What this covers

Dom and Matt R talk with Matt Levine, the Bloomberg columnist, about how he writes and what he writes about. He calls himself an aspiring art critic of financial deals, someone who appreciates weird, intricate transactions and wants to pass that on, and he says readers outside finance, including tech workers, respond to that. Much of the talk is about why deals that look like adversarial fraud from outside, such as a call spread overlay or a bank capital relief trade, are usually legal arrangements in which both sides gain. He also says textbook derivatives, framed as hedges of market risk, often serve tax and accounting goals in practice.

The range is wide. On SPACs, Levine calls the cost-saving and IPO-demand claims wrong, and says the warrants were free money for hedge funds. He still thinks the core idea holds, because public company costs and IPO sizes have risen. He also covers merger agreements, where Musk's Twitter deal made obscure remedy clauses front-page news. Other topics are how insider trading norms are spreading to land purchases and sports gambling, and his view that most derivatives activity is useful rate hedging while zero-day options resemble gambling.

The most contested material concerns crypto. Levine sees two paths: Congress writes a tailored regime, or the SEC's long-held view that crypto is already covered by securities laws stands, which would make much of the industry's conduct illegal in the U.S. The last stretch turns to media, including the shift from institutional brands to personal ones and what Twitter's decline under Musk did to journalists weighing independence.

Sharpest takeaway

Levine argues that crypto is replaying the 1920s pattern of fraud followed by disclosure-based regulation, and that much apparently predatory finance is really a complex, multi-party trade with a government third party, which is best understood as an aesthetic object rather than a simple morality tale.

  • Crypto's current fraud-and-boom phase mirrors the 1920s, when the eventual response was disclosure-focused securities regulation that many later credited with building deep U.S. capital markets
  • Complex structured deals such as tax and capital relief trades look like zero-sum fraud from outside but often involve all parties getting a share of benefits, with the government as a hidden counterparty
  • Levine's columns succeed because readers are drawn to explanations of complexity, and he sees himself as an art critic of financial deals rather than a reporter or cheerleader

The argument · threads9 threads · 60 claims
0.78

Crypto repeats 1920s-style fraud patterns and should fall under disclosure-based securities regulation.

7 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Many standard securities fraud playbooks from decades ago were wiped out by securities regulation, yet some of them are arguably still questionably legal in crypto, which makes crypto an interesting place to study how fraud patterns persist.

    “what was a standard playbook of securities fraud from 20 or 30 or 100 years ago that got wiped out by the securities regulations but is arguably questionably may be legal in crypto still”

  • Crypto today resembles the 1920s, when potentially world-changing companies raised money with little regulation alongside many frauds, leading to a market crash and then a concerted push for disclosure-focused stock market regulation that, in hindsight, worked well by reducing fraud and helping U.S. capital markets become large, liquid, and deep.

    “Crypto feels in a lot of ways, like very much a rehash of the 1920s”

  • The SEC has said for years that crypto is a form of securities market already covered by securities laws, and if that is right, much of what crypto firms have been doing is illegal in the U.S. because disclosure rules written for stock issuers do not fit decentralized token issuers.

    “the SEC has been saying for years now, sometimes more, sometimes less loudly, but they've been saying for years now that crypto is a form of securities markets”

  • There are two possible paths for crypto: Congress passes a tailored regulatory regime that makes it a transparent industry, or the SEC's long-standing position holds that crypto is securities and already regulated, which would make many activities illegal in the US.

    “the SEC has been saying for years now, sometimes more, sometimes less loudly, but they've been saying for years now that crypto is a form of securities markets”

  • The 1930s-era regulation of the stock market, focused on disclosure, reduced fraud and, in hindsight, made American capital markets large, liquid, and deep, giving the US a competitive advantage.

    “the American capital markets became incredibly big and liquid and deep in a huge competitive advantage because we had this well-regulated disclosure-focused stock market”

  • Litigation over financial crisis conduct, once statutes of limitations ran, exposed the details of opaque transactions such as synthetic CDO squared structures, which were otherwise hidden from outsiders even in 2007.

    “you'd get to read the details of transactions that were very opaque to people outside of the people who were doing them even in 2007.”

  • Crypto failures such as algorithmic stablecoins like LUNA and Terra repeat lessons from traditional finance, so experience in older markets helps explain new ones.

    “again you'll find the lessons of traditional finance”

0.57

Journalistic attention and authority are shifting from institutions and Twitter to individual creators and platforms.

9 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Twitter's significance to culture and especially to journalists has declined, faster among journalists, and no single replacement has emerged, because X, Bluesky, Threads, and Mastodon combined have less influence than Twitter had two years earlier.

    “the sum of X and Bluesky and Threads and Mastodon is less than where Twitter was two years ago.”

  • Two years ago journalists were too focused on what Twitter considered important, and too little focused on the real world and platforms like TikTok, because Twitter was the easiest place to gauge news and interest.

    “journalists were much too focused on what people on Twitter thought”

  • The traditional journalism career ladder from small-town papers to big-city papers to The New York Times has been replaced by starting on a blog or creator platform and being picked up by a large institution, as with Gawker as a feeder and Bloomberg hiring creators like Kyla Scanlon.

    “the old model had been replaced by the model of you start at Gawker or Gawker, in particular, became like the feeding ground for media organizations.”

  • The pendulum swung toward individual journalists as their own brands, and then partly back toward large organizations, because many who went independent returned and journalists accepted more institutional Twitter policies, while the economics of subscriptions also cycle with the broader economy.

    “the pendulum swung very far in that direction and that has swung back a little bit”

  • The decline of Twitter under Musk reduced the personal value of star journalists who wanted to go independent, because their ability to promote themselves to paying audiences fell and Twitter moved to monetize distribution.

    “your personal value went way down because your ability to promote yourself to people who would want to buy your stuff has come down”

  • Journalism has shifted from a model where a strong institutional brand like the New York Times subsumed anonymous staff to one where individual journalists have personal brands and large followings, sometimes bigger than the publication.

    “everyone was subsumed by the brand. And then it's almost one-to-one tied with Twitter.”

  • Subscription money available to independent writers is cyclical: in a booming economy there is money to be raised, but subscription revenue is somewhat lower than two or three years earlier.

    “in a booming economy, there was money to be raised and there is money on subs like that. It is maybe a little bit lesser”

  • The tension between journalists' personal brands and their employers has eased not because of a principled solution but because both sides learned to accommodate each other, with organizations relaxing Twitter policing somewhat and journalists pushing back less.

    “It's not like a big answer or like someone solved the problems. It's just people like sawed off some of the edges”

  • Twitter is structured so that many people publish valuable content for free that the platform monetizes, while it has become costly for creators to use its distribution.

    “a lot of people are publishing a lot of good content for free that Twitter monetizes”

0.47

Complex deals often look like fraud but are legal tax, bailout, or hedging arrangements.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Structured finance deals that look like adversarial fraud from outside, such as call spread overlays, are often legal arrangements where client and bank split economically unjustified but legal tax benefits, so assuming zero-sum adversarial fraud misses the actual complexity.

    “you could push this button and get a ton of tax benefits that were not economically justified but were legal”

  • Over time people have internalized a norm of fairness, so insider trading is now widely seen as applying to markets beyond stocks, such as land purchases around Amazon's planned second headquarters and sports gambling, even though the legal boundaries in those markets remain unclear.

    “over time, people have internalized that norm of fairness. And so now they think insider trading law applies to a lot of other markets.”

  • Sports gambling has moved from a world of bookies who both wanted informed lines and sometimes enforced their rules violently to a large quasi-regulated business, and it is unclear what insider trading is permissible in sports betting markets even as prosecutors may pursue egregious cases.

    “the law is not super clear”

  • Textbook derivatives are presented as hedges of probabilistic market risk, but clients in practice often focus on tax benefits and accounting treatment, so the real drivers of many transactions are levers beyond straightforward market risk.

    “the clients rarely thought very much about that. They were like, oh, the tax benefits, oh the accounting for this so much better.”

  • In big complex transactions there is almost always a third party, the government, which is often the source of value; in bank capital relief trades, banks accept losses on trades because they receive valuable capital relief, which ultimately rests on an expectation of future financial bailouts.

    “Where does that value come from? The government, but it's like increasing the expectation of future financial bailouts.”

  • Most derivatives activity is interest rate hedging, which is probably a net positive for society, whereas single-name or zero-day equity call options look more like a substitute for sports gambling, though people are free to do what they want.

    “the overwhelming majority of them is interest rate hedging, that's probably a net positive for society”

0.37

Levine covers weird financial deals aesthetically, choosing topics by personal interest over audience strategy.

7 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Levine's aspirational self-description is an art critic for financial deals, because he has an aesthetic appreciation for weird and complex financial transactions and wants to convey that appreciation to people, rather than primarily reporting news.

    “I want to be like an art critic for financial deals. The thing that I want to do is I have an aesthetic appreciation for stuff that happens in the financial markets.”

  • Levine chooses topics mainly by personal interest, on the view that if he finds something interesting and weird his readers with matching interest patterns will likely find it interesting too, rather than following a deliberate audience strategy.

    “It's mainly personal interest because I just feel like the stuff that I'm interested in is the stuff that I can write interesting things about.”

  • Most of Levine's readership comes from email, which is free, while Bloomberg Terminal readers are a smaller but higher-value audience who pay more and are more likely to hold high-powered finance roles.

    “the pretty large majority of my readership comes from the e-mail... The terminal is expensive, the e-mail is free.”

  • Levine tries not to assess the performance of his writing; feedback is mostly anecdotal from email, Twitter, and occasional delayed mentions, and he no longer gets email open rates, which he does not miss.

    “the answer is mostly anecdotal. It used to be Twitter feedback now it's e-mail feedback”

  • Writing about weird, complicated niche topics like derivatives does not only attract niche audiences; readers across technical fields, including tech workers who do not otherwise follow finance, enjoy the aesthetic appreciation of systems and moving parts.

    “there is an expectation that weird complicated niche topics have only weird niche audiences and that doesn't seem true”

  • Levine feels obligated to cover major crypto news because of his extensive prior coverage of firm collapses and crypto-regulation questions, even though he and his readers are tired of the topic.

    “But I'm sick of it and a lot of my reads are sick of it.”

  • Levine's personal answer for where he'd air-drop into finance is a flow trader's desk for a week, because it is an alien, unfamiliar lifestyle compared with the bankers and lawyers he knows.

    “I always wanted to be a flow trader for like a week.”

0.34

Levine's column career rests on owning his name and Bloomberg's editorial freedom.

6 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Individual creators typically do not own their back catalog or the title under which they release work, but they own themselves and their personal following, which is enough to start out on their own; Levine owns his name while Bloomberg owns the money stuff IP.

    “the thing that you have as an individual creator is you don't necessarily own things like your back catalog or the title under which you release your work but you own yourself and probably your personal Twitter following.”

  • People Levine has criticized, including those convicted of insider trading, often respond to him sensibly and with humor rather than hostility, and grumpy critics tend to avoid calling him.

    “often I find that people who I am generally critical of take it in a good way and have sensible responses but have a sense of humor about it, too.”

  • Levine has considered community events, such as the Deal Breaker dramatic reading nights with actors reading posts and comments, as a way to build community around his newsletter.

    “We rented it at a bar and hired in an actor to read stuff and it was so funny and such a great community building event.”

  • Bloomberg gives Levine substantial freedom to write about whatever he finds interesting, because it hired him to do exactly the kind of work he does and trusts that his choices resonate with the audience.

    “they hired me to do the thing that I do, and they want me to do the thing that I do.”

  • Levine's dream of rotating through finance jobs on sabbatical does not work because no firm would hire someone for three months and then have him write publicly about it.

    “no one would hire me to do like three months and then go back to write about it”

  • Levine would consider a book or podcast as ancillary projects, but he sees writing the column as the core thing he wants to keep doing.

    “I think probably it makes sense to do ancillary things. A book is a potential ancillary thing. A podcast is a potential ancillary thing.”

0.30

SEC enforcement and rules constrain SPACs, whose economics favour hedge funds over retail investors.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The meme stock episode is not regulatorily interesting; it is people buying stocks at irrational prices, and the SEC has no obvious basis to act against it.

    “It's like people decided to buy stocks at irrational prices and they have their fun”

  • Public company costs and IPO ticket sizes have risen, making it harder for small, speculative companies to go public, which is the main problem SPACs were trying to solve.

    “over time, the public company costs have gotten higher and the ticket size for IPO investors has gotten higher”

  • The SEC's position that SPAC promotional materials are effectively IPO communications ends the ability to make SPAC promotions outside the traditional SEC process.

    “The SEC has said, nope it's an IPF.”

  • SPAC structures, particularly warrants, function as free money for hedge funds, and the economics are worse for retail investors and companies than promoters claimed.

    “some structural step up the warrant to like free money for hedge funds is true”

  • SEC chair Gary Gensler likely dislikes SPACs and similar routes that take speculative companies public, and wants companies to be less speculative, so he is pushing against this model.

    “in his heart of hearts, Gary Gensler hates that and wants companies to be less speculative”

0.30

Obscure expertise becomes valuable when events make it newsworthy.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Most merger agreements contain many pages of remedies for things going wrong that are rarely used, but when a high-profile deal like Musk's Twitter acquisition fails to close, the normally obscure provisions become front-page news and offer rich material for writing.

    “the normal way a merger agreement works is you sign the merger agreement, it has 70 pages of what happens if things go wrong.”

  • Levine's experience is that small pieces of obscure market knowledge, like death spiral convertibles, become suddenly relevant when new situations emerge, as in Bed Bath & Beyond, where similar analytical muscles applied even though the deal was not a true death spiral convertible.

    “knowing a little bit about death spiral convertibles is incredibly helpful in the Bed Bath & Beyond situation”

  • Crypto failures like algorithmic stablecoins LUNA and Terra reveal lessons from traditional finance, and Levine's earlier writing on payment for order flow became suddenly central when Robinhood and GameStop brought it into public attention.

    “again you'll find the lessons of traditional finance.”

  • Levine wrote about payment for order flow for years to an audience of about 30 dedicated readers, and when Robinhood and GameStop brought the topic to mainstream attention, that earlier coverage became valuable.

    “I've written for years about market structure, payment for order flow stuff, and that has a very intense audience of 30 people”

  • A growing category of American litigation involves companies sued for securities fraud over matters unrelated to their financial statements or results, which Levine sees as an interesting legal development that supplies him with recurring material.

    “companies being sued for random stuff that has nothing to do with their like financial statements or financial results but gets characterized as securities fraud”

0.27

SPACs validly democratized access to markets, even though many of their claims proved wrong.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Companies that would have been public 10 or 20 years ago are now private, so the capital markets have shifted, creating regulatory debate about democratizing private market access for retail investors while the SEC considers tighter rules on the institutional side because private markets now matter more to capital formation.

    “private markets are the new public markets”

  • Claims that SPACs were a cheaper way to go public because they avoided underwriter fees and IPO pops were always insane, and claims that SPACs would pull IPO demand forward proved totally wrong, since SPAC investors pulled their money when the IPO market cooled.

    “People really made claims that SPAC was a cheaper way to go public because it didn't involve paying an underwriter or an IPO pop. And that was always insane”

  • The core idea of SPACs, making it easier to take smaller and more speculative companies public as public company costs and IPO ticket sizes have risen, is valid, and it is a form of democratizing private markets, even though many SPAC claims were wrong.

    “the basic idea of we're going to take a company public in a way that slightly makes it easier to take a smaller and more speculative company public, I think in his heart of hearts, Gary Gensler hates that”

  • In the mid-century model, an investment bank underwriting an IPO vouched for the company and its price, but that belief in the bank's endorsement is no longer present, while SPAC PIPE investors who pay the deal price implicitly vouch for the company.

    “No one is like, "Oh, the price in this IPO was set by Goldman because they believe in the company" is not a thing anymore.”

0.20

Levine's banking background and columnist vantage give finance knowledge without reporting training.

6 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Creators who start on YouTube or TikTok may come into big media with less training in reporting or subject expertise, but they gain audience-building skills; Levine's advantage was starting in law and banking, which gave him subject knowledge rather than reporting skills.

    “there's a risk, if the training ground for media is starting a YouTube channel when you're 18 or starting a TikTok when you're 18, then people will come in with less training”

  • Because Levine is a columnist who does not primarily quote people, he avoids the on-background and don't-quote-me constraints that reporters must navigate, letting him rely on his own thoughts.

    “I'm a columnist, I'm not really in the business of quoting people and so if you're like, don't quote me on this, that's fine”

  • Levine's own view is that he has become more of a media person and less of an investment banker, and he is partly pleased and partly worried that he has lost some of his banker's edge.

    “My identity is like more of a media person and less of an investment banker. I worry and/or I'm pleased that I've lost a little bit of that edge.”

  • Mainstream media often assumes bankers are inherently evil and trying to pull one over on the world, whereas Levine argues that most of what looks suspicious in finance is logical from a capitalist standpoint and that the complexity is more interesting than the simple villain story.

    “you're missing the actual complexity, which you might not like any better, but it's more interesting than the simplistic story of bankers defrauding clients.”

  • In bank capital relief trades, a bank is willing to lose some money on the trade because it gets valuable reduction in capital requirements, typically by structuring derivatives with hedge funds or insurers.

    “a bank is willing to lose some money on a trade because they get valuable capital relief”

  • Levine's pre-writing career in law and banking gave him substantive knowledge of finance, so he compensates for lacking journalism training by knowing the subject and by writing as a columnist rather than a reporter who quotes sources.

    “I came with knowing something about finance. ... I don't come in with reporting skills, really.”