Boeing: Turbulent Times
What this covers
The conversation pairs Zack of Business Breakdowns with aviation journalist Jon Ostrower. It begins with how commercial aerospace works before turning to Boeing's troubles. The industry sections cover the duopoly with Airbus, the 25-to-30-year service life of an airplane, and form-follows-function lock-in: airline relationships of 20 to 30 years, with simulators, pilots and maintenance organizations built around a design. They also discuss sovereign backing, using Bombardier's C-Series, absorbed into Airbus in 2018, and the Comac C919, which is certified but flies only in China.
The Boeing story is told as a chain of decisions. Ostrower describes the 1997 McDonnell Douglas merger and its Jack Welch-style financialization, then the divestiture of Wichita and Tulsa into Spirit AeroSystems. He covers the 787's overruns, estimated at 300% to 900% of plan, and how the 777 and 737 Next-Generation worked as cash cows under program accounting. He then moves to the re-engined 737 MAX as a cost-driven answer to the A320neo. On MCAS, he says both crashes trace to bad data from a single sensor. China's delayed return of the MAX appears as a geopolitical bargaining chip.
The economics get their own stretch: why production rate drives profit, how predelivery payments fund working capital, and why services, roughly 70% of life-cycle cost, appeal as a steadier business than boom-and-bust sales. Ostrower also covers the oversupplied twin-aisle market before COVID and the cost of sustainable aviation fuel. He argues that Boeing's corporate strategy is unchanged and that the post-crash reforms are cultural and procedural.
Ostrower argues Boeing's crisis stems from compounding strategic missteps, including the post-1997 McDonnell Douglas financial-management culture and the rushed 737 MAX, rather than from external shocks alone. He contends that aerospace's long fleet lifecycles, high switching costs, and sovereign backing make change slow and painful, so Boeing must fix its internal integration to survive.
- Boeing's 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas brought financial-instrument, GE-style management that divested supplier capabilities and prioritized cash over integration.
- The 737 MAX was a cost-driven response to Airbus's A320neo, and the MCAS design flaw plus the 20-month grounding exposed institutional failures.
- Aircraft programs last 25-30 years and carry 20-30 year airline relationships, so industry structure resists rapid change.
Rapid, cost-driven design changes caused costly 787 overruns and the MAX crashes and grounding.
- Boeing's 787 development spending has been estimated at between 300% and 900% of original plans depending on measurement, against an original budget of under $5 billion in 2003 dollars, with estimates ranging from $14 billion to $60 billion.
“Boeing in it was spending estimates have ranged from anywhere between 300% and 900% of what they had originally planned”
- In aerospace, when companies attempt to change designs very quickly, things break and break painfully, as the 787 development showed when Boeing moved from the 777's aluminum, high-bypass design to a mostly carbon-composite, more-electric architecture with a new production system in less than a decade.
“what we've seen, I think, on multiple occasions in this industry is that when you do try to change it really quickly, things break and they break really painfully.”
- Whether next-generation designs like the truss-braced wing and open rotor reach market and produce a convincing business case for airlines will largely determine what the 2030s look like for aerospace.
“whether or not they make the business case closed and they convince airlines that this is a path forward, will, I think, in large measure, decide what the 2030s look like.”
- Boeing, under a NASA shared grant, is converting an old MD-90 into a transonic truss-braced wing demonstrator with a long, thin wing supported by struts, planning first flight in 2028, the first full-scale shape change since the 707 in the 1950s.
“in 2028, they will fly.”
- Mitsubishi, the Japanese industrial conglomerate, pulled back from its regional jet program, shelved it, and will almost certainly never bring it to fruition.
“they ended up shelving the program, and it will almost certainly actually will never come to fruition.”
- Airbus faces supply chain challenges too, but it does not carry the overhang of the MAX crisis and regulatory challenges that Boeing faces in the U.S. and globally.
“They are different because they don't have the overhang of what happened with MAX”
- The cost of developing a new single-aisle airplane, at a time when Airbus was launching the A320neo, pushed Boeing to pursue a re-engined 737, the MAX, rather than a clean-sheet design, which was a cost-driven choice made after the 787 overruns.
“the cost of developing a new single-aisle airplane at a time when Airbus was coming out with the A320neo drove them to put new engines and create 737 MAX.”
- After the two crashes, the 737 MAX was grounded starting with China and spreading worldwide, with the U.S. and Canada the last to ground it, and it remained grounded for 20 months until returning to U.S. service in December 2020.
“the airplane being grounded for 20 months. Then it finally went back to service in the U.S. in December of 2020.”
- When the 787 launched in 2003 and 2004, development took two to three years longer than expected because technology was not ready, the supply chain was not ready, and certification took much longer.
“they undertook that process over what ended up being 2, 3 years longer than they expected”
- The Lion Air crash in October 2018 killing 189 people and the Ethiopian Airlines crash five months later were both 737 MAX accidents that occurred within months of each other, which was highly unusual after one of the safest years in commercial aviation history.
“after literally one of the safest years in commercial aviation history, you had two airplanes crashing within months of each other, and that just doesn't happen.”
Outsourcing to an integrator model compounds Boeing's self-inflicted missteps and supplier dependency.
- Boeing's singular challenge is integrating an incredibly complex product with an equally complex, integrated enterprise responsive to customers, and each successive misstep compounded the drift away from solving that core problem.
“the sum total of each misstep sort of compounding the issue getting farther away from solving the core problem”
- Aircraft production depends on thousands of suppliers whose own suppliers run four, five, or six tiers deep, especially for raw materials like titanium used in jet engines, and every step must work with no room for error.
“you're talking about a chain that, in some cases, is four, five, six levels deep”
- Under the post-merger leadership, Boeing decided that its expertise should be design integration and assembly rather than manufacturing of components, so it treated most component production as noncore.
“Boeing wanted to be an aircraft integrator. They pulled all the pieces together and they wanted to have that design capability”
- In the early 2000s Boeing divested non-core units, including Wichita and Tulsa, to create Spirit AeroSystems for the 787, and that spin-off became Boeing's largest supplier, with significant performance challenges and now financial troubles.
“they divested their Wichita unit and their Tulsa unit to create Spirit AeroSystems, which is now their biggest supplier”
- Although external forces such as competition and geopolitics bear down on Boeing and Airbus, the biggest threats are the firms' own compounding missteps that lead them away from being strategic national assets and delivering airplanes well, and maintaining one's own house is the key to weathering storms.
“the biggest threats to Boeing and Airbus are themselves making up series of compounding missteps”
- Boeing's leadership deliberately defined the company as an aircraft integrator that retains system design capability and assembly, outsourcing the rest, and the integrator model is the source of both its advantages and its supplier dependency problems.
“Boeing wanted to be an aircraft integrator. They pulled all the pieces together and they wanted to have that design capability”
Boeing's finance-driven culture and cash-focused strategy persist despite leadership change.
- The 1997 Boeing–McDonnell Douglas merger brought McDonnell Douglas's leadership and its GE-influenced, Jack Welch-style view of the company as a financial instrument, which changed Boeing's corporate culture around its role as an aircraft manufacturer.
“brought a lot of very Jack Welch, GE-centric approaches to how the company was run in terms of thinking about the company as a financial instrument.”
- The 777 and 737 Next-Generation, optimized under earlier leadership, became cash cows that generated large cash flow during the 2011–2017 transition while the 787 was losing money per delivery, and Boeing accounts on a program basis rather than a per-unit basis.
“They became the cash cows. They generated tremendous, tremendous, tremendous cash for Boeing at a time when the 787 was getting on its feet.”
- CEO Dennis Muilenburg was ousted at the end of 2019 and David Calhoun, a long-serving board member, took over shortly afterward.
“then CEO, Dennis Muilenburg was ultimately ousted at the end of 2019, and David Calhoun took over shortly thereafter.”
- Despite the MAX tragedies and leadership change, Boeing's high-level corporate strategy has not changed; the changes are cultural and procedural, such as a chief safety officer, safety promotion programs, and an ombudsman, while Wall Street still measures the company on cash generation.
“fundamentally, the corporate strategy of Boeing has not changed, building airplanes for the world's airlines for growth and replacement.”
Aircraft economics center on pricing, predelivery cash, and services rather than new-sale performance.
- About two-thirds of an airplane's final price is paid on delivery, while the remaining one-third or half comes in predelivery payments that fund working capital for engines, interiors, fuselages, and wings during production.
“So we deliver an airplane and about 2/3 of the final price of the airplane is actually paid on delivery.”
- Estimates suggest services such as maintenance, upgrades, and tools represent roughly 70% of an airplane's total life-cycle cost, and Boeing and Airbus are trying to grow this share because it is more stable than the boom-bust cycle of new sales.
“I've seen estimates that that's like 70% of the total cost -- life cycle cost of an airplane.”
- Single-aisle aircraft list at $110 million to $130 million, but discounts of 40% to 60% are typical, so airlines pay roughly $50 million to $55 million, while all-in build cost for mature programs like the A320 or 737 is roughly $25 million to $35 million.
“discounts of 40% to 60% are very, very common and typical”
- Airbus has a backlog of roughly 6,000 to 7,000 aircraft and Boeing roughly 4,000 to 5,000, which keeps both busy for the next decade.
“Airbus is 6,000 or 7,000 right now. I'm probably fudging those numbers... In Boeing between 4,000 and 5,000.”
- A new aircraft program costs an estimated $15 billion to $20 billion to develop.
“So a new aircraft program, the estimates are around $15 billion to $20 billion.”
Operating efficiency and airline ecosystems lock in existing designs and keep the duopoly entrenched.
- With the jet age transition to 707s and DC-8s, the industry's guiding ethos shifted from higher, faster, farther to faster, better, cheaper, and the most durable commercial aerospace trend since then is delivering lower operating cost through lower fuel burn and maintenance.
“the macro picture for airplane operations went from higher, faster, farther to faster, better, cheaper.”
- Airlines generally do not want more performance from new aircraft because their operations are built around an existing ecosystem, and profitability comes from optimizing within that structure rather than from raw capability.
“Airlines don't generally want more performance because there's a whole ecosystem designed around the structure that we have right now”
- The duopoly's structure persists because form follows function: barriers to entry require a particular form factor, and airline relationships last 20 to 30 years with embedded simulators, pilots, and maintenance organizations, so changing designs is very difficult.
“you're talking about a 20- to 30-year relationship between the airline and the aircraft manufacturer. So it just doesn't change that easily.”
- The economic useful life of a commercial airplane is roughly 25 to 30 years, so a plane delivered today will likely still be in service around 2050.
“Typically, the economic useful life of an airplane is measured in roughly 25 to 30 years.”
- The 737 entered service in 1967 and the A320 around 1987–88, so both designs are old and reliable, and the surrounding infrastructure makes them persist even though the A320 is newer by about two decades.
“fundamentally these designs are really old. They're really reliable for the most part, and they're familiar, and there's an infrastructure built up around that.”
MAX crashes and geopolitics, such as China's grounding and trade policy, shaped Boeing's fortunes.
- Boeing and Airbus, though publicly traded, should be understood as extensions of their national patrons, serving as instruments of soft power for the U.S. and EU commercial and strategic dominance.
“they are extensions of both commercial dominance that the EU and the U.S. want to wield around the world. These are instruments of soft power.”
- China will become a growing part of the aircraft duopoly over coming decades, but it will happen more slowly than people think, and geopolitical and industrial ties will affect both Boeing and Airbus regardless.
“Yes, China is going to be a growing part of the duopoly over the coming decades.”
- China grounded the MAX first out of safety caution but returned it to service much later than the U.S., and its delayed return evolved into a geopolitical pawn shaped by trade policy that began under the Trump administration and continued under Biden, making Boeing a casualty.
“It had become effectively a pawn in the geopolitical game that was borne out of trade policies that started in the Trump administration”
- MCAS, designed to meet certification requirements for high angle-of-attack handling, repeatedly activated erroneously in both MAX crashes because bad angle-of-attack data reached a single sensor and input, causing crews to lose control, and neither accident would have happened without MCAS.
“neither of those accidents happen if MCAS doesn't exist.”
Boeing's boom-bust production approach creates overproduction and forces painful layoffs.
- Around 2017 to 2019, before COVID, the market for large twin-aisle airplanes became oversupplied as Boeing, especially, built at an incredible pace, including 787s, leaving the company exposed to overproduction and its consequences.
“there was a glut of twin-aisle airplanes. So this is an industry that particularly Boeing”
- Boeing has traditionally run its commercial business by riding demand waves, accelerating production as demand rises, but this procyclical approach means every upswing creates a downswing that forces large layoffs.
“Traditionally, the airplane business, as has been practiced by Boeing has been -- on the commercial side, has been to ride the demand waves up and down.”
- Boeing went from building 737s at nearly 42 per month to stopping the production line entirely, then restarting it, colliding with supplier relationship problems and pandemic-era supply chain fragility.
“having gone from continuing to build airplanes at almost 42 per month for 737s to stopping the line completely and then restarting it”
Aviation's future involves new technologies, entrants, and shifting demand beyond tube-and-wing designs.
- GE is developing an open rotor engine, an unducted, propeller-like design with a very large fan that could change aircraft propulsion.
“GE, for example, is developing what's called the open rotor engine”
- Boeing's eVTOL investment through Wisk, which it now wholly owns, is part of a long-running autonomy strategy aimed at removing pilots, driven by the scarcity of pilots that may limit growth of the airplanes being delivered, and Boeing has been consistent on this bet since 2017–2018.
“if you don't have enough pilots to grow with the airplanes that you're trying to deliver”
- By 2033 air travel will not look the way it does today, given climate policy, fuel costs, and new aircraft technology.
“what does the world look like in 2033 for air travel? And by all accounts, it is not going to look like the way it does today.”
- The iPhone 15 and the Boeing 777X both represent mature products whose incremental evolution (cameras, engines, processors, avionics) keeps the form factor fixed, and both companies face the same challenge of finding the next product category, so the two firms track each other more closely than people realize.
“fundamentally the form factor remains the same. And so you watch these two products evolve over time.”
- JetZero, a start-up in Long Beach, is trying to build a blended wing body aircraft in which the entire airplane is a wing rather than the tube-and-wing configuration used by Boeing.
“I have a company start-up out of Long Beach called JetZero, for example.”
- Boeing's commercial demand has two drivers: replacing aging fleets in North America and Europe with more fuel-efficient, larger, or better-engined aircraft, and growth from emerging markets such as China, India, Asia Pacific, the Middle East, and Latin America.
“There are two big pieces that drive the model on the commercial side. One is growth and one is replacement.”
Shareholder returns and profit margins should follow from delivering airplanes at a stable rate.
- Boeing's stock price reached record levels, at one point pushing toward $500 per share, as the company was viewed as a darling of equity markets.
“which drove its stock price to record levels at one point, pushing $500 a share.”
- Boeing has sought profit margins of 5% to 15% on commercial airplanes, which improve as programs mature, making aircraft a long-term business.
“generally, Boeing has sought profit margins anywhere between 5% and 15% for a commercial airplane.”
- Shareholder returns are the outgrowth of executing well on the two core missions, serving as strategic national assets and delivering airplanes, rather than being the primary objective themselves.
“the outgrowth of all that. When you do that well is shareholder returns.”
- Output rate is the main driver of profitability: spreading fixed overhead across more units sharply lowers unit costs, and a stable drumbeat of about 42 737s per month, or roughly two per production day, creates a virtuous flywheel that goes straight to the bottom line, so Boeing's roughly $100 billion revenue year was driven by a stable, rapid tempo.
“your overheads just get the benefit of spreading them across a good number of units and unit costs just fall tremendously”
Commercial aircraft need sovereign backing and serve national strategic interests like soft power.
- Sovereign backing is one of the major prerequisites for entering the commercial aircraft business, as shown by Bombardier's C-Series, which was technically superior but failed to achieve market traction and was absorbed into Airbus in 2018.
“one of the major prerequisites for entering this business is to have sovereign backing.”
- China's state-owned COMAC has certified the C919, roughly the size of a 737 or A320, which entered service but is not certified to operate outside China, with only two in operation, while the ARJ21 regional jet also flies domestically.
“there are two Chinese C919s flying. So there's a long way to go.”
- Officials such as the Secretary of the Air Force have commissioned analysis of how the disruption to Boeing affects Pentagon projection capabilities and State Department soft power, and State Department economic officers help with Boeing sales campaigns, which Ostrower says is not uncommon.
“The economic officers of the state department are involved with helping with Boeing sales campaigns, absolutely, and the same in the EU.”
- Aviation underpins everyday life through the movement of goods, fresh flowers, electronics, and people, and the public takes this for granted even as it complains about air travel.
“People are far more likely to complain about air travel than they are to embrace the amazingness of it”
Aircraft manufacturing is harder than spaceflight, and each efficiency leap costs more.
- Aircraft manufacturing, with tolerances of around 1,000 to 10,000 thousandths of an inch and products that must withstand harsh weather, is arguably the most challenging industrial task humans perform, harder than commercial spaceflight because rockets fly in pristine conditions and operate at far lower volume.
“What you're fundamentally talking about is the single most challenging industrial task humans do.”
- Every next leap in fuel efficiency in aircraft design is more expensive to develop than the previous one, a consistent trend in the business that forces tradeoffs about how to recover costs.
“every next leap gets even more expensive.”
- Commercial aircraft require more operational robustness than rockets because airplanes fly in terrible weather at high tempo and are serviced by a workforce ranging from minimum wage to $300,000 to $400,000 a year, while rockets wait for pristine weather.
“So a rocket will wait for good weather, perfect pristine weather. And an airplane will fly in terrible weather”
Aviation's carbon emissions and costly sustainable fuel raise open questions about industry growth.
- Aviation accounts for about 2% to 3% of the world's carbon emissions, and the industry's right to continue at that level is an open existential question.
“the type of emissions that the industry has produced, which is about 2% to 3% of the world's carbon emissions on its own”
- Sustainable aviation fuel, which can cut lifecycle carbon by up to 50% to 80%, currently costs roughly four to five times as much as traditional jet fuel, raising questions about ticket prices, demand elasticity, and whether supply can meet need.
“It's not going to be cheaper at least where we sit today, it's 4 or 5x more expensive than traditional jet fuel.”