What this covers
In this Business Breakdowns episode, Freddie walks Zack through the Coca-Cola Company as a system rather than a single firm. The center owns the brand and sells concentrate, while independent bottlers carry the heavy physical work. Freddie says this makes reported revenue a poor guide to scale. The better yardstick is system sales of nearly $150 billion. He traces the arrangement back to an early-1900s fixed-price syrup contract that let bottlers keep the gains from inflation, which led to decades of renegotiation. He then covers the refranchising of over 40% of bottling assets between 2015 and 2017, which he calls about 95% complete.
The middle of the conversation covers a lot of ground. It looks at the 1980s New Coke episode and what it implies about brand versus product, a claim marked as contested. It compares marketing spend with PepsiCo's, at roughly three to one. It covers the reach of about 30 million outlets, the cut from 500-plus brands to about 200, and cash economics of about $10 billion in free cash flow, about 75% of it paid out as dividends. Emerging markets get their own stretch. India is the most exciting, per-capita consumption in Latin America is still climbing, and currency translation has trimmed organic growth by 1-2% a year.
Freddie also takes on the threats. He notes that GLP-1 weight loss must be sustained weekly for life, and that Coke has answered diet concerns since TaB, with about 35% of drinks now zero sugar. A more contested argument is that dominant consumer brands behave like organic monopolies whose returns need not fade.
Freddie argues Coca-Cola's value comes from a capital-light franchise system in which a brand-owning center and independent bottlers are financially aligned, so reported financials understate value creation and the main risks (GLP-1 drugs, health concerns) are smaller than headlines suggest.
- The bottling system is aligned through revenue-share pricing, ~20% ownership stakes, and bottler returns that are adequate, so the earlier brand-bottler conflict has faded
- Historical weak periods were self-inflicted (New Coke, bottler disputes), while external health threats have not reduced volume
- Under a bearish GLP-1 scenario, volume impact is roughly 5%, which unit-volume growth can offset
Brand and franchise scale sustain Coca-Cola's dominance over Pepsi and produce durable, non-fading returns.
- On a system basis Coca-Cola's operating income is about twice Pepsi's, and Coke has roughly 4x the beverage scale of its nearest beverage competitor, while over 50% of PepsiCo's operating income comes from snacks.
“the business is twice the size of Pepsi in terms of operating income. And PepsiCo, over 50% of their operating income comes from snacks and salty treats”
- Coca-Cola operates 26 individual billion-dollar brands, sells about 2.2 billion servings a day, and sells in all countries except Cuba and North Korea.
“they have 26 individual billion-dollar brands within the business”
- Pepsi won blind taste tests, but Coke's 1980s reformulation was cancelled after nine months due to backlash, proving that the Coca-Cola brand and marketing matter more than the product itself, which led Coke to focus on marketing and distribution over product innovation.
“it doesn't matter that it's the best product, the best cola. It matters that it's Coca-Cola”
- Coca-Cola outspends Pepsi on marketing roughly three to one, possibly four or five to one excluding snacks, and its marketing scale is the lifeblood that its cola-driven cash flow funds.
“it outspends Pepsi on a marketing basis three to one, maybe even four or five to one actually these days if you exclude the snacks”
- Coca-Cola's brand is one of the most recognized symbols in the world, and nurturing that brand equity over a very long period is a durable competitive advantage.
“the value of nurturing over a very long period of time that brand equity”
- About 15% of Coca-Cola's sales are spent on direct marketing support for bottlers and another 10% on brand advertising, which funds innovation that bubbles up to the center and is then distributed.
“15% Coca-Cola Company sales are spent on marketing support direct for the bottlers, another 10% in brand advertising”
- Market-leading consumer franchises like Coca-Cola tend toward organic monopolies that can compound for decades, so investors should not assume returns fade for great businesses that keep investing in brands and distribution.
“our kind of version of capitalism really does tend towards organic monopolies. And market-leading positions can continue to catapult businesses but decades and decades beyond”
- Depending on how it is calculated, Coca-Cola is by far the largest consumer staples company in the world, with the most valuable consumer brand and the largest operating profit of any company the analysts look at.
“by far and away, the largest consumer stable company in the world with the single most valuable consumer brand and the largest amount of operating profit out of any of the companies that we look at”
- North American per capita consumption has been roughly flat for 30 years, but Coca-Cola is taking share from Pepsi, outspending it on marketing about three to one or even four to five to one excluding snacks.
“it outspends Pepsi on a marketing basis three to one, maybe even four or five to one actually these days if you exclude the snacks”
- Freddie describes Coca-Cola as a franchise ownership business that supports franchisees with extraordinary marketing, and argues its higher return on capital model creates synergistic benefits rather than a cost-of-capital arbitrage like many recent property and operating company splits.
“It's not purely a split operating company and a property and capital company business. Those models which have been more prevalent in the last 20 years, interest rates have been falling. They're more of a kind of cost of capital arbitrage.”
- Combining volume and price, system revenues have grown about 5-6% a year, well above the consumer staples peer group and above most large companies the investors analyze.
“So you've ended up achieving a kind of 5% to 6% system revenues growth, which is well in excess of the consumer staples peer group”
- The central business is aligned behind revenue growth management and value creation for each brand on a standalone basis, which is what gives the portfolio room to grow.
“a central business that is totally aligned behind the revenue growth management and the value creation of each of those brands”
- Coca-Cola can keep growing by creating new consumers, taking value share, and growing in other categories, and its track record suggests other licensed franchises could do the same.
“there's a lot of room to grow for this business, both from creating new consumers, taking value share and growing in other categories.”
Emerging markets, total beverage expansion, and new channels widen Coca-Cola's addressable market and growth potential.
- Coca-Cola's total beverage company strategy means entering every category and dominating where it plays, with its juice, water, energy, and alcohol moves, and the Monster joint venture (which was highly accretive) serving as a substitute for the Monster stake it missed.
“the business has this phrase that they're trying to become a total beverage company, which means entering every category and dominating in the categories where they play”
- India is the most exciting emerging market for Coca-Cola, but currency translation has cut organic growth by 1-2% a year over the last decade, so turning local growth into dollar profit is the main challenge.
“The last 10 years, FX has hurt organic growth rates by 1% to 2% per year”
- About 10% of developed-market consumers are outside Coca-Cola's addressable market for beverages, compared with about 65% in developing markets, so rising incomes could roughly treble the addressable market in those regions.
“only about 10% of the developed markets are not captured in their addressable market... That number is around 65% in the developing markets”
- Coca-Cola cut its brands from over 500 to about 200 to focus on building each brand individually, as part of a total beverage company strategy, with legacy Coke representing only about 50% of the offering.
“They actually cut their brands down from over 500 to 200 a couple of years ago”
- Coca-Cola's distribution reaches about 30 million customer outlets globally, and the number has risen 50% over the last decade, making it the single best point of access for any brand seeking to push a product.
“30 million customers globally, 50% rise in the last decade in the number of customer outlets”
- Latin American per-capita consumption was half the North American level 20 years ago and is rising toward the North American average of about 400 servings per year, implying significant emerging-market growth potential.
“Elsewhere in Latin America, for example, 20 years ago, the consumption per capita was half the level of North America”
- Coca-Cola's customer touchpoints, managed by local partners who understand their customers, create a network effect that acts as the leading competitive advantage and has been improved and invested in heavily over the last 20 years.
“A network effect created by the customer touch points ultimately being right in front of the customer at all times”
- The shift from drinking water at home to buying a drink out of the fridge, called the commercial beverage occasion, is likely over the next 10 to 20 years and is a major growth driver for emerging markets.
“the potential for growth for moving people into commercial beverage occasion, they call it, but the idea of not just drinking water at home but buying a drink out for your fridge”
- The average Coca-Cola serving costs about $0.50, making it an accessible treat that consumers in emerging markets can adopt as their incomes rise.
“The average serving of Coke costs something like $0.50”
- Coke Zero is growing volume more than 10% a year and is the main way the company is dialing in its portfolio, while trademark Coca-Cola and Diet Coke also continue to grow substantially in many markets.
“Coke Zero, which is really the dialing in the portfolio at the moment growing 10% plus a year in terms of volume.”
- Coca-Cola plans to take Costa Coffee internationally using the innocent playbook, which doubled innocent's sales within five or six years through international rollout, and to expand through vending machines in petrol stations, airports, and hotels rather than physical stores.
“over the next five or six years, they doubled the sales from that business purely by taking it into international markets”
- Jack and Coke could be a huge success and Absolut Vodka and Sprite may take longer, and Coca-Cola's guidance does not include any alcoholic contribution, so the category is upside rather than a driver of the base case.
“even their guidance doesn't include any alcoholic contribution.”
- India and China are the two most exciting markets; India is especially attractive, and the company keeps the Indian bottling asset, which is a double-edged sword because it adds capital burden and control.
“the two most exciting markets are definitely India and China. Probably India is the most exciting for us”
Healthy, aligned bottlers depend on genuine symbiosis, not financial engineering, for capital-light franchising to work.
- The system became strained in the 1970s and 1980s as Coca-Cola, trying to charge too much for raw materials, faced lawsuits, and the problem was still unresolved entering 2000.
“Coca-Cola getting a bit greedy trying to charge too much of the raw materials and lots of lawsuits through the sort of '70s and '80s”
- The concentrate price bottlers pay, as a share of their sales, has sat in the low 20s and is likely to drift from about 21% toward 23% as mature markets show Coca-Cola can charge more.
“it is likely over time that the average concentrate cost as a percentage of sales may drift up from sort of 21% to 23%”
- Bottlers run enterprise systems that provide real-time consumer behavior data, which informs marketing spend and revenue growth management by region and category, a benefit that took people a while to recognize.
“all of these bottlers are invested in systems similar to SAP HANA or Microsoft Dynamics and they're getting this real-time data”
- Coca-Cola moved from a volume-based system to incidence-based pricing, sharing revenue with bottlers so both benefit from gross profit dollars, which is written into shareholder agreements and reduced the brand-bottler tension.
“Coca-Cola was really running a volume-based system. And that isn't aligned to value creation. And so they've moved to... incidence-based pricing”
- Bottlers earn about 10-12% average return on invested capital, which rises to roughly 15-20% when the approximately 30% of invested capital tied to perpetual distribution-right intangibles is excluded, so bottlers are healthy and reinvesting.
“the average return on capital... for the bottling assets it's around 10% to 12%”
- Locally managed bottlers, often with large family reference shareholders and public listings, give deep local go-to-market knowledge and regulatory and taste insight, which Coke feeds back into the system; this is a circle-of-competence argument for splitting brand and bottling.
“a local business managed with a long term, they call them reference shareholders”
- Coca-Cola owns around 20% of most of its bottling assets, sits on their boards, and uses that position to direct strategy and gather feedback that flows back into the system.
“The model is that The Coca-Cola Company still owns around 20% of most of these bottling assets. They sit on the board.”
- Coca-Cola's own capex is about $7-8 billion a year, but as remaining company-owned bottling assets are refranchised, absolute capex should fall to about $1 billion or less, with the majority of capital spending done by bottlers.
“as those businesses get refranchised, the absolute CapEx number for The Coca-Cola Company will fall to probably $1 billion or less”
- Moving from a capital-light center to a capital-intensive periphery works only when the two parts have a genuinely symbiotic relationship; pure financial engineering can work for about 10 years but erodes value by under-investing in durability.
“It doesn't work long term if it's purely financial engineering. It can work for 10 years”
- Recent financials understate Coca-Cola's value creation because franchising reduces reported revenue, so analysts must use qualitative analysis of system evolution, and purely numeric analysis can also mask where value is being destroyed.
“looking purely at the numbers, can miss value creation, it can also very dangerously mask where value is actually being destroyed”
- Many business models that adopted the capital-light franchise route over the last 10 to 15 years, aided by falling interest rates, could struggle in an era of higher interest rates and inflation because their arbitrage depends on cheap cost of capital.
“a lot of business models that have employed that route over the last 10 to 15 years, that could really, really struggle in an era of higher interest rates”
The franchise bottling model boosts Coca-Cola's returns and shifts it toward brand ownership.
- Coca-Cola's reported revenue understates its scale because bottling and distribution are outsourced to franchise partners, so the comparable measure is system sales of nearly $150 billion, which is unmatched by other beverage companies.
“The system sales are nearly $150 billion. That's the kind of wholesale sales through The Coca-Cola Company and its bottlers and that's pretty much unsurpassed by any other beverage company”
- Between 2015 and 2017 Coca-Cola refranchised over 40% of its bottling assets, the latest phase of a 10-to-15-year reorganization that Freddie says is now about 95% complete.
“they refranchised over 40% of the bottling assets. And so the story was one of great success”
- An early-1900s bottling contract let bottlers buy syrup at a fixed price, so when inflation rose the bottlers earned the profits while Coca-Cola did not, forcing a long period of contract renegotiation and tension.
“offers were able to buy the sort of raw ingredients from Coca-Cola at a fixed price. So as inflation came through and took off, the bottlers were making all the money”
- Coca-Cola's franchise model earns close to 30% return on invested capital, rising, versus about 10-15% for its bottlers, so the company favors marketing and brand ownership over bottling.
“closer to 30% return on investment capital at the moment and rising quite dramatically versus 10 to 15 to the bottlers”
Free cash flow funds steady dividends, modest buybacks, acquisitions, and reinvestment.
- Coca-Cola held about 20% of Monster but did not own more because it judged Monster's shares overvalued, and the stake still gave it access to Coke's distribution network, which was a key source of Monster's success.
“I think it was a sense of valuation risk at the time”
- Coca-Cola generates about $10 billion of free cash flow, rising toward $12 billion, with an EBIT margin of about 30% trending toward 35-40%, and it pays out about 75% of that cash as dividends while repurchasing about 1% of shares a year.
“They're generating $10 billion of free cash flow at the moment, it will be $12 billion by soon”
- Freddie expects more acquisitions and more buybacks, since the lightly leveraged balance sheet can support them, but new brands take years to settle into the Coca-Cola system and it is very hard to see any of them matching Coke or its top five power brands.
“it does seem to take a number of years for these new brands to settle into the Coca-Cola system”
- Free cash flow is about a 30% EBIT margin now, expected to reach 35% after refranchising and trend toward 40%, with most of that converting to cash after taxes.
“it's going to move up 35% post refranchising, we believe, trending towards 40% margin.”
- Most free cash flow goes to dividends, about 75%, with roughly 1% of shares repurchased annually; Freddie expects more buybacks and a stable dividend, since the dividend has been maintained or grown for over 60 years.
“they pay out about 75% of that free cash and dividends.”
- The company generates about $10 billion of free cash flow now and expects about $12 billion soon, which funds reinvestment, acquisitions, and dividends.
“They're generating $10 billion of free cash flow at the moment, it will be $12 billion by soon.”
GLP-1 and health trends pose manageable threats, with a muted impact on staples volume.
- Most of Coca-Cola's weak periods have been of its own making, such as bottler breakdowns and the New Coke reformulation, and external marketing threats have never actually hurt its volume.
“most of the weak periods in Coca-Cola's history have pretty much been of its own making”
- Coca-Cola has been responding to diet concerns since launching TaB in the 1960s, Diet Coke in the 1980s and Coke Zero in the 2000s, and about 35% of its drinks are already zero sugar, with zero-sugar options growing faster.
“a large proportion of their drinks, I think it's 35% already is already zero sugar”
- Under a bearish GLP-1 scenario, roughly 20% of US obese adults get access to the drug, about half of those stay on it, and a roughly 50% cut in Coca-Cola consumption among them would imply only about a 5% hit to volumes, which growth can offset over several years.
“I think a fair stab in most bearish scenario for a business like Coca-Cola would be that it's around 50% fall in consumption of any Coca-Cola product. That's like a 5% potential hit to volumes”
- Freddie's firm had held Novo Nordisk for many years but recently exited on valuation grounds, while believing the GLP-1 impact on consumer staples will be more muted than commonly assumed.
“We were shareholders in Novo for many years, we've actually recently exited from a valuation perspective”
- GLP-1 weight loss is not permanent because studies show people revert to their normal size when they stop taking the drug, so it must be taken weekly for life to sustain the effect.
“you need to do it every week for life. If you stop taking the drug at any point, the studies have all shown you do revert back to your normal size”
- Coca-Cola has the highest penetration in meal home delivery, at 65%, and this shows its adaptability to changing eating patterns.
“They have, by far and away, the highest penetration at 65% meal home deliveries”
Steady volume growth and inflation-level pricing drive top-line growth well above consumer staples peers.
- Over the last 10 to 15 years, Coca-Cola has averaged roughly 2-3% price increases, roughly inflationary, which combined with volume growth produces about 5-6% system revenue growth, well above the consumer staples peer group.
“they have averaged around 2% to 3% price, roughly inflationary pricing”
- Coca-Cola's unit case volume has grown at around 3% a year, very steadily, for 50 to 60 years and for the last 10 to 20 years, through acquisitions, brand extensions and organic growth.
“unit case volumes has grown around 3% incredibly steadily for the last 10, 20 years”
- Given Coca-Cola's emerging-market growth and North American stability, the business could grow top line at seven-plus percent even without major inflation, with guidance excluding any ready-to-drink coffee or alcohol contribution.
“You could be talking about a business even without major inflationary pressures, that's growing at seven plus percent top line”
- North America's volume had capped out 10 to 15 years ago, shifting growth to other regions, until the pandemic produced a meaningful pickup in consumption and reactivated households, especially for trademark Coke.
“North America had sort of capped out 10 to 15 years ago”
Pricing and currency mechanics determine how volume growth converts into dollar profit.
- Concentrate is the syrup Coca-Cola sells to bottlers, who add sugar and carbonated water to make the finished drink, and it is the key pricing point of tension between the two sides.
“the concentrate is the syrup that they sell to the bottlers, which they add sugar and fizzy water and create the drinks.”
- The company measures volume in unit cases, equivalent to 24 cans of 8 ounces each.
“they refer to things called unit cases, which is just an equivalent of 24 cans of 8 ounces.”
- Over the last 10 to 15 years, with low inflation, the company averaged roughly 2-3% price growth, roughly inflationary pricing, which Freddie expects to continue.
“they have averaged around 2% to 3% price, roughly inflationary pricing, which I would anticipate remains in the future.”
- Currency movements have reduced organic growth by 1-2% per year over the last decade; translating local growth into dollar profit is the hard part, and a weaker dollar would be a boost.
“The last 10 years, FX has hurt organic growth rates by 1% to 2% per year.”
Costa, BODYARMOR, and other non-cola bets are incremental rather than needle-moving over five years.
- The most exciting Costa outcome would be a successful ready-to-drink coffee product, a category many companies are pursuing, but none of the coffee businesses are expected to contribute within five years.
“The most exciting outcome from that acquisition will be them successfully creating a ready-to-drink version”
- The most promising Costa upside is extending its coffee outside restaurants, through vending machines in petrol stations, airports and hotels, which has been taken up rapidly in the UK and is being rolled out elsewhere, and this supports capital-light growth.
“they're actually making very good coffee through vending machines”
- BODYARMOR counters the threat from data-driven and other challengers to Coca-Cola's business but may prove more defensive than a true revenue generator.
“BODYARMOR goes a long way towards countering the data threat and other threats to their business, but it may prove to have been more defensive than a real revenue generator”
- Coca-Cola's Global Ventures division holds Costa, BODYARMOR, innocent and fairlife, each around $1 billion in sales, and these are incremental rather than needle-moving for the next five years.
“they're all around $1 billion of sales. They're all exciting”