What this covers

This is a conversation between the host and Michael Kitces that walks through advisory history as a sequence of business models. After commissions were deregulated in 1975, discount brokers cut the cost of a stock trade by about 90% over two decades. Brokers then lobbied for the 12b-1 fee, which powered the mutual fund era. When Schwab's 1998 OneSource offered no-load funds against a 5.75% average upfront commission, advisors moved to the AUM model and sold goals-based portfolios. Kitces treats the 2010s robo-advisor wave as a smaller shock than OneSource.

The middle of the discussion turns to pricing. Kitces cites Thomas Philippon's long-run data on what finance extracts from savings, and argues the industry adds value rather than cutting prices. He notes that advisory revenue yield has held at roughly 72 to 78 basis points for over a decade. He also contends that robo fees have risen, with Betterment at 25 bps and others at 30 to 35 or more. Other threads include why AUM fees are less salient than retainer checks, the Forrester segmentation) in which "validators" are poorly served, and the back-office lag of wet-ink and faxed paperwork.

The more contested material is predictive. Kitces expects advisory firms to consolidate through economies of scale, as brokerages did. He expects passive investing to eliminate weak active managers rather than active management itself, since some clients will always pay for a chance to outperform. He also argues that public markets are so efficient that value creation is moving to private markets, which bring opacity and overhead. He disputes the common view that robo-advisors disrupted human advisors, pointing instead to Schwab and Vanguard as the firms under threat.

Sharpest takeaway

Kitces argues financial advice has been reshaped in cycles by technology that undercuts the prevailing fee model, and that as asset-based fees compress, advisors will defend their pricing by adding value and specializing, with flat and fee-for-service models eventually becoming dominant.

  • Each prior advisor business model (commission brokerage, mutual fund sales, AUM portfolio management) was disrupted by technology that unbundled its core service
  • Robo-advisors have not displaced human advisors, but the pricing pressure they created is compressing asset-management fees
  • Advisors are defending the 1% fee by adding services, and the market will shift from 1% of assets toward fees based on income as the mass affluent expand

The argument · threads11 threads · 70 claims
0.78

Advisors displaced fund managers and commission sales by moving to AUM-based, asset-allocated portfolios.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • We are only in the second inning of the shift away from the mutual fund model: it began with OneSource in 1998, took about 15 years to reach net outflows, and the industry's most drastic advisor pricing pressure should not arrive until the late 2020s or early 2030s.

    “I don't think you'll really see the most drastic levels of a pricing pressure on this until the late 2020s, early 2030s maybe”

  • The industry describes advisors moving into index funds and ETFs as an advisor shift to passive investing, but the real change is advisors becoming portfolio managers who cut out mutual fund manager fees, disintermediating funds.

    “advisors have been making themselves portfolio managers and disintermediating mutual funds.”

  • After commissions were challenged, brokers lobbied the SEC for the 12b-1 fee, creating an ongoing shareholder servicing fee that let advisors shift from one-time commissions toward recurring compensation, which powered the mutual fund era of the 1980s and 1990s.

    “They lobbied the SEC for a change, to create a new option in mutual funds, this thing called a 12b-1 fee, where advisors could get paid an ongoing shareholder servicing fee”

  • Turnkey asset management platforms emerged in the late 1990s on the logic that if ten advisors build the same diversified portfolio, one centralized manager can do it for all of them with economies of scale.

    “Why didn't we just have one centralized manager do it for all 10? It's much more efficient with economies of scale than having 10 advisors make their own.”

  • In any vertical chain with competition, whoever sits closest to the client tends to win; advisors, who face clients directly, capture the value by cutting the fees of intermediate fund managers rather than their own.

    “whoever's closest to the client tends to win. The advisor sits across from the client”

  • When direct-to-consumer platforms undercut commission-based fund sales, advisors moved to the AUM model, selling diversified, asset-allocated portfolios tied to client goals, which raised the value proposition and drove the 20-year rise of fee-based and RIA practices.

    “We said, "Well, anybody can sell you a mutual fund. I will create for you a diversified asset allocated portfolio of them," and we went into the AUM model.”

0.71

Advisor value is moving toward retirement decisions, cashflow tools, and advisor-facing portals.

8 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Personal cashflow and net-worth dashboards like Mint are underbuilt for consumers because they optimize for product upsell, leaving a wide-open opportunity for advisor-facing client portals focused on cashflow and balance sheet rather than investments.

    “it's really clear to me they have spent years iterating on their technology not to make it better for me as a consumer, but to figure out how to sell me more stuff”

  • After the initial retirement portfolio is built and automated, advisors can add ongoing value across the client's remaining 30 years by advising on Social Security, health insurance, Medicare, and housing and care decisions, which is where advisory value increasingly lies.

    “So, what else are you doing that's useful for them over the next 29.7 years after you get their retirement portfolio set up?”

  • The American College's Retirement Income Specialist program became its fastest-growing designation in a century within about three years of launch, and the Investments and Wealth Institute then bought a competing program, showing demand for retirement-income specialization.

    “their fastest growing destination program in a century was their Retirement Income Specialist Program they launched about three years ago.”

  • Edmond Walters built eMoney Advisor, a client portal integrating cashflow and net worth that sells at three times the price of other planning software, and Fidelity acquired it for a quarter of a billion dollars, demonstrating the value of advisor-facing cashflow tools.

    “Fidelity bought him for a quarter of a billion dollars.”

  • Many investment vendors still require wet-ink signed paper applications, and some advisor vendors required faxed applications until about two years before the interview, so the back-office of investing lags far behind trading and banking digitization.

    “I can only open an account with a wet ink signature, like an actual physical piece of paper”

  • Because most advisors serve baby boomer retirees, their value-add services are concentrating on retirement decisions such as Social Security claiming, Medicare choices, long-term care, and whether to move into a continuing care community or age in place.

    “So, what else are you doing that's useful for them over the next 29.7 years after you get their retirement portfolio set up?”

  • Advisors should not encourage clients to obsess over investment portals, and a cashflow tool from an advisor can drive logins without upselling products, since the advisor is already paid a fee for the relationship.

    “I don't need to upsell you off my software. That's just a value add that can be designed to be a pure and fantastic value add.”

  • Investment platforms make money from trading volume, so their reporting design shows red and green alerts that excite emotions and encourage trading, rather than simplifying performance reporting for consumers.

    “They make money by showing green redlines and red headlines that rile up your emotions, and freak you out, and make you want to do something, because then you trade more”

0.64

Advice is shifting toward fee-for-service and life-planning models serving a broader population than the wealthy.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Despite flat fees losing head-to-head with AUM today, Kitces predicts flat or fee-for-service models will become the dominant advisory model within 10 to 15 years, as the market expands beyond the wealthy to people needing ongoing life-planning advice.

    “I think what you're going to find 10 to 15 years from now is that flat fees are actually the dominant model.”

  • About 40 to 50% of US households have the financial wherewithal to pay an advisor a fee without handing over assets, a population that fee-for-service models could serve, even though roughly half of all households will never engage an advisor.

    “we estimate is probably 40 to 50% of US households who have the financial wherewithal to pay an advisor, as long as you don't require them to hand over assets.”

  • The model of the last 10 to 20 years was 1% of assets, but the model of the next 10 to 20 years will be closer to 1% of income, because the broader middle-income population needs ongoing life-stage financial advice more than investment management.

    “The model the past 10 years or past 20 years has been 1% of assets. I think what you're going to find is the model of the next 10 and 20 years is 1% of income.”

  • Forrester's consumer segmentation shows a large middle group of validators who want a second opinion on their own plan, but the advisory industry responds by requiring full asset management, so validators feel poorly served and are left out.

    “Those folks tend to have a lot of trouble in the industry today, because they say, "Hey. I'm just looking for a second opinion about what I'm doing," and we respond with, "Well, give me your life savings"”

  • People in their 20s through 40s face a steady stream of life events, such as career changes, marriage, children, home buying, student debt, and business formation, that create ongoing demand for financial advice, which an annual fee for service can address better than an asset-based fee.

    “where we need a steady stream of ongoing financial advice, because life just tends to change and veer left and right throughout that time period”

  • The AUM advisory model is built for roughly 5 to 7% of US households: the mass affluent are about a third, but only about half of them have money outside a 401(k), and only about a third of those are delegators willing to hand over assets.

    “What you come down to is our whole financial advisor business model is built for about 5-7% of the population”

0.56

Recurring AUM fees rise automatically with markets, making advisory revenue more durable than flat retainers.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • When evaluating an advisory firm, a key test is whether its revenue is recurring, since firms with recurring AUM or 12b-1 revenue hire for financial planning, while firms with non-recurring revenue must hire salespeople to generate new business each year.

    “Firms with recurring revenue tend to hire financial planning jobs. Firms with non-recurring revenue tend to hire sales jobs.”

  • Flat retainer fees are hard to sustain against AUM fees because clients feel fees more when written as checks; an AUM fee is debited out of sight and rises automatically with market returns, so a $10,000 retainer must be re-justified and raised every year while an AUM fee lifts itself.

    “We hate writing checks and paying for things. We feel much better when fees are just kind of debted out.”

  • AUM is the only business model in any industry where average revenue per client rises automatically above inflation simply by keeping the client, since market returns lift assets and therefore fees without any price increase being declared.

    “It is the only business model that I'm aware of anywhere in the history of any industry where your average revenue per client automatically goes up at a real increase above inflation simply by keeping the client”

  • The benchmark advisory fee is about 1% on a $1 million account, with graduated schedules running about 1.3 to 1.5% for accounts under $250,000, about 0.6 to 0.8% for multimillion-dollar accounts, and roughly 0.25 to 0.5% for $5 million to $10 million-plus accounts.

    “The low end, under $250,000 accounts, is actually typically more like 1.3 to 1.5%, and then by the time you get up to multimillion dollar accounts it's usually about 0.6 to 0.8.”

0.43

Discount trading technology removed broker commission protection and drove price competition.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Fixed trading commissions set by the SEC after the Great Depression protected brokers from price competition, which was intended to prevent consumer gouging but removed the incentive for brokers to lower costs.

    “The problem, of course, if you also have no price competition when it's all set by the regulator.”

  • The shift from fixed-commission stockbroking to competitive trading was driven by technology: after the 1975 deregulation of commissions, computer-based discount firms like Schwab scaled trade execution, and the cost of a stock trade fell about 90% from 1975 to 1995, eliminating the traditional stockbroker business model.

    “In the span of 20 years, from 1975 to 1995, the cost to execute a stock trade fell by 90%, and stock brokers went away.”

  • The 1998 launch of Schwab OneSource offered no-load mutual funds with zero commission when the average upfront A-share commission was 5.75%, a disruption more severe than the robo-advisor shock of the 2010s.

    “They offered a commission for zero when the average upfront A-share mutual fund commission was 5.75%.”

  • Firms are pushing advisory and asset management pricing toward zero by monetizing the underlying products, as Schwab gives away its robo-advisor because it earns on its own funds, forcing competitors without proprietary funds to match.

    “Schwab gave away Schwab Intelligent Portfolios Robo-Advisor, because they make money on the underlying funds”

0.43

Robo-advisors repackaged existing advisor tools and did not meaningfully disrupt human advisors.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Robo-advisors were essentially advisor model-management and rebalancing software repackaged for consumers, and the trading functions they offered, including tax-loss harvesting, were already available to advisors in iRebal in 2004.

    “There was nothing in the Betterment and Wealthfund trading process that you couldn't have done literally eight years earlier in iRebal”

  • Robo-advisors, despite strong initial hype and asset gathering, never meaningfully disrupted human financial advisors, because the human relationship remains central to advice, although the trend they represented did transform the industry.

    “The literal robo-advisor model has not in any way, shape, or form disrupted the financial advisor.”

  • Advice relationships are low-turnover because consumers get comfortable with their advisor and hire advisors precisely to stop thinking about money, so disruption in advice unfolds over a decade or more rather than quickly.

    “consumers don't tend to change advisors or providers very often. We get comfortable with what we're doing, and we tend to hang with it.”

  • Contrary to the expectation that advisory fees must collapse to the 25-basis-point robo level, the average robo-advisor fee has risen over seven years, with Betterment consolidating at 25 bps and Wealthfront, Fidelity Go, and Schwab landing around 30 to 35 bps or higher, so the real gap to advisor fees is smaller than assumed.

    “the trend that we've seen even in the robo space is that the average robo-advisor fee has just gone up, and up, and up for the past seven years.”

0.39

Advisory firms defend fee levels by adding planning services, talent, and niche depth.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The true revenue yield for advisory firms, total fees divided by total assets, has stayed between roughly 72 and 78 basis points for 10 to 15 years, and the slight downward drift reflects graduated fee schedules and bull-market client growth rather than actual fee compression.

    “you see an average revenue yield for advisory firms that sits right around 75 basis points. It's sort of fluctuated between about 72 and 78 basis points for 10/15 plus years”

  • Thomas Philippon's study of financial intermediation over roughly 150 years shows the average fee financial services extracts from savings has stayed between about 1.5% and 2%, implying the industry tends to value-add its way to maintaining fees rather than scaling prices down.

    “the average fee that the financial services industry extracts has hovered almost precisely between 1.5% and 2% of savings for over a century.”

  • Rather than cutting fees to match robo-advisors, advisory firms are defending the 1% by adding planning services, upgrading talent with designations, and going deeper into niches, which raises wages and headcount, so profit margins stay flat despite a decade of bull markets and scale technology.

    “Advisor profit margins should be at blow out record highs. The average profit margin for advisory firms has not been rising.”

0.39

Commoditization concentrates value in mega-firms and narrow niche specialists.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • In commoditized financial markets, falling prices and rising volume favor large firms with economies of scale, as the brokerage industry consolidated into a few mega-firms that now compete to push trading costs toward zero.

    “Lower price plus volume means larger firms with economies of scale tend to do well.”

  • When a scalable market commoditizes, value concentrates at two ends: mega-firms that use size to outprice rivals, and niche boutiques that offer specialized services to defined clienteles, leaving the middle squeezed.

    “you essentially see two winners. The first are the mega firms that just flat out use their size and economies of scale”

  • Advisors who specialize narrowly, such as serving young doctors at three local hospitals or Midwest bass fishing professionals, can build highly successful practices, because specialized knowledge like hospital contract negotiation drives more value than the portfolio.

    “That's his entire client base, young doctors at one of three hospitals in his one town, because their big problem actually has nothing to do with the portfolio stuff”

0.33

Strong advisor practices are measured by deep client relationships, credentials, and focused firm identity.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The easiest way to distinguish a financial sales job from a financial advisor job is that sales roles require you to bring your own clients from the start, whereas advisor roles do not, and a sample financial plan is a useful test of firm focus.

    “The easiest way to tell is sales jobs require you to get your own clients out of the gate and advisor jobs do not.”

  • The minimum legal requirement to become an advisor is a short regulatory exam, and CFP certification should be treated as a starting point, since within 5 to 10 years most advisors will hold it and lacking it will be a negative signal.

    “If you want to be succeeding in this space in five and 10 years, when the majority of all advisors will have CFP certification, having it isn't a benefit. Not having it is a negative.”

  • Historically advisors sold products to anybody, so some have hundreds of clients they have not seen in a decade, meaning the apparent client count overstates their real practice, and those relationships are closer to one-time sales than clients.

    “You opened an IRA for them in 2003 and haven't seen them since. I get it. You still get paid a little trail on them, but that's not a client.”

  • Most advisors can be wildly successful with about 50 great clients, and the practical ceiling is around 100 active clients, since advisors with more than 100 clients have typically not talked to many of them in years.

    “most advisors can be wildly successful with about 50 great clients. We tend to top out at about 100.”

  • The 80/20 rule holds strongly in advisory practices: roughly 80% of profits come from the top 20% of clients, so even a 200-plus-client advisor earns most profit from its top 40 to 50 clients.

    “80% of profits come from the top 20% of the clients. Even if you're 200 plus clients, most of your profits and success comes from your top 40 or 50 clients.”

0.29

Investment differentiation persists through private markets, tactical allocation, and active managers.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Public markets have become too efficient, so the remaining frontier of investment value creation is moving to private markets, which offer less price discovery and more opportunity but also more opacity, risk, and overhead that favor larger firms.

    “the whole public markets in the aggregate have become too efficient that the last frontier of investment value creation is going out there into those darker private markets.”

  • The rise of passive investing is destroying the bad active managers who charged high fees for low active share, not active management as a whole, and the industry will be left with a smaller set of genuinely skilled active managers, as in the dot-com sorting phase.

    “You're seeing the destruction of bad active managers.”

  • Advisors can differentiate on the investment side through tactical allocation that adjusts bond and equity weights to valuation and interest rates, and through access to alternative and private market investments, although scarce products also invite overpriced and poorly diligenced offerings.

    “I see the rise of firms that are doing essentially tactical management.”

  • Active investing will never disappear because some clients will always pay for the opportunity to outperform, driven by the desire to be above average or to accumulate wealth, even though many of them do not actually outperform.

    “There will always be a group of people who are willing to pay for the opportunity of doing better.”

0.07

Kitces prioritizes education and self-directed business investment over retirement accounts.

2 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Kitces's own investing prioritizes education and self-directed business investments over retirement accounts, which he has not contributed to for years, because he believes the return on degrees, designations, and startups exceeds that of a Roth IRA, while accepting that 80 to 90% of startups fail.

    “The ROI on getting myself degrees and designations is exponentially better than anything I ever could have done by putting money into a Roth IRA.”

  • Bob Veres launched Kitces's first newsletter by building his website and emailing his own subscriber list to introduce him, producing about 200 initial subscribers, and that early hand-up turned into a blog, podcast, and business portfolio that Kitces now replicates by seeding others.

    “He did the whole thing. He covered it out of whatever his contractor agreement or whatever it is with his developer.”