Fanatics: Growing the Sports Economy
What this covers
Deven Parekh, an investor in Fanatics, walks Jesse through the company's history and the logic of its expansion. The story starts in 2011, when Michael Rubin bought Football Fanatics, then at about $250 million in revenue, after eBay had acquired its parent GSI Commerce mainly for non-sports businesses. The early idea was the Displaced Fan Thesis: people who move away from their home team want its merchandise, and local stores rarely stock it. Deven contrasts this with the old model, in which inventory was bought nine to 12 months ahead of a season, producing chronic overstock or stockouts. Rubin's answer was vertical commerce): own the manufacturing, keep blank apparel on hand, and add a player's name after a trade or big game. Roughly half of sales now work this way, which Deven ties to gross margin in the 40s versus 15-20% for typical e-commerce.
The range widens from there. Fanatics pays leagues royalties on all product sold, whichever site sells it, and Deven also describes a fan database of 81 million people. The conversation then moves to adjacent categories. Trading cards are framed as an exercise in removing three to four layers of intermediaries, though Deven concedes the industry has not yet grown. Fanatics' Candy NFT business accepts only fiat, meant to be collectible rather than speculative. In betting, he argues DraftKings and FanDuel face runaway acquisition costs because they lack a customer database. The claims about betting, NFTs, and whether Amazon could outbid Fanatics for league rights are the most contested.
Deven names operational execution as the main risk, mitigated but not eliminated. He closes with two lessons: keep redefining your market, and back the right person.
Fanatics has built a moat in sports merchandise by owning long-term league rights, a licensed fan database, and vertically integrated manufacturing, and it is extending the same league-aligned model into trading cards, NFTs, and betting.
- Long-term league rights and royalties paid regardless of sales channel align the leagues with Fanatics
- Vertical integration gives real-time inventory response and roughly 40s gross margins versus 15-20% typical e-commerce
- The 81-million-fan database lets Fanatics cross-sell into new categories at lower acquisition cost than pure-play betting or NFT operators
Vertical integration lifts Fanatics' margins and builds an e-commerce moat, though its execution risk is mitigated.
- Fanatics' e-commerce growth has accelerated over the last two years even at scale, and rising vertical integration could push gross margins higher than the current forties range.
“on the eCommerce business, I think even at scale, over the last to years, our growth has accelerated.”
- Most e-commerce businesses have gross margins of around 15-20%, which leaves little room for error, whereas software starts near 75-80%, so Fanatics' apparel mix and vertical integration put its gross margin in the 40s.
“when you start at 20% or 15%, there's not a lot of room for error”
- Fanatics' vertical model creates two advantages: a fast on-demand experience, and product that is available only on its own sites and not on Amazon or Alibaba, which strengthens its business moat.
“You can't find a lot of the products on Fanatics, you're not going to be able to find on Amazon or Alibaba”
- Deven says the company will keep investing in technology, websites, manufacturing, and logistics for customer experience, reflecting a view that long-term customer experience ROI beats near-term cost control.
“We're investing heavily in logistics so that the customer experience gets better.”
- Vertical integration creates operational complexity and execution risk because Fanatics takes on manufacturing efficiency risk that leagues do not bear.
“We're taking the risk on our manufacturing efficiency”
- Leagues collect royalties without bearing manufacturing risk; if Fanatics mismanages production, the cost is Fanatics' problem, not the league's.
“We're taking the risk on our manufacturing efficiency”
- The main risk in e-commerce is operational execution, since vertical integration adds manufacturing complexity and operational intensity, though Deven believes the team has mitigated but not eliminated it.
“There's a beauty of vertical integration, but there's more complexity with vertical integration.”
Proprietary fan data and brand scale give Fanatics a competitive edge in betting, iGaming, and customer acquisition.
- Fanatics' main differentiator is long-term exclusive rights with over 900 properties in more than 11 countries, including the NBA, NFL, MLB, and NHL, which are often 20-plus-year deals that let it sell in its categories exclusively.
“We have rights with over 900 properties in over 11 countries, all the major leagues”
- Fanatics has spent over $1 billion on marketing since 2016, currently runs more than $250 million in annual spend, and reached about 60% aided brand awareness.
“Since 2016, we've invested over a billion dollars in marketing.”
- Doug Mack joined Fanatics as CEO in 2014 under Michael Rubin's strategy of emphasizing real-time manufacturing, data, and technology.
“you recruited a new CEO, Doug Mack, who joined Fanatics in 2014”
- Michael Rubin bought Football Fanatics in 2011 after eBay had acquired GSI Commerce mainly for non-sports businesses, and Fanatics had about $250 million in revenue at the time of purchase.
“Michael bought those back out in 2011, and at that point, Fanatics had done about 250 million in revenue.”
- Fanatics holds a sports fan database of about 81 million fans, 57 million customers, 8 million new customers each year, and 40 million annual transactions, which Deven describes as the largest sports fan database in the world.
“We have 81 million fans in our database, 57 million are customers. We have 8 million new customers annually, 40 million annual transactions.”
- Amazon could theoretically outbid Fanatics for league rights, but Fanatics' deep category knowledge, proprietary data, and long-term deals make it likely to stay competitive in sports merchandise.
“There's nothing that says that Amazon can't at some point, come in and say that we're going to pay more.”
- Fanatics has an unfair advantage in betting because its database shows which teams fans like, buy, and when they buy, enabling timely communication that Deven argues is unmatched.
“We know what teams they like. We know what teams they bought. We know when they've bought.”
- Below gross margin, sales and marketing and technology are the largest costs, with technology including AI and machine learning used to forecast when and where fans will buy so inventory is placed correctly.
“we're also investing in AI and machine learning to figure out where fan's going to buy.”
- Sports betting operators such as DraftKings and FanDuel face out-of-control customer acquisition costs because they lack an existing customer database and must acquire gamblers from scratch.
“the cost of customer acquisition has gone out of control.”
- Fanatics believes it can build a large iGaming business both organically and through inorganic moves such as its operator partner Matt King, using its fan database to communicate about teams fans are passionate about at the right time.
“we have an amazing operator, as well as inorganically to build a really large business”
Direct consumer distribution extends trading cards and NFTs while expanding the market and lowering consumer prices.
- Because Candy only accepts fiat, average NFT dollar prices have been lower than on crypto-native platforms where some sports NFTs traded for $700,000 to $1 million before falling sharply.
“the average dollar price points have been lower”
- Fanatics cross-promoted Candy NFTs to its e-commerce customers, offering credits for merchandise purchases, targeting database users interested in MLB, to convert existing fans into NFT buyers.
“you could get credits when you bought a certain amount of merchandise in e-commerce to Candy”
- Having gained direct consumer access in cards, Fanatics can vertically integrate into grading, insurance, and secondary-market management, which Deven argues would make it the natural home for card resale.
“why are we not the best place to also manage the secondary market in that card?”
- Michael Rubin believes the best way to create lasting value is for every participant to do better, so he structured trading cards with leagues as equity owners to share in both royalties and business value growth.
“He believes that the best way to create something really valuable is by everybody doing better.”
- Removing intermediary layers in trading cards would let consumers pay less than scalped prices, let leagues capture more margin, and expand the overall industry, although Deven concedes the industry size has not yet grown.
“you can pay the league and say, hey league, right now, you're only participating up to one layer of margin”
- The trading card industry had three to four layers of intermediaries between manufacturer and consumer, including bulk buyers who cut packs and resold cards, so consumers faced high prices and scarce access.
“So you had three to four different layers of margin before you got to the consumer”
- Fanatics first secured league rights for trading cards, then acquired Topps' existing card rights, since Topps had longer-term rights extending in MLB until 2026.
“once we got the rights, we were able to go to Tops and acquire them”
- Critics assume a direct-to-consumer card model raises consumer prices, but Deven argues consumers pay less than scalped prices and the net promoter score of the industry will rise.
“I think everyone focuses on the consumer's going to pay a higher price and it's really not true and that's the flaw.”
- In trading cards, restructuring the industry could make the market two to three times its current size, with Fanatics as the dominant player across cards and ancillary services.
“there's a real opportunity to take the industry structure from where it was to two to three times the size”
- Deven argues that Fanatics has not really grown the total trading card industry, but has moved existing industry value into a more structured, company-captured system that leagues and consumers accept.
“We've just taken the size of the industry and made it part of the industry structure”
Leagues benefit when partners monetize their IP, because royalties align incentives toward total sales.
- Because Fanatics powers the sites of leagues and many teams, most people who bought sports apparel online likely bought through Fanatics even if the purchase was on a non-Fanatics-branded site.
“So the odds are, if one of your listeners has bought a sports apparel product online, it's highly likely that they bought it through Fanatics”
- Fanatics pays leagues royalties on all product sold regardless of which site sells it, so leagues do not need to funnel revenue to their own sites and the incentive is aligned toward growing total sales.
“give you royalties regardless of where the product gets sold”
- Royalties Fanatics has paid to league and partner rights holders increased more than 20 times between 2006 and 2021.
“between 2006 and 2021, they've gone up over 20 times, 20 times”
- Leagues have a core competency in IP and media rights, not in running e-commerce sites, so they benefit from partners who monetize their intellectual property.
“Running a site is not really the core competency of the league”
- All of the major U.S. leagues work with Fanatics, but soccer's fragmented global market structure makes the dynamics there different.
“if you look at all the major leagues in the U.S, they're working with us”
- A core early thesis for Football Fanatics was the displaced fan: people who move away from their home team still want that team's merchandise, which local stores often do not stock, so online retail serves them better.
“one of the big thesis was the displaced fan”
- Leagues are better off offloading non-core operations to specialists, as they do with TV production, which Deven argues is parallel to having partners run sites and cards.
“They don't run their TV shows. So they're doing things that's not their core competency.”
Owned manufacturing lets Fanatics respond quickly to demand and reduce inventory mismatch.
- Vertical integration removes distribution layers, which raises gross margin, and the extra margin funds higher sales and marketing spend to build the Fanatics brand.
“it also has significantly higher margin, because you're taking out layers of distribution and vertically integrating”
- Michael Rubin's V-commerce (vertical commerce) strategy internalized manufacturing so Fanatics can keep blank apparel in stock and add a player's name or number quickly after a trade or big performance, so roughly half of what it sells now is vertically integrated.
“When a Tom Brady joins the Buccaneers, we have blanks. We can put Brady's name on it and we can ship them out right away.”
- The traditional sports merchandise model required buying inventory nine to 12 months ahead of the season to predict which teams and players would be popular, which caused chronic overstock or stockouts because team performance is unpredictable.
“you're buying that inventory nine to 12 months out”
- Owning manufacturing capacity is what allows Fanatics to win deals such as its arrangement with the NFL and Nike to manufacture and sell licensed merchandise online, which a pure retailer could not secure.
“To be able to go to the NFL and to go to somebody like Nike and do a deal like that is only possible because we manufacture.”
- Because Fanatics manufactures, it can predict demand from team performance and produce just in time, which matters most in hot markets such as Super Bowl teams with asymmetric demand.
“you have a pretty good prediction of what your demand is going to be based on what your performance is going to be”
Fanatics is a multi-line platform in investment mode, growing through cross-selling and new categories.
- Fanatics is best understood as a global digital sports platform with several business lines: core merchandise commerce, trading cards (via Topps), collectibles and NFTs (Candy), sports betting and iGaming, and joint ventures such as a 49% stake in Lids and a China venture with the NBA.
“it's a global digital sports platform that has four distinct business lines”
- The iGaming business faces rising competitive intensity as more states legalize sports betting, which increases the total addressable market but also the level of competition and the cost of acquiring customers.
“you're going to have more states that are looking to introduce this. The TAM is going up, competitive intensity is really high.”
- Fanatics has not yet prioritized cost optimization; it is in investment mode, and the leadership view is that acquiring customers and share is easier to justify than trimming cost.
“I don't think we're at that point yet in the business where we've focused on cost optimization.”
- Fanatics could expand into ticketing and sports media because its database and sports infrastructure could support those categories, though neither is on the current roadmap.
“why couldn't we be in ticketing? Why couldn't we be in sports media?”
- Fanatics' commerce business could triple from current levels because cross-selling new categories to existing customers adds revenue and deepens the database.
“There's no reason this business can't triple from where it is today.”
Candy NFTs can succeed as a fiat-only collectible market while NFT rights remain fragmented and prone to correction.
- Candy could become the default collectible NFT brand for sports beyond baseball, and NFT rights will likely be more fragmented across categories like video and trading card replicas than other sports rights.
“I do think there's a chance that Candy becomes the defacto collectible NFT for sports”
- Fanatics' Candy NFT business is designed as a collectible market, not a speculative one, by allowing only fiat purchases now, which Deven argues will be more sustainable than crypto-driven markets even if initial GMV is lower.
“we want to really have this be, think of it as a collectible market, not a speculative market”
- The main risk in NFTs is that market participants pay irrational prices for league rights, which makes rights uneconomic and eventually self-correcting but harder for Fanatics to expand its rights basket.
“I do believe that it doesn't last, because at some point people can't continue to pay for rights that are uneconomic.”
- Early high-priced sports NFTs that traded at hundreds of thousands to about a million dollars fell quickly, partly because buyers who had crypto gains moved them into other assets rather than holding the collectibles.
“Some of that was people just taking their gains in crypto and moving it into an alternative asset”
Leaders who keep redefining their market and see outsized upside tend to win over time.
- The key investor lesson is to back the right person, because leaders who treat obstacles as problems to route around, go over, or break through tend to win even if slowly.
“in the end, you got to back the right person.”
- Michael Rubin started his first business at about 16 selling skis from his basement and dropped out of college after a semester, showing an entrepreneurial pattern before GSI and Fanatics.
“he started his first business I think when he was 16. He was selling skis out of his basement.”
- Venture investors evaluate deals by asking how they can get lucky, looking for one or two outcomes that could be very large, and Deven sees Fanatics as having many such upside paths.
“The venture business is all about, how can I get lucky and what can I get lucky on?”
- The biggest lesson for founders is to constantly redefine their total addressable market, asking how to lose the number-one market share position so they can expand into a larger opportunity.
“how could you redefine it so that you no longer have the number one market share? That's your market opportunity.”
- eBay bought GSI Commerce for its third-party website and logistics management capabilities, not for sports or league relationships, which is why Rubin could later buy back Fanatics.
“They weren't necessarily particularly interested in sports as a category or doing deals with leagues.”
- Merchandise is one total addressable market, but sports as a whole is a much larger TAM, so Fanatics expanded its definition of its market to include adjacent categories such as cards, betting, and other fan services.
“Merchandise is a TAM, but sports is a much bigger TAM”
- Competitors such as Amazon can be beaten by going deep into a single vertical, understanding it and its customers better than anyone else, which Deven argues people consistently underestimate.
“when you take something, you go really deep and you understand it really well and you understand your customer better than anybody else in the world, you can compete”
- The host says the episode is one of the most detailed profiles of Fanatics available.
“this might be the most detailed.”