What this covers
Patrick talks with Jeff Ptak about why most active funds trail their benchmarks and what separates the few worth owning. The conversation leans on a Morningstar study that tracked a group of funds from 2006 for ten years. About 20 percent of survivors beat their benchmark, but only 8 percent did so on a dollar-weighted return basis. Much of the discussion is about the behavior gap. Gaps of five to seven percent a year show up in high-flying growth and sector funds, where money arrives after a run and mean reversion follows. Target-date funds avoid this because they sit in controlled settings with defaults and no room to tinker. Dimensional's emerging markets value fund serves as an example of likely misuse.
Ptak then separates structural from cyclical causes. He names the Style Leadership Effect, the long bull market, and narrow dispersion between styles. He calls these reversible, and the claim that active managers protect investors in bear markets is one he rejects. He also notes that long-term winners often spend a decade or more underperforming, the Winners look like losers problem. He cautions that Active Share shifts with the chosen benchmark. He also argues that cheap smart beta products can be expensive once overlap with a near-free total market fund is accounted for.
The last stretch covers selection and incentives. Fees come first: the cheapest quintile is about three times as likely to succeed as the priciest. He is skeptical of how much 40 Act fulcrum fees change behavior. He treats a sudden flood of assets into a strategy as a warning sign. PRIMECAP Management is held up for its long-horizon compensation and manager ownership, and Vanguard as a structural moat.
Ptak argues that active management's underperformance is structural and cyclical rather than a matter of bad luck, that investors' own timing behavior widens the gap further, and that the few active funds worth owning are identifiable by low cost, manager skin in the game, low turnover, long tenure, and disciplined capacity management.
- Only about 20% of surviving funds beat their benchmark over 10 years, falling to 8% on a dollar-weighted basis, so investor timing decisions compound the underperformance.
- Cost, manager ownership, low turnover, and fund-family structure are the quantitative and qualitative filters Ptak uses to separate potentially durable active funds from the rest.
- Indexing is the default recommendation for investors unwilling to do deep manager research and hold through long periods of underperformance.
Most investors should index, while patient selectors favor modest-fee funds and avoid chasing popular flows.
- Given low active success rates but a belief in mean reversion, Ptak would choose a bet on five quality active equity funds that charge modest fees, avoid overtrading, and apply prudent strategies over a passive target-date fund or simple equity index.
“I would probably take that second bet, which is to find five quality, actively invested funds, equity funds, and go with them”
- Because active funds require very long patience and resolve through extended underperformance, most investors who cannot sustain that discipline should index rather than invest in active funds.
“For many of us, that's too much to ask for, and for those of us, we should index rather than invest in active funds.”
- The gap between dollar-weighted and total returns for Dimensional's emerging markets value fund indicates that investors have likely misused the product by buying and selling at poor times.
“that's an indication that perhaps it's been misused”
- The more an investment rattles around in price, the more likely it is to spook investors, and spooked investors tend to time purchases and sales poorly, which is why diversified products like target-date funds outperform sector and other streaky funds in investor hands.
“the more an investment rattles around, the more likely it is to spook an investor. The more it spooks an investor, the more likely they are to inopportunely time their purchases and sales”
- A large influx of assets into a strategy is a telltale warning sign, as seen with tactical mutual funds after the financial crisis and popular liquid alternative funds around 2011, where the product became more of a story than an investment thesis.
“one telltale huge warning sign is a big influx of assets into the strategy concern”
Turnover, performance-based pay, and manager ownership reveal whether managers are aligned with investors.
- For fundamental equity managers, low turnover tells an investor a great deal about how the manager's process is wired before knowing what they buy, though the turnover rate only means something in the context of the strategy.
“with fundamental managers that have low turnover rates, that tends to tell me quite a bit about how they're wired, how their process works”
- When a meaningful share of compensation is performance-based, managers are more likely to close strategies before bloat sets in, a discipline managers have historically failed to show, and this contributes to mean reversion in mutual funds.
“You're going to shut the strategy off before bloat set in, which is not something that managers to this point have a really, truly impressive record of doing.”
- In 40 Act mutual funds, performance fees must be fulcrum fees with a base and a performance adjustment, but the fixed base portion dwarfs the fulcrum, so the incentive effect on long-term behavior is limited.
“It has to be a fulcrum fee so there's a base fee and then there's a fulcrum that sort of flaps around at the top of that.”
- PRIMECAP combines three unusual incentive features: tying compensation to much longer-term performance measures than the typical one-, three-, or five-year window, having managers eat their own cooking, and letting analysts run a sleeve of the portfolio alongside portfolio managers, which together are powerful.
“You take those three things together which any one of them individually would be somewhat unusual by kind of run the mill Investment Management standards. You take the three of them together, that's pretty powerful.”
- Manager experience and tenure are not sufficient on their own because many experienced managers have mediocre results, but tenure combined with personal ownership of the fund is reinforcing and signals real belief in the strategy.
“manager experience is not a panacea. We see plenty of experienced managers that have ho-hum results”
- Managers who invest a million dollars or more of their own money in the fund they run send a strong signal of confidence, and this is a clear minority situation, with well below half of funds having a manager invested at that level.
“We're talking well below 50% of managers, of funds have a manager that is invested at that level.”
- Hedge fund fee structures are generally ridiculous, but their substantial performance-based component is a useful feature because a fixed 2 percent management fee alone does not guarantee managers will work to earn the other 20 percent of performance.
“I think that there are many things to quarrel with when it comes to hedge fund fee structures, which generally speaking are ridiculous. But I do like the fact that, there's a pretty big performance-based component.”
- Managers often do not invest in their own funds for mundane reasons: their investment is in a separately managed account, the fund is offered in a jurisdiction where they do not invest, or they do not believe enough in it because fees are too high or they prefer an in-house strategy.
“In many cases, it boils down unfortunately to that”
- Letting analysts run a sleeve of the portfolio alongside portfolio managers gives analysts skin in the game and ownership over what enters the portfolio, a practice Capital Research has popularized.
“they actually have the analysts run a sleeve of the portfolio. This is something that the Capital Research is popularized”
- Performance-based fees, when properly structured, are better aligned with investor interests than asset-based fees, because under 40 Act fulcrum fees the fixed base fee dwarfs the performance component and so barely changes manager behavior.
“It has to be a fulcrum fee so there's a base fee and then there's a fulcrum that sort of flaps around at the top of that.”
Judging funds and firms requires looking past headline numbers and measurement tools like active share.
- The 2002 public unveiling of Eliot Spitzer's allegations of market timing against mutual fund complexes was a pivotal moment for the industry and for Morningstar, which responded by identifying offending firms and warning investors away from them.
“we watched Elliot Spitzer basically unveil his allegations of market timing against a number of mutual fund complexes”
- Morningstar considers an active-share-adjusted expense measure a valid way to assess the value investors are accruing, but has not built it into its products, and activeshare.info offers a free tool for it.
“We think that's a useful way to look at it. We haven't built that into our products or our data points yet.”
- Active share and tracking error can be indicative of how a manager operates and can guide research, but they are not defining, and conclusions should not be drawn from comparing two funds on those numbers alone.
“I think that they can be indicative, but they're not defining.”
- Morningstar has moved well beyond the nine-box style box by releasing a commercial risk model with many factors, including momentum, quality, proprietary factors, moat, valuation, and the uncertainty of intrinsic value estimates, because classifying funds requires more than size and value-growth.
“it actually expands numerous different factors so we've moved well beyond the nine-box, style box grid that many people associate us with”
- Active share is a quirky metric that is highly sensitive to the benchmark chosen, so different benchmarks yield different active share numbers and can lead to different conclusions about the same security, as AQR research has shown.
“active share can be a bit of a quirky data point. It's quite, quite sensitive to the benchmark that's chosen”
- Fund families that are monoline asset managers and those housed in diversified financial services firms can both work, but the diversified model carries more complexity and risk because the asset management division sits under a larger organization with many competing priorities.
“the asset management division falls underneath some big tent with all the attendant risks and concerns”
- Morningstar's star rating is a backward-looking, risk- and load-adjusted measure versus category peers and should be used only as a starting point for research, not as a complete evaluation.
“it's a starting point for research. It's not a start, middle, and end.”
- Morningstar recommends few funds from very large diversified firms and few from boutiques, because boutiques struggle with scale, generational transfer, depth, and team continuity, while large firms risk distraction and weaker manager connection to any single strategy.
“with a boutique, it's more difficult to attain scale, generational transfer, depth, breadth, continuity of a team”
- A paradox of manager tenure is that by the time a manager's skill can be established, he or she may already be planning retirement, so team-managed funds mitigate dependence on one person, while manager handoffs to less senior successors can be very messy.
“by the time that you can establish that a manager is skillful, he or she may be in the process of making plans for retirement”
- Ptak's most meaningful professional kindness was being taken on by Arthur Andersen's Professional Standards Group despite being a young, unpolished accountant, where he spent six years learning from accomplished partners.
“they took a chance on me. I spent the next six years of my career working for these extremely accomplished, unbelievably hardworking partners”
- Ptak's most instructive research experience was spending over a year with PRIMECAP partners, which taught him that evaluating a firm's capacity, generational transfer, and philosophy inculcation matters more than bricks-and-mortar holdings analysis.
“Having this kind of much more encompassing conversation about a firm and what makes it succeed, that was extremely valuable to me”
Patient low-turnover holding is disciplined investing that avoids the behavior gap from overtrading and chasing.
- Ptak would tell his children to index unless they are willing to do substantial manager research and have the resolve to hold through uncomfortable periods, and if they do invest actively they should hold with very low trading and be able to live with the decision for years.
“unless they're willing to do the work, which is not insubstantial as you know, they should index”
- Warren Buffett has suggested treating a stock investment as if the stock market will close for five years starting tomorrow, reflecting the view that the right approach is serious forethought rather than monitoring price movement.
“you should be prepared in making an investment for the stock market to close for some period of time starting tomorrow, say for five years”
- Advisors should tell clients honestly that an active fund is meant to be held for a substantial period and will likely underperform at times, since underperformance is part of the price of eventual outperformance, and setting that expectation prevents inopportune buying and selling.
“There's probably going to be some underperformance along the way, because that's part of the price of praise of outperformance in some cases.”
- Fabled investors have taught that it is inaction rather than action that matters most, and a low-turnover manager is more likely to show the resolve and careful mindset of successful investors, so turnover is a key diagnostic.
“it's not the action that's important. In many cases, it's inaction.”
- Funds with decades of positive cumulative excess returns frequently spent many years, sometimes 10-plus years, underperforming their benchmark along the way, so long-term winners often look like losers for long stretches.
“What you commonly find is these funds that you would ordinarily say, Hey, these are success stories, they have beaten their benchmark over an extended period of time. They spent many, many years looking up at their benchmarks.”
- Fewer trades generally leave investors better off, and the discipline of making investment decisions with forethought and holding for years forces better up-front homework.
“I think the fewer actions you take, trades you make, the better off generally speaking you tend to be”
- Modest entry and exit fees applied judiciously can make sense because they make investors think before buying and deter short-term churn, but punitive front-end loads and redemption fees are unhelpful and sometimes predatory.
“I actually feel that entry and exit fees applied judiciously can make a good deal of sense.”
- Transparency is valuable for research and oversight, but excessive monitoring of short-term performance can cause investors and portfolio managers to become worked up and overtrade, which widens the dollar-weighted gap, so the discipline of a long horizon matters more than watching holdings squiggle.
“being able to watch something squiggle around on a screen is not really what counts. What counts is the forethought that goes into investment”
- Target-date funds show positive dollar-weighted versus time-weighted gaps, but this reflects situational factors such as defined contribution plans, auto-contribution, defaults, and steady contributions during an equity bull market rather than anything inherently virtuous about the product.
“I don't think that with target-date funds that there's something inherently virtuous about them”
- Target-date funds and similar asset allocation products keep investors from behavioral mistakes because they are offered in controlled settings such as defined contribution plans, often with auto-contribution defaults, advice, and no choice to tinker.
“It's a more controlled environment, a defined contribution plan”
- The gap between dollar-weighted investor returns and fund total returns, sometimes called the behavior gap, is a major source of underperformance, widening when investors overtrade, chase performance, and buy after gains.
“the gap between the dollar-weighted return and the actual return of your investments, that sort of gap opens up when you overtrade”
Cost-driven flows from active to passive funds are the dominant industry trend.
- The dominant trend in mutual funds and ETFs is the shift of assets from higher-cost active investments into lower-cost passive investments, especially ETFs, a shift driven partly by the opening of platforms and the unbundling of advice and investment solutions that have put cost at the center of investor decisions.
“the shift towards the lower cost mediums for investment, most notably passive and specifically ETFs”
- The largest casualty of the shift to passive has been US large-cap and large-cap growth funds, with substantial assets moving into total market and S&P 500 index trackers, while fixed income, particularly munis, has been less affected because it is harder to index and less liquid.
“by far the biggest victim if you want to call it that, or casualty has been large-cap and large-cap growth specifically”
- Firms that do distribution well, such as American Funds, Dimensional, Vanguard, and iShares, build advisor relationships that understand the firm's investor values and present their value proposition clearly at point of sale, which ensures expectations are not misaligned.
“That's probably four or five examples of firms that I think do a particularly effective job of kind of weighting who they are as investors”
Low cost is the dominant screen for choosing active funds.
- Fees for active funds are declining; the asset-weighted fee averaged 61 basis points and the equal-weighted fee 117 basis points, with the top 1,000 share classes, holding about 75 percent of AUM, averaging around 64 basis points, still a large gap above cheap passive beta.
“the average active-weighted fee or I should say asset-weighted fee for funds was 61 basis points and on an equal-weighted basis, it was 117 basis points”
- Morningstar research finds that the cheapest quintile of funds in a category is about three times as likely to survive and succeed as the most expensive quintile, making fees the top screening criterion for active funds.
“the cheapest quintile of funds in a given category are about three times as likely to survive and succeed than the most expensive quintile of funds”
- Global distribution reach, as with Franklin Resources, was once a moat, but as more firms have become global it has become commoditized, and investors now care more about low cost than global presence.
“I think for me though, that's become a bit more commoditized since more firms have become global”
Cyclical style, market-trend, and dispersion headwinds hurt active funds but could reverse.
- When a style leads the market, active managers in that style are disadvantaged because their style-pure benchmark outperforms them, and this has been the case recently because large-cap beat small-cap and growth beat value, leaving managers who drift toward mid, small, or value at a disadvantage.
“it's not in your favor when your subject styles, let's say I'm a large growth manager when my style is leading the way”
- Active managers' success rates are generally higher in down markets than in up markets, so the belief that active managers will protect investors in a bear market is a fallacy, and a prolonged bull market has hurt active investors.
“success rates for active are a bit higher in down markets than they are in up markets”
- Returns across styles have been tightly bunched, so the payoff for an active manager who deviates from the dominant style is smaller than in the past, and wider dispersion between styles would help active managers.
“Styles, the returns to styles have been fairly tightly bunched. There hasn't been this big spread between them”
- Three cyclical factors have hurt active equity funds, especially in the US: the nature of style leadership, the market trend between up and down markets, and dispersion between styles, and these are cyclical rather than permanent drags that could reverse.
“There are probably three cyclical factors that have been holding active funds back in particular”
- If style leadership shifts, markets pull back, and dispersion widens, active managers could get a day in the sun, but this would at most slow the shift toward passive rather than arrest it.
“It's not even necessarily going to arrest the shift towards passive, but it could slow it a bit and give active managers maybe their day in the sun again”
Durable firms rest on research culture, scale, and succession, not on a single star.
- Third Avenue is the quintessential recent example of a failed succession: after legendary investor Martin Whitman handed the portfolio to protégés who could not carry the torch, the firm ran into significant struggles.
“When he handed that off to his proteges, it didn't go off well. They weren't able to carry the torch”
- Sequoia's long run of underperformance over the last 10 to 15 years, including problems with Valeant, does not necessarily disqualify a firm with ingrained discipline, a research-intensive culture, and knowledgeable managers, so Morningstar continues to recommend it though less strongly than before.
“Certainly, the fact that they've had the difficult run that they've had in the last 10, 15 years, I don't think is disqualifying necessarily.”
- Vanguard is the quintessential example of returns to scale, and its mutual ownership by the funds and their shareholders on an at-cost model creates a moat that is very difficult to replicate.
“They built a moat by virtue of the fact that they are organized. They're basically mutually owned by the funds and therefore the shareholders of those funds. It's an at cost model.”
- A culture of research excellence and commitment to shareholders, combined with attracting the right type of client, can create a durable moat, and firms like Dimensional and Capital Research have succeeded by consistently practicing their philosophy through thick and thin.
“What you can do in the course of that is attracting the right type of client.”