What this covers
Matt interviews Armen Panossian on how private credit developed and where it stands. The story starts in the late 1990s with mezzanine finance. Middle-market companies could not economically issue high-yield bonds, which needed $125 to $150 million minimums, ratings, and bank syndication. Armen then follows the pattern through later episodes: the 2022 dislocation, when SVB and Signature collapsed and Wall Street was stuck with hung loans, and the Basel III endgame, which is pushing banks out of small-business, consumer, and specialty lending. The draw for sponsors is certainty of execution, meaning no six-month ratings process in which a deal can fall apart.
The middle of the conversation covers a lot of ground. Armen describes the lack of any secondary market for direct loans, how CLOs hold distressed paper, and how distressed investing moved from buying blocks of bonds to consensual rescue lending. He disputes the idea that private credit is opaque, arguing that marks follow fundamentals and can be checked across BDCs, and he cites COVID markdowns of 6 to 9 points against 18 to 20 for public bank loans. He also covers fund size, sector-specialist sourcing, and life sciences lending, with its loan sizing, milestone-based follow-on commitments, and lack of correlation to GDP.
The macro section is the most contested. Armen argues the Fed has no mandate to cut just because inflation is falling, so rates stay high. A base rate above 5% plus a spread near 500 basis points puts first-lien buyout financing above 10%. He sees stress building in 2018, 2019, and 2021 LBOs, and warns that interest costs and deficits could push the Fed's balance sheet to grow.
Panossian argues private credit grows secularly by filling gaps that public markets and bank regulation leave open, and that its advantages (certainty of execution, sourcing, structuring, and fundamental marking) are durable, though he is concerned that rising interest costs and fiscal deficits could create rate risk.
- Private credit expands each time public markets or regulation fail to supply financing, from mezzanine in the late 1990s to asset-backed finance after Basel III endgame.
- Sponsors pay for speed and certainty of execution, which private lenders can deliver and syndicated markets cannot.
- Distressed investing has shifted from marketable-securities trading to consensual rescue lending, and private marks track fundamentals more than public prices did in COVID.
Private credit grows by filling gaps that banks and regulation leave behind.
- The private credit market grew about 5x from 2007 to today, from roughly $250 billion to nearly $1.5 trillion, as private lenders filled gaps left by banks.
“from 2007 to today, we've seen about a 5x increase in the size of the private credit market. It went from $250 billion to now nearing $1.5 trillion.”
- Private credit originated in the late 1990s and early 2000s as mezzanine finance, because middle-market companies could not economically issue high-yield bonds, which required minimum issues of $125 to $150 million, ratings, and bank syndication.
“It just didn't make sense to issue a high-yield bond at that time because you needed to have a minimum issue size of $125 million or $150 million.”
- Basel III endgame regulation is causing US investment banks and regional banks to exit legacy lending to small and medium businesses, certain consumer finance, and specialty finance, creating an asset-backed finance opportunity for private credit.
“the effect that it's having in the U.S. is that investment banks as well as regional banks are exiting legacy areas of lending”
- After the global financial crisis, Dodd-Frank and other regulations meaningfully shrank bank activities and trading desks, creating a gap that private markets expanded into with first-lien and unitranche lending.
“And then the global financial crisis happened, and Dodd-Frank and other regulations stepped in. Bank activities and trading desks meaningfully shrunk.”
- Digital infrastructure construction needs capital as banks appear fully tapped, so private credit will increasingly need to finance both stabilized assets and construction lending, though the structures may be less detailed than life sciences deals.
“the banks appear to be fully tapped or approaching the condition of being fully tapped. And the private credit universe will more and more need to come in”
- Every time public markets or regulatory environments fail to provide an adequate solution, private markets fill in, and private credit then grows, takes market share, and maintains it until the next regulatory shift.
“every time that there's a market failure or every time there's a regulatory shift, the private credit community responds, grows and frankly, maintains that market share until the next regulatory shoe drops.”
- Post-crisis private credit moved from junior mezzanine debt to first-lien and unitranche structures, and then to larger deals that previously would have gone to the syndicated bond or loan market.
“the markets went to first-lien private credit, went to unitranche private credit, which is essentially first lien plus some junior or second lien wrapped into one larger financing.”
- After the 2022 dislocation, when SVB and Signature Bank collapsed and Wall Street was left with hung loans, private credit expanded further, enabling $2 to $3 billion private loans for sponsors valuing certainty of execution.
“It went even larger scale. You could do a $2 billion or $3 billion private loan now, if you're a private equity sponsor and you have certainty of execution.”
Rescue lending has shifted to consensual, bespoke deals that depend on restructuring expertise.
- CLO holders of distressed or CCC-rated loans do not need to sell even after default, and CLOs act as self-regulating mechanisms, so forced selling pressure appears only during sudden institutional or retail withdrawals, which have been brief since the GFC.
“So in the case of CLOs, or collateralized loan obligations, they're holders of that debt. They don't need to sell. Even if it defaults or if there's a CCC, they don't actually need to sell it.”
- Distressed debt investing changed from marketable-securities trading that required buying a third or more of a bond tranche to control restructurings, to consensual rescue lending, because tradable credit liquidity has dried up.
“So as a result, distressed debt has become more of a private credit-oriented exercise where you're looking for consensual rescue loans... I think the biggest change in the distressed debt market is the drying up of liquidity in the tradable credit market.”
- Oaktree's advantage in distressed situations comes from restructuring experts across its strategies, including former distressed debt investors inside performing credit and dedicated restructuring specialists in opportunistic credit, and from the firm's founding in 1995 and distressed strategy launched in 1988.
“Even within our performing private credit business, several of our team members are former distressed debt investors”
- Layered capital structures, where new rescue loans sit ahead of existing debt, will continue as rescue loans roll through over the next two or three years as maturities arrive, with first-lien rescue loans grabbing unpledged collateral or holdco preferred rescue loans delevering the first lien.
“that certainly happens, for sure. And it's probably going to continue to happen, I think, with rescue loans that are probably going to roll through over the next two or three years as maturities happen.”
- Oaktree's performing and opportunistic teams can co-invest in the same tranche of a large deal, such as the $1.25 billion DIP loan to LATAM Airlines during COVID, but they do not take different tranches of the same capital structure because of inter-fund conflict concerns.
“We all participated in the same tranche. We typically do not participate in different tranches of the same capital structure.”
- A holdco preferred rescue loan that sits junior to the first lien but ahead of equity can delever the first lien and make it refinanceable, which is a healthier outcome with clearer capital structure than opaque layering.
“there will be other situations where there's a holdco pref rescue loan that comes in, that delevers the first lien and makes it refinanceable.”
- Rescue lending requires bespoke structures because each distressed borrower's problems differ, and structure matters most there since the lender must protect its position while still funding the company through a difficult period.
“every one of those types of situations is bespoke”
- During COVID the window to buy distressed paper lasted only about two or three months, from March to roughly June, which is when most of the paper traded, so public distressed investors must be nimble and convicted.
“the depth of the buying opportunity was only about two or three months, from March to maybe June”
Sector-expert sourcing and disciplined underwriting create a sustainable private credit advantage.
- Private credit managers cannot lend to every sponsor, so they must self-select a smaller set of private equity firms with sector expertise and good execution, and prefer sponsors that treat lenders well.
“You have to self-select to a smaller set of private equity firms that you think, at least, have subject matter expertise in particular sectors... you really want to do business with the private equity firms that treat their lenders right.”
- A sustainable advantage in private credit comes from three things in order: sourcing through sector-expert analysts who know management teams, disciplined underwriting to avoid 'land mines,' and disciplined structuring for complex deals.
“It starts from the beginning, which is sourcing. You really need to have good sourcing people.”
- Technology companies rarely sit in the middle inflection point; they are either venture-stage or large LBO targets, and the middle often carries real credit risk such as single-customer dependence.
“There are very few companies in the in between inflection point... For example, they might have only one customer, and that customer is potentially just going to shut off the business.”
- Lenders should size their position well below enterprise value, because a loan equal to a business's value can become 100% loan-to-value if clinical trial spending burns the proceeds, so structure must stop the bleeding if things go badly.
“if the business is worth $500 million, you don't want to lend them $500 million because the outcome could still be negative in that they could take your $500 million and burn it in the clinical trials”
- Good sourcing in private credit requires analysts who specialize deeply in one sector, know management teams, and attend that industry's regular trade shows rather than finance conferences.
“They go to the trade shows. Not trade shows involving finance, but trade shows involving that particular industry's regular trade.”
Scale and a balanced platform let lenders win large sponsor deals.
- In opportunistic and rescue lending, large fund size is a major advantage because a private equity firm needing a $700 million solution wants one or two counterparties to write the check quickly and quietly rather than talking to 30.
“if you're a private equity firm that needs a $700 million solution, you don't want to have to go out and talk to 30 counterparties.”
- Banks compete with private credit for strong, lightly levered deals rated around BB, pricing aggressively, but they are often partners who co-provide solutions such as privately placed second liens or first liens alongside syndicated loans.
“I think just as much as they are competitors, they're often partners.”
- Oaktree's private credit platform is balanced, equal parts opportunistic and performing credit, so it can offer private equity firms first-lien sponsor loans in good times and rescue capital in bad times.
“we have a very balanced private credit platform in that we are equal parts opportunistic credit as we are performing private credit. And so we have a solution for private equity firms in both good times and bad times.”
- Institutional investors with billions in sponsor-led first-lien direct lending want differentiated exposure because the holdings are all correlated, which drives private credit managers to innovate in structure and end-market exposure.
“I just can't double and triple down and sponsor first lien anymore. This is just a lot, and it's all correlated.”
- Banks have lost market share to private credit because they no longer have the balance sheet access to shorten syndication or make execution more certain, though the overall market is large enough that banks still have plenty of business.
“But they just, at this point, unfortunately for them, don't have the same balance sheet access as they used to. There's no way for them to shorten the syndication process or make it more certain.”
- In performing private credit, bigger funds are generally better, but there is a natural upper limit because sponsors split large facilities among three or more lenders, so a $1 billion check gives only a partial allocation.
“there is an upper end of the fund size where you just find it hard to fill the boat because the private equity firms are generally not doing $10 billion LBOs with $5 billion private financings.”
Rates will likely stay high, making credit preferable to equity given Fed policy and deficits.
- During the financial crisis, levered vehicles such as structured investment vehicles with mismatched assets and liabilities blew up, and bank trading desks and levered funds enabled the marketable-securities approach to distressed investing.
“These special structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, that had mismatched assets and liabilities.”
- Over the next 12 months, the upcoming US election may amplify rate and Fed-related risk, since both candidates are likely to continue deficit spending, and rising rates could trigger a consumer and corporate confidence crisis.
“there's a lot of rate- and Fed-related risk, I think that could unfold over the next 12 months depending on who becomes president.”
- The Fed does not have a mandate to cut rates just because inflation is heading in the right direction or to support asset prices, so rates likely stay high for an extended period, making credit a better place than equity for the medium term.
“The Fed does not have a mandate just to reduce rates for the sake of reducing rates. The Fed does not have a mandate to support asset prices.”
- US interest expense approaching $1.1 to $1.2 trillion, combined with deficits and lack of political will to cut spending or raise taxes, means the Fed balance sheet may have to grow to absorb Treasury issuance, risking unruly long-term rates and a confidence-driven recession.
“the cost of interest of the U.S. economy or the U.S. treasury now approaching something like $1.1 trillion or $1.2 trillion just for interest expense.”
- A growing level of stress sits in the tail of the market, meaning LBOs done in 2018, 2019, or 2021 when base rates were near zero and never contemplated rates near 5%.
“there is a growing level of stress in the tail of the market. The tail being LBOs that were done maybe in 2019 or 2018 or 2021 even, when base rates were near zero”
- The Fed does not have a mandate to cut rates for their own sake or to support asset prices; its mandate is stable growth and employment, so falling inflation alone should not trigger cuts absent a recession or meaningful shock to stability.
“The Fed does not have a mandate just to reduce rates for the sake of reducing rates. The Fed does not have a mandate to support asset prices.”
Private credit marks track business fundamentals, making the asset class less opaque than believed.
- Investment Company Act of 1940 (40 Act) regulated private credit vehicles mark their books to fundamental performance every quarter and disclose metrics like fixed charge coverage and leverage, and third-party valuation agents working across BDCs help validate marks.
“if you look at the '40 Act regulated private credit vehicles, they do mark their books to fundamental performance every quarter.”
- Private credit marks its books based primarily on fundamental performance of businesses and secondarily on changes in market spreads, adjusted for the asset's expected duration.
“Private credit marks its books based on fundamental performance of businesses. But secondarily, they also mark it based on a change in market spreads.”
- During COVID, private credit books marked down about 6 to 9 points in the quarter, while public bank loans, whose index fell to the low 80s, marked down about 18 to 20 points, and private credit marks were arguably closer to fundamentals.
“private credit books generally mark down six to nine points for that quarter. And public credit, especially bank loans, probably marked down 18 to 20 points.”
- The common belief that private credit is very opaque and that managers play with marks is a misconception, because positions are held across multiple BDCs and comparable marks can be checked against other public BDCs.
“this is just really opaque, and people are playing with the marks. While I understand that skepticism, I think that there is a fair bit of transparency in private credit”
- Within about 12 months after COVID, most private credit positions snapped back quickly thanks to stimulus, which suggests the early private marks were a reasonable best guess under deep uncertainty about which companies would fail.
“Nobody knew whether company A in the private market or company B in the public market was going to implode or be just fine.”
Direct lending gives sponsors certainty of execution, though illiquid exits limit lenders' options.
- Oaktree does not build new products primarily to securitize them, because it is hard to invest in a new product without knowing the buyer base; the focus is whether the firm has the resources and history to deliver it.
“I wouldn't necessarily say that we're focused on securitizing as a pathway to achieving that.”
- The main advantage private credit offers private equity sponsors is certainty of execution: they avoid a six-month syndication and ratings process in which a deal can fall apart at any point.
“The benefit of private credit versus public, for a private equity sponsor, is that certainty of execution. You don't need to go through a six-month process, going through a syndication, a ratings process. At any point, it could fall down.”
- There is effectively no secondary market for direct loans; a lender wanting to exit usually must sell to another consortium member under a negotiated process that the sponsor often controls, which is inefficient and generally yields poor outcomes for troubled positions.
“There really isn't a market, per se... Oftentimes the trading of that position is monitored or traffic copped by the private equity firm that owns the business.”
- Portfolio-level sales of clean direct-lending books have occurred near par in healthy markets when buyers with fund inflows want exposure, but troubled or end-of-life portfolios are very hard to sell at reasonable prices.
“We've seen trades like that at the portfolio level over the last few years in healthy markets where the average dollar price has been near par.”
- Between 2000 and 2007, private credit grew to roughly $200 billion to $250 billion, but it was mainly a junior, mezzanine-style instrument.
“between 2000 and 2007, private credit had grown to maybe $200 billion, $250 billion in size, and again, mainly a junior instrument”
- In large-cap first-lien sponsored lending, private equity sponsors write equity checks of 60% or more, and lenders earn spreads of $500 to $550 million equivalent in the current market, or 10% to 12% yields, on companies worth at least $1 billion or with $100 million or more EBITDA.
“private equity firms are writing 60% plus equity checks”
- Oaktree Lending Partners is a fund dedicated to one narrow focus, large-cap first-lien sponsor lending, drawing on a pool of private credit investors, while other vehicles pursue best-ideas strategies across rescue, mezzanine, and first lien.
“we have something called Oaktree Lending Partners, that is a fund managed by this big pool of private credit investors, but with that very narrow focus”
High base rates squeeze buyout borrowing while attracting investor inflows to private credit.
- With base rates above 5% and private loan spreads around 500 basis points, first-lien borrowing costs for a private equity buyout exceed 10%, which reduces LBO deal volume.
“because base rates are so high right now, over 5%, and because spreads for a private loan... has a spread of about 500 basis points. The cost of borrowing on a first-lien basis... is north of 10%.”
- Because private credit is largely a floating-rate asset class, it has attracted significant inflows into BDCs and other vehicles from both institutional and retail investors in a high-rate environment.
“because private credit, for the most part, is a floating rate asset class, there has been a significant amount of inflows into BDCs and other vehicles, both institutional investors and retail investors.”
- Month-to-month deal flow can make private credit look oversupplied, but over the medium and long term there is a large mismatch in favor of demand, given trillions of private equity dry powder and roughly $300 billion of private credit dry powder.
“in any month-to-month period, there may be a slowdown of deal flow... But over a medium or long-term period... there's just a really big mismatch in terms of the need for financing and the supply of that financing.”
Life sciences lending pays well because returns track scientific milestones, not the economic cycle.
- Lenders can commit up front to additional loans on the same terms if the borrower hits pipeline milestones such as developing drug number two or three, which gives management a capital incentive and lets the lender benefit as science derisks its credit position.
“And then we also provide carrots, too. And the carrots are milestones.”
- Early-stage life sciences businesses are a binary outcome akin to venture lending or venture equity, which Oaktree does not do.
“Early stage is a binary outcome. It's venture lending, it's venture equity, and that's not what we do.”
- Life sciences lending offers returns as good as or better than first-lien sponsored direct lending but is uncorrelated with GDP, because company performance depends on scientific innovation and commercialization rather than the economic cycle.
“Life sciences companies, their performance is uncorrelated with GDP. If they're good at curing cancer, it doesn't matter if we're in a recession or not.”
- Oaktree's typical life sciences borrower has one or more products that are either already FDA-approved or whose loan is contingent on FDA approval, and loan proceeds fund commercialization and pipeline clinical trials rather than early-stage research.
“Our typical borrower has a product or two or three that are either post-FDA approval or our loan to them is contingent upon them getting FDA approval.”
Oaktree controls risk through diversification, concentration limits, and autonomy after Brookfield's acquisition.
- Oaktree's direct lending investment committee applies a rule that if an investment is attractive for one fund it is attractive for every fund, then overlays concentration limits for industry, sponsor, vintage, and reserves for rescue loans.
“if we like it for one fund, we like it for every fund. That's our starting point.”
- Oaktree limits single-position losses through a diversified portfolio across regions, sectors, foreign borrowers, currency risk, vintage, and refinancing access, and is largely first-lien in its accounts.
“we tried to make no one position large enough that it's that damaging. So highly diversified portfolio, we look for diversity by region.”
- Brookfield's acquisition has not changed Oaktree's investment process: Oaktree stays independent with its own board, an information wall, and full autonomy over investment decisions, while Brookfield provides balance sheet size and sector knowledge when asked.
“Brookfield has not changed anything that we do. It's, I would say, only amplified or supplemented things that we do.”