What this covers

This is a conversation between Jonathan, who carries most of the analysis, and Matt, about Kering, the French luxury group. It starts with the company's origins. Kering was built after LVMH's 1999 attempt to take over Gucci, when Kering stepped in as a white knight. François-Henri Pinault later decided that regional distribution businesses could not gain from global expansion and moved the group toward luxury. Bottega Veneta, Balenciaga and YSL followed. Puma was the last divestiture because its roughly 10% margin sat far below luxury norms.

The middle of the discussion covers how luxury economics work. The industry runs on roughly 70% gross margins and 30% operating margins. Production is only about 30% of costs, with stores, salespeople and advertising making up most of the rest. Jonathan explains why owned retail versus wholesale matters for pricing control, and how brands hold volume down and let prices rise so that buying now feels rational. He shows Operating Leverage in Reverse with Gucci: a 25% revenue decline produced roughly a 50% profit decline, from about 40% margins on 10 billion of revenue under Alessandro Michele to just over 20% on about 7.5 billion today.

Other threads include the Balenciaga campaign backlash and how a multi-brand structure absorbs it, using Volkswagen's diesel crisis as the comparison. Demand also shifts by region, since Chinese buyers have gone from about half of growth to about 10%. The discussion then looks at Kering's stake in Valentino, its leverage of about 3x net debt to EBITDA, and the logic of buying minority stakes before full acquisitions. Valuation comes up through EV to Sales and price-to-book comparisons with past luxury selloffs in 2003 and 2009.

Sharpest takeaway

Kering's stock is cheap because Gucci's margins have collapsed from roughly 40% to about 20% during a design-driven slump, and that margin is cyclical and recoverable, so the investment case rests on earnings normalization and patience rather than multiple expansion.

  • Gucci is roughly half of Kering revenue and over half of profit, so its margin recovery drives the group
  • Normalizing Gucci to a 30% margin implies a sub-10x earnings multiple on Kering versus about 18x as quoted
  • Luxury downturns have historically lasted two to three years, and the company is expected to cut costs to protect the income statement

The argument · threads12 threads · 65 claims
0.78

Luxury demand and operating gearing make profits cyclical, so investors must build conviction over years.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Luxury is great in about 8 out of 10 years but difficult in about 2 out of 10, and 2024 was the sixth worst year for luxury in the last 20 years.

    “They're great for about 8 out of 10 years and 2 out of 10 they're pretty tough. ... This is the sixth worst year in luxury out of the last 20.”

  • Luxury is cyclical because it depends on global wealth; luxury stocks derated sharply in 2003 and 2009, with Richemont falling to about one times book value, which Jonathan considered a buying opportunity.

    “During that period, it went to one times book. That was a great buying opportunity.”

  • At cyclical bottoms the news flow is uniformly bad, so investors must actively search for good news, and confidence comes from taking large positions for two to four years when evidence accumulates.

    “It's always dark at the bottom. You never have complete confidence. When it's at the top, everything is clear.”

  • Luxury demand depends on top-end wealth, particularly the top 1%, so when asset prices rise the top earners buy and when they fall the business suffers.

    “When global growth is doing really well, when asset prices are going up, the top 1% are doing well.”

  • Investors consistently underestimate operational gearing on both the way up and the way down, and Jonathan is still surprised by how large its effects are when they occur.

    “the operational gearing of businesses, both on the upside and downside is really important to understand and it's misunderstood by a lot of investors”

  • Investors now use public data such as credit card spending and Instagram likes to analyze luxury brands, so the analytical process has changed even though the investment decision itself has not.

    “I think it's changed the analytical process. Decisions are still decisions, but today there's a lot more data available. You have credit card data, we have Instagram likes.”

0.68

Gucci's sales slump reflects a lagging product-line cycle and should recover within a few years.

7 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Historically luxury margin compression lasts only a couple of years, two to three at most, so the current compression is not yet unusually long.

    “Usually it just lasts for a couple of years, two, three years. That would be the most.”

  • Changes in designer, CEO and product take time to reach stores, often about two years, so investors who judge a turnaround early and sell on weak margins make a mistake.

    “The product is just getting in the store and it's almost two years later. It takes time to get there. That would be the big lesson for me, is be patient.”

  • Over 1994 to 2004, when Tom Ford led the brand, Gucci grew about eightfold, and under Michele it grew about two and a half times, showing that the business grows nicely over long periods despite recent declines.

    “from 1994 to 2004 when Tom Ford was up eight times, Michele was up two and a half times.”

  • Gucci sales have fallen about 25% over the last year or two as the design change and tougher luxury conditions hit demand.

    “Gucci sales are down 25%. That's not good the last year or two”

  • Gucci's decline followed narrowing product and fading popularity after Michele, and the design change is slow to flow through to sales, so the early slump reflects a product-line lag rather than a permanent break.

    “I think what happened was the popularity started to decline. The product may have been a bit too narrow.”

  • Sabato De Sarno's designs for Gucci had only been in market about three months at the time, and customers had not yet shown they would accept the new direction.

    “I think that's a really important point because so far the answer has been not yet. To be fair though, his designs are just coming out in the last three months”

  • Historically, luxury margin compression has typically lasted about two to three years, so Jonathan's expectation is that the Gucci problem should be resolved in that window if management protects the income statement.

    “Usually it just lasts for a couple of years, two, three years. That would be the most.”

0.60

Kering trades far below normalized, sum-of-parts, and historical valuation, so the stock is cheap.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Investors should triangulate valuation with multiple methods, and when valuation, data and management signals all point the same direction, it gives the conviction needed to hold through dark periods.

    “As an investor you like to triangulate and look at different methods. But when you come to the same answer ... then you get more comfort as an investor”

  • If Gucci earned a 30% operating margin on about 7.5 billion revenue, Kering's price-earnings multiple would fall below 10x, versus a market at about 12-14x, showing the stock is cheap on normalized earnings.

    “if we were to plug in 30% operating margin for Gucci on a 7.58 billion revenue business, you get the P multiple down less than 10 times.”

  • Private market transactions for luxury brands cluster at four to five times sales, and at four times Gucci's 7.5-8 billion revenue with a 34% margin, Gucci alone roughly equals Kering's current market cap, so the other brands are effectively free.

    “if we were to plug in 30% operating margin for Gucci on a 7.58 billion revenue business, you get the P multiple down less than 10 times.”

  • Kering trades near 2.5x enterprise value to sales, a 50-60% discount to its own history and far below LV at about 4x, while Hermès trades at a high multiple that lifts the sector average.

    “Right now it's near 2.5 times, which is extremely low. LV is on 4 times ... But Kering is on a 50 to 60% discount on an EV to sales basis.”

  • Kering's stock has fallen from about 800 to almost 200, and Jonathan says that when several valuation methods converge on the same answer, investors gain comfort in buying.

    “the stock is down from 800 to almost 200, then you get more comfort as an investor”

0.57

Kering's multi-brand model scales acquisitions while pruning non-luxury businesses toward pure luxury.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Under Kering, Bottega Veneta grew from about 56 million to about 1.7 billion in revenue over roughly 25 years, illustrating Kering's ability to scale brands.

    “Bottega Veneta was 56 million, it's now 1.7 billion. And that's happened in 25 years.”

  • Kering was built after LV attempted a 1999 takeover of Gucci, prompting the Gucci CEO and family to bring in Kering as a white knight; Kering then acquired Bottega Veneta, Balenciaga and YSL over three to five years.

    “there was a takeover attempt by LV in 1999 to take over Gucci. Needing a white knight, the CEO and the Gucci family came to Kering”

  • Kering divested non-luxury businesses including Conforama, Rexel, French electronic retail and finally Puma, moving the group toward a pure luxury portfolio.

    “They got rid of Conforama, Rexel, some of the electronic retailing in France, and then finally Puma.”

  • A multi-brand group like Kering adds value to small acquired brands by supplying store format guidance, logistics, IT, and CEO recruiting, enabling brands to transition from wholesale to retail as they scale.

    “Having the expertise of a multi-brand strategy really helps something like Kering.”

  • Kering owns 30% of Valentino with a put or call option to buy the rest in coming years, and its balance sheet at about 3x net debt to EBITDA is near its limit, which constrains further acquisitions.

    “they own 30% of Valentino and they have a put or call option to buy the rest in the next few years ... It's three times net debt EBITDA right now.”

  • Revenue is revenue, but a balanced regional mix is preferred because stores need to be supported, and an extreme split like 90/10 is undesirable.

    “you wouldn't want to have it 90, 10, but as long as it's balanced is the answer.”

  • Small brands typically run 70-80% wholesale, but brands above about 1 billion in revenue run around 80% retail and 20% wholesale; the transition requires a large capital investment.

    “When you're small, it's more 70, 80% wholesale. ... you're really thinking 80% retail, 20% wholesale. There's a big switch.”

  • Kering runs shared development centers in Europe for leather and ready-to-wear, so brands can develop design concepts, source materials, and plan distribution faster than standalone companies.

    “they've got development centers in Europe where they have a development center on leather, they have a development center on ready-to-wear.”

0.50

Gucci's sales and margins swing with design appeal and operating leverage.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Puma was a roughly 10% margin business, far below Gucci's 30-40% margin over 20 years and luxury's typical margins, which is why it was the last divestiture.

    “Puma was a 10% margin business. Gucci, over the last 20 years, it's been a 30 to 40% margin business.”

  • Gucci is almost 50% of Kering revenues and over 50% of its profits, making it the dominant brand in the portfolio.

    “It's almost 50% of revenues and it's over 50% of profits.”

  • Gucci's popularity rises and falls with its fashion appeal, so when a strong designer like Alessandro Michele succeeds, the brand's sales and valuation multiple rise, while a design transition causes a slump.

    “its popularity comes in and out, depending on how well its fashion does”

  • Luxury as an industry has roughly 70% gross margins and about 30% operating margins on average, with LV and Hermès somewhat higher.

    “Luxury overall, it's a 70% gross margin business. On average it's about a 30% operating margin.”

  • When revenue declines, operating leverage cuts both ways: with a fixed cost base and reinvestment in the brand, a 25% revenue decline led to roughly a 50% profit decline at Gucci.

    “when revenues decline 25%, profits are down 50%. And that's basically what's happened at Gucci.”

  • When Gucci reached about a 10 billion revenue business under Alessandro Michele, operating margins hit about 40%; today on roughly 7.5 billion of revenue the margin is just over 20%.

    “when Gucci got to a 10 billion revenue business, operating margins hit 40%. ... Today they're a 7.5 billion business ... it's just over 20% margin.”

0.46

Kering trades near fair value because Gucci and other brands are under-earning.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Kering trades at roughly 18 times one-year forward earnings, which Jonathan considers close to fair value given that Gucci and other brands are under-earning.

    “I think it's on 18 times earnings one year forward. That is close to where it should sit valuation-wise.”

  • Gucci has historically sold at a valuation discount to LVMH because investors see more variability in its earnings tied to fashion cycles.

    “That's why historically they've sold at a discount to LV because investors have looked at them and said, "Oh, I think there's more variability in your business."”

  • In strong global growth periods luxury brands grow about 9% organically on price and volume combined, with operating leverage on top.

    “I usually think about 3, 4% price and maybe 3 to 4% volume. There's some mix in there as well.”

  • Higher interest rates in 2023 and 2024 caused aspirational luxury consumers to cut back, hurting Gucci more than peers because its customer base is more aspirational.

    “Gucci has more aspirational as well. Those consumers were having a tougher time too this year and last year due to higher interest rates and they've pulled back.”

  • Price-to-book and price-earnings multiples are used to value luxury companies, and at cyclical troughs luxury stocks can fall to about one times book, which marks a buying opportunity.

    “sometimes we'll use book values, PE multiples, price earnings multiples to figure out how to value these companies.”

0.43

Aggressive luxury price hikes are outrunning demand and shaping consumers' buy-now behavior.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • A workable framework for annual luxury revenue growth is roughly 3-4% from price, 3-4% from volume, plus mix effects from discontinuing products or launching at higher price points.

    “I usually think about 3, 4% price and maybe 3 to 4% volume. There's some mix in there as well.”

  • Chanel and Dior have raised prices about 50% over the last three to four years, and consumers are beginning to notice.

    “They've raised prices 50% over the last three, four years. That's a lot. And consumers are starting to notice.”

  • During COVID luxury brands raised prices by 10-20% per year, far above normal, and this is now catching up with the industry in soft leather where competition is heavier.

    “There were much bigger price increases during COVID, more like 10, 15, 20% a year.”

  • Luxury brands deliberately keep volume controlled and let prices rise so consumers see the product as a store of value; buying later costs more and prices do not come down, which trains a buy-now mindset.

    “you want to make it something where people connect with, but they understand that price going up is a store of value.”

0.33

Owned retail gives brands control over pricing, inventory, and consumer relationships, at a cost.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Production is about 30% of luxury costs; the remaining cost base is dominated by the store and wholesale network with salespeople, plus advertising and promotion, which is the main cost of creativity.

    “It's making the product and that's probably 30% of the cost there.”

  • Some luxury managements, once they reach a target operating margin, decide to reinvest any extra profit in stores and advertising rather than let margins expand, so there is a ceiling on operating leverage.

    “they're going to reinvest it back in the business. We might open new stores, we might advertise some more.”

  • Luxury groups co-locate sibling brand stores and negotiate rents together, and store size must match available product, since renting 3000 square feet with stock for 1500 creates a serious problem.

    “if we rent 3000 and we only have product for 1500, we're in big trouble.”

  • Owned retail gives a brand control over pricing, product, inventory and the consumer relationship, whereas wholesale loses pricing control and visibility, so unsold wholesale goods degrade margins.

    “you have more control over pricing and more control over product, and you have more control over the inventory.”

  • Kering will likely sell minority stakes of about 49.9% in recently bought Paris, New York and Italy retail properties to raise cash, while keeping control of the sites because brands need to hold their key locations.

    “what they'll do is they'll sell a 49.9% stake. ... It could be 40 something where they have control over that property.”

0.33

Management should protect the balance sheet through cost cuts, M&A pauses, and shareholder engagement.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • After design investment, management should protect the income statement by cutting costs or closing stores, because a company that has shrunk from 10 billion euros to 7.5 billion needs cost discipline; large shareholders can press this in conversation.

    “at some point you need to protect the income statement. Maybe some costs need to be cut, some stores need to be shuttered.”

  • Dividends are the main capital allocation priority for family-controlled Kering, with a typical payout ratio of 40-50% because the family wants cash, given the low capex needs.

    “Dividends are a big focus for family-owned companies typically. ... Normally I see Kering having a good dividend payout ratio, 40 to 50%”

  • Kering has been acquisitive recently, buying Creed, eyewear and the Valentino stake, so Jonathan expects few further acquisitions beyond the Valentino buyout and expects the portfolio to be fixed for about five years.

    “I don't see them making a lot of acquisitions. I think they have the portfolio they have for the next five years.”

  • When François-Henri Pinault took control, he judged that the regional distribution businesses could not benefit from global expansion, so the group pivoted to luxury brands.

    “When the father gave control to François-Henri, I think he looked at the portfolio and said, we've maxed out on what we can do.”

  • As a large shareholder, Jonathan engages management to protect the balance sheet, such as pausing M&A and cutting costs, and says this dialogue is a benefit of being a big investor.

    “And I think it's really important as a shareholder to converse with the management team and share your opinions. And I think it's one of the benefits of being a big shareholder”

0.29

Balenciaga's damage will be absorbed by the multi-brand group, with repair concentrated in the US.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Jonathan does not expect Kering to divest Balenciaga; he expects the group to trade through the damage, with repair concentrated in the US.

    “I don't see a divestiture. I think they will trade through it.”

  • Consumers have long memories, so a major brand misstep like Balenciaga's continues to shape purchase behavior years later, with some customers reluctant to wear the brand.

    “people have long memories. I know people who have Balenciaga goods ... and they are loath to wear those products sometimes”

  • The Balenciaga ad campaign backlash severely damaged the brand, especially US sales, but the multi-brand structure insulates the group, as with Volkswagen's diesel crisis across Audi and Porsche.

    “when something like that happens at Balenciaga, it doesn't hurt the whole company; obviously, it's hurt the brand. Same thing would happen with VW, with the diesel crisis.”

  • Investors monitor brand health through Instagram following and likes, surveys such as the List in the US, store conversations, and credit card data, treating public data as an analytical edge.

    “We do a lot of work on Instagram following the strength of the brand on certain surveys like List in US”

0.29

Brand positioning and creative leadership should follow the consumer each house is trying to attract.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Fashion-forward brands must adopt edgier messaging because that is the consumer they are trying to attract, whereas conservative houses like LV can use safer campaigns with popular spokespeople.

    “I think for brands that are a little more fashion, they will be a little edgier in terms of their message because that's the consumer that they're trying to attract.”

  • Product design stays decentralized at the brand level, with the brand CEO implementing a strategy aligned with the designer, while the designer focuses on design.

    “I think what you want to have is the CEO of a brand and the designer to be in concert with one another strategically.”

  • When a new creative director arrives, investors examine the designer's prior work and results, such as Sabato De Sarno at Valentino, and ask whether the customer base will accept the new direction.

    “Sabato De Sarno was at Valentino — taking a look at what he has designed, his vision. Asking yourself as an investor, is the customer base willing to change and go in that direction?”

  • Kering's brands are positioned differently and have different geographic strengths, but the variation is not extreme; for example Bottega Veneta is somewhat stronger in Europe and Asia.

    “they will have different geographic presence, to be fair. But it doesn't vary that much.”

0.25

Group portfolio decisions turn on business fit, staged stakes, and where luxury demand concentrates.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Christie's sits in the Pinault family company Artemis rather than Kering because it is a service business without product development or retail synergies that fit the luxury group.

    “Christie's doesn't really fit within the luxury brands. ... There's no development of a product. It's really a service”

  • Luxury groups often buy 30-40% stakes before full acquisitions because price is high at four to five times sales, and the partial stake lets them test whether culture and operations will work before committing.

    “there's almost like a dating process before you get married. You're kind of feeling each other out to see if it works.”

  • Chinese buyers drove roughly half of luxury growth over the last 10-15 years but now only about 10% of growth; Americans are about a third of wealth but buy 20-25% of luxury, while Chinese are about 25% of wealth and spend about 35%.

    “They were probably almost 50% of growth the last 10 or 15 years. Now that's down. The last few years, it's only down to 10% of growth.”