Rakuten: Rewiring Japan’s Digital Economy
What this covers
This Business Breakdowns episode has Matt and Matthew walking through Rakuten's history and its current bet on a national mobile network. The first half covers how a marketplace grew into a conglomerate. After launching Ichiba, Rakuten bought a brokerage and a travel business in the early 2000s and a credit card business by the mid-2000s. Matthew reads this as a blue ocean strategy: rivals lacked funding, and Japan's language barrier and dense websites kept foreign competitors out. He says the mistake was concluding the playbook always works. Early reluctance to use credit cards online made trust a real edge, and the shared points system tied the services together. The discussion also covers why Rakuten gets little advantage from Japan's already excellent logistics, and why Amazon has a distribution moat that Rakuten's mostly third-party model lacks.
The second half turns to telecom and valuation. Rakuten Mobile entered at roughly half the incumbents' price. It had about 7.7 million customers against some 200 million devices. Matthew argues that moving from 10% to 20% share is easier than moving from 5% to 10%, invoking Metcalfe's law, and he cites how Docomo, KDDI and SoftBank each overcame early reliability doubts. The fixed-cost structure means operating leverage could be large once the network is full. Matt brings in the difficulty of long-cycle investments with no short payback. Several claims are contested: that Japan's digital lag is only a matter of time, that Rakuten would have been more profitable without finance and telecom, and that Japanese firms play too safe. For valuation they combine sum-of-the-parts thinking with a separate assessment of the mobile segment's losses.
Rakuten's conglomerate is held together by a shared points system and single user ID that let trust transfer across services, so its domestic adjacencies succeeded while overseas acquisitions failed. The mobile network is now the swing factor in whether that ecosystem can keep compounding.
- Cross-service points and a single user ID create a self-reinforcing ecosystem that competitors struggle to replicate in Japan
- Expansion into adjacent businesses in Japan worked, while buying third- to fifth-place businesses against Amazon-style incumbents abroad did not
- The mobile network is roughly 20% of sales, still loss-making, and the largest source of valuation uncertainty
Interlinked services and trust reinforce each other, making Rakuten's mobile business compelling.
- The shared points system is the main element that has held Rakuten's diverse businesses together since the early days, because points earned in one service (such as travel bookings) can be spent in others (such as Ichiba e-commerce or brokerage).
“the big thing that glued the whole thing together in the early days, and again, continues through to now was the point system”
- Early reluctance among Japanese consumers to use credit cards online made trust a key edge, so Rakuten's established reputation and large merchant pool became self-fulfilling, and a separate seller's store offered much less benefit.
“once Rakuten had established trust and had this big pool of merchants selling through them, that almost became like a self-fulfilling edge”
- Rakuten has used a single user ID across services in Japan, so once a customer signs up, they can easily access many services, which avoids the fragmented, non-integrated services that confuse other conglomerates' customers.
“within Japan, they've always used a single user ID. It's very easy for people, once they've signed up with Rakuten, to access multiple services”
- Rakuten's original Ichiba marketplace was a curated version of eBay, with professional merchants running their own storefronts, and Rakuten stayed selective about merchants, which preserved quality and helped the platform thrive.
“a curated version of eBay. So it's professional sellers with their own storefronts”
- Because Rakuten's services share customers and trust, trust built in existing services carries over into new areas, creating a self-reinforcing ecosystem that makes each new entry easier.
“develop this almost self-reinforcing ecosystem, incorporating a lot of different areas and to share the trust they've built up in existing services”
- Rather than only asking whether Rakuten can beat other mobile operators on mobile alone, investors should ask what rival operators offer beyond mobile, since Rakuten's e-commerce and fintech assets could make its total customer experience stronger.
“the other way to look at this is to invert the question and say, look at those other mobile operators, what do they offer in addition to mobile”
- Durable Japanese conglomerates such as Sumitomo Corporation, which is hundreds of years old, show that durability comes from many touchpoints and adaptability, which Rakuten may achieve by letting individual services evolve or fail without ending the group.
“Sumitomo Corporation, literally hundreds of years. And the question is what creates that durability”
- Rakuten is one of the most ubiquitous Internet companies in Japan, spanning e-commerce, finance (credit cards and banking), travel, and most recently mobile telephony, so that anyone living in Japan encounters the brand.
“Rakuten is one of these ubiquitous Internet companies in Japan. It does loads of different services now.”
- The traditional problem with a new incoming mobile network is lack of customer trust, because the phone is a critical device, and Rakuten can use the reputation it built in other services to offset that.
“the traditional problem with an incoming mobile network is lack of trust. Your mobile is an important device in the modern world”
- Looking further out, Rakuten's combined customer data across credit cards, banking, e-commerce, and mobile could enable AI assistants that present personalized offers, such as a phone alerting a shopper to a discount on an item they are looking at in a store.
“your mobile phone pings and offers you the same item at a good discount, that type of thing. Now that's not something I've directly heard the company talk about”
- When a new service is good, customers show initial inertia, so the first few customers are the hardest to win, and once a provider gets the ball rolling, subsequent acquisition becomes easier.
“it's quite common in customer behavior, when someone comes with a new service that's a good new service, that there's a bit of inertia at the start.”
- Rakuten has repeatedly struggled when moving outside its core Japanese market, but within Japan it has been able to bolt on services successfully, because in its own backyard it knows the customers and can leverage the reinforcing strength of its other businesses.
“they generally have been able to bolt on services very successfully. And I think that's where when we think about that mobile business, they are competing in their own backyard”
- Rakuten's mobile business will not end up as a walled garden in the way early visions of mobile operators imagined, but it could still be compelling through touchpoints like e-money (Rakuten Pay) and the Rakuten mobile app that connect services.
“This is never going to end up being a walled garden, but it could end up being quite compelling.”
- Because Rakuten points are additive and in some cases multiply depending on how many services a user adopts, the points program creates increasing returns to using more of the ecosystem.
“points are additive and, in some cases, even multiplicated depending how many services you're using”
Mobile breakeven and success hinge on the built network winning customers who recommend it.
- Reaching the roughly 8 to 10 million customers needed for breakeven is treated as a given, so the real investment question is how far market share can grow over five to ten years and what profits that generates.
“the question is for me, not whether they can get to the roughly 8 million or 10 million customers that's breakeven, I think that's a given”
- Valuing Rakuten combines sum-of-the-parts analysis, comparing total sales to market cap, and estimating what share of Japan's mobile profit pool Rakuten could capture, and attractive businesses look attractive across these angles.
“we've done sum of the parts where we break it down by business line”
- Mobile networks are mostly fixed-cost: the whole network must be built before any service works, but once built, adding customers costs little, so incremental revenue flows quickly to the bottom line.
“it's substantially fixed cost. You have to build out your network. You can't have half a mobile network”
- Roughly half of Rakuten's sales come from Internet businesses such as e-commerce and travel, about 30% from finance (bank, cards, brokerage), and about 20% from mobile, making mobile the largest swing factor.
“roughly half of the sales currently come from those Internet-related businesses... roughly another 30% are coming from the finance businesses... the final 20% is coming from mobile”
- Rakuten had about 7.7 million mobile customers against a total addressable market of roughly 200 million devices, since many people own multiple devices, so its market share remains small.
“it's got, I think, 7.7 million customers out of a total addressable market of about 200 million”
- The big three Japanese mobile carriers price similarly and relatively high, and Rakuten Mobile entered at roughly half their price, betting that modern network technology allows it to reach breakeven at a much lower price point.
“Rakuten have come in pricing at roughly half of what the main networks are offering”
- Rakuten's mobile network is now fully built, with upload and download speeds considered good and dropped-call rates equivalent to other networks, so the remaining challenge is customer acquisition rather than network quality.
“that new mobile phone network is fully built now. It has upload/download speeds that are good. The dropped calls are equivalent to other networks.”
- Rakuten entered mobile in 2014 as a mobile virtual network operator using others' networks, then in 2019 decided to build its own nationwide network using open RAN technology, a decision that has been expensive and is not yet profitable.
“in 2014, they entered the mobile phone business, initially as a mobile virtual network operator or MVNO”
- Customers who sign up for Rakuten Mobile have begun using other Rakuten services more than before, creating a group of heavy users who deepen their ecosystem engagement.
“customers who sign up for the Rakuten Mobile also begin to use other Rakuten services more than they did before”
- The real milestone for the mobile business is when existing customers recommend it through everyday conversation, as the point when acquisition becomes self-sustaining.
“what will make the mobile phone network succeed is when people are sitting around in the cafe and one person says to the other”
- Once Rakuten's mobile business passes breakeven, investor attention will shift from survival to whether it is a valuable business, and mobile growth could be much faster than the core businesses.
“in terms of the mobile business, I would expect to see potentially much more rapid growth, particularly as you move through that breakeven point”
- As AI develops, the mobile device may become central, and if Rakuten succeeds in mobile it would combine e-commerce, finance, and mobile in one position, though it will not become a walled garden.
“the mobile device becomes very central in an AI world. And I think Rakuten, in that sense, are going to end up in a position”
- Mobile customers will not move in until the network is properly built, so the right KPIs are coverage, speeds, satisfaction, and churn, and promoting heavily before it is finished leads to customers leaving.
“you can offer them a cheap deal as much as you want, but they're not going to move in. You've got to have the thing properly built”
- Existing Rakuten Bank customers can pass the know-your-customer requirements for the mobile network very quickly because the bank already holds their data, which lowers acquisition friction.
“if a customer is already a customer of Rakuten Bank, they can fulfill the know your customer type of criteria for the mobile network in an incredibly fast period of time”
- For mobile, going from 10% to 20% market share is easier than going from 5% to 10%, because adoption accelerates once early trust is established, similar to network effects or Metcalfe's law.
“if they were sitting there with a 10% market share, it would actually be easier for them to double that market share than it would be to get from 5% to 10%”
- Rakuten's earlier heavy promotion on cost attracted customers who then left when the service was not good enough, but now customers are joining at proper prices and staying, which is the traction investors want to see.
“Rakuten initially tried to promote very, very heavily in terms of cost. But effectively, they were trying to promote their apartment building before it was quite finished”
Early capital and timing, not market differences or a repeatable playbook, explain Japan's lag and Rakuten's expansion.
- Japan's logistics and delivery are already very efficient and customer service is high everywhere, so service quality is a high baseline that gives Rakuten less competitive edge than it would in markets with lower service standards.
“the logistics, the delivery services are incredibly efficient anyway. So that's almost like a minimum standard that's really, really high in Japan”
- The advice Matthew gives younger Japanese Internet companies is to avoid expanding into America, since entering the U.S. against entrenched leaders has been a repeated failure.
“it's my five-word business book for Japanese Internet entrepreneurs, and it's just 'please don't go to America.'”
- In Japan, a third-party marketplace model has succeeded, while in the U.S. and U.K. first-party retail models like Amazon have been more successful, a difference in how the market has developed.
“much more success from the first-party type of sellers like Amazon. And I think that's a difference in Japan”
- When Japan follows a trend that other countries reached first, investors can gain high conviction about where the market will end up before it arrives, because the path is visible from the comparison.
“if you can see that in a different country, you're getting to higher levels, but you know Japan is broadly similar but taking longer, it can give you a really high conviction”
- Japan's digitization lagged the U.S. because it received less early Internet capital and because shops, cash use, and logistics already worked well, not because Japan is fundamentally different; it has just taken longer.
“it's not that Japan is fundamentally completely different. It's just taken a bit longer”
- Japan's e-commerce share of retail sales is slightly below the U.S. level, which is in the low-20% range, and e-commerce penetration is still growing in all countries, with no clear ceiling.
“Slightly below that would be my sense, but I guess where I think you've got this interesting point is it's still growing everywhere.”
- Rakuten's early expansion worked as a blue-ocean strategy: little competition let it occupy new spaces first, and Japan's language barriers and visually complex websites also deterred foreign rivals, so the lesson that the playbook always works was a misreading.
“it was a strategy that worked really well in almost like a blue ocean type of environment where there wasn't a great deal of competition”
- Rakuten expanded rapidly from e-commerce into brokerage, travel, and credit cards in the early-to-mid 2000s, and those businesses remain part of the group and have been quite successful.
“in the early 2000s, they acquired a brokerage business. They acquired a travel business. They then went on to acquire a credit card business by the mid-2000s”
- Japan's dot-com boom was smaller than America's, with less money and fewer funded companies, but Rakuten secured capital early, so when the bubble burst it was positioned to enter new areas while rivals were not.
“there was less money available, fewer companies got funded, but Rakuten was one of those ones that got the money in at the start”
Expansion works near existing strengths, not into crowded fields lacking a real edge.
- Rakuten's grand vision includes location-based e-commerce, such as a phone prompting a discount when a customer is near an item in a shop, but that vision is some way off and not something the company has directly described.
“Now that's not something I've directly heard the company talk about, but that's the kind of idea that they potentially have the ability to do”
- Investors should stay optimistic about companies entering new areas but ask hard questions about the edge they have there, and expansion into areas closely adjacent to existing strengths is easier than running the same playbook into crowded fields.
“it's a lot easier to bolt on new services when they are closely adjacent to your existing areas of strength”
- After its overseas setbacks, Rakuten went through a period of significant retrenchment, and its core is now domestic, with only some overseas parts still remaining.
“they then went through a period of significant retrenchment. They've still got some overseas parts, but the core of the business is very much domestic now.”
- Japanese shops are highly organized and convenient, and cash use is safe because crime is very limited, which reduced urgency for digitization even though real efficiency gains exist.
“Shops in Japan are incredibly well organized and convenient. Use of cash in Japan has been very safe because there's very limited crime”
- After launching its marketplace, Rakuten quickly acquired a brokerage business and a travel business in the early 2000s and a credit card business by the mid-2000s, using a bigger vision and the lack of funding among rivals to expand broadly.
“in the early 2000s, they acquired a brokerage business. They acquired a travel business. They then went on to acquire a credit card business by the mid-2000s”
- Because most of Rakuten's e-commerce is third-party, it lacks the distribution and logistics moat Amazon built, and in Japan's already highly efficient delivery market, logistics is a minimum standard rather than a source of edge.
“the logistics, the delivery services are incredibly efficient anyway. So that's almost like a minimum standard that's really, really high in Japan”
Home-market leadership and steady core growth underpin Rakuten's ecosystem strength.
- Rakuten points are additive across services and in some cases multiply depending on how many services a customer uses, which together with brand history creates the company's competitive edge.
“points are additive and, in some cases, even multiplicated depending how many services you're using”
- Rakuten's e-commerce and travel businesses grew just under 20% a year over the past 20 years, though that growth is fading, and finance tends to follow a similar growth pattern while mobile could grow faster after breakeven.
“the growth rates are a bit under 20% a year over the past 20 years. Now I think that's fading downwards at the current time”
- Rakuten has grown its sales every year since its IPO despite the global financial crisis, COVID, and other downturns.
“since it listed, has managed to grow its sales every single year”
- Rakuten holds number one or two positions in Japanese e-commerce, travel, credit cards, and online banking, and is fourth in mobile, so its home-market strength supports its mobile expansion in ways it lacked abroad.
“they're in the fourth position in that narrow mobile business, but they're in number one or number two positions across e-commerce, travel, credit cards, strong in online banking”
- Rakuten targets a 20% operating margin, which it achieved in the late 2000s to about 2015 at 15 to 20%; the current negative margin is caused by mobile losses, so the mobile segment should be evaluated separately.
“the OPM was generally between 15% to 20%. So we've been there before”
A nationwide mobile network is an all-or-nothing commitment that Rakuten had to fully make.
- Most of the mobile network's capital expenditure has been spent upfront, and because the network is built from new equipment, ongoing maintenance costs will not be particularly significant.
“You spend most of your CapEx upfront. There's a bit of maintenance then”
- Rakuten customers can roam on overseas networks at good value, but the network build is an audacious all-or-nothing move because a half-built mobile network cannot work.
“It's an all-or-nothing type of move.”
- Rakuten only began contemplating a nationwide network five years before the interview from nothing and has gone ahead with it, which the guest sees as evidence that when seizing a big opportunity, a company must fully commit.
“they only started even thinking about rolling this network out five years ago from nothing. And they have gone ahead and they've done it.”
- Building a national mobile network is an all-or-nothing commitment, since a half-built network cannot compete, so Rakuten had to fully invest despite the scary cash burn.
“It's an audacious move. It's an all-or-nothing type of move.”
Japanese caution gets outcompeted, so firms must take bold risks.
- Japanese conservatism made investors reluctant to fund young entrepreneurs with unproven business plans, so funding went to established figures like Hiroshi Mikitani rather than outsiders like Masayoshi Son, who self-financed.
“The inherent Japanese conservatism I think meant that people were a bit less willing to give money to guys straight out of university with pretty sketchy business plan”
- Japan's attitude toward young entrepreneurs has shifted, so a young founder today would be received more favorably by investors than in the late 1990s.
“nowadays, I think a young entrepreneur in Japan would be received more favorably than when we go back to the late '90s”
- Japanese companies have often played too safe and been outcompeted, as in solar, by Chinese rivals willing to invest heavily, so growth requires taking big risks such as Rakuten's network build.
“sometimes Japanese companies have been almost too cautious, they've tried to play it safe and in the end, sometimes, they've been essentially outcompeted in industries like solar”
- SoftBank entered Japanese mobile by acquiring Vodafone's Japanese assets and then gained iPhone exclusivity through Masayoshi Son's relationship with Steve Jobs, and the product initially faced doubt before becoming ubiquitous.
“SoftBank broke into the mobile phone market properly by acquiring Vodafone's, Japanese assets, and then they cut a deal to have exclusivity on the iPhone”
- Japanese mobile carriers Docomo, KDDI, and SoftBank each gained share despite early criticism about network reliability, showing that new entrants can overcome initial distrust with patience and lower prices.
“And then KDDI broke into the market and took share. While they were doing that, the initial criticisms were about the network is not so reliable”
Costly new ventures depress near-term profits, though some early struggles pay off.
- Rakuten's late-2000s to 2010 overseas push, including joint ventures in China and acquisitions of Buy.com and Play.com, mostly did not work out, because it bought third-, fourth-, or fifth-place businesses that then faced strong incumbents such as Amazon.
“They bought Buy.com, Play.com. And frankly, those things generally haven't worked out as well for Rakuten.”
- Rakuten's acquisition of KC Card in the mid-2000s brought internal problems that took a long time to resolve, and the credit card business that resulted is now very valuable and highly profitable, showing that early struggles in new businesses can pay off.
“they acquired something called KC Card back in the mid-2000s, and that had some internal problems”
- Rakuten has had many ideas, some quite expensive, which has been the problem for shareholders, reflecting Peter Thiel's point that profits come when a company has run out of ideas.
“profits are what you make when you've run out of ideas. I think in the case of Rakuten, almost the problem we've had over the years as a shareholder is that this company has had a lot of ideas”
- If Rakuten had never entered finance or telecom, its profits and share price would likely be much higher, because building new business models makes free cash flow look poor for a long time.
“if Rakuten had decided never to do finance-related businesses and certainly, if it decided not to do the telecoms business, sitting here today, I would be fairly confident the profits and the share price would be a lot higher”
Rakuten's margins can recover to historical levels once mobile is judged separately.
- Rakuten's long-term target is a 20% operating margin, which the guest considers reasonable compared with telcos and internet companies; the company was operating at 15% to 20% margins in the late 2000s to about 2015, showing it has been there before.
“the OPM was generally between 15% to 20%. So we've been there before”
- When some components of a business are profitable and others are immature and loss-making, you should not average them together; the mobile business should be stripped out and assessed on its own, so the company's current negative operating margin does not mean the rest of the business has deteriorated.
“you don't just average them all together. You have to consider them individually.”