What this covers

Patrick interviews Andy Rachleff, co-founder of Benchmark and Wealthfront, in a conversation that moves between how venture investing works and how a company finds customers. Rachleff frames investing with the Howard Marks Consensus Matrix: you lose money when wrong, and also when right but consensus, so only the right, non-consensus bet pays. On the operating side he leans on Steve Blank's application of the scientific method to startups. A company should first prove its value hypothesis through exponential organic growth, and only then look for a cost-effective way to acquire customers. He also places new products on Geoffrey Moore's technology adoption life cycle.

The venture stories give that framework its texture. Rachleff recounts Benchmark's founding as an equal partnership. Its founders picked Kleiner Perkins as the rival and turned Kleiner's strengths into weaknesses, a strategy filed under judo strategy. He also describes how Bruce Dunlevie negotiates by letting the other side name the price, and how eBay grew from Pierre Omidyar's apartment hobby into an investment. The contested turn is his view that backing something emerging beats taking share from incumbents, illustrated by John Doerr paying four times the normal valuation for Netscape.

The last stretch is Wealthfront. Rachleff explains why traditional planners need million-dollar minimums and asset-based fees. He argues that software does routine work better, citing tax-loss harvesting that he says added 1.8 percent a year after tax, plus direct indexing. He also explains why Wealthfront refuses to offer hedge funds or venture funds, and says young clients pay it precisely so they won't have to talk to anyone. A shorter thread covers personal growth: amplify strengths rather than fix weaknesses.

Sharpest takeaway

Rachleff argues that durable success in venture and in product companies comes from building something customers pull out of your hands (proven by organic word of mouth), from non-consensus bets on big emerging markets, and from trust-based operating principles, and that software can now deliver wealth-management services to people who were previously excluded.

  • Product-market fit is proven when customers grow the product organically through word of mouth, and that can cover for weak operations
  • Companies should iterate on the 'who' (the customer) rather than the 'what' (the product), and prove the value hypothesis before pursuing growth
  • Software lets Wealthfront automate and democratize services like tax-loss harvesting and financial planning that were previously reserved for high-minimum private wealth clients

The argument · threads11 threads · 72 claims
0.80

Only right, non-consensus investments make money, since consensus bets get arbitraged away.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Investment outcomes fall into a two-by-two of being right or wrong versus being consensus or non-consensus; you lose money when wrong, and also when right but consensus because returns get arbitraged away, so only being right and non-consensus makes money, which is hard because you cannot know ahead of time you are right.

    “you don't make money if you're right and consensus, all those returns get arbitraged away. So the only way you make money is by being right and non-consensus”

  • It is much better to invest in something emerging than in an existing big market, because it is very hard to take share from large incumbent companies.

    “But you don't want it to be big today because it's really hard to take share from big companies. It's a lot better to invest in something that's just emerging.”

  • The most successful technology investments are typically ridiculed by others until they go public, because they are non-consensus at the time of investment.

    “And that's what usually is associated with the most successful investments in technology.”

  • John Doerr was driven by whether an opportunity could be big, which mattered more than valuation or team quality; he paid four times the normal valuation for Netscape and still profited, and did the same with Amazon.

    “So if it was really high price like Netscape, he paid 4x the then normal valuation for Netscape and everybody thought he was nuts.”

  • Mark Leslie, co-teaching with Rachleff at Stanford, founded Veritas Software, grew it to about 1.5 billion dollars in revenue, and hated venture capitalists because he was turned down by many early on for a non-consensus idea.

    “Mark hates venture capitalists. Just hates them because it was a very non-consensus idea and he got turned down by a lot of venture capitalists early on.”

0.71

Benchmark's equal partnership and team-based offer let it recruit better than rivals.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Benchmark's founders picked Kleiner Perkins as their closest competitor and turned its strengths into weaknesses: Kleiner's star-individual model became a team-based offer, and its board-chairman role and forced Keiretsu referrals became a stance of letting entrepreneurs be the stars.

    “try to turn their greatest strengths into their greatest it's weaknesses... Classic judo.”

  • An equal partnership only works if founding partners leave when they stop committing, which venture firms rarely do; Benchmark's founders agreed that any partner unwilling to work 110 percent would opt out of future economics while keeping the right to invest.

    “if any of us got to the point that we weren't willing to work 110% on Benchmark, we had to opt out and take no economics in future partnerships”

  • Benchmark structured itself as an equal partnership where every partner, including later joiners, has the same economic stake in new funds, which let it recruit a better team than rivals because a candidate choosing between equal partnership and a junior role elsewhere faces what Rachleff calls an intelligence test.

    “we thought that if we built an equal partnership, we could attract a better team than anyone else in the business”

  • John Doerr is exceptionally bright and built perhaps the best network in venture because of his success, and he has the best voice in the business, which makes people want to do whatever he says.

    “because of his success, he built perhaps the best network in the business.”

  • Benchmark got off to a good start because three of its founders had over a decade of venture experience, with good track records and networks, combined with the team-based and entrepreneur-as-star positioning.

    “those two things combined with the three of us who had been in the venture business before, for more than 10 years”

  • Benchmark pitched that it could attract a better team than any rival because entrepreneurs were often disappointed when they did not get John Doerr, so Benchmark competed by offering a team of equal partners.

    “entrepreneurs were often disappointed if they didn't get John. So we wanted to compete with the individual with a team.”

0.66

Product-market fit shows up as customers pulling the product and growing organically.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • For a consumer business, the technical test of product-market fit is exponential organic growth, which can only happen through word of mouth, which requires customers who are delighted with the product.

    “the technical way that you can tell whether or not you've actually achieved product market fit, at least in a consumer business, is if you grow exponentially organically.”

  • Bob Kagle's test for product-market fit is that customers buy the product rather than being sold it, meaning people try to pull it out of your hands.

    “my partner Bob Kagle used to say, 'You want products that are bought not sold.' When people want to pull it out of your hands that's product market fit.”

  • If customers want the product badly enough, a company can get almost everything else wrong and still succeed, so the entire goal of starting a tech business is to get customers to eat the dog food.

    “if the dogs want to eat the dog food, you can screw up almost everything else, and you'll still be really, really successful.”

  • Every new product passes through a technology adoption life cycle from innovators and early adopters through pragmatists, the early majority, the late majority, and laggards, as described by Geoffrey Moore in Crossing the Chasm, so new products take time to be adopted.

    “Crossing the Chasm written by Geoffrey Moore in the mid '90s, where he described what he called, 'The technology adoption life cycle'”

  • Companies must prove the value hypothesis first, through exponential organic growth, and only then pursue a growth hypothesis, which is a cost-effective way to acquire customers.

    “the companies have to prove out their value hypothesis, then and only then, can they pursue a growth hypothesis, which is a way to acquire customers cost-effectively.”

0.61

Growth comes from experiments that amplify what works, not from fixing failures.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Steve Blank was the first to apply the scientific method of hypothesis, experiment, results, and iteration to business, making it a framework for finding product-market fit, as laid out in The Four Steps to the Epiphany.

    “Steve was the first person to describe applying the scientific method to business.”

  • In the value hypothesis, the what, who, and how are tested, but successful founders hold the technology fixed and iterate on who the customer is; most founders instead find a market problem and build a solution, which leads to mundane outcomes.

    “you don't iterate on the what, you iterate on the who.”

  • Growth comes faster from figuring out what is working and running experiments to amplify it than from fixing what is not working, and the same holds personally: it is better to amplify your strengths than fix your weaknesses.

    “fixing what isn't working doesn't help you grow nearly as fast as improving what is working.”

  • Growth hacking, which the best practitioners dislike as a term, is actually an analytical process of finding what works and running experiments to make it better.

    “The people that are best at it hate the term growth hacking because they don't think it's hacking.”

0.57

Wealthfront is a software company automating private wealth management for young people.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Wealthfront's strategy is to automate services traditionally offered by private wealth managers with minimums of 5 to 15 million dollars and deliver them to the masses, focusing on young people with under a million dollars who want to delegate.

    “automate what they do through software and deliver them to the masses, thereby democratizing access.”

  • Young people live electronically and tell Wealthfront they pay it not to talk to them, the opposite of the traditional industry's assumption that clients will want advisers when they get older, and this is a generational change rather than a life-stage change.

    “they actually tell us, 'We pay you not to talk to us,' which is the exact opposite of the way the traditional industry thinks.”

  • Wealthfront is being adopted at twice the rate Charles Schwab was when it started, and Schwab was adopted faster than Merrill Lynch because discount brokerage was a clear improvement.

    “We're actually being adopted at twice the rate that Charles Schwab was when they started.”

  • Wealthfront considers itself a software company that does investing, rather than an investment company that uses software, which is how the rest of its competitors operate, and the beauty of software is that it constantly improves.

    “we consider ourselves a software company, not an investment company. So we're a software company doing investing, not an investment company doing software.”

  • Wealthfront's college planning tool can estimate the cost of any college a user picks and predict financial aid, which Rachleff says cannot be found anywhere else on the internet.

    “We can even tell you what the financial aid is going to be. You can't get that anywhere on the internet.”

  • Wealthfront's first product was a diversified, rebalanced portfolio of low-cost index funds that offered little value and was priced accordingly, yet it still beat what most Americans could access.

    “And I used to say to people that we offer very little value and price accordingly.”

0.53

Wealthfront's software features add value through credit, tax-loss harvesting, and direct indexing.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Wealthfront clients with at least 100,000 dollars invested are automatically enrolled in a line of credit, with no credit check, that can borrow up to 30 percent of account value at rates below Wall Street, roughly two-thirds the cost of a home equity line.

    “if you invest at least $100,000 with us, then you are automatically enrolled in a line of credit. No credit check, nothing.”

  • Instead of alternative assets, Wealthfront can offer additional asset classes that are not correlated with the core portfolio, are liquid, and are rules-based and peer reviewed.

    “We can give you some additional asset classes that are not correlated, that are liquid and that are rules based and peer reviewed”

  • Traditional financial planners charge asset-based fees because hourly billing cannot earn enough, require million-dollar minimums, and rely on the same commercial software; APIs connecting to accounts let software give immediate, more accurate planning on a phone.

    “with application programming interfaces, we can connect to all of your financial accounts, get much more accurate estimates of what you spend and save.”

  • Wealthfront's tax-loss harvesting service has added on average 1.8 percent to clients' annual after-tax returns over the four years it has been offered, because software can harvest losses daily across many tax lots in a way advisers with 100 to 200 clients cannot.

    “it's amazing in the four years that we've offered this service, on average, it's added 1.8% to our clients' annual after tax return.”

  • Direct indexing, recommended by Burton Malkiel, harvests losses within an index by swapping individual stocks, for example selling Coke after an earnings miss and buying Pepsi, which adds another 0.2 to 0.5 percent after-tax return per year and is included without extra charge against a quarter-percent fee.

    “that adds another 0.2 to 0.5% to your return after tax every year. And we don't charge anything incrementally for either of those services.”

0.29

Successful companies pivot their target customer, then rewrite history to hide the pivots.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • eBay began as Pierre Omidyar's hobby community inside an apartment; when bandwidth costs grew, he added a listing fee that brought in more money than expenses, and revenue reached roughly 200,000 dollars per month and was growing 10 percent per month a year later.

    “from that day forward, the checks came in faster than the expenses. So fast forward a year, and I think he was up to about 200,000 of net revenue per month and he was growing at 10% per month.”

  • Bruce Dunlevie pushed Pierre Omidyar to raise money and sell some stock so he could take money off the table; Benchmark then invested because it saw eBay as a platform for many goods beyond collectibles, a non-consensus view that was mocked until the IPO.

    “it wasn't until the company went public that people stopped making fun of us for having made that investment.”

  • Every successful technology company has pivoted, meaning changed its target customer, but successful companies later revise their history to hide the pivots because that story does not feel good to consumers.

    “And every successful technology company has pivoted. Now they all revise history to make you think they didn't”

0.29

Retail investors' poor timing justifies excluding them from alternative funds.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • University endowments and charitable foundations are, on average, the best investors for a premier venture or hedge fund because they are the most long-term oriented, though there are exceptions.

    “the best investor, the one that is the most long-term oriented is either a university endowment or a charitable foundation”

  • Wealthfront will not offer alternative assets like hedge funds or venture funds because the best funds do not want retail investors, who buy high and sell low, and the funds that accept money from Goldman or Morgan Stanley are desperate and therefore likely weak.

    “So the only venture capital funds that would let Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs invest in their funds are the ones that are desperate for capital. Why are they desperate for capital? They suck.”

  • Research shows individual retail investors buy when markets rise and sell when they fall, the opposite of contrarian behavior, which makes them the least desirable investors for a long-term fund.

    “individual investors, retail investors, buy when the market goes up and sell when the market goes down. The exact opposite of what they should do.”

0.24

Career outcomes reflect kindness and luck more than deliberate skill.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Benchmark started in 1995 at the best possible time for a venture firm as the internet was taking off, and Rachleff says it is better to be lucky than good.

    “It's better to be lucky than good, and fortunately we made some great investments”

  • Rachleff believes his career is a function of kindness and luck, from a Blyth Eastman Dillon M&A head who recommended him to Stanford Business School to a classmate's father, the HP CEO, whose son introduced him to venture firms.

    “I actually think my entire career is a function of kindness and luck.”

0.24

Success teaches more than failure, and venture skills do not make better operators.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • People learn more professionally from success, because successful companies teach tricks that never-successful people cannot learn from reading, while they learn more personally from failure; learning from failure teaches what not to do, but hiring managers hire for what you know to do.

    “I think you learn more professionally from success. I think you learn more personally from failure.”

  • Skills from venture capital do not make someone a better operator, or the reverse; Rachleff's year as CEO made him a better board member because he now stays at 100,000 feet and avoids managing details.

    “Nothing about being good in venture capital makes you good as an operator or vice versa.”

0.10

Trust-based dealing with counterparties produces better outcomes and loyalty.

2 pointscentrality 1/5
  • In negotiations, Bruce Dunlevie lets the counterparty set the price, for example asking the entrepreneur for a fair valuation; about 10 percent of people will exploit this with an inflated ask, and walking away from them builds loyalty from everyone else.

    “I always put the gun in the other person's hand and that breeds great loyalty.”

  • Rachleff believes people teach the golden rule to their kids but rarely apply it in business, and that trust-based dealings, assuming good faith, produce better outcomes and loyalty.

    “It's funny, I've always been a really big believer in the golden rule. We teach it to our kids, but we seldom execute it in business.”