What this covers
Arjun walks through Exxon by first building the industry it sits in. The history starts with John D. Rockefeller, who responded to the chaotic overproduction after the Titusville boom by controlling pipelines and logistics, a form of Chokepoint Control. The 1911 breakup of Standard Oil then produced most of today's majors, including Exxon, Mobil, Chevron and BP. The talk also covers the business segments. Upstream E&P is where most of the value lies, refining is a spread business with no new US refinery since 1976, and gas stations earn their money on coffee and snacks rather than fuel.
The middle of the discussion is economics. Because producers sell at a globally visible price, the edge comes from position on a steep cost curve, with some fields viable at $30 to $35 oil and others needing $70. Depleting fields, the Commodity Boom-Bust Cycle, and April 2020's negative $37 WTI price are used to explain why supply responds slowly and why underinvestment could tighten the market. George Mitchell and horizontal drilling in the Barnett Shale lead into the shale boom and the XTO deal.
The most contested stretch concerns the energy transition. Arjun leans on historical 50-to-70-year timelines, argues that solar and wind face storage and reliability limits, says gas could beat coal if methane leaks are eliminated, and treats coal-reliant China and India as a hard sell. He also contests the idea that oil investing is simply a bet on price, pointing to Lee Raymond-era shareholder returns.
Murti argues Exxon's decade of underperformance stems mainly from centralized, homogeneous management that abandoned return-on-capital discipline and made bad acquisitions like XTO, not from oil prices or the energy transition alone, and that the oil cycle is turning up.
- Exxon earned top-quartile returns on capital for decades until the last five years, then regressed to mediocrity
- The XTO acquisition at a peak gas valuation was the clearest break from the return-on-capital discipline of the Lee Raymond era
- Energy transitions take 50 to 70 years, so oil demand and investment remain necessary for a long time
Fossil fuels still dominate, and slow, difficult transitions mean oil demand will persist for a long time.
- Oil and gas are part and parcel of everything society does, from driving and flying to Amazon deliveries and hospital plastics, which is why transitioning away from fossil fuels is so challenging.
“all of these contain fossil fuels. That is why it is such a challenge to transition away.”
- Crude oil in itself is essentially valueless to end users, since no one except a refiner demands it, so value is created by refining crude into usable products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.
“no one except a refining company demands crude oil... crude oil in and of itself is completely a valueless product.”
- Refiners make significant money by keeping plants running when competitors have outages, and by buying discounted heavy crude that costs about $20 less than WTI but needs specialized processing.
“If you're able to run at a time when other people are having problems, that is one of the ways you can make quite a bit of money in the refining business.”
- Despite advanced seismic modeling, oil exploration remains a guess-and-test business, though technology has made reservoirs increasingly accessible at a given price.
“There's always a guess and test element to it. But what you find is increasingly harder to get at oil reservoirs become increasingly accessible within the range of oil prices thanks to technology.”
- Exxon's position against shifting capital into renewables is that solar and wind are low-return businesses and that consumers, not producers, should bear responsibility for emissions from burning gasoline, while BP's strategy of becoming an integrated energy company is the opposite path.
“they're also saying, we don't know anything about solar and wind, those are low-return businesses... we're going to be the best possible oil company”
- The oil industry's cyclical pattern of over-optimism, overdrilling, oversupply, price crashes, and then undersupply began with the 1860s Titusville, Pennsylvania boom and has persisted since the industry's founding.
“you get periods of time where everybody is too optimistic, they drill too many wells. It then creates over supply that causes the price to crash, that began with the founding of this business.”
- Global energy use falls into transportation, power generation, and heating, with transportation overwhelmingly dependent on crude oil, while about 80 percent of total world energy comes from fossil fuels: oil about 30 percent, coal about 25 percent, and natural gas about 25 percent.
“Oil is about 30% of that, coal is about 25%, and natural gas is about 25%. If you add up 30 plus 25 plus 25, you'd say 80% of the energy the world uses today is fossil fuel based.”
- Solar's key advantage over fossil and nuclear generation is that households can install it themselves for distributed backup power during blackouts, something one cannot do with a gas or nuclear plant.
“the ability to have distributed power is actually a real advantage of solar that you don't get. You can't build your own natural gas plant”
- Solar and wind are now cost-competitive in power markets, but scaling them from 1 to 100 percent would require battery storage progress and would face reliability problems during extreme cold or heat, so the cost advantage does not yet translate into a full replacement.
“could you go from 1% to 100% at that low cost and have, by the way, reliable power that doesn't just work when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining?”
- Natural gas is far less polluting than coal, but methane leakage means producers must eliminate emissions, and if they do, gas becomes a more climate-friendly option than coal, with monitoring technology now available.
“Even in something like natural gas... you still have a methane issue... when you do that, suddenly natural gas becomes a more climate and environmentally friendly alternative”
- China and India sit on massive coal deposits that support rail and other industries and jobs, so asking them to switch to more expensive and less dependable power is a very tough sell, and realistic timelines for change are 50 to 70 years.
“In countries like India and China, they're sitting on massive coal deposits... It's a very, very tough sell to developing countries... realistically 50 to 70 years.”
- Fossil fuels were roughly 85 to 90 percent of the energy mix 10 to 20 years ago and about 80 percent today, showing a slow decline in share.
“It would have been 85%, 90%. So you've had a steady gain in the share of renewable.”
- Solar and wind each supply only about 1 percent of global energy despite growing at double-digit rates, so they remain minuscule relative to the total energy mix, meaning the world will need fossil fuels for a long time.
“solar and wind are each just 1% of the energy markets. They've been growing at double digit clip... but in terms of a percent of the total, they're minuscule.”
- Around one billion people lack access to modern energy and another billion have very limited access, so for them affordable and dependable fossil power, such as gasoline cars or coal plants, is more realistic than Teslas or solar, which means fossil fuel demand growth will persist.
“it is absurd to think someone who has nothing is going to be driving a Tesla as their first vehicle... that is why it exists.”
- Historically, energy transitions have taken five to seven decades, as coal and internal combustion engines each took about 70 years to dominate their markets, so rapid decarbonization faster than 50 to 70 years would be a major challenge.
“energy transitions take multiple decades. And by multiple, I mean five to seven. So 50 to 70 years is the timeframe”
- Nuclear power is carbon-free and dependable once built but expensive to construct, and if the world is serious about decarbonizing it is almost certain nuclear will have to be part of the solution.
“if you're truly committed to decarbonizing, it's almost certain that nuclear is going to have to be part of the piece.”
- Residual fuel oil was once a major power-generation fuel, but after the 1970s oil crisis the US, Japan, and Europe switched to coal, nuclear, and natural gas mainly for energy-security reasons, leaving residual oil as a low-value product that refiners must keep cracking.
“after the 1970s crisis, especially the US, Japan, and Europe said, 'We don't want to do this anymore.' Not so much for environmental reasons, a little bit more for energy security reasons.”
- Exxon's position is that it is not responsible for Scope 3 emissions from consumers burning gasoline, since individuals choose their vehicles, that solar and wind are low-return businesses, and that because billions of people cannot afford electric vehicles, oil demand will persist in most scenarios, so the company's strategy is to be the lowest-cost oil producer.
“why are we responsible for that? ... You were the one who bought the SUV”
Upstream value and excess returns rest on low-cost production position, not on forecasting oil prices.
- Lee Raymond's core philosophy was that Exxon could not predict oil and gas prices, so it should focus on identifying low-end cost-curve assets and invest there regardless of price forecasts.
“I don't know what the price of oil or gas is going to be, I know that I have to constantly figure out what is going to be at the low end of the cost curve going forward.”
- Oil investing is not primarily about guessing the oil price, because Exxon under Lee Raymond delivered better total shareholder return than the S&P 500 over rolling 10 and 20-year periods with lower volatility and a better Sharpe ratio.
“Exxon's total shareholder return was better than the S&P 500 consistently over rolling period at a lower volatility. They had a better sharp ratio than the S&P 500”
- In a commodity business, returns on capital tend to converge to the cost of capital over time, so excess returns require investing at the low end of the cost curve and avoiding overpayment driven by optimism.
“If you're a commodity business, over time your returns on capital are going to correspond to your cost of capital. You're actually not going to generate excess returns in a commodity business.”
- The best-in-class oil companies have consistently earned 15 to 30 percent returns on capital through all price regimes, while the bottom quartile often lost money even during the 2003-2008 super cycle when oil rose from $20 to $150.
“your best in-class companies have consistently done 15 to 30% returns on capital... your fourth quartile... you probably lost money.”
- Upstream oil profitability depends on where a field sits on a steep cost curve, with some fields needing only a $30 to $35 oil price for acceptable returns and others needing $70, driven by extraction difficulty, acreage cost, well productivity, and company capability.
“you might need, for example, only a 30 or $35 oil price to generate an acceptable return in some fields. In other fields, you might need a $70 oil price.”
- For Exxon and most integrated oil companies, exploration and production accounts for roughly two-thirds to three-quarters of value, because it is where a company can differentiate on cost position and profitability.
“anywhere from two-thirds to three-quarters of their value”
- Exxon Mobil has long been the largest publicly traded oil and gas company in the world, roughly a $250 billion company with about $250 billion in revenue and $50 billion of EBITDA, and it is the largest and most successful of the private (non-state) producers, which together with state-owned companies make up the world's oil supply.
“Exxon has long been the largest, most substantial, most significant publicly traded oil and gas company in the world”
- For an upstream producer, value comes from three things: how much was paid for the acreage, what development costs are, and how well the company extracts oil, and because revenue is set by the globally visible oil price, the producer's edge depends on its cost position rather than on the price itself.
“what did I pay for the acreage? What was the development cost for the oil?”
Centralized, outdated leadership suppressed dissent and drove repeated capital misallocation at Exxon.
- Exxon's decision-making was highly centralized in a small group of five men with similar engineering and geology backgrounds in Dallas, which discouraged executives from proposing investments that contradicted leadership's view and left the company without diverse perspectives when it needed to change.
“Exxon has been classically highly centralized in their decision-making... there's sort of five men, all have a pretty similar background... sitting in Dallas making these decisions”
- Exxon's management succession was poorly designed, because a leadership culture built under Lee Raymond failed to develop diverse successors able to challenge assumptions, whereas Chevron has managed four CEO successions well.
“CEOs and management teams, one of their number one responsibilities is to train and mentor and bring along that next generation... Chevron... deserves credit for doing CEO succession very well.”
- An Exxon executive in China told Murti he would not propose a lower-return but growth-oriented investment because he did not want to tell Lee Raymond he had wasted company capital, illustrating how executive power suppressed dissent.
“'I'm not going to be the guy going to Lee Raymond and telling him why I wasted a bunch of the company's capital.'”
- When Rex Tillerson became CEO around 2003, Exxon was coming off a bust-era restructuring cycle, but the management team failed to recognize that the fundamentals for a successful oil company were changing, which set up later missteps.
“When they made the CEO change to Rex Tillerson, and it was about 2003 timeframe... management team I think didn't recognize that the fundamentals... were changing.”
- Exxon judged the US mature and pivoted overseas, making poor bets abroad and divesting many US assets roughly a decade before the shale revolution made US acreage very valuable.
“The big integrated oils like Exxon made a decision, 'The US is mature, let's go overseas.' And they frankly made some bad bets on where to go overseas. They ended up divesting a lot of the US assets.”
- A legitimate critique of Lee Raymond is that Exxon was not at the forefront in accepting climate science, and that skepticism and delay that began under his leadership still affect the oil and gas industry.
“environmentalists would probably rightly critique that Lee Raymond was not exactly at the forefront accepting the science behind climate change.”
- After the 1970s boom and the 1986 bust, oil majors restructured by cutting costs, divesting high-cost assets, and narrowing to low-cost operations, and Lee Raymond led that mindset, which the management team continued even after conditions had changed.
“Lee Raymond led the charge of saying, 'We need to be profitable, we need to focus on our lowest cost assets and operations.' That mindset is something the management team stuck with even when it no longer made sense”
- Few companies dominate their industry for 150 years, and Exxon's survival across that span is a remarkable record of adaptation compared with newer leaders like Apple, which is only about 50 years old.
“how many companies and how many different industries do you think will dominate their industry for 150 years?”
- Beyond XTO, Exxon's notable missteps included high-cost Canadian oil sands investments and a failed partnership with Russian companies, forming a pattern of poor capital allocation.
“They made some bad investments in Canada. Oil sands itself can be a good or bad business, their oil sands investments turned out to be high cost. They tried to partner with some Russian companies, that didn't work out.”
Exxon's recovery requires shrinking, divesting non-core assets, and restoring return-on-capital discipline after losing its cost edge.
- Exxon's recovery depends less on oil prices rising and more on shrinking to grow, divesting non-core assets, and restoring return-on-capital discipline, with a more diverse board including renewables and restructuring expertise.
“for Exxon, it's not about hoping that places get better, it is about fixing themselves as an oil company.”
- Lee Raymond's discipline was to not forecast oil and gas prices and instead focus on the low end of the cost curve, a rule that became a problem when conditions changed.
“I don't know what the price of oil or gas is going to be, I know that I have to constantly figure out what is going to be at the low end of the cost curve going forward.”
- Unlike manufacturing plants, oil fields naturally deplete, so the central task is replacing depleting fields; Exxon's error was not running out of golden-goose assets but choosing future fields with much lower profitability than expected, then doubling down on them.
“the mistake they made was not so much that the golden goose assets ran out, but that the future assets they chose to invest in turned out to be much lower profitability”
- Chevron and Total have taken over from Exxon as the highest-quality large integrated oil companies, with Chevron maintaining financial discipline and closing the gap that once separated it from Exxon.
“I'd say Chevron and Total, which is a French super major, they've really taken the mantle from Exxon”
- Exxon's central problem is that its returns on capital fell from the best-in-class 15 to 30% range, which it held until about the last five years, to that of an average oil company, a regression to the mean.
“the overwhelming problem with Exxon has been the deterioration in their returns on capital from being in that best in class 15 to 30%”
- Major oil companies were once quite diversified, with Exxon owning Montgomery Ward, and investors may again press companies to divest tangential businesses as they mature, as oil majors did in the 1980s and 1990s.
“These companies used to be quite diversified, I think Exxon owned Montgomery Ward.”
Oil is at a cyclical bottom, and tightening supply and repriced shale acreage should drive returns to recover.
- Investors should ask whether the decade of low inflection, low commodity profitability, and growth stock leadership is ending, examining inflation, GDP growth, and whether value and commodity profits are set to recover.
“after a 15-year period of oil profitability has been bad, growth stocks have worked, inflation's been low. I think you have to say, are we at the end of that cycle?”
- Commodity cycles are measured in decades, and boom-era optimism such as the 2008 belief that growth would last forever leads producers to overinvest, after which slowing marginal demand turns the cycle, so investors should look for the next inflection now.
“Look in 2008, when things were booming, it felt like that was going to last forever... the business companies over-invested and demand on the margin slowed”
- Return on capital in the oil sector moved up from 1990 to 2006, fell to a bottom from 2006 to 2020, and Murti believes 2021 will be the first year of an uptick that could last about ten years, aided by underinvestment driven by ESG pressure.
“we're at the end of a 15-year down turn of return on capital. 1990 to 2006, we were up. 2006 to 2020, we were at the bottom. And I actually think 2021 will be the first year of the decent uptick”
- Entrepreneurs and executives must distinguish structural inflections from normal cyclical noise and constantly challenge core assumptions, guarding against confirmation bias, recency bias, and reliance on voices that think like themselves.
“how do you figure out when your basic business environment is changing in a dramatic way and not just the normal noise?... How do you get away from confirmation bias? How do you get away from recency bias?”
- Shale drilling has repeated the classic over-optimism and over-pessimism cycle of earlier oil booms, and large integrated companies with disciplined field optimization should reduce that pattern, with Exxon likely to steward the Permian well.
“we've had a couple of boom, bust cycles within shale as E&Ps exhibited classic over optimism and then over pessimism capital investing behavior... I think Exxon will be one of the companies that shepherds the Permian basin along in a good way.”
- Oil producers shut in production only when prices fall to the shut-in price, which is near the low lifting cost of a few dollars per barrel, and in April 2020 storage was full so prices went to negative $37 per barrel because oil cannot be stored like gold.
“the actual lifting cost to just simply lift the barrel, that might only be 6, 7, 8, or $10 a barrel... We ended up going to negative $37 a barrel, negative.”
- At the April 2020 lockdown low, global oil demand fell from about 100 million barrels per day to about 80 million, a roughly 20 percent drop that was about 20 times the worst normal annual decline.
“Demand... fell from 100 to 80. 20%... It's about 20X the demand fall that would normally be the worst case demand fall that you've ever seen.”
- Unlike manufacturing plants, oil fields naturally decline at 5 to 8 percent a year, and some decline 30 percent annually, so supply shrinks quickly if companies stop investing, which means underinvestment will tighten the market.
“An oil field if you don't invest will naturally decline 5, 6, 7, 8% a year, some fields might decline 30% a year.”
- Full-cycle development may require $50 to $60 a barrel for a good return, but the direct lifting cost of an existing barrel may only be $6 to $10, so producers keep producing until prices fall below that operating threshold.
“while a fulfilled development might require $50 a barrel or $60 a barrel to get a good return, the actual lifting cost to just simply lift the barrel, that might only be 6, 7, 8, or $10 a barrel”
- Major oil companies had to catch up in shale by acquiring independents, but once they buy the acreage, the low-cost value they hoped to capture is largely paid away at a fuller price.
“all the big guys have had to play catch-up in shale, so that generally means then acquired another company.”
- George Mitchell, the founder of the fracking boom, pioneered drilling wells sideways (horizontal wells) combined with fracture stimulation in the Barnett Shale of Texas, achieving gas production at lower-than-expected cost, and XTO then bought assets from majors that did not see the shale potential.
“George Mitchell is the heralded founder of the fracking boom. And he had a field in the Barnett shale of Texas, figured out a way to drill a well sideways”
Exxon's long dominance reflects repeated adaptation and inherited industry history.
- Exxon has been the largest publicly traded oil and gas company for well over a century, descending from the Standard Oil of New Jersey spun out in 1911, and it has dominated the industry through world wars, the 1970s, and every subsequent era by repeatedly adapting.
“Exxon has long been the largest, most substantial, most significant publicly traded oil and gas company in the world.”
- Exxon was a top-three S&P 500 company by market cap in 1990, 2000, and 2010, and was the world's largest company by market cap around 2013, before slipping to about 21st in the index as it was passed by firms like Home Depot, Mastercard, and Visa.
“In 1990, your top three companies were IBM, Exxon and General Electric... Today, they fall into, I believe, 21 in the S&P”
- Exxon produces about 2.3 million barrels of crude per day, comparable to a mid-sized OPEC producer, and about 2% of global oil market demand, so it can be thought of as a nation-state in its own right.
“Exxon today produces 2.3 million barrels a day of crude oil... So when you think of Exxon, you can think of them as sort of a nation state in and of itself.”
- Almost every major oil company today descends from the 1911 breakup of Rockefeller's Standard Oil, including Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, BP through Amoco, and Royal Dutch Shell, which merged with Dutch Royal Petroleum around 1907.
“They're almost all Rockefeller creations. If you've heard of a company, it's almost certainly a Rockefeller creation.”
- Exxon's integration across exploration, refining, and marketing was born from an era with no open supply chain; today integration is no longer a prerequisite, since companies can sell crude and buy pipeline and refining services, so Exxon's integration is largely a legacy of its history.
“Exxon's integrated nature is a little bit of its legacy. What they have shown is that they historically have been able to be profitable by being integrated. It's not a prerequisite anymore.”
- The energy sector comprised 8 to 15 percent of the S&P 500 during Murti's 30-year career, but today it is just under 3 percent, reflecting the sector's underperformance.
“the energy sector has been anywhere from eight to 15% of the S&P 500... Today, energy is just under 3% of the S&P 500”
Oil profits come from controlling infrastructure and fixed spreads, not from selling fuel itself.
- Rockefeller, frustrated by chaotic overproduction from independent drillers after the Titusville boom, realized that controlling logistics and pipelines would let him restrict supply and thereby control oil prices, and this monopoly over infrastructure defined his strategy.
“if I control the logistical infrastructure, I can control the price of oil. And so he essentially monopolized the pipeline and refining part of the business.”
- Midstream pipeline companies, often structured as MLPs, earn fixed or low variable tariffs for shipping oil, which made them attractive as fixed-income proxies in the low-interest-rate search for yield.
“you tend to get a fixed or very low variable tariff for shipping the oil along your pipeline. So they've been sort of fixed income proxies in this low interest search for yield”
- Gas stations make little money on gasoline itself and earn most of their profit from convenience-store items like coffee, cigarettes, and snacks, which carry margins of 20 to 30 percent or more, while fuel draws customers in.
“the bulk of the money comes from coffee, cigarettes, and donuts... It can be 20, 30% margins or more”
- Most refineries sell to wholesale marketers rather than directly to gas stations, because the mature oil market has grown only 1 to 2 percent a year, making the downstream business fragmented and specialized.
“most refineries are going to sell to a wholesale marketer who then will in turn sell to a gas station... the growth rates for oil demand are 1 to 2%”
- Refining requires huge upfront fixed investment, so it earns returns only on the spread between product prices and crude costs, and building new US refineries has been uneconomic, with none built since 1976.
“in the United States we've built no new refineries since 1976... That really becomes just a margin business.”
The XTO gas acquisition was a costly mistake that shale gas later made worse.
- The XTO deal was the first time Exxon publicly moved away from its historical emphasis on return on capital, and the talk shifted toward timing the gas price cycle, a red flag that Murti flagged while at Goldman Sachs.
“It was the first time Exxon went away from talking about returns on capital. I flagged it when I was an analyst at Goldman Sachs”
- Fracking was first used in the 1950s but only became commercially major in the 2000s shale gas boom and the 2010s shale oil boom, when horizontal drilling and fracture stimulation unlocked thin, tight reservoirs that had previously been considered worthless, turning the US from shrinking supply into a top producer rivaling Saudi Arabia and Russia.
“suddenly it opened up this massive resource that people previously thought was worthless... the US has gone from being a country with shrinking oil supply to rivaling Saudi Arabia and Russia”
- Exxon paid roughly $45 billion for XTO near a peak gas valuation, just before the shale gas revolution pushed US natural gas prices from around $6 per MMBtu toward $2 to $3, and the fields XTO developed were no longer going to be low-cost.
“I want to say they paid $45 billion for XTO... Exxon essentially paid a peak valuation at a time when the shale gas revolution was going to take US natural gas prices from $6 in MMBtu to as low as 2 to $3”
Oil's pollution reputation and a faster shift away from oil threaten Exxon and the whole sector.
- The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, though cleaned up and compensated, began a period in which Exxon was cast as the villain and oil became associated with pollution and climate concerns.
“I think that began a period of them being cast as a villain and the oil business having sort of flipped from, 'Hey, this is great'”
- The main threat to Exxon over the next decade is a faster-than-expected transition away from oil, which BP and Shell have framed as rapid adoption or sky-scenario declines in oil demand, and which would hurt all oil companies.
“do we have a more accelerated transition away from oil in a shorter timeframe than what I think is practical? ... If that came true, that probably would hurt all oil companies including Exxon Mobil.”
- BP under CEO Bernard Looney committed to becoming an integrated energy company, accepting that its traditional oil supply could fall about 40 percent through asset sales and natural declines, and pledged to address Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions by 2050 in line with Paris goals.
“we're totally okay if our traditional oil supply falls by, I want to say they're saying 40%... we're going to address all of that by 2050 in line with Paris goals”
Distinguishing structural inflections from cyclical noise is the key lesson, since oil cycles run about 15 years.
- Good decision-makers should identify the two or three factors that could push outcomes three standard deviations better or worse than their base case and maintain a constant paranoia about them while still managing near-term results.
“What are the two or three things that can cause them to be three standard deviations better or worse than what my base case is?”
- For newcomers, Dan Yergin's The Prize is the essential history of the oil business, showing recurring themes such as whether the age of oil is ending, and Ron Chernow's biography Titan covers Rockefeller.
“There's still the classic books. One is written by my friend Dan Yergin called The Prize... the other book on Rockefeller is Titan.”
- The key lesson for builders is to distinguish a structural inflection from normal cyclical noise, since recency bias and confirmation bias make it hard to see when the environment is changing, and oil's profitability cycles run roughly 15 years up and 15 years down.
“How do you figure out when your basic business environment is changing in a dramatic way and not just the normal noise?”