What this covers
This Business Breakdowns conversation has Zack questioning Nic Humphries of Hg about Visma, the Norwegian software group Hg took private in 2006. Nic starts with the history. Øystein Moan sold the marine software division in 1999 for cash rather than telecom shares, and was proved right when telecom stocks crashed two years later. Norway's small population then pushed Visma to buy similar businesses across the Nordics. Hg built its relationship with Visma's CEO through its IRIS Software and Addison Software investments, and Visma came to it in 2005-2006 as an alternative to a trade buyer's bid. Revenue has since grown from about $200 million to about $2.5 billion, and EBITDA from $35-40 million to about $800 million.
The middle of the discussion covers the market and the operating model. Nic breaks the roughly 8-9% annual growth of the SMB software market into three drivers: more small firms, more software modules per firm, and rising regulation. He explains why bookkeeping and payroll are the last software a failing company switches off. He describes 30-40 tuck-in acquisitions a year, a high retention rate among acquired founders, and a short list of centrally enforced standards. Other topics include the Nordic lead-market heuristic, small bets on new technology, and the move to SaaS from 2009-2010, which slowed growth for several years before it accelerated. Pricing runs at inflation plus a little, and Nic rejects the usual private-equity price hike.
The more contested material concerns Hg's three-to-four-year planning cycles, its decision to hold a small share of its businesses across successive funds, and its refusal of SPAC and IPO offers at the 2019-2021 peak. Nic also explains why Visma stays out of North America, where Intuit dominates. He names culture, not the revenue model, as the main risk.
Visma's durability comes from compliance-driven, mission-critical products with high switching costs, plus a decentralized entrepreneurial operating model. Hg's long-hold, three-to-four-year planning discipline lets it compound that position without chasing peak-market exits.
- Regulated bookkeeping and payroll software earns trust through a long compliance record, which makes it a hard-to-displace go-to product
- Light-touch integration of acquired entrepreneurial businesses keeps growth high while central hygiene standards keep quality consistent
- Holding for three-to-four-year plan cycles inside long ownership periods lets Hg invest for payback without short-term pricing or exit pressure
SMB software market grows steadily, supported by regulation, business-critical demand, and multi-decade growth trends.
- The SMB software market grows about 8-9% per year, roughly three times GDP, driven by three factors: SMB customer count growing 1-2% per year in Western Europe as large institutions fragment into entrepreneurial firms, software module penetration growing 4-5% per year as compute power falls to small businesses, and regulation rising.
“that market had long-term multi-decade trends that were driving approximately three times GDP type market growth.”
- Governments claim to cut compliance burdens but keep increasing them, which gives bookkeeping and payroll software providers a steady opportunity to build new modules or price at inflation plus a small amount each period.
“Every government on the planet tells you they're cutting those things, and of course, they're not.”
- Because bookkeeping and payroll software is business-critical, it is the last thing a company turns off before closing, and even a receiver keeps using it for about a year after appointment, so the category grows through all cycles including the GFC and COVID.
“this is pretty much the last thing you turn off before you turn off the lights on the business and appoint a receiver.”
- Visma's Nordic home markets are among the world's most expensive by GDP per capita, so customers there need productivity gains early, which shaped Visma's product focus from the start.
“those markets are pretty much bound to have productivity as a very, very core requirement early on.”
- Hg's sector analysis, done around 2001 to 2003, found that SMB software had multi-decade secular trends driving market growth of roughly three times GDP, and Nic believes the market will keep growing 8 to 9 percent per year for the next 10 to 15 years.
“that market had long-term multi-decade trends that were driving approximately three times GDP type market growth.”
- Hg has grown from about 30 people managing about $500 million in a single fund in 2001 to about 400 people managing roughly $65 billion and about 50 software businesses with an aggregate enterprise value near $130 billion, growing 20 percent per year, making it the number one software investor in Europe.
“Today, we're about 400 people. We are the Top two software investor globally, number one software investor in Europe with about $65 billion”
Long holding periods with testable plans beat both quarterly and perpetual ownership horizons.
- Hg sets three-to-four-year plans for each investment period because research by McKinsey, Bain and others suggests quarterly horizons prevent investment, while 20-year horizons are too long to test the thesis, so each four-to-five-year period of Visma has a distinct plan.
“you need a period that is long enough that you can make investments that have two- or three- or four-year payback”
- About 80-90% of Hg's investments are held on shorter timelines and sold to a strategic buyer, financial buyer, or via IPO, and only a small share of the best-quality businesses receive the decade-plus long-hold treatment.
“80-90% of our investments tend to be shorter and we'll sell them to a strategic”
- Long-hold investors must hold two ideas at once: the business can grow for decades, and they must regularly self-check that they are not becoming enamored with their own rhetoric about the business.
“you have to constantly check that you're not getting enamored with your own rhetoric.”
- Hg holds a small share of its businesses for very long periods, typically in an existing fund for 8-10 years and then migrating to a larger fund, which it can do with Chinese walls and governance because clients such as state pension funds accepted the long-hold philosophy.
“we have a small, medium and large fund that we can essentially move a business from one fund to another.”
- Nic's investment philosophy is to beat the stock market by a healthy margin with very low volatility over very long periods, which he argues is how a pension fund managing retirees' annuities should be invested.
“what I'd want to try and do is beat the stock market by a healthy margin, but to do that very consistently with very, very low volatility”
- Hg's clients have earned a consistent IRR in the high 20s to late 30s percent over the 17 years of Visma's private ownership, which Nic presents as evidence that long holds benefit both clients and the business.
“they've made a consistent high 20s, late 30s IRR over 17 years.”
Visma's decades of blemish-free compliance make it a trusted, go-to, low-risk software choice.
- Visma is the European equivalent of Intuit, providing daily mission-critical software such as bookkeeping and payroll to small and medium-sized businesses, from a few employees up to about 1,000, and is the leader across Europe.
“The simplest way of describing Visma would be that it's the European equivalent of Intuit.”
- Visma is deliberately not expanding into North America because Intuit is a dominant gorilla with strong defensive ability, and Visma prefers smaller geographies where deep local regulatory and competitive knowledge is needed, avoiding the largest markets such as the US and China.
“we don't want to come up to be against a huge gorilla that is a very, very successful gorilla as well.”
- Visma's primary competitive advantage is a 25-30 year record of blemish-free, on-time regulatory compliance in tax and payroll, which both governments and customers value, so customers know they take no compliance risk by choosing it and it becomes a go-to product.
“Visma's, I guess, number one special sauce is that over a 25-, 30-year period, it's got a most blemish-free record of delivering those products on time with any regulations”
- A suite of modules feeding from one data source lets customers use expense, bookkeeping, banking, and credit checks in one app, which cuts customer waste and improves accuracy because data is never rekeyed or moved between applications.
“you massively reduce customer waste and increase customer productivity, and at the same time, you also improve fidelity of the product”
- At the high end Visma competes with Microsoft Dynamics and previously SAP and Oracle, while in each geography there are often several to a dozen-plus local competitors with local regulatory and market knowledge, and payroll sits between large vendors and local SMB specialists.
“there are typically many, several, maybe even a dozen-plus local competitors that have good understanding of local markets”
Small bets, SaaS reinvestment, and tuck-in acquisitions have compounded Visma's value since the 2006 buyout.
- Visma makes about 30 to 40 relatively small tuck-in acquisitions per year, using M&A to add high-quality SaaS products around its core bookkeeping and payroll applications.
“it makes about 30 to 40 relatively small acquisitions per year.”
- Since Hg's 2006 take-private, when Visma had about $200 million revenue and $35-40 million EBITDA, the business has grown to about $2.5 billion revenue and about $800 million EBITDA, roughly 20x EBITDA and over 12x revenue in about 16-17 years.
“So basically, after 16 or 17 years, the business is 20x the size in terms of EBITDA. It's more than 12x the size in terms of revenue”
- Visma makes 10-20 relatively small bets on new technologies, accepts that some waste $10-30 million, and then puts bigger money behind those that achieve product-market fit, turning off the rest.
“we made 10, 15, 20 relatively small bets on SaaS and SaaS products and SaaS product development.”
- Visma applies the same small-bet approach to ML and AI, funding 10-20 multimillion-dollar investments, because no one can credibly claim a single AI platform is the right lead product yet.
“I don't think anybody is brave enough to tell you this is 100% the AI platform”
- Around the tail end of the GFC, Visma's management chose to reinvest a large share of profits into developing SaaS and cloud products from 2009-2010 onward instead of distributing cash, an atypical choice for private equity owners, because the management team saw the long-term implications of SaaS early.
“we had a big decision to make about whether we would reinvest a lot of our profits, which is not a typical thing to do for private equity firms”
- Historically Visma consumed most annual cash on SaaS product development 8-10 years ago, then reinvested the remainder in accretive M&A, and most cash now goes to buying high-quality SaaS bolt-ons because product development is largely complete.
“we've consumed most of the annual cash with a combination of reinvestment in the SaaS product development.”
- Øystein Moan sold Visma's marine software division to a European telco in 1999 at the top of the market for cash rather than telecom shares, drawing criticism at the time but proving right when telecom stocks crashed two years later.
“he sold the Marine software business to a large European telco.”
Preserving entrepreneurial culture under engineering-led management is Visma's central challenge and strength.
- Zack's framing is that Visma's business quality, with high switching costs and mission-critical service plus strong incremental margins, checks all the boxes for a software investor, and Nic accepted that framing without contesting it.
“from a business quality perspective, it clearly checks all the boxes.”
- Nic says the revenue model is high quality and diversified, with 90%-plus recurring revenue, so the main risk to Visma is management and culture, particularly preserving its entrepreneurial spirit as it scales.
“I think at the end of the day, it's probably around management and culture.”
- Visma centralizes financial reporting, cash flow, cybersecurity and development practices as non-negotiable hygiene, while product development, go-to-market and product management stay with the entrepreneurs running smaller business units.
“financial reporting, cash flow, cybersecurity, development practices, all these things are things that we rigorously want to adhere to”
- Visma benchmarks its software development life cycle and development process against KPIs and considers them globally best-in-class, comparable to top West Coast US software businesses.
“They're up there with business on the West Coast of the States”
- Visma's management team has a technical and engineering background rather than being financier-led, which let them understand the long-term implications of SaaS and cloud well ahead of most European peers.
“I think they frankly understood the potential long-term implications of SaaS and cloud well ahead of most people in Europe.”
- In new technologies a company is almost certain never to get it right the first time, so an entrepreneurial culture must tolerate multi-million dollar failures, such as products that cost $5 to 10 million or more and did not deliver.
“you're almost certain to never get it right first time.”
- About 3.5 years before the interview, Øystein Moan moved from CEO to Executive Chair, and Merete Hveren, who had been with the company for about a decade, became CEO; Nic describes the succession as very well handled and says Merete's team has taken the business further.
“the transition of Øystein to Chairman and Merete into the CEO role was about 3.5 years ago now and it's performing incredibly well.”
Disciplined inflation-plus pricing and SaaS monetization accelerate Visma's organic growth.
- Visma's organic revenue growth has accelerated from about 6-7% at the 2006 buyout to about 15% today, and organic EBITDA grows about 20% per year, with a small amount of margin expansion each year.
“The business at the time was growing at about 6% to 7% organically”
- Visma prices its products to rise at roughly inflation plus a small amount, changing prices only when new modules or productivity gains add value, and Nic rejects the classic PE move of raising prices on sticky businesses for a quick IRR.
“it's pretty much the oldest private equity trick in the book to go buy a sticky business and whack prices up.”
- Nic distinguishes modern multi-tenant SaaS, which Visma now runs, from what he calls 'BS SaaS', a label he says is common in the market, implying many companies relabel legacy software as SaaS.
“modern multi-tenant SaaS not BS SaaS as I describe it, which you see a fair amount of.”
- Visma's pricing has moved from perpetual licenses with maintenance 15-plus years ago, to per-seat subscriptions about 10-15 years ago, and now toward usage-based pricing tied to data and API calls as SaaS makes usage measurable.
“the vast majority of pricing is moving towards being usage-based based on data and API calls”
- Converting the installed base to pure SaaS from roughly 2010 through 2016-2017 slowed growth, but by building the technology early, Visma now has 80-90%-plus SaaS revenue and growth accelerated over the last five or six years.
“the business was growing at a slightly slower rate as it transitioned both revenue model to subscription”
- Cloud SaaS gives the vendor more live access to customers and their data, enables in-app applications and features, and raises cross-sell and upsell ability, so customers spend more on Visma products.
“our cross-sell and our upsell ability from our core products has increased significantly”
Stable, long-tenured management and retained entrepreneurs support Visma's consistent execution.
- Visma retains acquired entrepreneurs at high rates, with about 75-80% of ex-entrepreneurs still working in the business five years after sale, unlike the typical pattern where founders leave after a year.
“five years later, 75%, 80% of those entrepreneurs are still working in Visma”
- Visma's roughly 15-person senior management team averages late 30s to early 40s and mostly has 10-15 years tenure, because many members joined as graduate trainees in their early 20s, and the CEO Merete Hveren has been with the business a decade.
“Several of the management team joined the business as graduate trainees in their early 20s”
- Visma has about 14,000-15,000 employees, growing at a high single-digit percentage each year, which Nic sees as a positive for Western European knowledge-economy jobs and employee equity.
“that grows at high single-digit number every year.”
- Nic's early career as a poor generalist led him to specialize in software and tech-enabled services, an 'inch wide, mile deep' strategy, because he judged deep sector focus would give better investment results.
“did a classic engineer's thing of going inch wide and mile deep and chose to pitch software and tech-enabled services”
Nordic leadership lets Visma foresee trends and roll out products and acquisitions across other markets.
- Because the Nordics are more advanced in mobile, internet and AI adoption, Hg can see roughly four to five years into the future by watching Visma's Nordic products, then roll them out elsewhere, though not directly, since local nuances matter.
“We get to go to Oslo and we take a trip into the future by four or five years”
- Visma moved into Latin America in a significant way through M&A over the last four or five years, adding to its Western and Central and Eastern European footprint.
“LatAm, we've also moved into in a fairly significant way through M&A in the last four or five years”
- Hg's investment team spans 27 to 30 languages and backgrounds, which helps it understand local nuances when transferring ideas from one country's software business to another.
“we got 27, 30 different languages and backgrounds within Hg”
- Visma experimented with SaaS in 2008-2009 but rolled it out to other geographies later, because those markets were lower on the adoption curve and launching earlier would have been premature.
“those other geos were frankly less of the adoption curve and therefore, we would have been too early.”
- Visma had to pursue international acquisitions from the late 1990s because Norway has only about 5 million people, so it bought similar SMB software businesses in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and elsewhere to scale.
“Norway's a relatively small country, very good country, but a small country, 5 million people approximately.”
- When Øystein Moan joined in 1997, the business had about 20 million in revenue and around 100 million in balance-sheet cash from the marine sale, and he used that cash to buy similar SMB software businesses in other countries.
“the business started as an approximately $20 million revenue SMB software business”
Staged ownership plans and public listing timing follow long-range planning, not market peaks.
- Hg invested in IRIS Software in 2004 and Addison Software in 2005 as similar businesses, using those investments to build relationships with Visma's CEO from 2003, and then Visma came to Hg for an alternative to a trade buyer's bid in 2005-2006.
“our strategy is to just meet every good company in a sector that we want to pursue, build relationships with them”
- Hg says a return to public markets is likely at some point as Visma scales, and it will look at the question seriously over the next few years, though it is not negative on public markets.
“There will be some point in which we think it's appropriate to be a public company”
- Visma's ownership phases had distinct plans: 2006 cleanup and margin improvement, 2010-2014 SaaS investment, and the current phase focused on international expansion and reaping AI/ML investments made four or five years ago.
“2010 to 2014 was the start of the SaaS journey, investing heavily in SaaS”
- Hg rejected SPAC offers and bank pitches to take Visma public during the 2019-2021 peak, because it did not want to go public at the top of the market and would rather list when valuations are more modest and can grow into.
“we were pretty negative about going public at the peak of the market in '19, '20, '21. We had SPAC offers”