What this covers

This Business Breakdowns episode has Zack questioning Mark, an investor whose firm once held a short on Siemens Gamesa, about Siemens Energy. It starts with the 2020 spin-off from the 150-year-old Siemens conglomerate. The split gave grid and renewables separate focus and imposed capital-allocation discipline on the loss-making gas and power platforms. The conversation then takes grid, gas and wind in turn.

The grid segment is the most numbers-heavy. Order intake has at least doubled in two years to around EUR 20 billion, and the order backlog has grown from about EUR 10 billion to over EUR 30 billion. Mark credits utilities such as E.ON and National Grid for multiplying their capex plans, with electrification, data centers and cross-border cables adding demand. Whether Ukraine-era panic pulled orders forward is contested. In gas, four makers, including GE Vernova, build roughly 100 to 110 large turbines a year. Mark expects growth to return as backup for variable renewables, and says the installed base service annuity generates most of the profit.

Wind gets the harshest treatment. Mark traces years of losses to the subsidy-dependent discipline gap, long and unhedgeable offshore project timelines, and a record in which even Vestas has averaged only about 4% adjusted EBIT margins. He also expects the race to build ever larger turbines to stall. He is skeptical of hydrogen without heavy subsidy. On the balance sheet, he argues the net cash position looks stronger than it is once customer prepayments and about EUR 13 billion of contract liabilities are counted. He also describes the German government's guarantees on the order book last autumn.

Sharpest takeaway

Mark Hiley argues Siemens Energy has a strong grid and gas-power business that is in a long demand upcycle, but its investment case depends on whether management can fix a loss-making wind unit through disciplined pricing and risk-taking in a consolidated, subsidy-shaped industry.

  • Grid technologies and gas services are capacity-constrained, with long order books and high-margin service contracts
  • Wind has lost heavily for years due to fragmented economics, subsidy-driven culture, and poor project-risk discipline
  • Balance sheet appears to have net cash, but prepayments and contract liabilities make it weaker than headline figures suggest

The argument · threads9 threads · 65 claims
0.85

Structural grid and gas demand, not macro conditions, gives suppliers pricing power and growth.

14 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The gas and power order book has more than doubled over four years and is still growing; because grid and gas equipment makers are capacity constrained, they now have pricing power, can cherry-pick contracts, and have simplified product portfolios.

    “the order books exploded. It's more than doubled over the last four years.”

  • Gas generation is moving back to growth because grids need baseload and peaker capacity to back variable renewables, Germany is phasing out coal, and data centers could add demand for another 30 to 40 large gas power plants a year.

    “there's a belief that data centers could add demand for at least another 30 or 40 large gas power plants a year.”

  • Electrification of industry, electric vehicles, and data centers connected to the grid increase demand-side load, which stimulates demand for low- and medium-voltage components and requires more high-voltage resiliency in the core grid.

    “as you connect data centers or electric vehicles to the grid, as there's more electrification of industry, that creates a much bigger pull on the demand side”

  • Grid equipment suppliers, including Siemens Energy and high-voltage DC cable makers such as Prysmian, NKT and Nexans, are taking orders that will be delivered into the 2030s, making the industry effectively sold out until about the end of the decade.

    “those companies are now taking orders which will be called off into the 2030s. So it's almost like all these companies that supply power grids are becoming sold out”

  • Adding variable wind and solar to the grid creates a need for dispatchable resiliency, so countries must reinvest in gas capacity to cover periods when the wind is not blowing or the sun is not shining, reversing the earlier expectation that gas generation was in structural decline.

    “as you add more renewable energy to the grid as you put solar and wind on the grid, that creates more variable load and that creates a need for resiliency. So you have to reinvest in gas capacity”

  • European countries are integrating their power networks through cross-border cables, such as Scotland to Norway and Denmark to the UK, because they need to manage variable generation and reduce reliance on Russian gas after the Ukraine war exposed energy-independence risks.

    “The Ukraine war really highlighted a need for energy independence.”

  • National grid operators such as E.ON and National Grid have doubled, tripled, or quadrupled their capex plans, with similar trends in the US, which is the real driver behind the boom in grid orders.

    “companies like E.ON and National Grid have doubled, tripled, quadrupled their CapEx plans.”

  • Grid technologies order intake has at least doubled in two years to around EUR 20 billion a year, and its backlog grew from about EUR 10 billion in 2021 to well over EUR 30 billion, while revenue grew 17% comparable last year and is guided to over 30% this year.

    “the order intake has at least doubled. It's gone from taking less than EUR 10 billion a year of orders to around EUR 20 billion a year, and the backlog has more than tripled.”

  • Grid technologies could grow revenue around 20% a year through the end of the decade, with an 8% to 10% margin guidance, very high return on capital because of low capex intensity, and a growing need to decide on factory footprint expansion as capacity approaches practical limits.

    “It could grow around 20% top line to the end of the decade.”

  • The grid investment wave is a generational reindustrialization of energy networks, running into the 2030s, and it can be described as an industrial revolution even though European macro growth is weak.

    “This is really what I think is a sort of generational change. You could even describe it as an industrial revolution”

  • Suppliers now have pricing power they lacked before, can cherry-pick the best contracts, and have simplified product portfolios, which lets them place orders into their backlog more efficiently.

    “I think these companies have pricing power, which they didn't have before.”

  • European macro growth is anemic, but Europe still contains pockets of high growth and global market leaders like Siemens Energy, so the investment case rests on sector-specific megatrends rather than macro conditions.

    “There are pockets of very, very high growth in Europe and there are global market leaders like Siemens Energy.”

  • Siemens Energy management faces a major capital allocation decision about expanding factory footprint toward the end of the decade, because customers are pressing for more capacity and practical limits will bind in the next few years.

    “There will be a big decision here about factory footprint towards the end of a decade”

  • Some grid demand has been pulled forward by panic around energy security and high prices after the Ukraine war, though the war also exposed real grid resiliency problems.

    “although there certainly has been some pull forward of demand and the Ukraine war really brought the problems of grid resiliency into stark relief.”

0.63

Wind execution risk and unresolved product and service problems drive group value.

10 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Wind developers have historically been unable to hedge key inputs, since steel cannot be forward-hedged four or five years out and transport costs are almost impossible to hedge, so supply chain inflation and unforeseen delays flow straight into losses.

    “very hard to forward hedge steel four or five years out. Transport costs almost impossible to hedge”

  • Around 80 gigawatts of wind capacity in Europe is reportedly waiting for regulatory approval, adding to project delays.

    “I think I read the other day that there was 80 gigawatts of wind sitting, waiting for regulatory approval to move forward.”

  • The wind industry lost possibly tens of billions in the last two years, including losses at Vestas, GE's wind unit, and offshore developers like Ørsted, and oil majors such as BP and Shell lost money developing wind projects.

    “It's probably running into the tens of billions.”

  • The key test for the next wind cycle is whether Vestas and Siemens Energy maintain pricing and risk discipline, passing cost-escalation risk back to project owners and declining risky orders, a behavior the industry has never historically shown.

    “And I think that's the mentality the industry has to have, and it's really not had that mentality historically. So I think there's an acid test coming.”

  • Siemens Gamesa's reported profits were typically on an adjusted EBIT basis that did not reflect real cash profits, and the unit was often loss-making or free cash flow negative.

    “Anytime they reported profit, it was kind of on an adjusted EBIT level, so not real cash profits.”

  • Last autumn the market feared wind losses could sink the group, customers hesitated to order because of balance-sheet frailty, and the German government provided guarantees on the order book, which helped protect the investment-grade rating needed to win long-term grid orders.

    “they had to go to the German government for backstops, guarantees on their order book.”

  • If wind is profitable by the end of the decade, the group could see a swing of about EUR 2 billion in profit, against gas and power that already generates at least EUR 2 billion of net income, so the total market capitalization of about EUR 20 billion is sensitive to wind execution.

    “then you're talking about a two billion-plus swing in profit.”

  • Offshore wind orders typically come with about 10 percent prepayments, so a rapidly growing wind order book could create a virtuous circle of down payments that improves cash flow, though visibility remains low.

    “They'll get down payments on those orders, perhaps something like a 10% prepayment”

  • Siemens Energy has had operational product problems with its 3x and 4x onshore wind platforms, adding to the work needed in the wind business.

    “They had operational product problems with their 3x, 4x platforms in the onshore business.”

  • Siemens Energy's wind service business, about EUR 2.5 billion of revenue, has unclear profitability, and its service margins need restoring.

    “It's mainly an offshore business, and then there's a service business, which is about EUR 2.5 billion of revenue. We really don't know how profitable that is.”

0.54

Gas and industrial businesses should be valued apart from wind, hydrogen and over-engineered products.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Industrial steam turbines and compression equipment are small, profitable, market-leading businesses without structural growth, best viewed as cash cows within the group.

    “I think about them more as the sort of cash cow, small cash cow businesses within the broader group.”

  • Siemens Energy made large disposals last year, including its stake in Siemens India and a business called Trench, which provided substantial proceeds that helped create the net cash position.

    “They sold their stake in Siemens India. And because it's such a big, complex conglomerate, there were other businesses which investors were overlooking, which were sold, so something called Trench.”

  • Mark is skeptical of hydrogen because making, storing and transporting it requires so much energy that a scalable roadmap is hard to see without large subsidies, and he expects hydrogen production to concentrate in the Middle East where gas and sun are abundant.

    “I'm quite skeptical on hydrogen. There's been a lot of hype in the markets”

  • The market's common view is that gas and power is good, profitable and growing while wind is a disaster, and Siemens Energy's overall profitability depends on separating these two stories.

    “It's commonly accepted by the gas and power business is good, profitable, growing, and wind is a disaster.”

  • Best-in-class engineering companies often over-engineer by building bigger and bigger products, such as turbines and jet engines, which cannibalizes existing ranges and ultimately destroys industry returns.

    “Lots of similarities about best-in-class engineering companies over engineering, building bigger and a bigger engine or a bigger and a bigger turbine, and then essentially destroying industry returns.”

  • Listed hydrogen companies such as Nel in Norway and ITM Power in the UK have fallen on hard times as the hype around hydrogen has faded.

    “they've fallen on hard times in the last few years as the hype around hydrogen has worn off.”

0.45

Wind is structurally loss-making and boom-bust, with an uncertain path to profitability.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The wind business, Siemens Gamesa, is about EUR 10 billion of revenue and is massively loss-making, probably losing close to EUR 2 billion this year and possibly more on a cash basis, which keeps the whole group unprofitable despite a profitable gas and power segment.

    “It's probably going to lose close to EUR 2 billion this year and maybe more on a cash basis.”

  • Wind consolidated as capital and technology requirements rose; onshore is a three- or four-player market among Vestas, Siemens Energy, GE and perhaps Nordex, while offshore is effectively a duopoly in Europe between Vestas and Siemens.

    “Offshore, very consolidated. Siemens Energy and Vestas in Europe, and Vestas and GE in North America.”

  • Vestas publicly targets 10%-plus margins, while Siemens Energy talks about high mid-single-digit margins by the end of the decade, with GE Vernova only getting back to breakeven, so Siemens Energy could be a 5% margin business rather than a perpetually loss-making one.

    “Could Siemens Energy be a 5% margin business instead of a perennially loss-making margin business? Maybe.”

  • Siemens Energy targets wind breakeven in 2026 or 2027, which requires delivering loss-making onshore projects in the onerous backlog by 2025, doubling offshore revenue to fill the factory footprint at profit, and restoring service profitability.

    “To get back to breakeven in wind, which they target by 2026, '27, they need to deliver the onerous backlog.”

  • Over 25 years, even Vestas, the best operator in wind, has averaged adjusted EBIT margins around 4%, cycling through about three years of losses followed by three years of profit.

    “their average EBIT margins, adjusted EBIT margins have been around 4%, and it generally has gone through cycles of three years of losses followed by three years of profit.”

  • Wind has been boom-bust because it grew up on subsidies, so its businesses never built a culture of unsubsidized profitability, which produced weak project-pricing discipline, optimism in accounting for delivery, optimism on approvals, and optimism on construction timing.

    “it's an industry which grew up on subsidies. So these businesses didn't really have a culture of unsubsidized profitability.”

  • Before Siemens Energy took full ownership, Mark's firm had a short recommendation on Siemens Gamesa over bad accounting, governance, capital allocation, optimistic revenue recognition and poor service levels, and it was always a poor second to Vestas.

    “we had a short recommendation on, really around bad accounting, bad governance, bad capital allocation, optimistic revenue recognition”

  • Because wind suppliers lost so much money, they are underinvesting in capacity, and offshore vessels, cable-laying, gearboxes, and bearings are consolidated; this could make the next capital cycle more disciplined, but only if turbine makers refuse risky orders and pass risk to project owners.

    “there's going to be a lot of supply constraints because people are just not willing to invest in capacity”

0.40

Grid, gas and service exposure makes an enduring upcycle plausible despite broad outcomes.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The grid technology market has very few players, and customers such as governments and grid operators want large, reliable partners who can supply components and support them for 20 to 30 years, which makes Siemens Energy often the only realistic option in Europe.

    “Siemens Energy are often the only game in town, particularly in Europe, they're extremely dominant.”

  • Investors fear customers have pulled demand forward because of the Ukraine war and energy-security panic, but the grid has had little investment for decades, with some British grid parts unexamined since the 1980s, so a long super-cycle is still plausible.

    “The reality is these grids haven't had investment for decades. There is parts of the British electricity grid, which have not been looked at since the 1980s.”

  • Siemens Energy has been a volatile stock that has doubled and halved at least three times since its IPO, fell about 40% late last year on balance-sheet worries, and has nearly quadrupled since then.

    “It's probably doubled and halved at least three times since the IPO. It's down 40% late last year when people worried about the balance sheet, and it's almost quadrupled since then.”

  • The original logic of combining wind, gas and power, and grid under one roof was that a future grid would run on Siemens-supplied turbines, service, substations and transmission kit, but Siemens Energy has not yet delivered on that vision, making it the problem child of the Siemens Group.

    “Siemens Energy has really not delivered on that vision. And Siemens Energy, it's been the problem child for the Siemens Group.”

  • Siemens Energy is a large European industrial champion and global market leader in consolidated, growing markets with long service tails, so it has the makings of an enduring upcycle, but its outcomes span a very broad range.

    “A European industrial champion, a world market leader of scale with massive megatrends, growth megatrends behind it”

  • Siemens Energy is a fascinating investment with a very broad range of outcomes, since wind visibility is very low even though the upside from gas, grid and a turnaround is large.

    “So these are very, very big numbers, but the visibility on wind is very low.”

0.38

Siemens Energy is an underappreciated business, distinct from a weaker Siemens group.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Siemens Energy's sustainable energy systems unit, which is essentially a hydrogen business, is tiny and not relevant to the investment story, and management is taking a cautious approach, including a JV with Air Liquide in France.

    “They have a JV in France with Air Liquide, a large industrial gas player, but a very cautious approach. It's tiny, not particularly relevant to the story.”

  • After the spin-off, Siemens Energy launched a bid to buy out Siemens Gamesa's minority shareholders, delisted the company from the Madrid Stock Exchange, and now owns 100 percent of the wind business.

    “they launched a bid and bought out the minorities of Siemens Gamesa.”

  • Siemens Energy may be underappreciated by its audience, and it is comparable to GE Vernova as a globally relevant business touching the same grid industrialization megatrends.

    “it's your business which can be compared to GE, GE Vernova.”

  • Siemens Energy has been the problem child of the Siemens Group, while Siemens AG and Siemens Healthineers have a stronger record of consistent profitability and Healthineers is a steady, defensive business.

    “Siemens Energy, it's been the problem child for the Siemens Group.”

  • Before the spin-off, gas and power was loss-making in 2019 and 2020 due to cost base, manufacturing footprint, complexity, and low demand, and grid technologies took under EUR 10 billion of orders a year with low single-digit margins.

    “So gas and power, as I said, was actually loss-making in 2019 and 2020.”

0.24

The group's balance sheet looks stronger than it is, and its shareholder-value record is weak.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Siemens Energy was spun off in 2020 because the energy businesses needed separate focus on renewables and grid megatrends, and because the loss-making gas and power platforms needed capital allocation discipline, reduced complexity, and a shareholder-value focus that was new for the 150-year-old conglomerate.

    “the business needed separate focus given the megatrends which were on the horizon around renewables, grid”

  • Siemens Energy has roughly EUR 35 billion to 40 billion of group revenue and an order backlog above EUR 110 billion, split mainly between gas and power at about EUR 25 billion and wind at about EUR 10 billion.

    “you have around EUR 35 billion, EUR 40 billion of revenue today for the whole company. But behind that, there's an order backlog over EUR 110 billion.”

  • After the spin-off, Siemens AG kept a roughly 30% to 40% controlling minority stake in Siemens Energy and has since sold down some shares, with some moved into its pension fund, which then sold.

    “Siemens AG retained something around a 30% to 40% controlling minority shareholding”

  • Siemens Energy has a net cash balance sheet after large disposals, but much gross cash is customer prepayments, with about EUR 13 billion of net negative contract liabilities and about EUR 3 billion of net negative working capital, so the balance sheet is not as strong as it looks.

    “Siemens Energy has net negative contract liabilities of about 13 billion, a net negative working capital of about three billion.”

  • Siemens Energy has a good engineering reputation but a weaker record of long-term shareholder value creation, which mirrors many German engineering companies.

    “It's a business with a very good reputation for engineering, maybe less of a good reputation for long-term shareholder value creation”

0.22

Offshore wind volume is large but hard to plan and scale, given delays and turbine size limits.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The arms race to build ever larger turbines may end because offshore blades are near 115 meter radius, the supply chain cannot yet deliver bigger turbines, and blades must be built by the sea, so makers may stop R&D and spend a decade monetizing sunk investment.

    “So what this could mean is an end to the diameter wars.”

  • If 10 to 20 GW of European offshore auctions occur annually for five years at about EUR 1.5 million per MW, that is roughly EUR 30 billion of business, which a Vestas-Siemens duopoly could convert into about EUR 15 billion a year of orders, with 10% prepayments creating a virtuous cash circle.

    “20 gigawatts of offshore auctions could be EUR 30 billion of business. And if we say that the European market is a duopoly in offshore”

  • Gas peaker plants can be switched on in anticipation of demand spikes, such as the surge when the UK's Coronation Street ad break triggers simultaneous kettle use, because wind alone cannot cover those peaks.

    “you need a steam peaker or a gas peaker, which you can turn on in anticipation of a load.”

  • Offshore wind projects take two to three years from order to site and then two to three years of construction, while steel and transport costs are hard to hedge, and weather, opposition, cranes, vessels and permits add unforeseen delays, so planning is extremely difficult.

    “wind historically has not been a business where people have been able to hedge components, very hard to forward hedge steel four or five years out.”

0.20

Gas services are a capital-light, high-margin business built on long-duration service contracts.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • In gas services, new units make up only about 35% to 40% of revenue, while most profit comes from long-duration service contracts with very high attach rates, and service margins are probably above 20%, because Siemens engineers service Siemens turbines for decades.

    “although maybe 35%, 40% of revenue is from new units, the profitability is really coming from the service contracts.”

  • Gas and power capex is only about EUR 500 million to 600 million per year on about EUR 25 billion of revenue, so the capex-to-sales ratio is below 2%, making gas services an extremely attractive, capital-light business with double-digit margins.

    “the CapEx for the whole gas and power business is only around EUR 500 million or EUR 600 million a year, and that's a business which is EUR 25 billion of revenue.”

  • The large gas turbine market is highly consolidated among Siemens Energy, Mitsubishi, GE Vernova and Baker Hughes, with roughly 100 to 110 large gas turbines built each year, and Siemens Energy is one of the largest suppliers.

    “You've got Siemens Energy, Mitsubishi, GE Vernova and Baker Hughes playing that”