a loss of editorial independence once affiliate links or paid recommendations are involved, as seen with NerdWallet and Wirecutter.

    “you also have guests or people that you feature and that is something that could be of huge value to them”

  • Forbes captures a younger audience of millennials and reportedly ranks extremely well relative to Facebook and Google on that group, making it a category owner that could be useful to influence operators.

    “there's this idea that Forbes actually captures a lot of millennials' attention”

  • An earlier Forbes acquisition deal with Sun Group faced pushback from U.S. regulators who worried the outlet could become a propaganda machine for China, and Matt argues that Forbes' appeal to younger readers and high rankings on certain measures make it a plausible target for such influence.

    “faced a lot of pushback in terms of U.S. regulators suggesting that this was going to be a propaganda machine for China”

  • Media businesses have a third monetization dimension beyond audience and advertisers: the guests and subjects they feature, who will pay to be covered, so Forbes' profiles and marketplace capture value from that group.

    “But then you also have guests or people that you feature and that is something that could be of huge value to them”

  • Forbes maximizes monetization underneath its own brand, while other media owners accept less brand revenue in exchange for value they capture elsewhere, such as influence, so Forbes' choice is a noteworthy case study.

    “So I think what Forbes has done is they maximized monetization of that brand for that brand.”

  • Matt views media as having extreme power to produce indirect influence that later returns as financial benefit, so brand owners should weigh that indirect return against near-term monetization.

    “It's something that I think media has this extreme power and you can use creative ways to have influence, which then is going to indirectly come back in your pocket in the future”

0.57

Forbes' sale has stalled amid investor churn, crypto bids, and ownership dilution.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Many buyers outside the United States are circling Forbes as a unique asset, and Matt thinks this is the most interesting part of the sale because it is not just a wealthy American buyer chasing influence.

    “there are many people outside of the U.S. waters that are circling this asset, and that's where it gets most interesting.”

  • Hong Kong-based Integrated Whale Media bought 95 percent of Forbes in 2014, and the brand began diluting as it moved further from the Forbes family, with reported tension between the investor and Steve Forbes, who still owns a stake.

    “Integrated Whale Media bought 95% of Forbes in 2014, and they are, again, Hong Kong-based now.”

  • Austin Russell, founder of Luminar Technologies, was announced as leading the roughly $800 million buyout of Forbes, but only about $10 million of the funding was his own, with the rest to be raised from other sources within six months.

    “It came out in the future that only $10 million of his own money was going into this, and most of the money was coming from other sources”

  • A SPAC transaction for Forbes fell apart because of market conditions, with many crypto and other investors involved in the attempt, illustrating how the sale process has repeatedly stalled.

    “There was a SPAC deal, many of them were involved in that. The SPAC deal fell apart related to market conditions.”

  • Binance announced an intention to invest $200 million in Forbes, but the investment did not close, similar to its FTX investment that also failed to close, and Forbes has been circled by several crypto partners.

    “They announced intentions to invest $200 million. That did not close similar to their investment in FTX that they announced, which did not close.”

  • Forbes was reportedly sold around 2013 or 2014 for about $400 million, while Matt says Elevation Partners, led by Bono, bought in for close to $700 million and later wrote the investment down by 80 to 90 percent before offloading the stake to Integrated Whale Media.

    “they interestingly enough bought the business for close to $700 million and wrote it down by 80% to 90% when they bought it because the business had just gotten crushed by the digital revolution”

  • Austin Russell's roughly $80 million California home was featured in Season 4 of the TV show Succession, and the Forbes sale is a dramatic story reminiscent of that show.

    “his $80 million pad out in California was featured on Season 4 of Succession”

  • Steve Forbes still owns a stake in Forbes and remains involved, but many reports describe tension between him and the investment firm that owns the majority, and Matt says heavy reporting on a story makes him believe it.

    “there has been tension between him and the investment firm according to not just a few reports, many reports.”

0.50

Forbes' rankings and lists shape discourse despite weak methodology and unreliable figures.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Matt argues the Forbes 30 Under 30 list is not simply something you pay to join, because it is an application process in which supporters can nominate candidates, though he acknowledges the list faces scrutiny over the integrity of some honorees.

    “That is not exactly true. Sure, you can indirectly pay other people to support you in getting on that list”

  • Forbes' presence in pop culture, including song lyrics, comes from list culture, since lists like the billionaire and top-400 rankings generate endless content and conversation even though many of the lists are guesswork.

    “I think where that really derives from is list culture. And list culture is amazing for content.”

  • Forbes' sports franchise valuation rankings have no real methodology or access to information beyond what the public has, yet they become authoritative reference points that shape how owners, fans, and media discuss team values.

    “They don't have any methodology or access to information. It doesn't go beyond what we have. And a lot of it is guesswork.”

  • Forbes' billionaire lists, including the story that Donald Trump wanted to be on the list, raise the question of how much of the wealth reported reflects reality versus self-promotion, since the lists rely on estimates.

    “There's the famous story about Trump making sure he wanted to be on the billionaire list, and it makes you wonder how much of it is reality versus how much of it is propaganda.”

  • Once a number is published, it gets recycled by companies, consultants, and investors, so most people prefer to anchor to an existing reference point rather than doing the work themselves, as Matt experienced with a $125 billion estimate for Amazon matching UPS and FedEx.

    “most people are more than willing to rely on someone else's reference point and anchor to that rather than go out and do the work themselves.”

  • Matt proposes that rankings like the 30 Under 30 or valuations should be replaced by votes from a trusted group of people chosen each year, similar to the Academy Awards, since the world loves lists and rankings and media companies will eventually create their own.

    “find a way to have contributors, rank these things or vote on these things”

0.46

The buyout price implies a valuation far above steady-state media multiples.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Bankers select high-multiple comparables such as tech and mega-media companies when selling a media business, since those comparisons yield higher valuations, and Matt notes that companies often want to be compared to technology assets even when they operate trucks.

    “That is 100% bankers saying this is where you want to comp yourself because they get way different multiples”

  • Media revenue does not recur automatically, so a publisher must produce as much or more content each year to generate the same revenue, and with few opportunities to invest capital above its cost of capital, media businesses deserve low multiples on a steady-state basis.

    “Media is tough. You don't just get to show up the next year and have all of that same revenue come through the door.”

  • With about $250 million in revenue and an adjusted EBITDA margin near 20 percent, Forbes generates roughly $50 million in EBITDA, so an $800 million price implies about 16x EBITDA, far above the 6 to 8x a steady-state media business would typically support.

    “let's say they're doing $50 million in EBITDA. Let me tell you, there is not a strong case for this business to be worth 16x EBITDA”

  • Media's influence creates value that is not always captured in dollars inside the brand, because influence accrues to owners in other ways, so media assets like sports teams can trade at valuations that seem illogical to standard methods.

    “Value accrues in a lot of different places with media and not always inside the brand.”

  • If an investor writes down an asset and later sells it at a higher price, the sale may generate a gain on the books, so the accounting around the Bono-led write-down and later sale is unclear to the hosts.

    “if you wrote it down, you would then have to take a gain on the sale. So I don't know exactly how the accounting works.”

0.33

Forbes' prominence came from borrowing formats and survivorship, not from originating ideas.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Forbes 30 Under 30 was largely borrowed from Fortune's 40 Under 40, which launched in 1999, while Forbes' version arrived in 2011, illustrating that success often comes from borrowing ideas rather than originating them.

    “the idea was mostly stolen from Fortune who had the 40 Under 40 list, which launched in 1999, Forbes 30 Under 30 comes in 2011”

  • The fact that Time, HBR, Business Week, and Fortune are all decades old reflects survivorship bias, since the comparison includes only the publications that survived, and in 15 to 20 years nobody may say a new competitor came at the same time.

    “Survivorship bias might be playing a role here.”

  • Bertie Charles Forbes worked at Hearst before founding Forbes, so he came out of a larger magazine publisher that still exists today, and his son Malcolm Forbes later took over the company.

    “Bertie Charles Forbes actually worked at Hearst before starting Forbes in 1970.”

  • You do not need the original idea to win in media; borrowing a format and executing it well, as Forbes did with the 30 Under 30, can produce far greater cultural prominence than the originator achieved.

    “it's once again proof you don't have to have the great ideas. You just need to be able to borrow them”

  • Matt stated Forbes was founded in 1970, but the company was founded in 1917 according to Dom, so one of the hosts' dates is wrong.

    “Bertie Charles Forbes actually worked at Hearst before starting Forbes in 1970”