What this covers

This episode of Business Breakdowns examines Casey's General Stores, with Markus Hansen doing most of the explaining. He defines the convenience-store offer as selling the customer time, then traces how Casey's grew. It targeted rural towns of roughly 15,000 to 20,000 people that larger chains ignored, a path he compares to Sam Walton's early Walmart. He also covers its owned logistics, where a roughly $100 million distribution center can serve about 600 stores within a 500-mile radius, and its pizza-led food business, which he says makes it the fifth-largest national pizza chain.

The middle of the conversation is about industry structure. Towns treat gas stations as NIMBY uses, which keeps good corner sites scarce. EPA underground-tank requirements, which he says have risen three to four times in 15 years, plus labor and food-safety costs, fall hardest on operators with two or three stores. Oil majors are selling off their retail networks. One contested claim is that local fuel prices are set by the smallest, highest-cost sellers, while big chains can price at parity or below. Other threads include safety and trust as reasons shoppers pick large chains, tobacco and liquor as a captive draw, and the point that only about 25% of fuel customers go inside, versus roughly double in Europe.

The last stretch turns to money and risk. Deals typically price at 14 to 17 times EBITDA, though synergies can shave off several turns. Fast inventory turns pay down acquisition debt quickly. Management rejected approaches from 7-Eleven and Couche-Tard in 2010. On EV adoption, the view is that it grows without dominating. Under 1% of Casey's traffic is EV-related today, and 15 to 20 minute charging may lift coffee and snack sales, though the Circle K data behind that is probably skewed toward higher-income drivers.

Sharpest takeaway

Casey's succeeds by treating gasoline as a traffic driver and using owned real estate, owned distribution centers, and fresh food to earn most of its profit inside the store, so its scale advantages compound while smaller rivals are squeezed out.

  • About 70% of revenue comes from fuel, but in-store margins (30-35% on groceries, 60%+ on fresh food) generate most of the EBITDA.
  • Owned distribution centers and owned real estate create operating leverage and a hard-to-replicate footprint, especially given NIMBY-driven scarcity of sites.
  • Rising compliance and technology costs push consolidation toward larger chains that can spread fixed costs across hundreds of stores.

The argument · threads10 threads · 73 claims
0.71

Store expansion and acquisitions offer margin upside and a long growth runway funded by low leverage.

9 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Casey's grew by targeting small rural towns of roughly 15,000 to 20,000 people that large chains ignored, in the same way Sam Walton built Walmart by serving underserved small towns before moving into larger markets.

    “not too dissimilar to how Walmart under Sam Walton started, which was a big focus in the early days on small rural towns”

  • Casey's went from about 1,000 stores in the 1990s to about 2,500 stores today, and just before the recording it announced a 63-store acquisition, with management believing the business can roughly double within its existing state footprint.

    “They got to about 1,000 stores in the '90s. And now they're at 2,500 stores. And in fact, actually, just yesterday, they announced an additional acquisition of 63 stores”

  • EBITDA margin is about 6 to 6.5% today, against 2 to 4% for traditional food retailers, and management could add 1 to 3 percentage points of incremental margin from scale, pushing margins to a higher single-digit range with mid-single-digit sales growth and low-single-digit EPS growth.

    “EBITDA margins can grow 8% to 10% if they can get that sales growth ... You got an average margin around between 6%, 6.5%”

  • Casey's is the third-largest convenience store chain in the United States, behind 7-Eleven (owned by Japan's Seven & I) and Circle K (owned by Canada's Couche-Tard), and is the largest American-owned, American-listed convenience chain, operating in about 16 Midwest and Southern states.

    “this is the third largest convenience store chain in the United States”

  • Casey's aims to add 100 to 120 stores a year from a base of 2,500, with about half from acquisitions and half from new builds, but acquisition timing is unpredictable and most small-seller deals are only 5 to 10 stores.

    “they're looking to grow their footprint anywhere between 100 to 120 stores a year, and that's off a base of 2,500. On the acquisition side, they're looking for about half of that to come from acquisition and half from new build.”

  • Casey's leverage is about 1x, well below the 2 to 2.5x that this kind of business can carry and about 3x for a large deal, which gives it capacity for both store growth and returns to shareholders.

    “this is a type of business that can easily carry 2 to 2.5x leverage. If they have to do a large deal, maybe 3x. Right now, they're running at about 1-ish.”

  • Casey's expands by drawing a 500-mile circle around its distribution centers, which makes new stores within reach logistically cheap, and word-of-mouth network effects make entry into adjacent towns easier once a store opens.

    “You draw a circle of 500 miles from which logistically it makes sense to operate. ... it becomes a word of mouth thing as well.”

  • Casey's rarely closes stores, and most of its changes are additive, with occasional consolidation of two small stores into one larger store or disposing of a few sites from a large acquisition.

    “For the most part, it is incremental growth. ... We're not seeing a significant amount of disposal.”

  • Because convenience products sell through in days rather than sitting in inventory, the business converts cash quickly, so leverage taken on for an acquisition falls rapidly after closing.

    “the cash conversion rate is very fast and high. So the ability to delever quickly on free cash flow perspective is also very, very attractive.”

0.68

Owned logistics and real estate give scaled chains structural cost advantages over small operators.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Casey's owns its own logistics, and as it adds stores to a fixed distribution network, it gains operating leverage, because a distribution center costing about $100 million, around 250,000 square feet, can serve about 600 stores and roughly 1,000 with redundancy within a 500-mile radius.

    “when they build these distribution centers, they're about $100 million to put together. They are roughly about 250,000 square feet”

  • Casey's owns most of its real estate, which lowers flexibility costs and lets it expand a store from 3,000 to 5,000 square feet or add a kitchen, even though owning land weighs on return on invested capital in the short run.

    “initially, the idea of going in, owning the real estate could weigh on your return on invested capital initially, but it does pay dividends going forward.”

  • Casey's generally does not store its own fuel and buys from wholesalers, but it delivers more than half of its fuel with its own trucks, and its bulk purchasing and logistics control provide cost advantages over peers.

    “they'll buy from the fuel wholesalers. Where they do have their logistics, more than half of their fuel, they provide on their own big trucks that they deliver.”

  • Private label is about 5% of Casey's in-store sales, management thinks it can exceed 10%, and peer grocery and convenience chains run 10 to 15%, with the margin benefit coming from leveraging its own distribution centers.

    “It represents about 5% of their in-store sales. They think they can get up to north of 10%. ... it's anywhere between 10% to 15%.”

0.61

In-store and fresh food sales generate most convenience profit, while fuel mainly drives customer traffic.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Casey's investor day said 75% of store traffic is non-gas, meaning customers come in for other products, and this non-fuel traffic drives both growth and the bulk of margin.

    “they did point out that 75% of traffic that comes into the store is non-gas related”

  • The average in-store ticket runs about $6 to $10 for purchases without prepared food, and adding food brings it up by another $5 to $10, with a pizza reaching about $20.

    “the average ticket size when you walk into these stores, if you don't buy the prepared food is anywhere between $6 to $7, $8, $9, $10.”

  • Casey's is the fifth-largest national pizza chain by total value of sales, and its pizza-led fresh food strategy is one that other convenience chains are beginning to copy.

    “They're the fifth largest national pizza chain if you based on total value sales.”

  • Only about 25% of customers who pull in to buy fuel also make an in-store purchase, and that conversion rate is roughly double in Europe, suggesting a meaningful upside if Casey's can raise US conversion.

    “only about 25% of people who pull in to actually fill up with gas will then go into a store and do an acquisition. That can grow as well. So if you use the example, for instance, in Europe, that number is about twice the level.”

  • Fuel margins run about 30 to 35 cents per gallon and are not growing much, while in-store grocery margins are about 30 to 35 percent and fresh food margins are above 60 percent, so mix shift toward fresh is where margin growth comes from.

    “Margins right now on fuel on average are running between $0.30 and $0.35 per gallon ... they're making a margin in the 30%, 35% range. Fresh food is where you're generally making a margin like any fresh operation of 60% plus.”

  • About 70% of Casey's revenue comes from fuel, but on an EBITDA basis the mix flips, so the in-store grocery and fresh food business generates most of the profit.

    “about 70% of the revenue is from fuel, but earnings-wise, from an EBITDA perspective is to flip. It's a combination of grocery and fresh.”

0.58

Casey's competitive position is protected by fragmentation, scarce corner sites, and limited rural competition.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Market share is low even for the leaders: 7-Eleven has about 8 to 9 percent after acquiring Speedway, the second-largest chain (K group, Circle K) has about 5 to 6 percent, and Casey's has about 2.5 percent, so the market remains heavily fragmented with no dominant player.

    “7-Eleven ... they only have about 8%, 9% market share. The second largest is the so-called K group, and they have about a 5%, 6% market share. And then we get to Casey's ... only has about a 2.5% market share”

  • Regional chains like Wawa (New Jersey, Florida) and Sheetz (Pennsylvania) dominate their home regions, and they are still small in national share, which leaves open whether they will ever expand nationally.

    “So for instance, Wawa will dominate the Jersey area. If you go out in Pennsylvania, you'll see a lot of Sheetz.”

  • Because few communities want new gas stations and the number of available sites has barely grown, existing corner sites are scarce and valuable, and once established they are hard to replicate across the street.

    “the number of actual gas stations available hasn't really grown in recent years. Because even if people need them, the fact is most people don't want it nearby.”

  • Casey's Midwest and Southwest small-town footprint faces less competition from national chains, since traditional quick-service restaurants, dollar stores, and supermarket convenience offers are the main rivals, and freeway traffic in these towns adds volume.

    “It's an area where the competition is slightly less from the national chains. Why? Because I mentioned there's a lot more smaller towns, but you do have significant traffic going through”

  • Casey's operates in 10 of the 20 cheapest cost-of-living states, and since the pandemic, people and industry moving to lower-cost areas create population and demand growth there, while heavy California regulation deters gas chains.

    “they operate in 10 of the 20th cheapest cost of living states in the United States.”

0.44

Rising costs and technology spending push the industry toward consolidation among large chains.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Chains collect data on what sells at what time of day, which lets them predict demand from weather and local events and manage inventory and working capital more tightly.

    “they get all this ream of data of what's selling well at what particular time of the day, which allows them to make predictions that if it's this type of weather in this month”

  • The US has about 155,000 gas station and convenience outlets, and roughly half (60,000 to 70,000) belong to mom-and-pop operators, with the rest spread across small regional chains, national chains, and oil majors' former marketing arms.

    “there are about 155,000 store gas station type offers across the United States, significantly fragmented”

  • Ordering kiosks, self-checkout, and digital menus shift labor from order-taking and checkout to kitchen and sales work, creating a virtuous circle that favors large chains with the capital to invest in these systems.

    “That reduces the amount of wage labor, which can then be used for making stuff that's being sold. That's a bit of a virtuous circle. And again, that plays nicely to these larger chains”

  • Rising costs, especially EPA underground storage tank requirements that have risen three to four times in 15 years, plus labor, minimum wage, food safety, and digital systems, fall hardest on small operators with two or three stores, pushing ownership toward large chains that can absorb fixed costs.

    “The cost of doing that has gone up three, fourfold in the last 15 years because of EPA rules for leakage and other things. That's very tough if you're a small player”

  • Digital pricing, loyalty programs, and inventory software are expensive to install and run, and they make economic sense only for operators with several hundred stores, so technology spending accelerates consolidation.

    “If you're a player with several hundred stores, it makes sense to spend that money on that software where you get the incremental benefits. If you're a small player, you don't.”

0.44

Casey's valuation is reasonable at 12 to 13 times EBITDA, with growing dividends.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • 7-Eleven and Couche-Tard approached Casey's about acquisition in 2010, when it had about 1,000 stores, for its strong presence in key growth states, and management rejected the offers, a decision Markus praises.

    “This company was approached for acquisition by both 7-Eleven and Circle K parent Couche-Tard back in 2010”

  • Casey's trades at about 9 to 10 times forward EBITDA, and Markus views paying 12 to 13 times as fair given its growth, with multiples above 14 times pricing in an acquisition premium.

    “In the case of Casey's, they're on about a sort of 9 to 10x. That's on forward numbers. I think paying up to anywhere between 12, 13x is pretty fair”

  • Convenience store deals typically price at 14 to 17 times EBITDA, but large deals can take three to four turns of multiple off through synergies, and paying above 14 times starts to price in acquisition optionality.

    “deals in the space generally are done for anywhere between 14, 15, 16, 17x EBITDA. But the synergies from larger deals, and we've seen this elsewhere, can generally take maybe three to four points off that very quickly.”

  • A quality growth investment should have branding power that allows pricing above commodity levels, a structural growth theme such as convenience, and enough cash flow to reinvest in distribution, technology, and product range.

    “the ability to develop our products which has branding power because branding brings loyalty and trust. That generally means there's something there that can be priced different to a commodity product”

  • Casey's dividend yield is under 1%, but under new management since 2019 the company is building a steady, growing dividend and buybacks, with the expectation that the dividend will grow faster than earnings over time.

    “I think the dividend yield is less than 1%, but they have put in place and particularly under this new management since 2019, the idea of actually growing a nice steady dividend”

0.41

Convenience formats win by selling customer time, trust, and repeat visits.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Drivers, especially women and families and anyone at night or early morning, choose large chains because they feel safer and trust the clean, well-lit facilities, and once a customer has visited once, the choice tends to repeat.

    “safety when you're pulling into a gas station, particularly later night or early in the morning is a key factor. So particularly women drivers feel more comfortable going into a larger chain.”

  • Once shoppers are inside, they buy emotionally and on the spot without comparing prices across the street, so convenience stores have more pricing flexibility on individual items than on larger planned purchases.

    “The other thing is when you go into a convenience store, you're also meeting an emotional need... once you're in the store, it's not like you can compare and say, I'm just going to pop across the street”

  • The modern convenience-store-plus-food model was developed in Europe on motorways and was then brought to the US, where drivers use the mandatory stop to buy coffee and meals and to take a break.

    “This whole idea of a nice convenience store where you can get food and other products was developed from Europe and was brought to the States.”

  • The core value proposition of a convenience store is that it sells the customer time, the ability to get errands done quickly and move on to other things, which is why its format wins on the road and in towns.

    “what the one thing that convenience does, it sells you the most valuable commodity, which is time”

0.30

New management is upgrading food, restaurant offerings, and the loyalty program.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Casey's is early in using loyalty points, bundled offers such as free pizza with a fill-up, and possibly a digital wallet, which Markus expects the new management to expand.

    “There's other added avenues, which I think they're considering down the road, the idea of the loyalty card but also maybe some sort of digital wallet.”

  • Other convenience chains are copying Casey's emphasis on fresh food, which Markus expects to become a template for the sector.

    “And the one thing they do, which others are copying is this idea of the emphasis on fresh.”

  • Loyalty point rewards work because customers enjoy receiving 'savings' messages at checkout, even if they are unsure what the points are worth, a gamification effect that drives repeat visits.

    “Everyone likes getting points. Half the time, I don't even know what these points mean, but nothing better than you walk in, you're told, oh, you just saved $2”

  • Casey's is unlikely to franchise because franchising would make it hard to keep the same fresh food and pizza quality across stores, and the company's model depends on controlling distribution, real estate, and product in-house.

    “Generally, though, from a quality control perspective, it can be harder to manage ... I think it's important to ensure that pizza they're selling, whether it's a store in Iowa to the one in Tennessee has the same level of quality”

  • In 2018 and 2019 Casey's hired senior management from outside, including a CEO who had worked at 7-Eleven and IHOP, who prioritized food, restaurant-style offerings, technology spending, and fintech talent, changing a legacy management team that had run a six- or seven-state business.

    “They took the decision to look outside the business for senior management and the CEO himself actually was originally 7-Eleven. He also operated International House of pancakes, IHOP.”

0.30

Demand tailwinds from car washes, EVs, snacking, and tobacco trends shape the convenience business.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Automated car washes at gas stations are growing because EPA runoff and chemical rules have made hand washing harder, and a wash adds 5 minutes of extra in-store revenue for drivers already at the pump.

    “There's EPA rules about what water goes into the drains, chemicals and so forth. So one of the replacements of that is you pull up and there's an automatic car wash.”

  • EVs will grow as a share of the fleet over the coming decade but will not dominate, and charging takes 15 to 20 minutes, which encourages drivers to buy coffee and snacks, though less than 1% of Casey's traffic is EV-related today, mostly in Chicago-area stores.

    “less than 1% of the customer base they see traffic coming into their stores, they believe are EV related. And that's mostly in the Chicago area stores.”

  • Snacking has become mainstream, with roughly one in three meals eaten this way, and convenience chains now sell nutritional, low-calorie, and gluten-free options, so people buy quick meals from gas stations instead of cooking.

    “snacking has gone from something which was like an additional thing to actually becoming a mainstream one meal in every three is done this way.”

  • Cigarettes and liquor are important traffic and sales categories that management does not expect to grow, and vaping is partly replacing cigarettes, but any ban or new regulation on tobacco or alcohol would hit sales.

    “Generally, they don't count on cigarettes being a growth area, but you are seeing this shift to vaping systems and so forth.”

  • Wawa's lemonade tea is a popular product that Markus and Matt both like.

    “Lemonade tea. Wawa has a great lemonade tea.”

0.24

Fuel pricing favors chains that match or undercut competitors to attract store traffic.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Local gas prices are generally set by the smallest, highest-cost operators, who sell only fuel and cannot cross-subsidize with in-store profit, while large chains can price fuel at parity or slightly below to attract traffic.

    “the module price tends to be set by actually the smallest player. Why? Because they don't have these added offers that can help them make their profitability. They're pretty much just selling gas.”

  • The price gap between regular 87 and premium 95 octane fuel is small for drivers, but the margin on premium gas expands significantly, which supports fuel profitability.

    “The added difference from 87 to 95, there isn't a lot there, and yet the margin expands quite nicely.”

  • Modern digital fuel price boards let stations adjust prices during the day based on data about nearby competitors, with chains usually matching or undercutting marginally while using in-store appeal to avoid being the price leader.

    “the pricing which is shown can actually become more dynamic during the day. And what they do, do is a combination of using data technology to monitor what nearby pricing is doing”