What this covers
Recorded in March 2020, this is a solo conversation with Bryan Krug about corporate credit as the coronavirus shock spreads. Much of it is a comparison with earlier cycles. He judges spread levels by weighing what investors are paid against expected default rates and severity. High-yield peaked just under 2,000 basis points in 2008 and near 1,000 in 1991 and the late 1990s, and its tight end sits in the low 300s. He says each cycle has a different cause. In 2008, hedge funds levered credit around eight times, Lehman triggered an unwind, and roughly $250 billion of LBO deals were announced but not closed, against perhaps $10 billion now. The late-1990s defaults came from telecom fiber builders.
The middle of the conversation covers energy. E&P is about 6% to 7% of high-yield, with MLPs similar and oilfield services about 1%, down from 9% to 10% five years ago. Years of restructuring removed weaker operators, so surviving issuers hold better acreage at lower valuations. He also traces second-order damage from shale bankruptcies to midstream MLP volumes, and reads revolver draws by companies like Hilton and Boeing as insurance or covenant preemption.
The last stretch turns to downgrades. The investment grade market is a little over four times the size of high-yield, so downgrades create heavy forced selling, a void of capital in fallen angels. He cites GE in 2018, which returned over 30% on price. Companies differ in how much they care about losing the rating, so he argues for company-by-company credit work. He also describes stress-testing the unprecedented virus shock with analogs such as 9/11 for airlines, and notes that loans have lost relative value to bonds.
Krug argues the March 2020 credit selloff is a liquidity and repricing shock rather than a 2008-style systemic crisis, and that high-quality, forced-seller dislocations (fallen angels, surviving energy issuers, BBB downgrade risk) offer opportunity while the coronavirus duration remains the key unknown.
- Energy exposure in high-yield is smaller and higher quality than five years ago, and survivors trade at deep discounts
- Forced selling by investment-grade holders creates temporary voids of capital in fallen-angel credits
- Leverage, LBO supply, and default composition in 2008 were far worse than today, so spreads are compensating for a different risk profile
Energy bonds and loans are priced far below the economic losses at risk.
- Highest-quality, lowest-cost E&P bonds trade anywhere from 10 to 70 cents on the dollar, no E&P bond is above 75 cents, and true economic dollars at risk are materially less than par exposure, perhaps 40 to 50 cents on the dollar.
“I can't think of one bond over 75 cents on the dollar in the E&P space today. The numbers I gave you before are par value.”
- Energy is roughly 6% to 7% of the high-yield market in E&P exposure, with MLPs similar or slightly higher and oilfield services about 1%, for a low double-digit percentage across the whole supply chain, down from about 9% to 10% five years ago.
“the high-yield market is around 6% to 7% energy, in terms of E&P upstream exposure”
- Five years of restructurings liquidated or bankrupted second- and third-tier E&P operators, so the surviving energy issuers have higher-quality assets and acreage than they did five years ago, even though their valuations are materially lower.
“the quality of the assets and the acreage are actually far greater than they were five years ago and the valuations of those same companies - the survivors - are materially lower”
- The high-yield market is fairly diverse, with TMT (telecom, media, tech) the largest issuance area, followed by energy and healthcare as the next major categories.
“TMT would be one area - that's Telecom, Media and Tech. Energy is another fairly meaningful area. And then healthcare is decent sized as well.”
- The leveraged loan market holds only about 2% to 3% energy exposure versus roughly 10% to 11% in high-yield, so it is more industrially weighted.
“it's less energy exposed. So more industrial exposed as opposed to energy exposed. It's a fraction of that - I believe it's 2% or 3% energy”
Wide spreads and early-cycle credit entry make current buying attractive despite an uncertain bottom.
- High-yield spreads were about 365 basis points a month before the interview, were a little over 660 basis points on the morning of the interview, and would likely approach 750 to 800 basis points after the day's close.
“As of this morning, on Thursdays, spreads are around a little over 660 basis points. For the market, they were 365 about a month ago”
- When spreads are wide, a longer-term horizon lets investors take more mark-to-market risk, accepting they will not catch the exact bottom, because equity-like returns justify the risk when the upside exists.
“when spreads are wider, we tend to have a longer-term horizon where we're willing to take more mark-to-market risk, knowing that we're not going to get the bottom”
- In the higher-quality part of the market, returns of mid-to-high single digits are achievable if spreads normalize to more typical levels, after some benefit from Treasuries and spread widening.
“if you're in the higher-quality part of the market... if we get back to more normalized spread levels, mid-to-high single digit returns.”
- Although the market could fall further, valuations are attractive now, and pricing is starting to show valuation support, even though the exact bottom is hard to identify.
“So it's hard to know exactly where we are in that point, but from a valuation perspective, things are attractive.”
- The team underwrites companies it is comfortable with at 8% to 20% or 25% IRRs, with the required expected return rising with risk, and the opportunity set is much greater than three weeks earlier.
“companies that we feel very comfortable with, we're underwriting, today, between 8% to 20% or 25% IRRs, depending on the risk”
- High-yield has had three negative return years in the past 30-plus years, and 2020 year-to-date is the second most negative return the market has experienced, with pricing now starting to reflect recessionary levels.
“it's had three negative years of return, and what we're experiencing so far in 2020 is the second most negative return”
- A strong credit market benefits equity investors because it finances M&A, capex and leveraged buyouts, and without credit markets buyout activity would not make sense.
“Without the credit markets and the leverage market, it wouldn't make sense to have buyout activity, which can obviously benefit equity investors.”
- Credit is a comparatively early-cycle asset class because growth is less important to it and financing returns faster than in equity, so investors tend to feel more comfortable entering credit first.
“investors tend to be a little more comfortable going into credit - it's a little earlier cycle asset class because growth, quite frankly, isn't important and financing tends to come back a little faster than equity does.”
Bottom-up, company-specific underwriting matters because downgrades affect each company differently.
- The investment-grade market is a little over four times larger than the high-yield market, so downgrades create roughly four-to-one selling pressure on high-yield, pushing bond valuations between single-B and double-B levels.
“typically the investment grade market is a little over four times larger than the high-yield market. So you have four to one sellers in that situation.”
- Potential fallen angels, investment-grade companies likely to be downgraded or already trading like high-yield, represent an opportunity in the current market, as virus-hit sectors like cruise ships, airlines, hotels and lodging trade at high-yield valuations despite investment-grade ratings.
“you're seeing potential fallen angels, which are companies that are IG rated that will likely be downgraded or are trading like they could potentially be downgraded. That's an area of opportunity that we're seeing today.”
- A downgrade from investment grade to high-yield affects more than debt holders, because it changes a company's competitiveness and working capital, and a company's motivations determine how much it cares.
“When credit gets downgraded from high-grade or investment grade to high-yield, there are more constituents than just the holders of the debt.”
- Kraft Heinz was recently downgraded into high-yield even though it could have kept its investment-grade rating by cutting its dividend, but it considered the rating less important than the dividend.
“Kraft Heinz was recently downgraded into the market and the company had levers to pull. They could have reduced their dividend.”
- Companies differ in how much they care about a downgrade: some are fine losing investment grade, while others sell assets to de-lever and preserve the rating, sometimes sacrificing long-term profitability.
“Some companies are okay with the downgrade... And for other companies it's critically important and you'll see them sell assets to de-lever.”
- The team does not base investment theses on bailouts or government aid because such support is too risky and unpredictable, and instead asks how much cash a company needs and what its businesses are worth.
“We don't bank or make an investment thesis predicated on like a bailout or aid. I just think that's too risky and unpredictable.”
- Investment-grade issuers have more levers to pull, so a downgrade may or may not happen, which makes it necessary for investors to do their own credit work and gain comfort with each company.
“the interesting thing about investment grade credits in general is they tend to have more levers to pull”
- Wireline telecommunications is an area the team is not excited about because it faces secular challenges, and the strategy is bottom-up, company-specific rather than broad-based.
“wireline telecommunications is an area that, quite frankly, we're not too excited about. We think there are just secular challenges there.”
- For cruise ships there is no meaningful historical precedent, so the team takes a view on potential impact and tries to be very conservative in its projections.
“we think of this as a known unknown and this known unknown is something where we will use historical examples and try to stress them”
- The largest high-yield categories are TMT (telecom, media, and tech), energy, and healthcare, and Krug's team avoids wireline telecommunications because of secular challenges.
“wireline telecommunications is an area that, quite frankly, we're not too excited about. We think there are just secular challenges there.”
- The team evaluates relative value based on the risk taken relative to the industry and company, underwriting returns to risk so that higher risk requires a higher expected return rather than comparing headline yields.
“we tend to look at relative value based on the risk that we're taking, of the industry and the company that we're considering making investments in.”
Oil price collapse and coronavirus will keep energy credit stressed for quarters.
- The energy sector stress will persist for at least the next two to three quarters, given the oil price level and its dependence on Saudi policy and coronavirus duration.
“So we'll be here for at least the next two to three quarters.”
- Oil prices below sustainable levels threaten producers like shale companies first, and if those bankruptcies occur, the damage extends second-order to midstream master limited partnerships, which depend on those producers' volumes.
“And as you think of more incremental players, such as Shell, Shell doesn't work at these levels on a sustained basis. And then you take the second derivative from that and you go to MLPs”
- Two shocks hit at once: the coronavirus, which pushed sectors like cruise lines and airlines from investment grade toward high-yield trading levels, and a Saudi-Russia oil price war that collapsed crude prices, which together triggered a massive repricing of risk across all asset classes.
“The first big shock is obviously with the coronavirus... Then combine that with a second massive shock, which came from a fight between the Saudis and the Russians”
- At roughly $30 oil, the economics do not work for Saudi Arabia, Russia, or shale producers, so the commodity price is not sustainable and must recover, with the supply-demand balance depending on Saudi policy and the coronavirus.
“As you think about energy, at $30 oil, it doesn't work for Saudi, it doesn't work for Russians and it doesn't work for Shell”
- Airlines, cruise lines, MLPs and now the auto sector fit the void-of-capital pattern, and the team is spending significant time on individual credits in those sectors.
“airlines fit that bill, cruise lines fit that bill, MLPs are fitting that bill, auto sector is starting to fit that bill right now”
The current repricing resembles 2008 in character, but default risk depends on each cycle's own composition.
- Although not at 2008 severity, the current environment is closest in character to 2008, with panic selling and very quick repricing of debt instruments and credit spreads blowing out meaningfully.
“the nearest comparison to this environment is - although we're not quite at the same severity - but it's an '08 type level”
- High-yield spreads peaked just under 2,000 basis points (about 20%) in 2008, roughly 1,000 basis points in 1991 and the late 1990s, and have had a tight end around the low 300s basis points.
“The wide end in the 2008 crisis... was just under 2,000 basis points of spread - so a 20% spread at that point.”
- Spreads should be judged by comparing expected default rates and default severity against what investors are being paid, so the current spread level reflects a view that losses will be far less severe than in past cycles.
“We'd ask ourselves, what are we being paid for on a spread basis? And so you need to also combine the outlook for default and the outlook in the severity of defaults”
- Today's leveraged market is nowhere near the 2008 level of supply and leverage, with perhaps $10 billion of commitments to close transactions, and the quality of the market is much higher.
“I would be surprised if you have $10 billion of commitments to close transactions, the quality of the market is much higher than it was before.”
- The 2008 crisis combined high financial leverage, with hedge funds levering credit around eight times, a Lehman-triggered unwind, and roughly $250 billion of announced but unconsummated LBO acquisitions, while today there are perhaps only $10 billion of commitments to close.
“hedge funds, specifically, were allowed to lever their credit investments, bonds, and specifically loans around eight times”
- Each credit cycle is different: 2008 was driven by the LBO boom and high leverage, the late 1990s default cycle was driven by telecom fiber-laying business plans, so the default profile depends on what composition of the market is exposed.
“Every cycle is a little different. So if we go back to the 2008 cycle, there was a boom of LBO activity.”
- Market composition, meaning which sector dominates issuance, is something people do not appreciate enough, because it determines how much of the market can default at once.
“The market composition is something that people probably don't appreciate enough.”
- The 1990s spread peaks around 1,000 basis points were tied to telecom business plan financings where about a quarter of the market was laying fiber with math that did not work, and that cohort defaulted.
“the late 90s default cycle was predicated by telecom. In the telecom business, you had a number of business plan financings where companies were laying fiber and the math just didn't work and that was about a quarter of the market”
- Spreads must be judged by comparing compensation to the outlook for both default probability and default severity, and each cycle differs, so spreads can be modest even in volatile markets.
“We'd ask ourselves, what are we being paid for on a spread basis? And so you need to also combine the outlook for default and the outlook in the severity of defaults”
- The 2008 cycle followed an LBO boom with many large take-privates such as TXU, Univision, Clear Channel, and Harrah's, and higher leverage made default losses and asset riskiness much greater than today.
“there was a boom of LBO activity. And if you remember back then you have a company like TXU going private. You had Univision going private, Clear Channel, Harrah's Entertainment”
Coronavirus is a transitory shock, not a 2008-style financial crisis.
- The critical unknown is how long the coronavirus lasts (45 days, three months, or six months), and other countries serve only as imperfect proxies because each country differs.
“I think the known unknown is the duration of the coronavirus. Will this be a virus that goes on for another 45 days?”
- Krug views the coronavirus as a transitory event lasting a quarter or two, with a cure likely within twelve months, so it is not a financial crisis of the same magnitude as 2008.
“I tend to view the coronavirus as more of a transitory event, as you think through it, this could take a quarter or two. It's highly likely within 12 months, there's going to be a cure for this.”
- The market has had circuit breakers triggered multiple times in the same week, and the S&P 500 closed down 9.9% in a historic down day.
“the market's had circuit breakers going up multiple times this week.”
- Corporate credit today is not experiencing the 2008 combination of heavy leverage, banks lending aggressively, and an unwinding of financial leverage; the current setup is very different and the underlying drivers differ.
“So it's a very, very different setup. And you really have to look at the underlying drivers and you can see that the market is different.”
Distressed energy and fallen angels reprice fast, creating forced-seller opportunities.
- General Electric's debt in fall 2018 traded to single-B to double-B valuations on fear of a downgrade, yet GE had levers through asset divestitures, and the bonds subsequently returned over 30% on price and mid-to-high 30s total return including interest.
“the debt in the Fall of '18 traded to valuations that were between single and double B valuations. And the company had plenty of levers to pull through asset divestitures”
- If energy prices recover to $50 to $55 oil, some distressed energy debt could return 500 percent or more, because bonds that were at par six to nine weeks earlier now trade deeply discounted.
“If energy were to go to $50 - $55 oil, in some debt instruments you can make 500% of your money.”
- Some energy companies had par-valued bonds only six weeks earlier, and within six to nine weeks their bonds traded deeply below par, showing how quickly credit can reprice.
“Those are companies that had par paper six weeks ago, just to give you some context.”
- Fallen angels are potentially a very good opportunity because a void of capital exists: IG holders facing downgrade become forced sellers, while high-yield investors wait for the downgrade to make the bonds cheaper, so the bonds get priced below fair value.
“we actually think fallen angels are a potentially very good opportunity because we think there's a void of capital there.”
Drawn revolvers signal individual business caution, not systemic banking fragility.
- Drawn revolvers are a sign of caution about individual businesses rather than systemic bank fragility, because the banking system is currently very healthy.
“So I'm not as worried about the banking system. The banking system is actually very healthy.”
- In the financial crisis, any bank downgraded to high-yield would see its business stop working, because banks depend on short-term, very low-rate financing and treat liquidity as their lifeblood.
“any bank that got downgraded to high-yield, it just, their business just doesn't work because they rely on short-term financing at very low rates”
- When firms like Hilton or Boeing draw down their revolvers, they are likely buying insurance against future inability to draw, or preempting covenant tests because of concern over cash burn, similar to banks' preemptive draws in the financial crisis.
“they're likely doing it as an insurance policy, unsure if they'll be able to draw it down in the future”
Credit analysis relies on stress tests, diversified mandates, and specific market indicators.
- Krug's strategies invest across the debt spectrum, mainly in leveraged credit (high-yield bonds and leveraged loans), selectively in investment-grade credit, and all of these securities are syndicated and trade through broker-dealers.
“we invest across the debt spectrum, predominantly in the leveraged credit market”
- Loans price off LIBOR, and since LIBOR fell with rates, loan coupons dropped; combined with high-yield price declines, the relative value of loans has deteriorated from six weeks earlier, though loans face similar pressure to a lesser degree.
“loans price off LIBOR and LIBOR has dropped as rates have dropped. And so generally loans are senior to high-yield debt”
- Since the coronavirus shock has no precedent, the team treats it as a known unknown and stress-tests models using historical analogs, such as 9/11 as a demand shock proxy for airlines and conservative assumptions for cruise lines where no analog exists.
“we think of this as a known unknown and this known unknown is something where we will use historical examples and try to stress them”
- To gauge risk appetite and liquidity, watch the Treasury market; for corporate credit, watch spreads on investment-grade and high-yield and their availability, and for loans watch spreads and dollar prices.
“If you want to understand investors appetite on liquidity or risk, you should look at the treasury market.”